“Because of” in § 245(b)(2)(B) Means But‑For Causation; Racially Motivated Road Violence Is a Badge of Slavery Congress May Prohibit Under the Thirteenth Amendment

Introduction

In United States v. Jordan Leahy, the Eleventh Circuit issued a published decision affirming a § 245(b)(2)(B) hate‑crime conviction arising from a racially motivated vehicular and in‑person attack on a Black motorist and his family on a county road in Florida. The decision does two things of lasting doctrinal significance:

It squarely upholds 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) as a valid exercise of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment Section 2 power, expressly recognizing racially motivated violence that interferes with the use of public roads as a “badge or incident of slavery.”
It adopts a but‑for causation standard for the statute’s “because of” requirement with respect to the victim’s use of a public facility, rejecting a specific‑intent‑to‑deter‑facility‑use formulation some other circuits had embraced before the Supreme Court clarified the ordinary meaning of “because” in Bostock v. Clayton County.

The case involved Defendant‑Appellant Jordan Leahy, a white man, who while driving on a Pinellas County road repeatedly tried to run J.T.’s vehicle off the road, shouted racial slurs, made gun‑firing gestures, exited at a red light to pursue J.T. on foot, and later told police Black people were “animals” who should be “kept … in their areas.” A jury convicted Leahy under § 245(b)(2)(B) for willfully attempting to injure, intimidate, or interfere with J.T. because of J.T.’s race and because J.T. was enjoying a state‑administered public facility (Starkey Road). On appeal Leahy mounted a facial and as‑applied constitutional challenge, disputed the district court’s jury instructions, and argued insufficiency of the evidence and trial error.

Summary of the Opinion

Constitutionality under the Thirteenth Amendment: Applying Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the court held Congress may legislate against conduct it rationally determines to be a “badge or incident of slavery,” and that racially motivated violence interfering with travel on public roads comfortably fits that category. The court rejected invitations to import City of Boerne v. Flores’s “congruence and proportionality” test into Thirteenth Amendment analysis and distinguished Shelby County v. Holder as Fifteenth Amendment-specific.
Statutory interpretation—causation standard: The court interpreted the word “because” in § 245(b)(2)(B) to carry its ordinary meaning of but‑for causation, citing Bostock, Burrage, and Nassar. It declined to graft a specific‑intent requirement onto the public‑facility element, noting Congress used “in order to” elsewhere in § 245 when it wished to require purpose.
Jury instructions and handling of jury question: The district court’s instructions correctly stated the law. Refusal to give the defense “theory of defense” charge (which effectively reintroduced a specific‑intent standard) was not an abuse of discretion. The court properly declined to answer a jury question that would have invited the judge to weigh evidence.
Sufficiency of the evidence and new‑trial motion: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Leahy acted because of J.T.’s race and because J.T. was using Starkey Road. The denial of Rule 29 and Rule 33 motions was affirmed.
Concurrence: Judge Rosenbaum (joined by Judge Abudu) elaborated on the original public meaning of “appropriate legislation,” grounding Jones in McCulloch v. Maryland’s deferential “appropriate”‑means test, surveying Reconstruction history (including the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Justice Swayne’s circuit opinion in Rhodes, and Chief Justice Chase’s in Turner), critiquing the Civil Rights Cases, and explaining why Boerne/Shelby County’s federalism concerns do not translate to Thirteenth Amendment enforcement.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited—and How They Mattered

