“Children” Means Under 18 for § 2251(e), and § 3283’s Child‑Abuse Limitations Apply to Mann Act § 2421: Commentary on United States v. Deakins (6th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Deakins, the Sixth Circuit issued a published decision affirming convictions and a life-plus-ten-year sentence for a decades-long pattern of sexual abuse of three boys, coupled with production and possession of child pornography. The decision, authored by Judge Larsen and joined by Judges Thapar and Bush, is significant for at least two doctrinal developments:

It holds that, as used in the penalty-enhancement provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), the term “children” means persons under eighteen, resolving an age-definition dispute that affects which state convictions qualify as predicates.
It confirms that the extended statute of limitations for “offense[s] involving the sexual or physical abuse” of children, 18 U.S.C. § 3283, applies to Mann Act transportation offenses under § 2421 when the government charges (and proves) that the defendant transported a minor with intent that the minor engage in illegal sexual activity that constitutes child sexual abuse.

Beyond these core rulings, the court rejected challenges to indictment sufficiency, clarified the proof required for intent under § 2421 and § 2251(a), explained how to satisfy the jurisdictional element for federal child-exploitation statutes, reaffirmed how “lascivious exhibition” is assessed in the Sixth Circuit, and rejected a narrow reading of “material” under § 2252A(a)(5)(B).

The case arose from a bench trial conviction in the Eastern District of Tennessee involving three victims (C.C., B.A., and J.G.), offenses spanning 1994 to 2018, and the recovery of “thousands” of child pornography images from thumb drives tied to Deakins. On appeal, Deakins challenged (1) the timeliness of the Mann Act count, (2) the sufficiency of the indictment on the first three counts (§§ 2421 and 2251(a)), (3) the sufficiency of the evidence on all counts, and (4) the use of Tennessee priors to trigger the § 2251(e) enhancement. The panel affirmed across the board.

Summary of the Opinion

Statute of limitations: The court held that § 3283’s extended limitations period for offenses “involving the sexual … abuse … of a child” governs a § 2421 prosecution where the charged intent is that the minor will engage in illegal sexual activity constituting sexual abuse. It rejected the defendant’s argument for a strict categorical approach, and held that—at minimum—even applying a Noveck-style analysis leads to the same result because intended sexual abuse is an “ingredient” of the § 2421 charge as framed.
Indictment sufficiency: Counts tracking the statutory language and including particulars of time, place, and victim adequately charged § 2421 and § 2251(a). For § 2421/§ 2422-type offenses, underlying state-law elements are not elements of the federal offense and need not be pled.
Evidence sufficiency:
- Count One (§ 2421): Circumstantial evidence (years of abuse before and during interstate travel) supported the mens rea; Florida statutory rape is strict liability, so knowledge-of-age was irrelevant; no record of emancipation existed.
- Counts Two and Three (§ 2251(a)): The “purpose of producing” intent can be inferred from surreptitious recording, number/nature/organization of images, and directed posing; the jurisdictional nexus was shown by the foreign manufacture of devices used to produce the depictions; images satisfied “sexually explicit conduct,” including “lascivious exhibition,” applying the Sixth Circuit’s six-factor test.
- Count Four (§ 2252A): “Material” includes computer disks and files; the government proved the jurisdictional element via production using devices manufactured outside Tennessee; the defense conflated the statute’s different uses of “material(s).”
- Count Five (§ 2260A): Stood because Count Three was affirmed and Deakins was a registrant.
Sentencing enhancement (§ 2251(e)): The court applied the categorical approach informed by the broad “relating to” language. It held that “children” in § 2251(e) means under eighteen, aligning the enhancement’s scope with the chapter’s “minor” definitions and avoiding disqualification of common state offenses. Deakins’s Tennessee convictions (statutory rape and sexual exploitation offenses) categorically relate to the sexual exploitation of children.

