“Composite-Evidentiary Conspiracy”: First Circuit Affirms Conviction on Interlocking Circumstantial Proof and Re-states the Limited Scope of Ineffective-Assistance Review on Direct Appeal – A Commentary on United States v. Reyes-Ballista (1st Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

United States v. Reyes-Ballista, Nos. 22-1185 & 22-1186 (1st Cir. July 25 2025), presented the First Circuit with two routine—but legally fertile—questions:

Was the Government’s web of circumstantial evidence, coupled with fingerprint identification, sufficient to sustain two cocaine-distribution conspiracies?
Can a defendant obtain a new trial on direct appeal by alleging breakdowns in attorney-client communication and poor trial strategy, or must such Sixth Amendment claims await collateral review?

Miguel Amaury Reyes-Ballista (“Reyes”) had been convicted after a six-day jury trial in the District of Puerto Rico of:

Two conspiracies to possess with intent to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846).
Three substantive possession counts (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).

The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Thompson (joined by Chief Judge Barron and Judge Rikelman), affirmed the convictions and dismissed the ineffective-assistance claim without prejudice. Although the result is unremarkable—affirmance—the opinion is noteworthy for the clarity with which it synthesises earlier precedent on (a) holistic sufficiency review in conspiracy cases, (b) the continued acceptance of ACE-V fingerprint methodology post-Daubert, and (c) the near-categorical deferral of fact-bound ineffective-assistance allegations to § 2255 proceedings. This commentary analyses those aspects and sketches their prospective import.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The panel conducted a de novo review—because Reyes moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)—and held that “no level-headed jury” would have been irrational in finding the conspiracies proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Key facts:

A repeating pattern of cocaine-filled household appliances shipped Puerto Rico → New York and cash-filled appliances shipped the other way.
Distinctive GPS trackers, hardened spray foam, identical handwriting, and express-mail attributes linked each parcel.
Pérez and Santiago acted as postal couriers; Reyes orchestrated, paid them, and drove them.
Reyes’s fingerprints appeared on the sticky side of packing tape and inside drug-laden parcels.
Reyes made inconsistent statements during a USPIS interview about intercepted cash.

2. Ineffective Assistance Claim. Reyes alleged that appointed counsel (and, derivatively, second counsel appointed days before trial) failed to communicate, ignored strategic requests, and conducted a weak cross-examination. The panel—adhering to its “regularity bordering on the monotonous”—refused to decide the fact-intensive Strickland claim on the existing record and directed Reyes to § 2255.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) – Frame for viewing facts “in the light most flattering to the verdict.” Used repeatedly to justify drawing all reasonable inferences for the Government.
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990) – The “undeveloped argument = waived” rule, applied to bar Reyes’s challenge to the substantive possession counts.
United States v. Vázquez Rijos, 119 F.4th 94 (1st Cir. 2024) – Recited for standard of de novo sufficiency review after a preserved Rule 29 motion and for anti-relitigation under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2009) – Reaffirmed admissibility of ACE-V fingerprint comparison methodology.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) – Cited for the proposition that cross-examination and contrary evidence—not wholesale exclusion—are the proper tools against reliable but impeachable expert evidence.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – Governing ineffective-assistance standard; panel emphasises requirement of record development to evaluate deficient-performance/prejudice prongs.
United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058 (1st Cir. 1993) and progeny – Articulate the “almost invariable” rule that IAC claims debut under § 2255 unless the record is “fully developed and undisputed.”

