“Contents” Means “Any Property”: Sixth Circuit Holds Michigan’s Pre‑2013 Arson of a Dwelling or Its Contents Is Generic Arson and a “Crime of Violence” Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2

Case: United States v. Laquintas Kenyetta Rushing, No. 25-1254 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025) (not recommended for publication)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Panel: Judges White, Stranch, and Murphy (opinion by Judge Helene N. White)

Introduction

In this appeal from the Eastern District of Michigan, the Sixth Circuit addressed a focused but consequential question in federal sentencing: whether a prior Michigan conviction under the pre‑2013 arson statute for burning a dwelling “or the contents thereof” qualifies as the enumerated offense of “arson” and thus a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). The defendant, Laquintas Rushing, challenged a two-level base offense enhancement applied to his felon‑in‑possession sentence, arguing that Michigan’s statute was overbroad because “contents” purportedly swept beyond the generic crime’s scope, which the Sixth Circuit has defined as the intentional or malicious burning of “any property.”

The case required the court to apply the categorical approach, compare the elements of Michigan’s statute to the generic offense, and resolve a specific interpretive dispute over the word “contents.” The court affirmed, holding that Michigan’s statute fits within its generic analog, and therefore Rushing’s arson conviction is a crime of violence under the Guidelines.

Summary of the Opinion

Issue: Whether Michigan’s pre‑2013 arson statute, M.C.L. § 750.72, which criminalized willfully or maliciously burning a dwelling house “or the contents thereof,” is coextensive with—or narrower than—the generic offense of arson and thus qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
Holding: Yes. The statute aligns with the generic offense because “contents” in context refers to property (personal or otherwise) burned within the dwelling or a building in its curtilage; and generic arson covers the intentional or malicious burning of “any property.”
Reasoning: Reading § 750.72 alongside adjacent provisions (§§ 750.73 and 750.74) shows “contents” functions as the statute’s way of covering personal property inside buildings. Thus, Michigan’s statute does not criminalize more conduct than generic arson. The court rejected Rushing’s argument that “contents” includes non‑property (e.g., trash not “owned”), noting he conflated Fourth Amendment privacy concepts with property status.
Outcome: Sentence affirmed. The district court properly applied the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) based on two prior crimes of violence: armed robbery (elements clause) and arson (enumerated offense).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013).
These cornerstone cases require courts to use the categorical approach when assessing whether a prior conviction fits a generic enumerated offense. The court looks to statutory elements, not underlying facts, and compares them to the “generic” version of the offense as used in federal law.
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013); Wingate v. United States, 969 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2020).
These authorities emphasize focusing on the minimum conduct the statute criminalizes while resisting “legal imagination.” The Sixth Circuit applied that discipline here, declining to expand “contents” beyond its contextual meaning.
United States v. Gatson, 776 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2015).
The Sixth Circuit previously defined generic arson as “the intentional or malicious burning of any property” and noted that its ACCA definition aligns with the Guidelines’ “crime of violence” enumerations. Gatson’s definition anchored the analysis in Rushing.
United States v. Lee, 608 F. App’x 375 (6th Cir. 2015) (unpublished).
Followed Gatson’s generic definition of arson, reinforcing consistency between ACCA and Guidelines enumerated offenses.
Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023).
Supports reading statutory language in context and in pari materia. The panel used this approach when construing “contents” by reading § 750.72 alongside §§ 750.73 and 750.74.
United States v. Cervenak, 135 F.4th 311 (6th Cir. 2025) (en banc).
Confirmed de novo review for crime-of-violence determinations, setting the standard applied here.
People v. Sickels, No. 234746, 2003 WL 21246658 (Mich. Ct. App. May 29, 2003) (unpublished).
Rushing argued that Sickels suggested “contents” extends beyond “personal property.” The Sixth Circuit disagreed, explaining Sickels merely held that arson of personal property (§ 750.74) is not a necessarily included lesser offense of arson of a dwelling (§ 750.72), which can be violated by burning empty structures or other scenarios not implicating § 750.74’s value thresholds.
People v. Fox, 591 N.W.2d 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
Cited by the government to illustrate that using “contents” avoids fixture disputes (i.e., real vs. personal property). The panel viewed this as a plausible but non‑essential explanation consistent with its textual conclusion.
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); United States v. Bruce, 396 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mathis, 807 F. App’x 476 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1983).
Rushing cited these to argue that discarded items (e.g., trash) are not “property.” The court explained these cases address abandonment of Fourth Amendment privacy expectations, not whether an item ceases to be “property” in the sense relevant to arson.

Legal Reasoning

Framework: The categorical approach and generic arson.
The Guidelines enumerate “arson” as a “crime of violence” but do not define it. Following Taylor, Mathis, and Descamps, courts use the generic, contemporary meaning. Gatson defines generic arson as the intentional or malicious burning of any property. The parties agreed on this definition.
Statutory comparison: Michigan’s pre‑2013 scheme (§§ 750.72–.74).
Section 750.72 (arson of a dwelling) penalized willful or malicious burning of any dwelling house “or the contents thereof” and buildings within the curtilage “or the contents thereof” (up to 20 years). Section 750.73 extended similar rules to non‑dwelling buildings (up to 10 years). Section 750.74 addressed burning “personal property” not specified in the preceding sections, with penalties tied to the property’s value (misdemeanor at ≤$50; felony if >$50).

