Introduction

In United States v. Marian Hudak, the Fourth Circuit (Chief Judge Diaz and Judges Wilkinson and Wynn, opinion by Judge Wilkinson) affirmed convictions under two federal hate-crime statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2), arising from racially charged assaults of a Mexican-American neighbor (J.D.) and a Black motorist (J.S.). The appeal presented two central evidentiary questions:

• Whether the district court properly excluded the defense’s mental-health evidence—both expert opinion and the defendant’s own testimony—under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), 18 U.S.C. § 17(a); and
• Whether the district court properly admitted evidence of Nazi and Ku Klux Klan memorabilia (after initially excluding it under Rule 403) once the defendant “opened the door” by testifying he was merely a “collector” of historical military flags.

The Fourth Circuit not only upheld the evidentiary rulings but also announced an important doctrinal clarification: the “because of” language in § 3631(a) and § 245(b)(2) requires proof of but-for causation. In practical terms, the government meets its burden if racial animus was one but-for cause of the assaults—even if other forces (such as mental illness or generalized anger) also contributed. The opinion consequently narrows the room for mental-health-based defenses in hate-crime prosecutions absent a pleaded insanity defense or a rare, tightly cabined “negation of intent” showing.

Summary of the Opinion

• Facts: Hudak repeatedly used racial epithets and threatened or physically attacked two victims. Police later recovered a Confederate flag, KKK flag, Nazi flags, and other racist paraphernalia from his truck and home; witnesses also recounted prior racist tirades via loudspeaker and in traffic.
• Charges and Convictions: The jury convicted Hudak of violating § 3631(a) (housing-related interference because of race/national origin) and § 245(b)(2) (interference with use of a public facility because of race/color). He received 41 months’ imprisonment.
• Mental-Health Evidence: The district court excluded the defense psychologist’s opinion and Hudak’s own testimony about mental illness. The Fourth Circuit affirmed exclusion under Rule 702 (lack of reliable factual basis tied to time of offense) and under the IDRA, which bars diminished-capacity evidence unless insanity is pleaded, with only a narrow, inapplicable exception for truly negating mens rea.
• “Because of” Means But-For: Adopting the Supreme Court’s textual approach, the court held that “because of” in § 3631(a) and § 245(b)(2) incorporates but-for causation, consistent with Bostock, Nassar, Gross, and Burrage and in line with the Sixth and Tenth Circuits’ readings of these hate-crime provisions.
• Nazi Memorabilia Evidence: Although initially excluded under Rule 403 due to prejudice concerns, the memorabilia became admissible after Hudak testified he was a benign “military collector.” The court held he “opened the door” and that the probative value—rebutting his claimed motive—outweighed unfair prejudice. First Amendment protection of possession does not bar its use as motive evidence in a violent-crime prosecution.
• Disposition: Affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• United States v. Caldwell, 7 F.4th 191 (4th Cir. 2021): Sets the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing evidentiary rulings: reversal only if guided by erroneous legal principles or based on clearly erroneous facts.
• Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997): Expert testimony must be relevant and reliable; courts may exclude opinions with an “analytical gap” between data and conclusion. The court found such a gap in the defense expert’s opinion here.
• Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), 18 U.S.C. § 17(a); United States v. Worrell, 313 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2002): Mental disease is not a defense unless insanity is pleaded. Worrell recognizes a “rare” carve-out for mental-health evidence used to negate a specific-intent element, but only if it shows “he did not do it,” not “he could not help it.” The court found Hudak’s proffer to be the latter.
• Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009); Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014): The phrase “because of” typically imports but-for causation. The Fourth Circuit applied this textual canon to §§ 3631(a) and 245(b)(2).
• United States v. Porter, 928 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2019); United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2014): Sister-circuit authority reading the same hate-crime causation language to require but-for causation; the Fourth Circuit aligned with these decisions.
• Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003): Recognizes the cross-burning as a symbol of hate; the Fourth Circuit analogized the swastika’s meaning to underscore probative value on motive.
• United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2019): Affirmed the admission of Nazi memorabilia to show predisposition; supports using such evidence to prove motive or state of mind.
• Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993): Upholds enhanced penalties for crimes committed “because of” race; violent conduct is not protected speech, and motive may be penalized.
• Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218 (2017); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting): Protects speech we “hate,” but those protections do not immunize violent conduct from motive evidence.
• United States v. Birchette, 908 F.3d 50 (4th Cir. 2018): Parties assume risks when they advance arguments that can be squarely rebutted; once Hudak portrayed himself as a benign “collector,” he risked admission of memorabilia to rebut that narrative.
• Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975): Situates hate-crime statutes within a historical backdrop of racial violence and Congress’s goal to deter and punish those who suppress civil rights by force.
• United States v. Sherifi, 107 F.4th 309 (4th Cir. 2024): Cited to contextualize contemporary resurgence of social antagonisms; underscores the ongoing importance of hate-crime enforcement.
• Richardson v. Clarke, 52 F.4th 614 (4th Cir. 2022): Used to dispose of a forfeited Rule 404(b) argument; highlights preservation requirements for appellate review.

