“Beyond Magic Words” –
Soto v. United States (2025) and the Re-Configuration of the Barring Act’s “Another Law” Exception

Introduction

In Soto v. United States, 605 U.S. ___ (2025), a unanimous Supreme Court, per Justice Thomas, re-defined the reach of the Barring Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3702, by holding that the Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) statute, 10 U.S.C. § 1413a, is “another law” that displaces the Act’s default settlement machinery, including its six-year limitations period. The litigation arose after Marine Corporal Simon Soto, medically retired with service-connected PTSD, was denied CRSC payments for periods preceding six years from his 2016 application date. The Navy relied on the Barring Act; Soto filed a nationwide class action and ultimately prevailed at the Supreme Court.

The decision provides the first comprehensive guidance on when a separate benefits statute “confers authority to settle a claim” and therefore supersedes the Barring Act. Rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “magic-words” approach, the Court focuses on statutory structure, context, and functional assignments of power. The ruling has considerable ramifications for veterans’ benefits, other special-pay regimes, and any statutory scheme that silently entrusts an agency with both eligibility and amount determinations.

Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: Section 1413a empowers the service Secretaries to determine the validity of CRSC claims and the amount payable; consequently, CRSC claims are outside the Barring Act’s six-year limitations period.
• Reasoning Highlights:
  • “Settlement” in government claims law means adjudicating validity and calculating the amount due (Illinois Surety reference).
  • Congress need not use the word “settle” or prescribe its own limitations period to create an alternative settlement regime.
  • The CRSC statute is a self-contained, comprehensive framework: Subsec. (d) (eligibility determination) + Subsec. (b) (amount determination) + Subsec. (a) (mandatory payment) together displace § 3702.
  • The Federal Circuit’s “magic words” and limitations-period requirements conflict with precedents on statutory interpretation and sovereign-immunity waivers.
• Result: Federal Circuit reversed; case remanded for recalculation of retroactive CRSC payments to Soto and the certified class without the six-year bar.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Illinois Surety Co. v. United States ex rel. Peeler, 240 U.S. 214 (1916). Supplied the historical definition of “settlement” as a two-part administrative function—validity and amount determination. The Court uses this century-old case as the yardstick for measuring § 1413a.
• Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (2024). Reaffirmed that Congress need not employ “magic words” to waive sovereign immunity. Justice Thomas analogizes to settlement authority: statutory purpose and context matter more than formulaic terminology.
• Winkelman v. Parma City School Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). Cited for the methodological point that courts must examine the entire statutory scheme holistically, not cherry-pick clauses.
• FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284 (2012) & Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79 (2017). Invoked to reject policy-based rewriting of statutes; textual analysis controls even if policy concerns (e.g., fiscal exposure) exist.
• Hernandez v. Department of the Air Force, 498 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Lower-court precedent acknowledging that settlement authority can be inferred without explicit “settle” language—it buttresses the Court’s reasoning.

2. Legal Reasoning

1. Definition of Settlement Authority
   The Court distills Illinois Surety into a functional test: (a) Does the statute empower an entity to decide if a claim is valid? (b) Does it empower the same entity to decide how much is owed?
   If both answers are yes, settlement authority exists, and § 3702 is displaced.
2. Application to CRSC
   • Validity: § 1413a(d) obliges the Secretary concerned to “consider” eligibility; eligibility criteria are prescribed by DoD regulations.
   • Amount: § 1413a(b) sets the formula for monthly compensation and caps; passive voice syntax does not obscure that the Secretary performs the calculation.
   • Payment Mandate: § 1413a(a) says the Secretary “shall pay” each eligible retiree.
3. Rejection of “Magic Words” & Limitations-Period Requirement
   The Federal Circuit demanded explicit “settle” vocabulary or a statute-specific limitations period. The Supreme Court repudiates both conditions as extra-textual and inconsistent with statutory-interpretation norms.
4. Policy Concerns Discounted
   Government’s warning of destabilizing fiscal exposure is treated as a matter for Congress; the judiciary’s role is to enforce the text.

3. Potential Impact

• Veterans’ Community: Thousands of combat-disabled retirees whose CRSC payments were time-barred under the six-year rule may now seek restoration back to 1 January 2008 (the date the program expanded) or even to their date of retirement.
• Other Benefits/Pay Statutes: The decision sets a template for displacing the Barring Act wherever Congress has implicitly delegated eligibility and amount determinations to an agency. Candidates include: Combat-Related Special Pay for Members Wounded in Action, certain Foreign Service and civil-service special pays, and narrow relief funds created after disasters.
• Administrative Practice: DoD, VA, and other agencies must revise guidance that mechanically applied the six-year bar. Expect a surge of correction-of-records petitions (10 U.S.C. § 1552) and readjudications.
• Litigation Posture: Future plaintiffs can now invoke Soto to bypass § 3702 where statutory schemes mirror § 1413a. Courts will face debates over which statutes are sufficiently “comprehensive.” The Government hinted at six possible candidates; more will be tested.
• Congressional Drafting: Legislators may include explicit limitations periods in new special pay statutes to avoid unintended retroactivity, or conversely, may consciously omit them to ensure broader relief.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)

A 1940s statute that supplies default rules on who within the Executive Branch decides monetary claims against the United States and imposes a six-year filing deadline.

“Another Law” Exception

Clause in § 3702(a) saying that if some other statute creates its own settlement procedure, that procedure—and not the Barring Act—governs.

Settlement (Government Claims Context)

Unlike private settlements, it means an administrative decision that a claim is valid and the Government must pay a certain amount—not a negotiated compromise.

Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC)

A benefit enacted in 2002 allowing retirees with combat-related disabilities to recoup the portion of military retired pay they had to waive to receive VA disability compensation.

Passive Voice Statutory Drafting

When a statute says “amount determined under subsection (b)” without naming an actor, courts infer the actor from context—here, the Secretary concerned.

Conclusion

Soto v. United States is a watershed for veterans and statutory-interpretation jurisprudence. By clarifying that Congress can create alternative settlement regimes without incanting the word “settle” or specifying a limitations period, the Court broadens the scope of the Barring Act’s “another law” exception. The ruling prioritizes functional statutory analysis over formalistic linguistic demands, honors the remedial purpose of the CRSC program, and reaffirms that fiscal policy concerns belong to Congress. Going forward, agencies and courts must scrutinize the structure and content of benefits statutes to discern whether they silently but effectively confer settlement authority, thereby freeing claimants from the Barring Act’s six-year ceiling. For combat-disabled veterans like Simon Soto, the decision restores the full measure of compensation Congress intended—and sets a powerful precedent for similarly situated claimants across the federal spectrum.