“Clearly Established” Curtilage Law and Qualified Immunity After Sauceda v. Lopez (Sauceda II)

1. Introduction

Sauceda v. Lopez, No. 24-40174 (5th Cir. 2025), nick-named “Sauceda II,” is the Fifth Circuit’s follow-up to its 2023 decision ( Sauceda I, 78 F.4th 174). Sauceda I held that a fenced front yard, even though accessible by a latched gate, is protected curtilage under the Fourth Amendment. The case returned to the district court solely to decide whether that rule was already clearly established in 2015, the year Officer Hector Lopez arrested Ricardo Sauceda inside the yard without a warrant. In Sauceda II the Fifth Circuit affirms qualified immunity for Lopez, concluding that—until Sauceda I—the law was unsettled. The opinion therefore cements two complementary principles:

First, Sauceda I supplies the substantive curtilage rule for future cases (latched-gate front yards are curtilage);
Second, Sauceda II teaches that officers who entered such yards before 2023 are protected by qualified immunity because the rule was not “beyond debate.”

The decision is unpublished, yet—per Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4—it may be cited to show preclusion of qualified immunity on identical facts, giving it practical significance for litigants, officers, and district courts across Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed summary judgment for Officer Lopez on his qualified-immunity defense. Applying the Supreme Court’s two-step immunity framework, the Fifth Circuit:

Assumed without deciding that Lopez’s warrantless entry and arrest did violate the Fourth Amendment (as Sauceda I had suggested); but
Held that, in 2015, “every reasonable officer” would not have known the entry was unlawful because existing precedent did not place the constitutional question “beyond debate.”

Consequently, Sauceda’s §1983 claims for false arrest and excessive force failed at the “clearly established” prong, and the district court’s grant of summary judgment was upheld.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The panel canvassed both Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases:

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) — Source of the four-factor “Dunn test” for curtilage.
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) — Warnings not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.
Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1974) — Backyard inside a complete fence deemed curtilage.
United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Thomas, 120 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Moffitt, 223 F. App’x 409 (5th Cir. 2007) — Varied holdings that fenced areas with open gates or driveways were not curtilage.
Sauceda I, 78 F.4th 174 (5th Cir. 2023) — First circuit case squarely holding that a latched-gate front yard is curtilage.

The juxtaposition of Fixel (curtilage) and Varkonyi/Thomas/Beene/Moffitt (not curtilage) revealed intra-circuit tension. Until Sauceda I, no Fifth Circuit opinion addressed a front yard behind a latched gate with “No Trespassing” signs—facts crucial to this lawsuit.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning tracks the Supreme Court’s two-part qualified-immunity inquiry:

Constitutional Violation (assumed)
The panel accepted Sauceda I’s holding—entering fenced curtilage without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment absent an exception. Doing so avoided re-litigation and let the court focus on step two.
Clearly Established Law (decided)
a. The court defined the right narrowly: “whether a reasonable officer in 2015 would know he could not open an unlocked gate and step onto a front lawn to arrest a suspect standing several feet from the street.”
b. Surveying precedent, the panel found no factually analogous case on point; opinions were “sparse” and “inconclusive.” The existence of contrary lines of cases meant the law was debatable, not “beyond debate.”
c. Supreme Court cautions against relying on generalized formulations of privacy and the Dunn factors reinforced the finding of ambiguity.

3.3 Potential Impact

Temporal Split: The Fifth Circuit has effectively erected a temporal dividing line:
- Pre-2023 incidents: Officers enjoy qualified immunity under Sauceda II, unless plaintiffs can locate substantially similar pre-2015 precedent.
- Post-2023 incidents: Sauceda I clearly establishes that a latched-gate front yard is curtilage. Officers must either obtain a warrant or identify a valid exception (e.g., hot pursuit, consent).
Practical Guidance for Law Enforcement: Agencies should update training materials to warn officers that entry into any fenced front yard—latched or not—risks constitutional violation unless an exception applies.
For older claims, defendants have a fortified immunity defense.
Litigation Strategy: Plaintiffs must now plead and prove two things: (1) A constitutional violation under Sauceda I, and (2) that the violation post-dates mid-2023 (or that an earlier, squarely-on-point precedent exists) to bypass Sauceda II’s immunity shield.
Doctrinal Clarity: Sauceda II underscores how the “clearly established” inquiry demands near-identical precedent in Fourth Amendment-qualified-immunity cases, reinforcing Supreme Court admonitions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Curtilage: The area “immediately surrounding and associated with the home,” entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protection as the interior of the house. Assessing curtilage uses the Dunn four-factor test.
Qualified Immunity: A legal shield protecting government officials from personal liability unless (i) they violated a constitutional right and (ii) that right was clearly established at the time.
Clearly Established: A right is clearly established when existing precedent renders it “beyond debate” that the conduct is unconstitutional. The bar is high; close factual alignment with prior cases is generally required.
Dunn Factors: (1) Proximity to home, (2) inclusion within an enclosure, (3) nature of uses (privacy-intensive activities), and (4) resident’s efforts to shield from view.
Per Curiam (unpublished): An opinion issued by the court collectively, not signed by an individual judge, and not published in the Federal Reporter, but still citable in limited circumstances.

5. Conclusion

Sauceda II is less about the substance of curtilage and more about the procedural doctrine of qualified immunity. It confirms that, for conduct predating Sauceda I, officers who entered fenced front yards through latched gates retain immunity because the governing law was unsettled. Going forward, police, litigants, and courts must treat Sauceda I as the operative curtilage rule, while recognizing that Sauceda II erects a safe harbor for earlier actions. The pair of decisions thus operate in tandem: one expands Fourth Amendment protections; the other defines their temporal reach under qualified immunity. Together, they illustrate the dynamic interplay between evolving constitutional norms and the immunity doctrine designed to cushion officers from liability during that evolution.