Denny v. State: Limits on Chain-of-Custody Objections and Counsel Performance Under Strickland

Introduction

In Denny v. State, decided May 6, 2025, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed whether defense counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to evidence seized from the defendant’s vehicle and home, and by not offering a gunshot residue report. The case arises from the fatal shooting of Kevin Rowe by his half-brother, Ashton Denny, Jr., in Conyers, Georgia. Denny was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession. At trial, he was convicted on all counts; malice murder carried a life sentence without parole. On appeal, Denny challenged both the admissibility of key physical evidence and his trial counsel’s performance under the two-pronged Strickland v. Washington standard.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s denial of Denny’s motion for a new trial. The Court held:

• Counsel was not deficient for failing to object to the introduction of the 9 mm pistol and related items from Denny’s Jeep, because the defendant offered only speculative assertions of planting and no evidence of tampering;
• Chain-of-custody requirements begin when evidence is seized, not during the period before police take physical control; thus no basis existed to exclude the front door of the house, even though it was collected a week after the crime;
• Counsel’s strategic choice not to offer a gunshot residue report—showing only a missing control sample but no exculpatory results—did not prejudice Denny in light of overwhelming proof of guilt.

Applying Strickland v. Washington, the Court concluded that Denny failed to show deficient performance or a reasonable probability of a different outcome, and therefore did not meet the prejudice prong.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – the controlling standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring proof of both deficient performance and prejudice;
• Bacon v. State, 316 Ga. 234 (2023) – defining “objectively unreasonable” counsel performance;
• Bates v. State, 313 Ga. 57 (2022) – clarifying the “reasonable probability” prejudice test;
• Rhodes v. State, 319 Ga. App. 684 (2013) – general chain-of-custody principles for fungible evidence;
• Lewis v. State, 306 Ga. 455 (2019), Armstrong v. State, 274 Ga. 771 (2002), McDowell v. State, 309 Ga. 504 (2020) – collectively holding that unsupported speculation about mishandling goes to weight, not admissibility;
• Other Georgia decisions on counsel strategy and fruitless objections: Hill v. State, White v. State, McCoy v. State, Baker v. State.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning progressed in three parts:

1. Evidence from the Jeep: Denny speculated that, because officers moved his Jeep from the street into the yard before obtaining a warrant, someone could have planted the pistol or ammunition. But law enforcement testimony established standard procedure for moving obstructing vehicles, timely deployment of crime-scene tape, and the registered ownership of the weapon. In absence of any evidence of tampering, the Court held that conjecture affects only the jury’s assessment of weight, not admissibility. A counse­l’s failure to raise such a fruitless objection is not deficient.
2. The front door: Seizure occurred a week after the murder to secure permission and funding for replacement. Again, no evidence suggested manipulation during that interval; investigators confirmed the bullet hole matched its original condition. Chain-of-custody rules do not apply before formal seizure. Moreover, trial counsel deliberately used the door to highlight angle inconsistencies and undermine the State’s theory—an objectively reasonable strategy.
3. Gunshot residue report: The defense report noted only that the control strip was missing and no test occurred. Introducing it would at best foster general doubt about investigative competence, but could not exculpate Denny. Against clear proof—family eyewitnesses, trajectory analysis, flight from the scene, and purchase records—the Court found no reasonable probability of a different verdict.

Impact

Denny v. State reinforces several important points for Georgia criminal practice:

• Defense attorneys need not lodge objections doomed to fail; Strickland does not demand exhaustive, meritless motions;
• Chain-of-custody concerns begin at seizure; courts will not suppress evidence absent proof of tampering or substitution post-seizure;
• Speculative allegations about crime scene handling go to the jury’s credibility determinations, not admissibility;
• Non-exculpatory forensic reports (e.g., incomplete gunshot residue tests) carry marginal impeachment value and rarely establish reasonable probability of a different outcome when guilt is strongly supported.

Future litigants will cite Denny to distinguish cases with credible chain-of-custody gaps or real procedural errors, as opposed to mere tactical objections. Trial counsel’s strategic decisions—particularly in evidentiary contexts—are given deference unless shown unreasonable and prejudicial under Strickland.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Chain of Custody: A record showing who handled evidence and when, ensuring it’s the same item seized. It need not cover periods before police take physical control.
• Fungible Evidence: Items interchangeable with others (e.g., bullets, powders). Courts require a reliable link from seizure to trial but will not demand proof before actual custody.
• Strickland’s Two Prongs:
  • Deficiency: Was counsel’s performance outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance?
  • Prejudice: Would a reasonable probability exist that, but for the error, the outcome would differ?
• Fruitless Objections: Raising an objection certain to fail does not constitute deficient performance.

Conclusion

Denny v. State clarifies that mere speculation about evidence planting cannot bar admission; chain-of-custody considerations begin at seizure; and defense counsel is not ineffective for forgoing baseless objections or marginally useful exhibits. The decision underscores deference to strategic choices and cements Georgia law’s approach to evaluating both evidence admissibility and counsel performance. Practitioners should use Denny to distinguish genuine evidentiary mishandling from unfounded conjecture and to reinforce prudent strategic decision-making under Strickland.