Legal Reasoning

1) Exclusion of Mental-Health Evidence

Rule 702 and Reliability: The defense expert (a psychologist) met with Hudak to evaluate competency months after the charged events and offered a broad opinion that his mental illnesses made it more likely than not he would not have engaged in the alleged conduct. But her report, tied primarily to competency, provided sparse specifics about Hudak’s mental state at the times of the assaults and portrayed the offense conduct as mutual “insults and threats”—a description at odds with the facts of violent attacks. The court found a “striking incongruence” between the limited data and the expansive causation opinion. Under Joiner, too great an analytical gap renders the opinion unreliable. Exclusion under Rule 702 was thus proper.

IDRA and Diminished Capacity: Independently, the court held the IDRA barred this evidence because Hudak did not plead insanity. Worrell’s narrow window for mental-health evidence remains open only when such proof negates a specific-intent element by showing the defendant “did not do it”—not that he lacked volitional control or “could not help it.” Hudak’s proffer did the latter, characterizing his “poor behavior regulation” as causative of the assaults; that is diminished-capacity evidence in disguise and is foreclosed by § 17(a). The court emphasized the “rare” nature of the Worrell exception; this case does not fit.

Relevance to “Because of” Element: Even aside from Rule 702 and IDRA, the court explained why mental-health evidence was not especially probative on the core trial issue: whether Hudak acted “because of” race. The statutory “because of” question focuses on racial animus as a cause of conduct, not on mental health as an alternative cause. Because but-for causation allows for “multiple but-for causes,” proof that mental illness contributed does not negate that race was also a but-for cause. Unless insanity is pleaded, mental-health evidence seldom defeats a “because of” showing.

2) Admission of Nazi Memorabilia After Defendant “Opened the Door”

Initial Rule 403 Exclusion: Pretrial, the judge excluded Nazi memorabilia as substantially more prejudicial than probative, recognizing jurors might associate the items more with antisemitism than with bias against Black or Mexican individuals. The court warned, however, that this was a preliminary ruling and subject to change based on the defense case.

Door Opening and Revised 403 Balance: On direct, Hudak testified he owned Nazi flags as a “collector,” tied to “support” for the military and “the history of war,” and expressly denied racist motives. This testimony put his motive squarely at issue and risked misleading the jury. At that point, the memorabilia became highly probative to rebut the “collector, not racist” narrative. Under Birchette, defendants take strategic risks by advancing positions that can be squarely rebutted. The court therefore allowed the government to introduce the Nazi flags, swastika patch, and Iron Cross ring, as well as testimony from a probation officer who saw a Nazi flag on Hudak’s bedroom door.

First Amendment Limits: The court carefully separated speech from conduct. While possession of Nazi symbols is protected expression, violent assaults are not expressive conduct within the First Amendment’s shelter. Under Mitchell, legislatures can punish crimes more severely when committed “because of” race; correspondingly, evidence of hateful symbols can be used to prove motive. The probative value of the memorabilia—particularly after the “collector” claim—outweighed any unfair prejudice.

3) The Doctrinal Core: “Because of” Means But-For

Relying on Bostock, Nassar, Gross, and Burrage, the court held that “because of” carries its ordinary meaning—“by reason of” or “on account of”—and thus incorporates but-for causation. Aligning with the Sixth and Tenth Circuits (Miller and Porter), the Fourth Circuit applied this standard to § 3631(a) and § 245(b)(2). As a result:

• The government need not prove that bias was the sole cause of the assault;
• It suffices that the victim’s race, color, or national origin was a but-for cause—i.e., that the assault would not have occurred in the same way if the victim were of a different protected status; and
• Evidence of multiple contributing causes (anger, mental illness, intoxication) does not preclude conviction if the protected characteristic was one but-for cause.

Impact and Implications

1) Hate-Crime Prosecutions in the Fourth Circuit

• Settled Causation Standard: Prosecutors now have clear authority that “because of” in §§ 3631(a) and 245(b)(2) requires but-for causation. Jury instructions should reflect that multiple but-for causes can coexist; the government need only prove bias was one such cause.
• Evidence of Bias: Racial epithets, prior racist acts or statements, symbols of hate, and patterns of targeting can be potent motive evidence. Courts will continue to weigh Rule 403 prejudice, but defendants who present benign explanations (e.g., “just a collector”) risk “opening the door.”