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Holistic View of Circumstantial Evidence. The panel reiterated that conspiracy may be proved by “express or tacit” agreement and that each conspirator’s presence at every overt act is unnecessary. It therefore rejected Reyes’s “I was never inside the post office” refrain.
Fingerprint Evidence as Corroboration, not Solitary Proof. The ACE-V analysis was deemed methodologically sound. Even if it were the sole inculpatory item (it was not), its reliability had been accepted circuit-wide; combined with GPS trackers, videotaped drops, payment patterns, and Reyes’s interview statements, it cemented membership in the conspiracy.
Waiver Doctrine Applied Rigorously. By invoking Zannino, the court excised the under-developed possession-count challenge, illustrating the perils of perfunctory briefing.
Procedural Posture Dictates Sixth-Amendment Review. The court found the record “missing connective tissue” as to which lawyer did (or failed to do) what, and whether prejudice ensued. Without affidavits, hearing transcripts, or trial-strategy explanations, direct review was inappropriate.
Conflict-of-Interest Sub-Issue. Although Reyes filed an ethical complaint against counsel, the panel—citing circuit and out-of-circuit authority (e.g., Ninth Circuit’s Doyle)—held that such a grievance, without more, does not create an actual conflict. That too may be probed under § 2255 if new evidence surfaces.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

Sufficiency Landscape. Prosecutors in drug-by-mail cases can rely on “composite marks”—identical shipping traits, common handwriting, GPS devices, fingerprints, and courier testimony—to establish agreement and knowing participation. Defense counsel must be prepared to attack each link or the aggregated chain will suffice.
Expert-Fingerprint Challenges. The First Circuit remains unwilling to disturb ACE-V admissibility absent novel methodological critique. Litigants seeking exclusion must present more than generic “subjectivity” attacks.
Ineffective-Assistance Timing. The opinion doubles-down on the court’s preference for collateral review, signalling that creative or detailed Sixth-Amendment arguments on direct appeal will almost certainly be dismissed unless the district court fully developed the record sua sponte.
Ethical-Complaint Tactic. Filing a bar grievance shortly before trial will not, without specific prejudice, guarantee substitution of counsel; district judges retain discretion to add co-counsel rather than permit withdrawal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

ACE-V Fingerprint Methodology: A four-step comparative process (Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, Verification) by which latent prints are compared to known prints. Courts have treated it as sufficiently scientific when the examiner’s work is documented and subject to cross-examination.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 Motion: After the Government rests, and again post-verdict, a defendant may seek judgment of acquittal on the ground that evidence is insufficient. Filing (or renewing) the motion preserves de novo sufficiency review on appeal.
Conspiracy Elements (21 U.S.C. § 846): (1) Agreement to commit a drug offense, (2) Knowledge of the agreement, (3) Voluntary participation. Presence or minor aid alone is insufficient; but circumstantial proof (fingerprints, driving couriers, instructing addresses) can establish knowing participation.
Strickland Standard: Two-prong test—(1) deficient performance (below objective reasonableness) and (2) prejudice (reasonable probability of different outcome). Fact-intensive, normally assessed in a post-conviction evidentiary hearing.
§ 2255 Habeas Motion: Statutory mechanism for federal prisoners to challenge conviction or sentence on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds after direct appeal has ended. Allows discovery, affidavits, and live testimony.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Reyes-Ballista adds no dramatic doctrinal pivot, yet it crystallises three enduring lessons:

Drug-conspiracy convictions can (and often will) rest on the totality of circumstantial proof; absence from the crime scene or parcel drop-off is not fatal when other interlocking evidence exists.
Fingerprint evidence derived via ACE-V remains admissible unless the defense mounts a targeted methodological or foundational attack beyond generic “subjectivity.”
Allegations of deficient lawyering without a developed record will almost invariably be postponed to § 2255 review; appellate counsel should either build the record below or prepare for dismissal without prejudice.

For practitioners, the case underscores the strategic imperative of:

Meticulously briefing all sufficiency challenges—lest they be waived.
Creating a factual record before appeal if ineffective-assistance claims are contemplated.
Countering composite circumstantial cases with expert testimony, handwriting analyses, and alternative explanations for fingerprints and parcel similarities.

In the broader jurisprudential vista, Reyes-Ballista stands as another First Circuit waypoint signalling judicial comfort with composite-evidentiary prosecutions and reiterating that direct appellate review is a poor vehicle for resolving nuanced Sixth-Amendment grievances.