“EEZ = High Seas”: The Eleventh Circuit’s Unpublished Re-affirmation of Congress’s Plenary Power under the MDLEA

1. Introduction

United States v. Nilson Olaya Grueso, Nos. 22-11929, 22-11932, 22-11933 (11th Cir. July 24 2025) (per curiam, non-published), consolidates the appeals of three Colombian nationals convicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501 et seq. The defendants were seized 140 nautical miles off Ecuador’s coast—inside Ecuador’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)—while transporting 964 kg of cocaine on an unflagged “go-fast” vessel. They pleaded guilty to conspiracy, then moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that:

• Congress exceeded its “Felonies on the high Seas” power by criminalising conduct occurring inside a foreign State’s EEZ;
• § 70502(d)(1)(C)’s definition of a “vessel without nationality” (stateless vessel) conflicts with customary international law; and
• Lack of a U.S. nexus violates due-process limitations on extraterritorial jurisdiction.

The district court rejected these arguments, and the Eleventh Circuit—relying heavily on its recent, published decisions in United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)—affirmed. Although the opinion is “non-argument calendar” and designated “[DO NOT PUBLISH],” it is a textbook application of the court’s prior-precedent rule and further entrenches the MDLEA’s broad extraterritorial reach.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Jordan, Luck, and Kidd, JJ.) held:

1. Constitutionality of § 70502(d)(1)(C). Congress may treat as “stateless” any vessel whose asserted flag State neither confirms nor denies its registry. International law cannot limit Congress’s definitional choices under the Felonies Clause.
2. EEZ as “high seas.” Consistent with Alfonso, a foreign State’s EEZ forms part of the “high Seas” for purposes of Article I, § 8, cl. 10, and thus falls within congressional authority.
3. No nexus requirement. The MDLEA’s exercise of universal and protective jurisdiction comports with due process; no U.S. nexus is required to prosecute foreign nationals intercepted abroad.

The convictions were therefore affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Grueso is less a trail-blazer than a fortification of recent Eleventh Circuit precedent:

• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024)
  • Held that customary international law does not cabin Congress’s Felonies Clause power.
  • Declared that a coastal State’s EEZ is functionally part of the high seas for U.S. constitutional purposes.
  • Rejected an as-applied MDLEA challenge identical to that raised here.
• United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)
  • Extended Alfonso to uphold § 70502(d)(1)(C)’s “stateless-if-uncorroborated” rule.
  • Reiterated that due-process constraints do not require a U.S. nexus where universal or protective jurisdiction applies.
• Other authorities (quoted or referenced): United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014); Article I, § 8, cl. 10 of the Constitution.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Prior-precedent rule. Under Eleventh Circuit doctrine, a published panel decision binds later panels unless overruled by the Supreme Court or en banc. Because Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar are published and recent, the panel’s hands were effectively tied.
2. Felonies Clause interpretation. The court re-emphasised that the Founders used “high Seas” to distinguish navigable waters beyond a nation’s territorial sea (traditionally three nautical miles). The modern EEZ, despite limited coastal-State resource rights, remains outside territorial seas and thus falls within the “high Seas” ambit as originally understood.
3. Stateless-vessel definition. By classifying vessels whose claimed registry is not immediately confirmed as “without nationality,” Congress closed a notorious evidentiary loophole. The panel, echoing Canario-Vilomar, held that this domestic statute governs even if it departs from “strict-construction” notions of statelessness in customary international law.
4. Due process and nexus. Longstanding Eleventh Circuit precedent treats drug trafficking on the high seas as subject to “universal jurisdiction” (similar to piracy) and the “protective principle” (protecting national security from the flow of narcotics). Hence, a nexus to U.S. territory or citizens is unnecessary.

3.3 Impact on Future Cases

Although non-published and non-precedential, Grueso supplies several practical signals:

• Futility of EEZ-based challenges. Defense counsel in the Eleventh Circuit should assume an EEZ is squarely within MDLEA reach unless and until the Supreme Court says otherwise.
• Expansion of “stateless” doctrine. By endorsing § 70502(d)(1)(C) yet again, the court cements Coast Guard practice of treating unverified flag claims as stateless—lowering the evidentiary burden for boarding.
• Due-process arguments weakened. The panel reiterates that universal and protective jurisdiction satisfy Fifth-Amendment standards. Future due-process claims will likely require a novel constitutional angle to stand a chance.
• Strategic shift to sentencing or diplomatic channels. Given diminished prospects for jurisdictional dismissal, foreign defendants may concentrate on sentencing mitigation or diplomatic interventions under 46 U.S.C. § 70505.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• MDLEA. A federal statute giving the U.S. worldwide authority to prosecute maritime drug trafficking, even when no U.S. nexus exists.
• Felonies Clause. Article I, § 8, cl. 10 empowers Congress “to define and punish…Felonies committed on the high Seas.”
• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Waters extending up to 200 nm from a coastal State, where the State has resource rights but not full sovereignty.
• Stateless (“vessel without nationality”). A ship not registered under any State’s flag. Under § 70502(d)(1)(C), a vessel whose claimed flag cannot be verified is treated as stateless.
• Universal jurisdiction. The notion that some crimes (e.g., piracy, maritime drug trafficking) are so serious any nation may prosecute them, regardless of where they occur.
• Protective principle. A basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction allowing a State to punish conduct abroad that threatens its security or governmental functions.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Nilson Olaya Grueso does not break new doctrinal ground but reinforces a clear trajectory: within the Eleventh Circuit, the MDLEA’s reach is vast, EEZ interdictions are constitutionally sound, and vessels whose registry cannot be verified are fair game. By doubling down on Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar, the court leaves little room for future litigants to argue that international norms or due-process constraints insulate them from U.S. prosecution. Unless the Supreme Court intervenes, the Eleventh Circuit’s stance—EEZ = High Seas for MDLEA purposes—is here to stay.