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968): The linchpin. Jones permits Congress to identify, rationally, “badges and incidents of slavery” and legislate to eliminate them under Thirteenth Amendment § 2. The panel followed Jones, reaffirmed by Griffin v. Breckenridge, Runyon v. McCrary, and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883): Cited in two ways. The majority noted its limited ongoing relevance post‑Jones and observed that even under its narrower view, restraints on freedom of movement were recognized badges of slavery. The concurrence offered a sustained critique and traced how the Civil Rights Cases deviated from McCulloch’s deference.
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020); Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014); Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013): These modern textualist decisions supplied the causation rule: “because of” denotes but‑for causation absent modifier. The court applied that ordinary meaning to § 245(b)(2)(B).
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966): The Senate reports cited Guest to highlight gaps in then‑existing federal tools against private, racially motivated violence on roads. The Eleventh Circuit also noted Guest implicitly recognized racially discriminatory private blockades of interstate travel as a Thirteenth Amendment concern.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013): Leahy urged importing these constraints on Congress’s Fourteenth/Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power. The panel declined: those cases do not govern Thirteenth Amendment legislation, and federalism and equal‑sovereignty concerns specific to regulating state action are not implicated when Congress targets private conduct under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Legislative materials (S. Rep. No. 90‑721 (1968); H.R. Rep. No. 90‑473 (1968)): Cited to show the problem Congress targeted with § 245—violent, racially motivated interference with federally protected activities by private actors, including on public roads. The court used these reports to confirm the rationality of Congress’s determination, not to expand the statute.
Other circuits on § 245(b)(2)(B): The court aligned with the Eighth, Ninth, and Second Circuits in upholding § 245 under the Thirteenth Amendment (Bledsoe, Allen, Nelson), but departed from pre‑Bostock readings that had demanded specific intent to deter the use of a facility, explicitly embracing but‑for causation for the “because of” element.
Canons and interpretive tools: Presumption of consistent usage (“because” means the same within the subsection), variation‑of‑terms canon (contrast “because” with “in order to” elsewhere in § 245), ordinary‑meaning textualism, and dictionary usage.

Legal Reasoning

1) Thirteenth Amendment Authority and “Badges and Incidents of Slavery”

The court anchored its constitutional analysis in the Amendment’s text—“appropriate legislation”—and the Supreme Court’s Jones framework. It asked whether Congress could rationally determine that racially motivated violence interfering with the use of a public road is a badge or incident of slavery. The answer, the court said, is easy.

Historically, slave codes restricted the movement of enslaved Black people, enforced by pass laws and violence. The opinion canvassed Virginia (1680), Maryland (1676), South Carolina (1712), Pennsylvania (1693; 1725–26), and local ordinances like West Baton Rouge to illustrate that travel restrictions—policed by force—were not peripheral but a core mechanism of slavery. Congress that proposed and ratified the Thirteenth Amendment understood this: contemporaneous statements (e.g., Senators Sherman and Trumbull) and the 1866 Civil Rights Act’s dismantling of Black Codes corroborate that restraints on movement were central badges.

On this record, Congress’s determination that racially motivated violence interfering with state‑administered roads is a badge of slavery is rational. Therefore, § 245(b)(2)(B), which criminalizes willful injury, intimidation, or interference “because of” race and “because” the victim is participating in or enjoying a state or local public facility, is “appropriate legislation” under § 2.

The court emphasized that Jones remains binding and controlling for Thirteenth Amendment enforcement, notwithstanding later Fourteenth/Fifteenth Amendment enforcement cases that employed different tests. And even “under the more restrictive test” of the Civil Rights Cases, restraints on movement sit at the heart of badges of slavery; thus § 245(b)(2)(B) would still fit.

2) “Because of” in § 245(b)(2)(B) = But‑For Causation, Not Specific Intent

Turning to the statutory element that the defendant acted “because” the victim was using a public facility, the court treated “because” as a term of art with an ordinary meaning across federal statutes: but‑for causation. It drew from Bostock’s instruction that “because of” imports the “simple” but‑for standard, Burrage’s insistence on but‑for causality in criminal statutes, and Nassar’s Title VII causation holding.

The court rejected Leahy’s argument—derived from the Second Circuit’s pre‑Bostock Nelson decision—that § 245(b)(2)(B) requires the Government to prove the defendant’s “intent to punish or prevent or dissuade” the victim from using the facility. Several strands of reasoning supported the but‑for reading:

Textual consistency within § 245(b)(2)(B): The same subsection uses “because of” twice—once for “because of … race” (which all agree denotes but‑for causation) and again for “because” the victim is participating in or enjoying a public facility. The presumption of consistent usage favors the same meaning in both places.
Contrast with “in order to” elsewhere in § 245: Where Congress meant to require purpose, it said so (“in order to intimidate …”). The absence of that phrasing in § 245(b)(2)(B) signals that Congress chose a causation, not specific‑purpose, standard.
Ordinary meaning and workability: But‑for causation is straightforward: change one thing (here, the victim’s use of the public facility) and see if the outcome (the attack) changes. If the attack would not have happened absent the facility use, the element is satisfied—even if the attacker had additional reasons.
Legislative purpose and constitutional fit: A but‑for standard targets a narrow class of conduct that makes the ability to use public facilities turn on race—precisely the harm Congress may eradicate as a badge of slavery—without creating a general federal assault statute.