Analysis

A. Statute of Limitations: § 3283 Applies to § 2421 When the Intended Sexual Activity Constitutes Child Sexual Abuse

Deakins argued that the five-year default limitations in § 3282(a) barred Count One, because the charged transportation occurred in 1999 and the indictment issued in 2022. The government invoked § 3283 (as amended in 2003 and 2006) and, ultimately, § 3299 (2006) which removed limitations for Chapter 117 felonies. The panel proceeded by asking whether § 3283 displaces the default limitations as to the charged § 2421 offense.

The defense urged a categorical approach, analogizing to Taylor/Mathis, and relied on United States v. Noveck (1926) to argue that unless the elements of the offense require sexual abuse of a child, the extended limitations for offenses “involving” child abuse do not apply. The panel responded in two steps:

It expressed skepticism that a categorical approach applies in this limitations context, noting the absence of modern Supreme Court authority extending the categorical method beyond recidivist/deportation settings and the lack of “element specific” phrasing in § 3283.
Even assuming Noveck’s logic applies, the court distinguished it: in Noveck, “purpose to defraud” was surplusage to perjury; here, intent that the victim engage in illegal sexual activity is an essential ingredient of § 2421. Because the indictment charged intent to commit specific illegal sexual acts (federal sexual exploitation under § 2251 and Florida unlawful sexual activity with certain minors), the offense was one “involving” the sexual abuse of a child.

Crucially, the court adopted the § 3509(a)(8) definition of “sexual abuse” to interpret § 3283, aligning with the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. Under § 3509(a)(8)-(9), “sexual abuse” broadly encompasses the use of a child in sexually explicit conduct and sexual exploitation (including child pornography). Given the charged intended acts, the § 2421 offense necessarily involved sexual abuse, so § 3283’s extended period controlled and the prosecution was timely. The panel also reaffirmed the principle that extending a limitations period before it expires does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause (citing Knipp).

B. Indictment Sufficiency: Tracking Statutory Text Plus Particulars Is Enough; Underlying State Elements Are Not Federal Elements

On Count One (§ 2421), the indictment mirrored the statute and specified the time frame, travel from Tennessee to Florida, the victim (C.C.), and two intended unlawful sexual activities (§ 2251 and Fla. Stat. § 794.05). The court rejected the argument that the indictment had to allege the ages of the defendant or the victim or the precise sexual acts. The “chargeable-offense” clause does not import the elements of the underlying state/federal predicate as elements of the federal offense—a principle the Sixth Circuit previously recognized for § 2422(b) in United States v. Hart. Given the parallel language between § 2421 and § 2422(b), the court applied Hart’s reasoning.

On Counts Two and Three (§ 2251(a)), repeating statutory language plus particulars of time, place, and victim sufficed. The indictment need not granularly describe which acts constituted “sexually explicit conduct” to meet notice and double jeopardy protections.

C. Evidence Sufficiency

1. Count One (§ 2421): Intent, Strict Liability Under Florida Law, and Emancipation

Intent standard. The court traced the evolution from the original Mann Act’s “for the purpose of” to the current statute’s “with intent that” phrasing. Without deciding whether the 1986 change lowered the government’s burden, the court held the evidence sufficed even under the “dominant purpose” line of cases cited in Sixth Circuit precedent (Mortensen; Salter; Harris). Years-long abuse before and during the Florida trip supported the inference that sex was a dominant intent motivating transportation.
Knowledge of age not required. Florida’s statutory rape (§ 794.05) is strict liability; mistake of age is no defense. Thus, to satisfy § 2421’s “sexual activity for which any person can be charged” element, the government did not need to prove Deakins knew C.C.’s age. Nor does § 2421 require that the defendant intend lawbreaking as such; it is enough that the intended sexual activity is, in fact, illegal (citing Moreira‑Bravo).
Emancipation argument rejected. There was no evidence of a Florida court’s removal of the “disability of nonage,” a controlled, resident‑limited process. A stray trial question about “disabilities” lacked the legal meaning necessary to suggest emancipation.

