“Braking the Cat’s Paw” – Seventh Circuit Narrows Retaliatory Causation in Johnson v. Accenture LLP
1. Introduction
In an opinion rendered on 2 July 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in Jeffery Johnson v. Accenture LLP (No. 23-1473). The case revolved around allegations that Accenture retaliated against Jeffery Johnson—a Black associate manager—after he reported racial discrimination during a client engagement. Although Johnson experienced difficulty obtaining projects and was eventually terminated, the Court concluded the evidentiary record could not sustain a causal linkage between his protected activity and the adverse employment actions. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit:
- Re-emphasised the stringent “but-for” causation standard for retaliation under both § 1981 and Title VII.
- Clarified the cat’s paw doctrine by explaining when independent decision-making breaks the causal chain.
- Illustrated how strict compliance with local Rule 56.1 can determine which facts the appellate court may consider.
- Underscored courts’ evidentiary limits despite acknowledging the reality of implicit bias in the workplace.
The decision thus refines the evidentiary burden for employees who seek to prove retaliation through circumstantial inferences—particularly when relying on indirect statements, timing, or cat’s paw arguments.
2. Summary of the Judgment
Judge Jackson-Akiwumi, writing for a unanimous panel (Rovner, Hamilton, Jackson-Akiwumi, JJ.), held that Johnson’s retaliation claims failed because he could not adduce evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that his protected complaint was the but-for cause of any adverse action:
- Failure to reinstate him to the Dana project – no evidence anyone with authority knew he wished to return, or that any refusal was retaliatory.
- Non-selection for the Cargill project – independent feedback and intervening HR steps severed any causal chain.
- Removal from Johnson & Johnson project – record devoid of facts linking removal to protected activity.
- Rejection from other projects – allegations were speculative.
- Termination for time on the “bench” – no evidence that the decision-maker acted on retaliatory information or that the proffered reason was pretextual.
Consequently, summary judgment for Accenture was affirmed. Because the § 1981 claim fell, the mirrored Title VII claim necessarily fell with it.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) – reaffirmed that retaliation requires but-for causation under Title VII; the Court applied the same standard to § 1981.
- Carlson v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 758 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2014) – articulated that protected activity need not be the only cause, but must be the determinative one; heavily relied upon to frame causation discussion.
- Robinson v. Perales, 894 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2018) & Woods v. City of Berwyn, 803 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2015) – critical to the cat’s paw analysis; emphasized that the biased subordinate’s animus must proximately cause the adverse act.
- O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2011) – cited for the proposition that suspicious timing alone rarely suffices.
- Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) – the Supreme Court’s recent clarification that a plaintiff need not show “significant” harm, only a disadvantageous change in employment terms, guided the Court’s threshold adverse-action analysis.
- Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) – directed courts to consider the evidence as a whole rather than through rigid McDonnell-Douglas boxes; the panel nevertheless found the whole record lacking.
- Local Rule 56.1 precedent: McCurry v. Kenco Logistics and Prairie Rivers Network were invoked to justify strict enforcement of summary-judgment submission rules and refusal to consider new material on appeal.
3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning
The opinion unfolds in three analytical steps:
- Gate-Keeping – Procedural Compliance
- Because Johnson’s Rule 56.1 statements were deficient, the district court properly struck unsupported facts and deemed many of Accenture’s statements admitted.
- The Seventh Circuit refused to entertain deposition pages not filed below (citing Prairie Rivers Network).
- Element-by-Element Retaliation Inquiry
- Protected activity was conceded.
- Adverse actions were analyzed using the Supreme Court’s fresh lens in Muldrow.
- Causation dominated the discussion: The Court sifted five discrete actions and found each broke down on the causal element—either owing to independent intervening decisions, lack of knowledge by decision-makers, or speculative chains of events.
- Cat’s Paw Clarification
- Johnson’s theory that Noble’s animus tainted later decisions was rejected because HR and other managers conducted independent checks, severing proximate cause.
- The panel emphasized that cat’s paw requires both actual animus and proof the subordinate’s scheme was the moving force behind the ultimate action.
3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment
- Higher Evidentiary Threshold – Plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit must now marshal detailed, admissible evidence linking each decision-maker to retaliatory motives; mere temporal proximity or workplace gossip will not suffice.
- Cat’s Paw Doctrine Narrowed – Independent HR review or additional decision points may immunize employers, even when an earlier supervisor exhibited bias.
- Bench-Management Policies – Consulting firms frequently use “bench” time limits; the Court implicitly validated termination for prolonged bench status if consistently applied.
- Rule 56.1 Enforcement – The opinion is a cautionary tale: faulty citations or legal conclusions disguised as facts can gut a plaintiff’s record before it reaches a jury.
- Implicit Bias Acknowledged but Constrained – The Court’s nod to scholarship (Kang et al., UCLA L.Rev.) signals judicial awareness of systemic bias, yet confirms evidence rules remain paramount.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Cat’s Paw Liability – Named after Aesop’s fable in which a monkey manipulates a cat to fetch chestnuts from a fire; in employment law it describes a biased subordinate who engineers a decision by an unbiased manager. Plaintiffs must show (1) biased subordinate, and (2) the subordinate’s input proximately caused the adverse act.
- But-For Causation – The protected activity must be the determining factor; “but for the complaint, the adverse action would not have occurred.” It need not be the sole cause but must be decisive.
- Pretext – A stated reason is pretextual if it is false and the real reason is unlawful. Evidence includes shifting explanations, implausibilities, or comparator data.
- Rule 56.1 Statements – Local rules in Illinois require pinpoint citations and prohibit argumentative or conclusory “facts.” Non-compliance can lead to striking of assertions.
- “Bench” Status – In consulting firms, being “on the bench” means unassigned but still salaried; lengthy bench spells often trigger termination under internal policies.
5. Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. Accenture LLP reinforces the rigorous evidentiary demands for retaliation claims under § 1981 and Title VII. By stressing strict procedural compliance and narrowing cat’s paw causation where independent decision layers exist, the Court erected a higher hurdle for plaintiffs whose cases rest on inference rather than documentary proof. While acknowledging “implicit bias” can distort workplace outcomes, the opinion underscores that federal courts remain bound by the evidentiary record, not by abstract social science. Practitioners should therefore invest heavily in contemporaneous documentation, deposition testimony tying each decision-maker to retaliatory motives, and meticulous Rule 56.1 filings. Failure to do so may leave even compelling narratives without a legal remedy.
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