“Direct-Government-Notice” Rule for Pleading Manufacturer Knowledge
Commentary on Jodi Tapply v. Whirlpool Corp., Sixth Circuit, No. 23-1666 (Aug. 6 2025)

1. Introduction

In Jodi Tapply v. Whirlpool Corp. the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined when and how a plaintiff may plausibly plead that a manufacturer knew about a hidden safety defect in its consumer product. Five consumers from Michigan, Illinois, Oklahoma, New Hampshire and Nevada alleged that gas ranges manufactured by Whirlpool were prone to “unintended actuation”—the burners could turn on if the front-mounted knobs were merely brushed.

The district court had dismissed most of the suit, finding the pleadings deficient, although it accepted Article III standing. On appeal, Whirlpool challenged standing, while the plaintiffs attacked the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. The Sixth Circuit (Judge Cole, joined by Judge Moore) affirmed standing, revived nearly all fraud-by-omission and consumer-protection claims, and—crucially—announced that where a federal safety agency actually transmits consumer incident reports to the manufacturer, that transmission is enough to plausibly plead the manufacturer’s knowledge of the defect at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Judge Larsen dissented.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Standing. Each named plaintiff experienced the defect, lost the benefit of her bargain, and therefore suffered a concrete economic injury under Speerly v. GM.
• Pleading Standard for Knowledge. Knowledge may be alleged “generally” under Rule 9(b); no heightened particularity is required, and Smith v. GM does not impose one.
• New “Direct-Government-Notice” Rule. When a safety agency (here, CPSC) delivers incident reports to a firm pursuant to statute, the court may infer the firm’s actual knowledge of the defect and its safety risk. Eight sample CPSC reports sufficed.
• Duty to Disclose. Applying five states’ laws, the court held Whirlpool had a duty to disclose in Michigan, Oklahoma, New Hampshire and Nevada, but not under Illinois common law.
• Consumer-Protection Statutes. Statutory claims reinstated in all five states, except Illinois common-law fraud.
• Disposition. District court affirmed in part, reversed in part; case remanded for further proceedings.

3. Analysis

a. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Speerly v. General Motors, 143 F.4th 306 (6th Cir. 2025) (en banc): confirmed that manifested defects confer concrete economic injury; guided standing analysis.
• Smith v. General Motors, 988 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. 2021): previously rejected constructive knowledge based on scattered online complaints; majority distinguished Smith by stressing direct agency transmission.
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal & Bell Atl. v. Twombly: set plausibility framework used throughout.
• Federal rules: Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 & 9(b) (particularity v. general intent/knowledge allegations).
• State-law precedents: e.g., M&D, Inc. v. McConkey (MI), Connick v. Suzuki (IL), Sutton v. David Stanley Chevrolet (OK), Ingaharro v. Blanchette (NH). These informed the “duty to disclose” inquiry.

b. Legal Reasoning

1. Standing. Following Speerly, the court held that payment for a defective, safety-compromised product is itself a concrete monetary harm, even before personal injury occurs.
2. Pleading Manufacturer Knowledge.
   • Rule 9(b) expressly allows knowledge to be pled generally. The majority clarified that Smith’s fact-intensive approach stemmed from unique circumstances and does not raise the bar for knowledge in every fraud-omission case.
   • The CPSC, by statute (15 U.S.C. §2055a), must forward incident reports to manufacturers. Plaintiffs cited the specific dates, model information, and gas-leak descriptions that CPSC sent to Whirlpool. Thus actual, not constructive, notice was plausibly alleged.
   • The defect’s safety risk is inherent—burners ignite, gas leaks, risk of fire or death (as Whirlpool’s own manual warns). This satisfied any requirement that the defendant knew not merely of a defect, but of a safety-related defect.
3. Duty to Disclose under State Law.
   • Michigan: Duty arises on “superior knowledge”; plaintiffs plausibly alleged Whirlpool possessed unique knowledge (CPSC transmissions) not accessible to average consumers.
   • Illinois: Common-law fraudulent concealment still requires a special relationship or active concealment; plaintiffs fell short, so that claim remains dismissed, though statutory ICFA claim survives.
   • Oklahoma & New Hampshire: Superior knowledge + safety risk create duty; complaint sufficient.
   • Nevada: Whirlpool never contested duty below; claim reinstated.
4. Statutory Consumer-Protection Claims. Each statute’s scienter requirement was met once the court accepted plausible knowledge; Illinois ICFA does not require an independent duty to disclose.

c. Potential Impact

• Pleading Stage Leverage. Plaintiffs in consumer-product cases may now satisfy the knowledge element by alleging even a handful of complaints that flowed through an official agency conduit. This lowers the pre-discovery barrier created by Smith.
• Compliance & Recall Strategy. Manufacturers must treat every CPSC (or NHTSA, FDA, FAA) incident report as potential litigation notice; internal tracking protocols will be scrutinised in discovery.
• Forum Shopping. Because the Sixth Circuit covers Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee, plaintiffs nationwide may file multi-state class actions there to exploit the new rule.
• Duty-to-Disclose Variability. The court’s state-by-state analysis highlights the continuing divergence in common-law fraud standards—expect renewed efforts to harmonise duties legislatively.
• Appellate Splits. The decision intensifies tension with circuits that require extensive “public buzz” (e.g., Ninth Circuit’s Wilson v. HP) and may invite Supreme Court review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article III Standing. Think of standing as a three-legged stool: real injury, linked to defendant, fixable by court. Here, overpaying for a defective stove is the “real injury.”
• Pleading “Knowledge.” Under Rule 9(b), you must detail the “who/what/when/where” of the fraud, but you can state the defendant’s state of mind generally—as long as facts make that claim plausible.
• CPSC Incident Reports. When a consumer files a safety complaint with CPSC, the agency must forward it to the product’s maker. The majority treated that forward-action as equivalent to the maker reading the complaint.
• Benefit-of-the-Bargain Damages. Plaintiffs do not need burned hands or a house fire; paying full price for a product that contains a hidden safety flaw deprives them of the “full value” promised.

5. Conclusion

Tapply v. Whirlpool lays down a notable marker in product-liability and consumer-fraud litigation. By holding that direct government transmission of safety complaints suffices to plead a manufacturer’s knowledge, the Sixth Circuit eases the path for plaintiffs past the 12(b)(6) gate while reaffirming that Rule 9(b) does not heighten the knowledge requirement. Combined with its reaffirmation of “benefit-of-the-bargain” standing, the opinion will likely embolden future class actions over latent safety defects. Manufacturers, in turn, must treat every agency-forwarded report as actual notice—documenting receipt, investigation, and remedial action from day one.

Unless the Supreme Court resolves the emerging inter-circuit tension, Tapply will shape pleadings, discovery fights, and compliance programs for years within the Sixth Circuit and beyond.