2. Counts Two and Three (§ 2251(a)): Proving “Purpose of Producing,” Jurisdictional Nexus, and “Sexually Explicit Conduct”

Specific intent to produce. The “purpose of producing” requirement is a specific-intent element but need not be the sole purpose. The panel catalogued circumstantial markers that can prove intent: surreptitious recording; volume and organization of images; content going beyond recording a sex act (e.g., measuring genitalia; directing poses); use of cameras/phones/tripods; and pre/post‑act behavior. Here, the surreptitious nature, the number and content of images, and organization on devices supported the finding.
Jurisdictional hook. The government need show that the depictions were produced using materials mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate commerce. Testimony that Canon cameras are manufactured in Japan, Samsung phones in South Korea, and that no device capable of producing the recovered videos is made wholly in Tennessee was sufficient. The statute does not require proof that the defendant personally purchased devices out‑of‑state or directly received them via interstate shipment.
“Sexually explicit conduct.” Some depictions (e.g., anal intercourse) were per se explicit. Others were “lascivious exhibitions,” evaluated under the Sixth Circuit’s six‑factor approach recently reaffirmed in United States v. Jakits (2025). Images featuring a prepubescent child’s exposed genitalia as the focal point, sexual suggestiveness, and design to elicit sexual response satisfied the test. These findings also supported the § 2252A(b)(2) statutory aggravator for images involving a prepubescent minor or a minor under 12.

3. Count Four (§ 2252A(a)(5)(B)): “Material” Includes Digital Media; Don’t Confuse the Statute’s Two Uses of “Material(s)”

Deakins posited that “material” must mean something other than the enumerated items (e.g., computer disks) and that because the indictment charged “material,” the government failed to prove possession of the right category. The court rejected the semantic gambit: computer disks and files are plainly “material” that “contains an image of child pornography.” Separately, for the jurisdictional element, “materials” refers to tools used to produce the images (e.g., the camera/phone). The defense’s argument conflated the “container” sense of “material” with the “production inputs” sense of “materials,” which are distinct in the statute’s text.

4. Count Five (§ 2260A): Consecutive 10-Year Term

Because the § 2251(a) conviction for J.G. was supported and Deakins was a registrant, the § 2260A conviction stood. No independent error was identified.

D. Sentencing: § 2251(e)’s “Relating to the Sexual Exploitation of Children” and What “Children” Means

The enhancement raises the range to 35 years to life if the defendant has two or more prior convictions “under the laws of any State relating to the sexual exploitation of children.” Applying the categorical approach tempered by the breadth of “relating to,” the Sixth Circuit:

Reaffirmed that “relating to” sweeps broadly; a perfect element-by-element match is unnecessary (Sykes; Mateen). Tennessee statutory rape “categorically relates to” sexual exploitation of children (Sykes), as do Tennessee offenses of sexual exploitation of a minor (including especially aggravated forms).
Defined “children” to mean under 18 for § 2251(e). This is the opinion’s clearest new holding. The court anchored the meaning in the chapter’s context: “child pornography” in the same enhancement clause depends on the definition of “minor” in § 2256(1) (under 18); § 3283 uses “child under the age of 18”; the statutory titles and provisions often use “children” and “minor” interchangeably in this domain; and Supreme Court guidance disfavors interpretations that would disqualify a significant number of state offenses from serving as predicates (Quarles; Stokeling; Sixth Circuit Brown). Lenity did not apply because the text, structure, and context resolved any ambiguity.

Accordingly, Deakins’s Tennessee convictions—some of which reach conduct involving 17‑year‑olds—qualified as predicate convictions “relating to the sexual exploitation of children.”

