Collateral-Order Appeals in Habeas Cases:
Farrow v. Colorado Clarifies that No Certificate of Appealability Is Required and Re-affirms Strict Rule 4 Time Limits

1. Introduction

Farrow v. People of the State of Colorado, No. 25-1022 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 2025) confronted two procedural skirmishes that often bedevil federal habeas petitioners:

• whether a certificate of appealability (COA) is necessary to seek review of collateral, post-judgment orders, and
• how strictly Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4’s deadlines apply when a notice of appeal is filed late and the petitioner later seeks an extension or reopening of the time to appeal.

Michael Farrow, a Colorado inmate convicted of violent assault-related offenses, missed the 30-day window to appeal the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. He subsequently:

1. moved under Rule 4(a)(5) and (a)(6) to extend or reopen the appeal period,
2. filed a Rule 59(e) motion to revisit the district court’s refusal to grant that relief, and
3. moved to recuse the district judge.

When the district court denied each request, Farrow sought a COA from the Tenth Circuit to appeal those denials. The appellate court, however, held that no COA was required because the challenged orders were “collateral” to the merits of the habeas action, and it proceeded to affirm on the merits.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit issued four principal rulings:

1. COA Unnecessary. A petitioner need not obtain a certificate of appealability to challenge collateral orders—specifically, orders (a) denying Rule 4(a)(5) or (a)(6) relief and (b) denying motions for judicial recusal. (Harbison v. Bell applied.)
2. Strict Enforcement of Rule 4(a)(5). A motion to extend the time to appeal must itself be filed within 30 days after the appeal deadline. Farrow’s motion—filed roughly 60 days after judgment—was untimely, foreclosing extension.
3. Reopening under Rule 4(a)(6) Limited. Reopening is available only when the appellant did not receive notice of the judgment. Farrow concededly received notice, so reopening was unavailable.
4. Recusal Properly Denied. Allegations of bias predicated on adverse rulings or an administrative docket entry were insufficient under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 & 455, and the assigned judge was not required to refer the motion to another judge.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009) – Distinguished between merits-based orders (which require a COA) and collateral orders (which do not). The panel grounded its COA analysis squarely on Harbison.
• United States v. McIntosh, 723 F. App’x 613 (10th Cir. 2018) – Applied Harbison to deny the COA requirement for collateral orders; cited for persuasive authority.
• Bishop v. Corsentino, 371 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2004) – Confirmed that an order refusing to extend time to appeal is itself an appealable final judgment and set the abuse-of-discretion standard used here.
• Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) – Deemed Rule 4 deadlines jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling; foreclosed Farrow’s tolling arguments.
• Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2000) – Enumerated the narrow grounds justifying Rule 59(e) reconsideration; used to reject Farrow’s repetitive Rule 59(e) motion.
• Other cases – Mendoza, Burke, Kellogg, among others, supplied settled principles on recusal and mandamus.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning unfolded in a disciplined sequence:

1. Identify the Appealable Orders. Only the July 29 and December 6 orders were timely appealed because Farrow’s Rule 59(e) motion tolled the clock for those orders but not for the original April 5 merits judgment.
2. COA Step. Because the challenged orders dealt solely with procedure (timing and recusal) and not the “merits of a habeas corpus proceeding,” Harbison deemed a COA unnecessary. The court therefore dispensed with the threshold COA hurdle and reached the merits directly.
3. Rule 4(a)(5) Analysis. Extension requires a motion “no later than 30 days after” the notice-of-appeal deadline and a showing of excusable neglect/good cause. Farrow’s motion was late, so the district court lacked authority to grant relief. The panel, accordingly, affirmed without needing to scrutinise excusable neglect.
4. Rule 4(a)(6) Analysis. Reopening demands that the petitioner did not receive notice of the judgment. Farrow admitted he did, foreclosing reopening.
5. Rule 59(e) Analysis. Farrow’s reconsideration motion merely re-argued points already rejected; Rule 59(e) is not a vehicle for such repetition. District court acted within its discretion.
6. Recusal Analysis. Adverse rulings or administrative errors do not establish the “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” required under §§ 144/455. The judge thus properly denied recusal and was not compelled to refer the matter to the chief judge or a colleague.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

The decision, though non-precedential by the court’s own rule, will be persuasively cited for several propositions:

• COA Scope Clarified. Practitioners within the Tenth Circuit can confidently bypass the COA step when appealing collateral orders such as (a) Rule 4 timing denials, (b) recusal orders, or (c) other procedural rulings that do not touch the merits.
• Hard Rule on Timing. Farrow cements strict adherence to Rule 4(a)(5)’s dual deadlines—30 days to file a notice of appeal plus 30 days to request an extension. Missing either is fatal, and equitable tolling is barred by Bowles.
• Strategic Use of Rule 59(e). Petitioners must supply new law, new facts, or clear error; simple repetition will not secure reconsideration. Courts may cite Farrow to summarily dispose of duplicative Rule 59(e) motions.
• Recusal Standards Re-affirmed. Administrative mishaps and prior adverse rulings, without more, will rarely justify disqualification. The opinion arms trial judges with authority to handle recusal motions themselves.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Certificate of Appealability (COA): Like a “permission slip” a state prisoner usually must obtain before a federal appellate court can review the merits of a habeas decision. Farrow clarifies that no slip is needed when the appeal concerns only procedural side-issues.
• Collateral Order: An order that decides an issue separate from the case’s merits (e.g., who the judge is, whether the appeal is timely). Think of it as litigation “house-keeping.”
• Rule 4(a)(5) vs. Rule 4(a)(6):
  • 4(a)(5) Allows extension if you move within 30 days after the appeal deadline and show excusable neglect/good cause.
  • 4(a)(6) Allows reopening for 14 days if you never received notice of the judgment and move within 180 days.
• Rule 59(e): A tool to ask the trial court to fix or rethink its judgment within 28 days. It is not for repeating old arguments; use it only for new law, new evidence, or clear error.
• Recusal (28 U.S.C. §§ 144 & 455): Statutes requiring a judge to step aside if bias exists or impartiality could reasonably be questioned. Mere dissatisfaction with rulings is insufficient.

5. Conclusion

Farrow v. Colorado reinforces two procedural pillars in federal habeas practice:

1. The COA Gateway Is Merits-Focused. Appellants need not clear the COA hurdle to contest collateral, post-judgment rulings.
2. Rule 4 Deadlines Are Jurisdictional and Unforgiving. Even a pro se litigant’s diligent effort cannot resurrect an untimely appeal once both the notice-of-appeal period and the Rule 4(a)(5) grace window close.

By combining these teachings with a clear restatement of recusal standards and the limited role of Rule 59(e), the Tenth Circuit supplies a persuasive roadmap for lower courts and practitioners navigating the procedural thicket surrounding habeas appeals.