“Clear-Error” Becomes the Governing Appellate Standard for Hardship Findings: A Commentary on Toalombo Yanez v. Bondi

1. Introduction

On 13 June 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down Toalombo Yanez v. Bondi, a precedential immigration decision that does three things:

Confirms federal-court jurisdiction, post-Wilkinson v. Garland, to review whether established facts satisfy the statutory “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement for non-LPR cancellation of removal.
Articulates—expressly for the first time in the Second Circuit—the clear-error standard as the proper level of appellate deference when reviewing the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) hardship determinations.
Rejects an argument that the BIA impermissibly applied its 2020 precedent Matter of J-J-G- retroactively.

The petitioner, Gladys Eudosia Toalombo Yanez, an Ecuadorian national present in the United States since 1999, sought relief from removal under 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(1). She alleged her deportation would inflict exceptional hardship on her U.S.-citizen children, particularly a toddler with respiratory issues. Both the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA disagreed. On petition for review, Ms. Toalombo Yanez challenged (i) the hardship finding and (ii) the allegedly retroactive use of Matter of J-J-G-.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Jurisdiction: In light of Wilkinson v. Garland, the Second Circuit confirmed jurisdiction to examine mixed questions of law and fact arising under the hardship clause, §1252(a)(2)(D).
Standard of Review: The Court rejected the government’s and sister-circuits’ “substantial-evidence” approach and adopted clear error as the appropriate standard for appellate review of hardship determinations—because the inquiry is “primarily factual” yet still susceptible to judicial oversight.
Application: Applying clear-error review, the panel found no mistake in the agency’s conclusion that the evidence did not show hardship beyond what ordinarily accompanies removal.
Retroactivity: Reviewing de novo, the Court held the BIA did not impose a new or heightened “serious medical condition” test; thus no impermissible retroactive application occurred.
Outcome: Petition for review DENIED.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024) – Classified the hardship inquiry as a mixed question and restored appellate jurisdiction. This case set the stage for which Toalombo Yanez supplies the missing standard of review.
U.S. Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387 (2018) and Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68 (2020) – Supreme Court authorities explaining when clear-error review is apt for fact-bound mixed inquiries. The panel analogised hardship assessments to these totality analyses.
Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I.&N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001) & Matter of Andazola-Rivas, 23 I.&N. Dec. 319 (BIA 2002) – Early BIA pronouncements defining “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” The IJ relied heavily on these.
Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I.&N. Dec. 808 (BIA 2020) – Clarified evidentiary burdens when health issues form the hardship claim. Petitioner's retroactivity attack centred on this decision.
Recent circuit splits – Third Circuit’s Wilkinson II and Ninth Circuit’s Gonzalez-Juarez (2025) adopted substantial-evidence review, which the Second Circuit now deliberately departs from.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Why “Clear Error”?

The panel reasoned that hardship determinations are (a) fact-intensive and (b) involve cumulative weighing of multiple hardships. Drawing from U.S. Bank and Monasky, the Court concluded that clear-error review is appropriate where:

the fact-finder (IJ/BIA) sits in the best position to synthesise case-specific facts;
yet some oversight is needed to ensure the statutory threshold is not misapplied; and
“substantial evidence” would yield circular reasoning because the underlying fact-findings are themselves non-reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).

3.2.2 Applying the Standard

Under clear-error review the Court asked: Is the panel firmly convinced a mistake occurred? Answer: No. The IJ and BIA had considered:

Medical letter describing the toddler’s “hyperactive airway disease” (not diagnosed asthma) without evidence of severity.
Ecuador’s dual public–private healthcare structure versus any proof of inaccessibility.
Country-conditions evidence on crime which was either generic or targeted at Guayaquil, a city the family would not reside in.
Contrary conduct—sending a child to Ecuador on vacation—undercutting claimed fears.

3.2.3 Retroactivity Question

The BIA’s citation of Matter of J-J-G- went solely to burden of proof and not to introduce a new “seriousness” threshold. The panel applied Landgraf: there is no impairment of vested rights or new duty; hence no impermissible retroactivity.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Judgment

Circuit Split Deepens: The Second Circuit now stands apart from the Third and Ninth Circuits on the applicable standard, setting up a potential Supreme Court revisit.
Heightened Scrutiny? Clear-error review is marginally less deferential than substantial evidence, offering petitioners a slightly greater chance of success in the Second Circuit than elsewhere.
Guidance for Practitioners: Counsel in the Second Circuit must marshal record evidence to leave the panel with a firm conviction that the IJ erred—bare disagreement or alternative weighing of factors will not suffice.
BIA Decision-Writing: Expect more explicit articulation of cumulative-factor analysis to survive clear-error scrutiny.
Retroactivity Arguments Weakened: The decision clarifies that merely citing newer BIA authority in support of long-standing burden-of- proof concepts is not retroactive application.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship: A demanding statutory test. The hardship to qualifying relatives must be markedly worse than the normal pain, inconvenience, or economic loss typical of deportation.
Mixed Question of Law and Fact: A decision that blends factual findings with application of a legal standard. Examples: deciding “habitual residence” (Monasky) or whether established hardships clear the statutory bar here.
Clear-Error Standard: An appellate court may overturn the agency only if—after reviewing the whole record—it has a definite and firm conviction a mistake has occurred. Slightly stricter than “substantial evidence,” which merely asks whether any reasonable adjudicator could have reached the same conclusion.
Retroactivity in Agency Law: An agency may not enforce a new rule on past events if doing so attaches new legal consequences. But referencing a post-dated case for persuasive reasoning, without altering the governing standard, is permissible.

5. Conclusion

Toalombo Yanez v. Bondi represents a pivotal interpretive choice by the Second Circuit. By embracing the clear-error yardstick, the Court delivers fuller—yet still deferential—judicial review of the hardship inquiry while respecting Congress’s bar on re-litigating underlying facts. Until the Supreme Court resolves the drifts among circuits, practitioners must navigate a patchwork: clear-error in the Second Circuit, substantial evidence in others, and lingering uncertainty elsewhere. Beyond standards of review, the decision reiterates two evergreen lessons: petitioners bear a heavy evidentiary burden to show hardship far beyond the ordinary, and retroactivity arguments fail absent a demonstrable shift in legal requirements. The ruling thus tightens doctrinal clarity at the intersection of immigration hardship relief and administrative-law principles of judicial oversight.