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

United States v. Noveck (1926): Early limitations-period case distinguishing offense elements from surplusage; used to frame, and ultimately distinguish, the defendant’s categorical-style argument.
Taylor v. United States; Moncrieffe v. Holder; Mathis v. United States: Categorical-approach canon; cited to explain why the approach typically ties to element‑specific inquiries and Sixth Amendment concerns not present here, and why § 3283 lacks element‑specific language.
Weingarten; Schneider: Skepticism about exporting the categorical approach beyond post-conviction contexts.
Hamling; McAuliffe; Valentine v. Konteh: Indictment sufficiency standards—statutory language plus sufficient particulars.
United States v. Hart (6th Cir. 2011): Under § 2422(b), the underlying sexual offense is not an element of the federal offense; logic applied to § 2421’s parallel text.
Mortensen; Salter; Harris; Ellis; Cole: Mann Act mens rea cases discussing “for the purpose” and whether unlawful sex must be a dominant or sole purpose; used to show sufficiency even under the more demanding formulation.
Moreira‑Bravo (8th Cir. 2022): § 2421 does not require intent to break the law as such; the intended sexual activity simply must be illegal.
Feliciano and Fla. Stat. § 794.021: Florida statutory rape is strict liability.
Torres; Lebowitz; Rider; Morales‑de Jesus; Ortiz‑Graulau: Circumstantial proof of § 2251(a) “purpose of producing” via recording practices, directions to victims, volume/organization of images.
Lively; Sykes; Napier: Satisfying interstate commerce jurisdictional hooks via proof of device manufacture outside the state.
United States v. Jakits (6th Cir. 2025): Six-factor test for whether an image is a “lascivious exhibition” of genitals or pubic area.
Knowlton (5th Cir. 2021): Computer files/disks are “material” containing child pornography under § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
Sykes; Mateen (6th Cir.): Broad reading of “relating to” in § 2251(e); Tennessee statutory rape qualifies.
Quarles; Stokeling; Sixth Circuit Brown: Avoiding interpretations of federal recidivist provisions that would exclude common state offenses and frustrate Congress’s enhancement purpose.
Knipp (6th Cir. 1992): Extending a limitations period before it runs does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Legal Reasoning Highlights

Limits of the categorical approach outside its usual domain. The court emphasized statutory text and context over importing Taylor/Mathis into the limitations arena. Where Congress did not use element‑specific language, and where Sixth Amendment concerns are absent, a rigid categorical overlay is unwarranted.
“Involving” as a capacious connector. By charging § 2421 with an intent to commit specific illegal sexual activity that is, by definition, child sexual abuse, the government brought the case within § 3283. The mens rea of intent to facilitate sexual abuse is not surplusage; it is part of the element.
Parallel construction across adjacent Mann Act provisions. Because § 2421 and § 2422(b) use materially identical “sexual activity for which any person can be charged” phrasing, the Sixth Circuit harmonized its holdings: the elements of the predicate offense are not elements of the federal offense.
Evidence doctrine for intent and “purpose of producing.” The panel synthesized a clear circumstantial-evidence template prosecutors and courts can use—before/during/after conduct, surreptition, volume/organization, and directed posing all matter.
Commerce nexus proof. Expert testimony on manufacturing origin—without chain-of-title—suffices; “direct purchaser” or “direct interstate receipt” proof is not required.
Textual discipline in § 2252A. The court parsed two distinct uses of “material(s)” and refused to let wordplay upset a straightforward possession conviction.
Contextual interpretation of “children” in § 2251(e). The court tied the enhancement’s “children” to the chapter’s “minor” definitions and legislative context, resisting asterisks that would shrink predicate scope across states.

