“Beyond the Fine Print” – Idaho’s Supreme Court Confirms Broad Judicial Enforcement of Recreational Liability Waivers in Vaughan v. Gateway Parks, LLC (2025)

1. Introduction

The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Vaughan v. Gateway Parks, LLC, Docket No. 50674-2023, handed down on 26 June 2025, presents a pivotal clarification of Idaho contract and tort law in the recreational-activity context. The case asked whether an adult participant, injured while snow-tubing, could pursue negligence and premises-liability claims notwithstanding an electronically executed liability waiver and Idaho’s Ski Area Liability Act. By a 3-2 majority, the Court reversed the district court’s refusal to grant summary judgment to the tubing operator, holding that the waiver barred the claims as a matter of law and rendering statutory arguments moot.

The ruling solidifies—and arguably expands—the doctrine first articulated in Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene University (2012): an exculpatory agreement used in voluntary recreational activities need not enumerate the precise negligent act that ultimately injures the participant. If the contract language broadly references “hazards of the sport” (or equivalent phrasing) and the participant is an adult who assents without unequal bargaining pressure, courts will enforce that waiver even when the alleged negligence involves a hazard similar, but not identical, to examples listed in the agreement.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Holding. The electronic waiver Ms Vaughan signed during her online ticket purchase “unambiguously” covered injury caused by man-made obstacles, including the snow-making equipment mounted on a trailer into which she crashed. Therefore, her negligence and premises-liability claims were contractually waived.
Disposition. Reversed district court’s denial of summary judgment; remanded with directions to enter judgment for Gateway Parks. Attorney-fee request by Gateway denied; costs awarded.
Concurrence/Dissent. Chief Justice Bevan (joined by Justice Moeller) dissented, contending that (i) exculpatory clauses must be construed strictly against drafters, (ii) the waiver’s scope presented a fact question for the jury, and (iii) the Court should have reached the statutory issues under the Ski Area Liability Act.

Key Facts in Brief

• Gateway Parks operates a tubing hill at Eagle Island State Park under concession.
• When purchasing tickets online, Ms Vaughan digitally acknowledged a waiver describing numerous natural and man-made hazards and promising not to “make any claim” for injuries “resulting from these risks.”
• At the venue, a Gateway employee allegedly pushed her tube despite her request not to; the tube exited its lane, went over an embankment, and struck a flat-bed trailer covered with orange tarps and holding snow-making equipment.
• Vaughan suffered spinal fractures and sued for negligence and premises liability.
• The district court denied Gateway’s converted Rule 56 motion, finding factual issues as to (1) whether the Ski Area Liability Act immunized Gateway and (2) whether the waiver covered the particular trailer placement.
• The Supreme Court granted a permissive interlocutory appeal and reversed.

3. Analytical Commentary

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

a) Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene University, 152 Idaho 660 (2012)

The anchor precedent. Morrison held that a broad release for a university “challenge course” barred a participant’s climbing-wall injury claim, emphasizing freedom of contract and rejecting the need for itemized negligent acts. The Vaughan majority treats Morrison as controlling, extending its rationale to winter sports and digital waivers.

b) Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976 (1984)

Lee affirmed the validity of ski-area releases when the plaintiff is an adult partaking in recreation. Vaughan invokes Lee as early foundational authority allowing enforcement unless a “public duty” or superior bargaining power exists.

c) Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70 (2008)

Jesse invalidated an exculpatory clause in a landlord-tenant context, emphasizing strict construction and public policy. The Vaughan majority distinguishes Jesse as non-recreational; the dissent sought to apply its “disfavor/strict construction” principle.

d) Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175 (1979)

A commercial-transaction case resurfacing in waiver jurisprudence. The dissent characterizes Anderson & Nafziger as limiting releases to expressly named risks; the majority, following Morrison’s reading, relegates it to contracts that contain “narrow, enumerated” clauses.

