“But-For” Means “One Of,” Not “The Only”: The Fourth Circuit’s Clarification of Causation in Title VII Retaliation
Commentary on LaShaun Curry v. South Carolina State Election Commission (4th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

LaShaun Curry, a Black woman formerly employed by the South Carolina State Election Commission (“the Commission”), alleged that she was terminated because of race discrimination and for engaging in protected activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After the District Court for the District of South Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission, Curry appealed.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed, issuing an unpublished opinion that—despite its non-precedential designation—addresses three recurrent litigation flashpoints:

• the proper articulation of “but-for” causation in Title VII retaliation claims,
• the limits of judicial fact-weighing at the summary-judgment stage, and
• the use of hearsay and Rule 37 discovery sanctions when a party fails to disclose witnesses.

Because practitioners frequently confront these issues, the opinion’s clarifications—particularly its treatment of “but-for” causation as a necessary reason rather than the exclusive reason—merit close scrutiny.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Applying a de novo review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that—even assuming Curry established prima facie cases for both discrimination and retaliation—she failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact on pretext. The Commission had provided multiple legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for termination (false statements, insubordination, failure to improve after reprimands, etc.), and Curry offered no admissible evidence from which a jury could find those reasons pretextual.

The appellate panel also rejected three specific assignments of error:

1. Causation standard. Although the district court once mis-stated the standard (“retaliation and nothing else”), the record reflected that the correct “but-for” standard was ultimately applied.
2. Credibility determinations. Any weighing of evidence concerned only immaterial discrepancies; thus, it did not contravene summary-judgment principles.
3. Hearsay evidence. The district court correctly excluded investigative notes containing undisclosed-witness statements as inadmissible hearsay and as a Rule 37 sanction.

Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed without oral argument.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The panel anchored its analysis in a familiar doctrinal landscape, drawing upon:

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – The burden-shifting framework for circumstantial evidence cases.
• Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2019) – Standard of review for summary judgment and application of McDonnell Douglas.
• Ray v. Int’l Paper Co., 909 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2018); Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invests., LLC, 828 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2016); Foster v. Univ. of Md.–E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015) – Articulation of prima facie retaliation and the “but-for” standard.
• Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) – Ultimate burden of persuasion and role of pretext.
• Hux v. City of Newport News, 451 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2006) – De-emphasis on “minor discrepancies” at summary judgment.
• Giles v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 59 F.4th 696 (4th Cir. 2023); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) – Admissibility and disclosure rules during summary judgment.

Collectively these cases shaped the panel’s approach: showing that once legitimate reasons are proffered, the plaintiff must produce concrete evidence of pretext, and that discovery and evidentiary rules constrain what material the court can consider.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Burdens of Proof and Production. The court assumed Curry satisfied the prima facie stage, moving directly to the Commission’s legitimate reasons and the pretext analysis. This procedural posture underscores that courts may bypass detailed prima facie discussion where the ultimate issue is dispositive.
2. Clarification of “But-For” Causation. Curry seized on a single line in the district court’s order (“and nothing else”), arguing it imposed an impermissibly stringent causation test. The Fourth Circuit reiterated that while retaliation must be a “but-for” cause, it need not be the exclusive cause – a reading consistent with Foster and the Supreme Court’s decision in Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). This clarification is the opinion’s most salient doctrinal contribution.
3. Pretext Assessment. In assessing the Commission’s articulated reasons (dishonesty, insubordination, poor relationships), the panel held that Curry provided no admissible evidence casting doubt on those reasons. Mere allegations or speculative assertions are insufficient under Rule 56.
4. Evidence Exclusion. The investigative notes contained double hearsay and were proffered without identifying the declarants in discovery. Invoking Rule 37(c)(1) and Giles, the court deemed the evidence inadmissible, illustrating that litigants cannot circumvent disclosure obligations by attaching investigative summaries.
5. Minor Discrepancies. Relying on Hux, the court found that small factual disagreements—unrelated to the termination rationale—do not establish pretext. This echoes the well-established principle that summary judgment may be granted despite “he-said-she-said” disputes if those disputes are immaterial.

3.3 Potential Impact

Although unpublished, the opinion signals to district courts and practitioners that:

• Mis-phrasing of causation does not automatically warrant reversal where the record shows the correct standard was functionally applied.
• Plaintiffs must match an employer’s legitimate reasons with admissible evidence exposing their falsity, not merely alternative narratives or hearsay.
• Rule 37 sanctions remain a potent barrier against “trial by ambush” – undisclosed witnesses will not be considered at the summary-judgment stage.

Future litigants will likely cite this case—particularly the passage reconciling “but-for” with “multiple causes”—whenever courts appear to impose an unduly narrow view of causation in retaliation claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Prima Facie Case. Think of this as the plaintiff’s “starter kit”—basic facts that, if taken as true, raise an inference of discrimination or retaliation.
• But-For Causation. A legal way of saying “if not for X, Y would not have happened.” It does not require X to be the sole reason—only a decisive one.
• Pretext. After the employer gives a lawful reason, the employee must show it’s a sham—a cover-up for discrimination or retaliation.
• Summary Judgment. A procedural tool allowing courts to end a case without trial when no real factual dispute exists that would affect the outcome.
• Hearsay. An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts. Unless an exception applies, it’s inadmissible evidence.
• Rule 37(c)(1) Sanction. A penalty for failing to disclose information or witnesses: the non-compliant party can’t use that evidence.

5. Conclusion

LaShaun Curry v. South Carolina State Election Commission may not bind future Fourth Circuit panels, but it crystallizes practical lessons for Title VII practitioners. The court affirms that:

1. The “but-for” causation test in retaliation cases permits multiple contributing reasons; retaliation must be decisive, not exclusive.
2. At summary judgment, plaintiffs must marshal admissible evidence of pretext—unsupported assertions, hearsay, and minor factual quibbles will not suffice.
3. Discovery obligations are strictly enforced; failure to disclose witnesses forecloses later use of their statements.

These themes reinforce the judiciary’s dual commitments to evidentiary rigor and procedural fairness, ensuring that discrimination claims proceed to trial only when genuine, material factual disputes exist.