Impact and Practice Implications

Charging window expansion for Mann Act cases involving minors. Prosecutors within the Sixth Circuit can rely on § 3283 to reach older § 2421 offenses involving intended child sexual abuse. For post‑2006 Chapter 117 felonies, § 3299 already removes the limitations period entirely. The decision supplies a clear pathway for cases in the pre‑2006 window when the extension occurred before the original period expired.
Indictment drafting. For § 2421 and § 2422(b), indictments need not plead the elements of the underlying predicate offenses, though identifying the targeted offenses can be helpful. Particulars of time/place/victim suffice alongside statutory language.
Proof of intent. The court’s survey of circumstantial proof provides a ready checklist: patterns of abuse, surreptitious recording, quantity and organization of images, and directed posing can collectively carry the day on mens rea.
Commerce element strategy. Agents’ and experts’ testimony on device origin (brand/manufacturing) remains a practical, admissible route to prove interstate commerce for both production and possession counts. No need for receipts or shipping records.
Lasciviousness in images of minors. The court’s application of the Sixth Circuit’s six-factor test (Jakits) confirms that images emphasizing genitals, sexual suggestiveness, and design to elicit sexual response are lascivious—even absent a captured sex act—and can support § 2251 and § 2252A convictions and enhancements.
Sentencing enhancements widened. By holding that “children” in § 2251(e) means under 18, the court ensures a broad set of state convictions (including those covering 16–17-year-old victims) qualify as predicates. This will have substantial effects on exposure calculations for repeat offenders in the Sixth Circuit.
Defense considerations. Knowledge-of-age and knowledge-of-illegality arguments will not blunt § 2421 intent where the underlying state law is strict liability; emancipation defenses require formal state-court action, which must be evidenced. Attempts to cabin “material” to exclude digital media are unlikely to succeed.
Unresolved threads. The panel did not decide whether Mortensen’s “dominant purpose” requirement survives the 1986 switch to “with intent,” or whether the categorical approach has any broader role in limitations statutes; it found sufficiency “even if” those more defense‑favorable assumptions applied.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical approach vs. conduct-based inquiry. The categorical approach compares elements of statutes, not actual facts, and is dominant in recidivist and immigration contexts. Deakins underscores that courts need not import it into statute-of-limitations questions absent textual cues.
Divisible statute and modified categorical approach. When a statute lists alternative elements creating multiple crimes, courts may consult indictments to identify the variant charged. The court analogized § 2421’s “prostitution or other sexual activity” split to this concept to show the charged variant involved intended child sexual abuse.
“With intent” vs. “for the purpose of.” “With intent” signals a mental state akin to “purposely.” Even under past “dominant purpose” formulations, intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and need not be the sole purpose of travel.
§ 3509 definitions inform § 3283. Though § 3283 lacks definitions, courts sensibly borrow § 3509(a) definitions of “sexual abuse” given the statutory lineage and subject-matter overlap.
“Lascivious exhibition.” The Sixth Circuit uses six nonexclusive factors (focus on genitals, setting, pose, attire, sexual coyness, intent to elicit response) to decide if an image of a minor is a lascivious exhibition—one form of “sexually explicit conduct.”
Jurisdictional “materials.” For production offenses, the government can show that the devices used to produce the images moved in interstate or foreign commerce. This is separate from whether the defendant possessed “material” (e.g., disks/files) containing the images.
“Relating to” in predicate statutes. Enhancement statutes using “relating to” sweep in offenses that are associated with the target conduct, not only those that match element-for-element. This broad reading increases the set of qualifying state convictions.
Ex post facto and limitations. Extending a criminal limitations period does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if the extension occurs before the original period expires.

Conclusion

United States v. Deakins is a comprehensive, prosecution‑affirming decision that will shape child‑exploitation litigation in the Sixth Circuit. Its two most consequential doctrinal contributions are:

Clarifying that the § 2251(e) enhancement’s reference to “children” means persons under eighteen, ensuring that common state offenses involving 16–17‑year‑old victims qualify as predicate convictions.
Confirming that § 3283’s elongated statute of limitations applies to § 2421 prosecutions where the charged transportation is undertaken with intent that a minor engage in illegal sexual activity amounting to child sexual abuse.

The opinion further consolidates Sixth Circuit law on indictment sufficiency for Mann Act and production counts, articulates practical evidentiary pathways to prove specific intent and interstate commerce, and rejects hypertechnical defenses to possession under § 2252A. It leaves for another day whether Mortensen’s “dominant purpose” standard survived the 1986 amendment and whether a categorical approach has broader purchase in limitations jurisprudence. In the meantime, Deakins supplies prosecutors, defense counsel, and district courts with a clear, structured map for charging, proving, and sentencing federal child-exploitation offenses.

Note: This commentary is for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.