e) Idaho Ski Area Liability Act, I.C. §§ 6-1101 – 1109

Although extensively argued below, the Act becomes academic in the majority’s view. Still, its definition of “inherent risk” framed much of the factual debate and underlies the dissent’s readiness to address statutory immunity.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Contractual Analysis.
- The waiver’s language is deemed “unambiguous.” Contract interpretation therefore is a question of law, suitable for summary judgment (citing Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson).
- The clause expressly lists “man-made obstacles such as … snow-making equipment” and instructs the participant to assume risks of “falls and collisions.” The trailer qualifies as a man-made obstacle whose purpose was snow-making; enumeration is illustrative (“such as”), not exhaustive.
- Applying Morrison, the Court rejects the argument that the waiver must identify the precise negligent act (i.e., allegedly reckless trailer placement). A collision with a man-made object plainly falls within the broad category of “hazards of the sport.”
Public-Policy Considerations.
- Idaho recognizes strong “freedom of contract.” Adult recreation participants are free to waive negligence claims unless a special public duty or disparate bargaining power exists. Neither impediment is present here.
- Electronic assent is treated on a par with traditional signatures; there is no suggestion of fraud, duress, or lack of opportunity to read the waiver.
Dismissal of Remaining Questions.
- Because the waiver resolves liability, the Court declines to apply the Ski Area Liability Act or evaluate factual disputes about inherent risks versus operator negligence.
- Attorney-fee request under I.C. § 12-120(3) is denied: the suit sounds in tort, not a “commercial transaction.”

3.3 Impact Assessment

a) On Idaho Tort & Contract Law

Vaughan cements a broad, waiver-friendly regime for recreational providers. The decision:

Affirms that courts, not juries, decide the scope of an “unambiguous” release—even when a dissent characterizes the scope question as factual.
Signals that illustrative listings like “such as lift towers” suffice to encompass analogous hazards (a trailer) without need for exhaustive cataloguing.
Emphasizes the enforceability of click-wrap/ browse-wrap style releases, provided assent is required pre-purchase.
Potentially narrows the circumstances under which plaintiffs may invoke Jesse’s strict-construction approach outside landlord-tenant or other public-policy-sensitive contexts.

b) On Future Litigation Strategy

For operators: draft broad, conspicuous language; use “including, but not limited to” enumerations; obtain electronic acknowledgment; keep records.
For plaintiffs: challenge on grounds of ambiguity, unequal bargaining power, or public duty; argue that operator’s conduct constitutes willful/wanton misconduct (a claim typically non-waivable); scrutinize whether waiver language genuinely covers the mechanism of injury beyond superficial similarity.

c) On the Ski Industry & Outdoor Recreation in Idaho

The ruling lowers litigation exposure for ski, tube, zip-line, rafting, and similar businesses, potentially reducing insurance premiums and encouraging growth. The trade-off is heightened need for consumer awareness; participants may unwittingly surrender broad legal rights, shifting the deterrence function onto reputational and market forces rather than tort remedies.

d) National Resonance

Vaughan joins a nationwide trend (see Colorado, Utah, Washington) toward honoring pre-injury exculpatory clauses. Courts in states with similar freedom-of-contract philosophies may cite Vaughan when assessing whether “analogous but not listed” hazards fall within a waiver.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Exculpatory Clause” / “Liability Waiver”

A contractual provision where one party (often a recreation provider) is released from liability for negligence claims. By signing, the participant agrees not to sue if injured.

“Inherent Risk” vs “Operator Negligence”

In outdoor sports law, “inherent risks” are dangers integral to the activity (e.g., icy patches, variable terrain) that cannot be eliminated without altering the sport’s nature. Operator negligence involves avoidable dangers created by the provider’s failure to act reasonably (e.g., leaving equipment where participants predictably collide). Vaughn’s core dispute was whether a trailer at lane’s end is inherent or negligent placement.

“Summary Judgment”

A procedural mechanism allowing a judge to decide a case without trial when no material facts are genuinely disputed and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gateway won on summary judgment after the Supreme Court’s reversal.

“Freedom of Contract”

The legal principle that competent parties may make agreements without government interference; courts will enforce such bargains unless they contravene public policy or statutory commands.

“Strict Construction” of Waivers

A doctrine (often invoked but variably applied) directing courts to read exculpatory clauses narrowly, resolving ambiguities against the drafter. The Vaughan majority declines to apply strict construction, while the dissent urges it.

5. Conclusion

The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Vaughan v. Gateway Parks fortifies the latitude businesses enjoy when drafting recreational liability waivers—so long as the language is facially unambiguous and the participant is a consenting adult. The Court reinforces Morrison, distinguishes Jesse, and sidelines statutory considerations under Idaho’s Ski Area Liability Act when a waiver is dispositive. The ruling sends a clear message: in Idaho, adults who click “I agree” before skiing, tubing, rafting, or climbing are likely surrendering virtually all negligence claims arising from comparable hazards, even if the specific instrumentality of injury is not itemized. As recreational enterprises increasingly rely on digital waivers, this case will loom large—guiding contract drafters, informing risk-management protocols, and shaping the expectations of thrill-seekers throughout the state.