2) Mental-Health Defenses

• Narrow Path Without Insanity: Absent an insanity plea, mental-health evidence will rarely defeat the “because of” element. The IDRA precludes diminished-capacity arguments framed as loss of control.
• Rare “Negation of Intent” Exception: As Worrell indicates, only in unusual cases—where mental-health proof directly negates that the defendant formed the required intent or took the charged action at all—might such evidence be admissible. This opinion underscores how rare that exception is.
• Expert Foundations Matter: Where mental-health testimony is offered for a permissible purpose, it must be anchored to the time of the offense and show a reliable nexus to a disputed element. A competency-focused report with scant offense-period facts will likely fail under Rule 702 and Joiner.

3) Evidence of Hateful Symbols and the First Amendment

• Protected Possession vs. Admissible Motive Evidence: Possessing swastikas or Nazi flags is lawful, but such items may be admitted to prove motive when the defendant is on trial for violent conduct. Courts should provide limiting instructions as needed to ensure juries consider the evidence only for motive, intent, or state of mind, not propensity.
• Dynamic Rule 403 Balancing: Pretrial exclusions can be revisited mid-trial. Defendants who introduce exculpatory narratives about intent invite rebuttal, increasing probative value and shifting the Rule 403 balance.

4) Trial Practice Pointers

• For Prosecutors: Develop a record of biased motive with concrete, time-proximate evidence: slurs during the incident, prior racist statements, social media posts, symbols, and eyewitness testimony. Prepare to argue but-for causation in “mixed-motive” scenarios.
• For Defense Counsel: If contemplating mental-health evidence, be ready to plead insanity or tightly tailor the proof to negate a mens rea element without implying diminished volition. Ensure experts have offense-period facts and avoid sweeping causation claims unsupported by contemporaneous evidence.
• On Pretrial Motions: Seek clear, but recognized as preliminary, Rule 403 rulings; anticipate that defense themes (e.g., “collector,” “history buff”) may prompt reconsideration and admission of otherwise excluded items.
• On Jury Instructions: Request instructions clarifying but-for causation and permissible uses of motive evidence to mitigate unfair prejudice while preserving probative force.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• But-For Causation: A cause is a “but-for” cause if the outcome would not have happened in the same way without it. There can be many but-for causes. In hate-crime cases, the question is whether the victim’s protected status was one such cause.
• “Because of” Language: Statutory phrase meaning “by reason of” or “on account of.” Courts often read it to require but-for causation unless Congress says otherwise.
• Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA): Mental illness is not a defense unless the defendant pleads insanity and meets its legal standard. The Act aims to prevent “diminished capacity” defenses that argue a defendant could not control their actions short of insanity.
• Worrell Exception (Rare): Limited allowance of mental-health evidence to negate a specific-intent element. It must show the defendant did not form the intent or did not utter the words/do the act—rather than asserting lack of self-control.
• Rule 702 and Daubert/Joiner: Expert evidence must be relevant and reliable. Courts exclude opinions when there’s an “analytical gap” between an expert’s data and conclusions, or when opinions aren’t tied to the time and facts at issue.
• Rule 403 Balancing: Courts may exclude even relevant evidence if its unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. The balance can shift as the trial unfolds, particularly if a party “opens the door.”
• “Opening the Door”: When a party introduces a topic or characterization, they permit the other side to respond with otherwise inadmissible evidence to correct a misleading impression.
• First Amendment vs. Motive Evidence: Possessing hateful symbols is protected speech; however, when prosecuting violent crimes, such evidence can be used to prove motive or intent without violating the First Amendment.
• Standard of Review—Abuse of Discretion: Appellate courts defer to trial judges’ evidentiary rulings unless those decisions rest on wrong legal principles or clearly erroneous facts.

Conclusion

United States v. Hudak is a consequential Fourth Circuit decision for hate-crime jurisprudence and evidence law. The court:

• Clarified that “because of” in § 3631(a) and § 245(b)(2) requires but-for causation, aligning the Fourth Circuit with the Sixth and Tenth Circuits and embedding Supreme Court textualist causation principles into federal hate-crime prosecutions;
• Reaffirmed that the IDRA forecloses diminished-capacity defenses absent insanity and that the “negation of intent” exception is truly rare and tightly confined;
• Confirmed the trial court’s gatekeeping role under Rule 702 to exclude mental-health opinions lacking reliable, offense-period foundations; and
• Demonstrated the fluidity of Rule 403 balancing when a defendant “opens the door,” allowing admission of otherwise excluded motive evidence—here, Nazi memorabilia—without infringing First Amendment principles.

The opinion offers a comprehensive template for trying federal hate-crime cases in the Fourth Circuit: it emphasizes robust, contemporaneous proof of bias; cautions against poorly grounded mental-health defenses; and affirms that juries may consider hateful symbols as motive evidence where justified. In doing so, the court strengthens the doctrinal framework necessary to “deter and punish” those who would deny others the equal enjoyment of civil rights “because of” race, color, or national origin.