“Direct-Appeal Rule” for Alaska Adoptions: Only a Direct Appeal of the Decree Tolls AS 25.23.140(b)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in In re Adoption of C.R. & E.R., Op. No. 7778 (July 25 2025). The Court confronted a knotty procedural conflict created by parallel Child-in-Need-of-Aid (CINA) litigation and adoption proceedings. Twice the parents’ rights were terminated and twice those terminations were reversed on appeal. Yet, during the first appeal, the children were adopted by their foster parents. The central question on this third trip to the Supreme Court was whether the parents could now—more than a year after the adoption decrees—use Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) to vacate the adoption and re-open the CINA case. The answer was no.

The Court holds that the one-year limitation in AS 25.23.140(b) for challenging an adoption decree can be tolled only by a direct appeal of the adoption decree itself. An appeal of a related termination order in a CINA case—even one filed before the adoption is finalized—does not preserve the right to attack the adoption later. The ruling cements what this commentary calls the “Direct-Appeal Rule” and dramatically underscores the statutory demand for finality in adoption judgments.

Summary of the Judgment

After parental rights were first terminated in March 2019, foster parents B.R. and M.R. petitioned for adoption and obtained decrees on 14 November 2019. The parents timely appealed the termination orders but did not appeal the adoption decrees. The Supreme Court later reversed the terminations, remanded for further reunification efforts, and again reversed a second set of termination orders. On second remand the parents moved under Civil Rule 60(b) to vacate the adoptions, arguing that their earlier termination appeal implicitly tolled the one-year bar in AS 25.23.140(b). The superior court rejected the motion as untimely; the Supreme Court affirmed, holding:

AS 25.23.140(b) bars any challenge more than one year after entry of an adoption decree unless “subject to the disposition of an appeal.”
“An appeal” in §140(b) means a direct appeal “under this chapter” (i.e., Title 25, chapter 23—Adoption). Collateral appeals in CINA cases do not qualify.
Because the parents never appealed the adoption decrees within one year, the adoptions are final; with the children no longer “in need of aid,” the CINA case is moot.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1989) – First articulated the Legislature’s policy that adoption decrees must eventually become unassailable to avoid destabilising children’s placements.
Hernandez v. Lambert, 951 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1998) – Emphasised the “rapid development of lasting and powerful psychological ties” after adoption and the need for finality.
Edna L. v. DHSS, OCS, 477 P.3d 637 (Alaska 2020) – Reversed the first termination for use of accelerated FIT timelines.
John L. v. DHSS, OCS, Nos. S-18254/18256 (Sept 13 2022) – Reversed the second termination for failure to conduct new reunification efforts.
Blaufuss v. Ball, 305 P.3d 281 (Alaska 2013) & Szabo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 320 P.3d 809 (Alaska 2014) – Set the standards of review for Rule 60(b) motions.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Textual analysis. Section 140(b) says a decree may not be questioned after one year “subject to the disposition of an appeal.” Looking to subsection (a), which authorises appeals of orders “under this chapter,” the Court reasoned that “an appeal” refers to an appeal from an adoption decree, not to litigation under separate Titles (e.g., Title 47 CINA proceedings). The phrase “any person, in any manner, upon any ground” confirmed the Legislature’s intent for a broad, nearly impermeable bar.

Legislative purpose. Relying on T.N.F. and Hernandez, the Court re-affirmed that finality promotes permanency and psychological well-being for children. A rule that every collateral appeal in a CINA case tolled the statute would eviscerate finality; the Legislature could not have intended such an outcome.

Harmonising statutory schemes. Although CINA and adoption proceedings can be sequentially related (termination → adoption), they are governed by distinct titles, purposes, and parties. Importing appeals from Title 47 into Title 25 would ignore this structural division.

Availability of protective measures. The parents could have—yet did not—move to stay the termination orders or appeal the adoption decrees directly. Rule 21(b) (CINA) and Adoption Rule 15(b) expressly allow stays pending appeal, signalling that the Legislature contemplated direct protective steps rather than collateral tolling.

Mootness doctrine. Once the adoption stands, the children are no longer “in need of aid,” so the CINA case is moot. Reunification orders cannot issue where no parent-child legal relationship exists.

3. Impact of the Decision

Clarifies Statute of Repose Character: Though the Court stopped short of labelling §140(b) a statute of repose, its reading gives the provision repose-like finality. After one year and absent a direct appeal, subject-matter jurisdiction, notice defects, misrepresentation, or even later reversal of the underlying termination cannot disturb the adoption.
Litigation Strategy in CINA Matters: Parents’ counsel must now treat the initiation of an adoption closely. Counsel must (1) request a stay of any termination orders and (2) file a timely notice of appeal of any adoption decree. Failure to do both likely forfeits judicial review.
OCS and GAL Practices: The ruling reassures foster/adoptive families and agencies that a valid decree becomes iron-clad after one year, expediting permanency goals.
Trial-Court Management: Superior Court judges presiding over CINA matters must be vigilant about overlapping dockets but are not obliged to suspend adoption proceedings merely because a termination appeal is pending unless a formal stay is obtained.
Potential Legislative Response: Advocates may seek statutory amendment to extend or adjust the one-year period in cases where terminations are later reversed, but for now the text is unequivocal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CINA (Child-in-Need-of-Aid) case: Protective action under Title 47 where the State alleges a child is unsafe with parents; may culminate in termination of parental rights (TPR).
TPR (Termination of Parental Rights): Judicial severance of the legal parent-child relationship, freeing the child for adoption.
Adoption Decree: Court order under Title 25 creating a new, permanent legal parent-child relationship with adoptive parents.
AS 25.23.140(b): The “finality clause” of Alaska adoption law: after one year, no one may challenge an adoption for any reason unless a direct appeal is already pending.
Tolling vs. Statute of Repose: “Tolling” suspends a deadline; a “statute of repose” creates an absolute bar unaffected by equitable considerations. The Court read §140(b) functionally like a statute of repose, but left the label open.
Alaska Civil Rule 60(b): Allows relief from a final judgment for reasons such as mistake, fraud, or voidness—but only if not inconsistent with statutory bars like §140(b).
Mootness: Courts decide only live controversies. When an adoption is final and unchallenged, the child is no longer in State custody; any CINA issues evaporate.

Conclusion

The Alaska Supreme Court’s decision crystallises the Legislature’s intent that adoption decrees achieve rapid, irrevocable finality. By declaring that only a direct appeal of an adoption decree can toll AS 25.23.140(b), the Court provides clear procedural guidance and prevents perpetual uncertainty for adoptive families. Practitioners now have an unequivocal roadmap: secure a stay or appeal the decree directly within one year—or the door closes forever. The ruling promotes stability for children, predictability for adoptive parents, and efficiency for the courts, while simultaneously reminding litigants of the strict separation between CINA and adoption frameworks in Alaska law.