“Disarming the Dangerous” after Bruen and Rahimi: The Fourth Circuit’s Endorsement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)
United States v. James Gould (4th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

United States v. James Gould is the Fourth Circuit’s first fully published response to the Supreme Court’s post-Bruen historical-analogical methodology (N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 2022) as refined by United States v. Rahimi (2024) with respect to persons deemed dangerous. James Gould, previously involuntarily committed four times, was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) for firearm possession. After pleading guilty, he mounted a facial Second Amendment challenge, arguing that no founding-era analogue existed for a lifetime disarmament of formerly committed persons. The Court (Diaz, C.J., joined by Heytens & Benjamin, JJ.) affirmed the conviction and declared § 922(g)(4) facially constitutional, crafting a detailed historical analysis that now functions as controlling precedent inside the Fourth Circuit and persuasive authority nationwide.

Key Issues

• Whether § 922(g)(4)’s lifetime firearm ban for anyone ever involuntarily committed violates the Second Amendment under the Bruen/Rahimi framework.
• What historical evidence or analogues suffice to justify modern disarmament of those judicially found dangerous due to mental illness.
• The contours of facial versus as-applied Second Amendment challenges after Bruen.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Applying de novo review yet mindful of the “high hurdle” for facial invalidation (Salerno standard), the Court held:

1. Gould’s conduct—keeping a shotgun at home—is prima facie covered by the Second Amendment; thus Step One of Bruen is satisfied.
2. At Step Two, the Government demonstrated that § 922(g)(4) is “relevantly similar” to a historical tradition of (a) incapacitating the violently mentally ill and (b) categorical disarmament of groups regarded as dangerous.
3. Modern statutory safeguards—judicial finding of dangerousness at commitment, post-release relief procedures in 33 states (including West Virginia), and availability of de novo review—render the statute, at minimum, constitutionally valid in substantial applications.
4. Because Gould launched a facial attack, the presence of any constitutional set of circumstances defeats his claim; accordingly, conviction affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) — Recognized individual right but labelled bans on felons and “the mentally ill” as “presumptively lawful.” The Fourth Circuit treats this dictum as weighty but not dispositive, choosing instead to conduct the full Bruen inquiry.
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022) — Abandoned means-end scrutiny, substituting a text-and-history test. Gould is an exemplar of the lower courts’ duty to act as “amateur historians.”
• United States v. Rahimi (2024) — Upheld § 922(g)(8) (domestic-violence protective orders) and clarified that exact historical replicas are unnecessary; emphasis on principles (dangerousness) and procedural safeguards. Gould imports the three Rahimi factors—judicial finding, temporal limitation, severity comparison—to justify § 922(g)(4).
• United States v. Hunt (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc) — Sustained felon-in-possession § 922(g)(1) by referencing historical disarmament of dangerous classes. Gould extends Hunt’s “disarming the dangerous” theory to mental-health commitments.
• United States v. Price (4th Cir. 2024) & Bianchi v. Brown (2024) — Provide methodological guidance (when to decide at Step One, heavy burden of facial challenges).

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step One: Coverage

Possession of a common weapon at home falls squarely within the Second Amendment. No textual limitation exists for “once-committed” persons, so the analysis advances to history.

Step Two: History & Tradition

1. Historical Treatment of the Mentally Ill
   – Colonial and early-Republic communities regularly incapacitated (“locked up,” “chained,” jailed) individuals whose lunacy made them dangerous.
   – Statutes empowered justices of the peace to confine “distracted” or “furiously mad” persons threatening public safety.
   – Although these laws did not mention firearms (many affected people owned none), the principle was removal of means to harm, including liberty itself.
2. Disarmament of Dangerous Classes
   – Pre-ratification England (1689) and American colonies disarmed Catholics, dissenting Puritans, Native peoples, free Blacks, and enslaved persons due to perceived threats.
   – Relief mechanisms (loyalty oaths, sureties) demonstrate contemporaneous acceptance of temporary or conditional bans keyed to risk.
3. Analogy and Relevance
   – § 922(g)(4) resembles founding-era incapacitation: disarmament follows a judicial finding of dangerousness (involuntary commitment) and persists only until the person proves restored safety.
   – Modern penalty (disarmament) is less severe than historical jailing; if the harsher practice was allowed, the lesser restriction is permissible (Rahimi logic).

Procedural Safeguards in the Modern Statute

• Commitment in West Virginia requires clear and convincing evidence, counsel, and adversarial hearing.
• Post-commitment petition process (34 U.S.C. § 40915; W. Va. Code § 61-7A-5) provides restoration upon proof of recovery.
• De novo judicial review ensures independent constitutional oversight.

Facial-Challenge Doctrine

Because some (indeed, many) applications are valid—e.g., recently released individuals still under outpatient constraints—the Court need not determine whether every conceivable application is valid. Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” test defeats Gould’s bid.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

• Within the Fourth Circuit: Binds district courts in MD, VA, WV, NC, SC to reject facial Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(4); shapes as-applied litigation by emphasizing individualized proof of continuing danger.
• National Persuasive Value: Complements Ninth Circuit’s Mai v. United States (2020) and Eighth Circuit’s Jackson (2024), offering a post-Rahimi, historically-anchored template other circuits can adopt.
• Legislative Cue: Validates Congress’s 2008 state-relief scheme (NIAA) and may encourage the remaining 17 states to adopt procedures unlocking federal gun rights upon recovery.
• Doctrinal Development: Confirms that “disarming the dangerous” constitutes a distinct historically supported limitation; may influence future debates about red-flag laws and substance-abuse disqualifications.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge – A facial attack claims the law is never constitutional; an as-applied attack challenges the law only as it affects a particular person’s circumstances.
• Involuntary Commitment – A civil proceeding where a judge authorizes hospitalizing a person—without their consent—because mental illness renders them dangerous or unable to care for themselves.
• “Historical Analogue” (under Bruen) – A past law that is not identical but similar in why and how it burdened arms possession; courts compare rationales and degree of burden.
• Surety Laws – 19th-century statutes requiring individuals who threatened violence to post money guaranteeing peace; failure led to jail—used in Rahimi as an analogue for restraining-order disarmament.
• Going-Armed Laws – Early regulations criminalizing carrying weapons “to the terror of the people,” demonstrating governmental power to restrict dangerous public carrying.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Gould solidifies the “disarming the dangerous” doctrine within Fourth Circuit jurisprudence and illustrates the practical application of the Supreme Court’s evolving Second Amendment methodology. By weaving colonial incarceration practices and categorical disarmament statutes into the modern fabric of § 922(g)(4), the Court signals that historical inquiry is flexible enough to accommodate contemporary public-safety concerns while still honoring the constitutional text. The decision underscores three critical lessons: (1) historical evidence need not be a perfect match but must reflect analogous principles; (2) robust procedural safeguards transform categorical bans into constitutionally acceptable measures; and (3) facial challenges remain an uphill battle where any plausible constitutional application exists. Moving forward, litigants attacking firearm disabilities must craft narrowly tailored, fact-intensive as-applied challenges rather than sweeping facial assaults, and legislatures designing firearms regulations would be wise to embed explicit findings of dangerousness and post-deprivation relief—features that saved § 922(g)(4) here.