“Directory, Not Disqualifying” – Arizona Supreme Court Holds that Failure to File A.R.S. § 14-5109 Notice Does Not Automatically Bar Professional Fees

1. Introduction

In In the Matter of the Conservatorship of William John Chalmers (Supreme Court of Arizona, July 11, 2025), the state’s highest court was asked to decide whether professionals appointed in a guardianship or conservatorship for an adult ward forfeit their right to reasonable compensation if they fail to file the written “basis of compensation” statement required by A.R.S. § 14-5109(A). The controversy arose during a highly litigated marital dissolution involving William John Chalmers, whose capacity was questioned, resulting in the appointment of several professionals—guardian ad litem, fiduciary company, and attorneys. When these professionals later sought fees, the trial court, on remand, ruled that their non-compliance with § 14-5109(A) compelled forfeiture of fees already awarded, effectively reducing total compensation by roughly 25 percent. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision, prompting Supreme Court review.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Holding: Failure to file the compensation-basis statement mandated by § 14-5109(A) is directory, not jurisdictional; it does not automatically waive or forfeit an otherwise valid claim for compensation under § 14-5110. Trial judges retain discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy, which may include fee reduction, but not mandatory disgorgement.
The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s order requiring disgorgement of previously approved fees, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the initial fee awards. It affirmed the trial court’s discretionary denial of later-requested fees as unreasonable or unnecessary.
No prejudicial “horizontal appeal” justification existed for revisiting the first judge’s fee awards.

3. Analytical Commentary

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

SolarCity Corp. v. Arizona Department of Revenue, 243 Ariz. 477 (2018) – reiterated that statutes must be read in context; the Court distinguished SolarCity to clarify that contextual reading applies even when language is “plain.”
State v. Serrato, 568 P.3d 756 (Ariz. 2025) and In re Riggins, 257 Ariz. 28 (2024) – reiterated the anti-superfluity canon: no statutory word should be rendered meaningless.
Workers for Responsible Development v. City of Tempe, 254 Ariz. 505 (2023) – difference in statutory wording indicates different legislative intent.
Department of Revenue v. Southern Union Gas Co., 119 Ariz. 512 (1978) – classic Arizona authority distinguishing “mandatory” from “directory” statutes.
Powell-Cerkoney v. TCR-Montana Ranch JV, 176 Ariz. 275 (1993) and Sibley v. Jeffreys, 81 Ariz. 272 (1956) – guiding standards for impermissible horizontal appeals.
Secondary interpretive canons from Scalia & Garner, Reading Law heavily informed the Court’s textual analysis.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Contextual, In pari materia Reading: Sections 14-5109 and 14-5110 belong to the same 2011 legislative package governing compensation for court-appointed professionals. The former prescribes a notice step; the latter imposes a four-month filing deadline and expressly states waiver as a consequence for missing that deadline. Because the Legislature included a penalty in § 14-5110 but not in § 14-5109, courts must presume the omission deliberate (“expressio unius”).
Directory vs. Mandatory Character: The Court revived the older Arizona dichotomy: a mandatory statute’s breach voids proceedings; a directory statute’s breach permits discretionary, prejudice-based relief. Section 14-5109’s silence on penalty, contrasted with the explicit penalty in § 14-5110, indicates directory intent.
Judicial Discretion & Reasonableness Test: Section 14-5109(C) already provides a reasonableness framework (six factors, including a catch-all). Trial judges can reduce or deny fees that appear excessive or prejudicial, ensuring the ward’s protection without imposing automatic forfeiture.
Horizontal-Appeal Doctrine: Because the first judge’s fee orders were not legally erroneous under the Court’s new reading, the successor judge exceeded authority by vacating them.

3.3 Anticipated Impact on Arizona Probate and Fee-Recovery Practice

Predictability for Professionals: Guardians ad litem, conservators, and their counsel can seek compensation even if the § 14-5109 notice was late or omitted, alleviating the fear of uncompensated work. Nevertheless, they ignore the statute at their peril because courts may still discount fees.
Enhanced Focus on Prejudice: Objecting parties (wards, families) must now demonstrate specific prejudice, not merely point to a technical defect, to achieve disgorgement or denial of fees.
Judicial Workload: Superior Court judges must exercise nuanced discretion; rote application of a forfeiture rule is no longer available. Expect more evidentiary hearings on reasonableness and prejudice.
Legislative Signal: The opinion invites the Legislature—if dissatisfied—to amend § 14-5109 to specify consequences. Until then, the judiciary’s interpretation stands as controlling precedent.
Spill-Over Effect: The directory/mandatory analysis may influence interpretations of other Arizona statutes with omitted penalties, reaffirming a “text-first” approach.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Guardianship vs. Conservatorship: A guardian makes personal/medical decisions; a conservator manages financial affairs. Often the same fiduciary serves both roles.
Guardian ad litem (GAL): A lawyer or qualified individual appointed to act in a party’s best interests during litigation.
Directory Statute: A law that says something “must” be done but does not prescribe a specific penalty for non-compliance. Courts have flexibility to decide consequences based on prejudice.
Mandatory Statute: A law whose violation automatically triggers a specific legal consequence (e.g., waiver, dismissal, void action).
In pari materia: Latin for “on the same subject.” Courts construe related statutes together to harmonize meaning.
Horizontal Appeal: Attempt to persuade one trial-level judge to overturn another’s earlier ruling in the same case. Generally impermissible absent manifest error or changed circumstances.

5. Conclusion

The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Chalmers clarifies that statutory notice requirements without express penalties are directory, not automatic fee killers. By firmly rooting its analysis in textual canons and the structure of Title 14’s fee provisions, the Court balanced two competing values: protecting wards from surprise professional charges and ensuring that qualified fiduciaries are fairly compensated for necessary services. Going forward, professionals must still endeavor to file § 14-5109 statements promptly, but disputes will hinge on demonstrable prejudice and reasonableness rather than on a bright-line forfeiture rule. The opinion thus injects both flexibility and rigor into Arizona probate practice while reinforcing a broader doctrinal message: courts will not write into statutes consequences the Legislature conspicuously withheld.