Crucially, §§ 750.72–.73 do not mention “personal property,” yet § 750.74 speaks of “personal property … other than that specified in the preceding sections.” Because buildings themselves are not personal property, the only personal property “specified” earlier must be the “contents” in §§ 750.72–.73. In context, “contents” thus functions as “personal property within the relevant building.”
“Contents” is not broader than “property.”
Reading § 750.72 in pari materia with §§ 750.73–.74 shows “contents” refers to property (personal property inside buildings). Since generic arson includes any property, “contents” is coextensive with generic arson’s scope. The term does not expand the statute beyond the generic offense.
Rejecting the “trash is not property” argument.
Rushing’s reliance on Fourth Amendment “abandonment” cases was misplaced. Those decisions hold that discarding trash eliminates a reasonable expectation of privacy; they do not hold that trash ceases to be “property.” Moreover, “property” means something that can be the subject of ownership; actual current ownership is not required for the thing to be within the category “property.”
Addressing Sickels and lesser-included offense doctrine.
The panel read Sickels to mean that § 750.72 can be violated without necessarily violating § 750.74, for example, by burning an empty structure within the curtilage. This does not imply that “contents” sweeps beyond “personal property” or “property.”
Alternative rationales (non‑essential but compatible).
The government’s suggestion that “contents” avoided disputes over whether particular items were fixtures (realty) or personalty is plausible (cf. Fox). Another plausible legislative reason is to distinguish §§ 750.72–.73 from § 750.74’s value‑dependent penalties. Either way, none of these considerations pushes “contents” beyond “any property.”

Impact and Implications

Guidelines sentencing in the Sixth Circuit: Michigan convictions under pre‑2013 § 750.72 (arson of a dwelling or its contents) qualify as the enumerated offense “arson” and thus as “crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). This directly affects base offense levels under § 2K2.1 and can bear on career‑offender analyses under § 4B1.1 where “arson” is enumerated.
Broader enumerated‑offense jurisprudence: The decision confirms that the Sixth Circuit will read state arson statutes containing the term “contents” in context, aligning them with generic arson where “contents” denotes property within a building. Defense arguments premised on the notion that “contents” sweeps beyond “property” are likely foreclosed in similar statutory settings.
No invitation for “legal imagination” overbreadth: The opinion exemplifies Moncrieffe/Wingate’s caution against hypothesizing fringe applications absent meaningful textual or doctrinal support. Assertions that discarded items or abandoned objects are not “property” will face headwinds where the statutory and structural context points the other way.
State statutory scheme coherence matters: Courts may use adjacent provisions to fix the meaning of terms like “contents.” Practitioners should be prepared to argue in pari materia when contesting or defending categorical fits.
Unpublished but persuasive: Although not recommended for publication, the opinion faithfully applies existing Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court precedents. It will likely be cited for its reasoning, particularly on the equivalence between “contents” and “property” in Michigan’s pre‑2013 scheme.
Other Michigan arson provisions: The court did not decide whether other pre‑2013 arson provisions (e.g., § 750.73 or § 750.74) independently qualify as generic arson, but its analysis suggests that they likely do where they require intentional or malicious burning of property. Post‑2013 statutory reforms were expressly not at issue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Crime of Violence (Guidelines): Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), certain offenses are “crimes of violence.” Some are listed by name (enumerated offenses) like “arson,” while others qualify based on having elements that involve force (elements clause). This case involves the enumerated offense “arson.”
Generic Offense: When the Guidelines list a crime by name but don’t define it, courts use the “generic” version—what most states and common law mean by the term today. For arson, the Sixth Circuit’s generic definition is “intentional or malicious burning of any property.”
Categorical Approach: Courts compare the elements of the state statute to the elements of the generic offense without examining case facts. If the state statute’s elements are the same as or narrower than the generic offense, the prior conviction qualifies.
“Contents” vs. “Property” in this context: “Contents” in Michigan’s pre‑2013 arson statute refers to property inside a dwelling or a building in its curtilage. Because generic arson already covers “any property,” “contents” does not make the statute broader.
Fourth Amendment Abandonment vs. Property Status: Throwing away trash can mean you abandon privacy in it (so police may search it), but it does not mean the trash ceases to be “property” in the sense relevant to arson.
In Pari Materia: A method of statutory interpretation that reads related statutes together. Here, §§ 750.72–.74 were read as a coordinated scheme, revealing that “contents” served as the mechanism for incorporating personal property inside buildings.

Procedural Notes and Sentencing Context

Standard of Review: De novo review of whether a prior conviction is a “crime of violence” (Cervenak).
Guidelines Effect: With the arson conviction counted, Rushing’s base offense level was 24, producing a Guidelines range of 57–71 months; without it, the range would have been 46–57 months. The district court imposed 36 months, below both ranges, but the correctness of the enhancement still matters for anchoring the analysis under § 3553(a) and for collateral consequences.
Other Convictions: Rushing referenced other priors (home invasion, controlled substance distribution), but the district court did not rely on them, and those issues were effectively moot given the affirmation on arson.
Publication Status: The opinion is not recommended for publication; it is persuasive but not binding precedent in the Sixth Circuit, consistent with applicable citation rules.

Conclusion

United States v. Rushing reinforces a straightforward but important proposition in enumerated‑offense analysis: Michigan’s pre‑2013 arson of a dwelling “or the contents thereof” fits squarely within generic arson because “contents,” read in the statutory scheme, refers to property inside buildings—and generic arson covers the intentional or malicious burning of any property. The court’s method—textual analysis in pari materia, adherence to the categorical approach, and resistance to conjectural overbreadth—provides a clear roadmap for future cases.

Practically, the decision confirms that pre‑2013 Michigan dwelling‑arson convictions count as “crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Conceptually, it clarifies that “contents” is not a loophole to expand state arson beyond the generic offense. And doctrinally, it illustrates the Sixth Circuit’s continued fidelity to Taylor/Descamps/Mathis and its own precedent in Gatson when matching state offenses to enumerated federal analogs.