The court also distinguished a mere temporal/locational coincidence (“while” using a road) from but‑for causation. If the attacker would have assaulted the victim anywhere regardless of the facility, the element is not met. But where the attack would not have occurred absent the victim’s use of the public facility, the “because of” element is satisfied.

3) Jury Instruction Rulings

The district court’s instructions closely tracked the statute and the indictment. On the public‑facility element, the court told jurors they must find the defendant would not have acted as he did “but for J.T.’s use of that facility”—identified as Starkey Road. That was legally correct. Because the defense’s “theory of defense” proposed instruction simply repackaged the rejected specific‑intent gloss, the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing it.

On the jury’s question—“Does the fact that both parties were on [the] road at the same time suffice [for] Part 4?”—the court properly declined to answer “yes” or “no,” referred jurors back to the instructions, and invited a more specific question. Judges must not weigh evidence or become “partners” in the jury’s factfinding. The jury did not follow up and returned its verdict shortly thereafter, undermining any claim of lingering confusion.

4) Sufficiency of the Evidence and New‑Trial Motion

The court cataloged trial evidence allowing a rational jury to find but‑for causation on both the race and facility elements: multiple attempts to force the car off the road while yelling racial slurs and miming gunfire; pursuit on foot at a red light; contemporaneous and later statements that Blacks are “animals” who should be “kept … in their areas”; and testimony from an ex‑girlfriend about Leahy’s frequent desire to attack Black people in public places. From this, the jury could reasonably infer that Leahy acted because J.T. (a Black man) was using Starkey Road—i.e., that the attack would not have occurred absent J.T.’s presence on that public road.

The fact that the jury returned a split verdict (guilty on Count One, not guilty on Count Two) did not undermine the sufficiency finding; the panel noted Leahy failed to develop any separate inconsistent‑verdict argument on appeal.

The Concurrence’s Original‑Meaning Roadmap

Judge Rosenbaum’s concurrence (joined by Judge Abudu) is a comprehensive originalist defense of Jones and of robust Thirteenth Amendment enforcement:

Textual anchor—“appropriate legislation” and McCulloch v. Maryland: The concurrence situates “appropriate legislation” in the constitutional vocabulary forged by McCulloch, which endorsed broad deference to Congress’s choice of means when pursuing legitimate constitutional ends. The Reconstruction Framers intentionally used “appropriate” to give Congress capacious power to eradicate slavery’s vestiges.
Reconstruction history: The 1866 Civil Rights Act (passed over President Johnson’s veto), debates by Senators Trumbull and Howard and Representative Wilson, and early post‑ratification decisions (United States v. Rhodes; In re Turner) reflect a contemporary understanding that Congress could legislate broadly to dismantle the badges and incidents of slavery.
Civil Rights Cases critique and Harlan’s dissent: The concurrence recounts the Civil Rights Cases’ departure from McCulloch and public condemnation, elevating Justice Harlan’s dissent (which presaged Jones) as the enduring historical guidepost.
Boerne and Shelby County distinguished: Those decisions constrain enforcement under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in part due to federalism concerns about regulating state action and equal sovereignty of the states—concerns not implicated by Thirteenth Amendment legislation regulating private conduct across the nation. The Court has never extended Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality” to the Thirteenth Amendment.

Impact and Forward‑Looking Implications

Binding rule in the Eleventh Circuit: Prosecutors need not prove a defendant specifically intended to deter or punish the victim’s use of a public facility to secure a § 245(b)(2)(B) conviction. It is enough to show the attack would not have occurred but for the victim’s use of the facility, alongside the race element.
Jury instruction templates: Pattern instructions in the Eleventh Circuit should reflect a but‑for causation standard for both “because of … race” and “because [the victim] is … enjoying [a public facility]” elements, and should avoid “intent to deter” language unless the statute expressly uses “in order to.”
Broader reach of § 245(b)(2)(B): The decision supports application to a wide range of state‑administered facilities—roads, parks, buses, schools, courthouses—provided the government proves the but‑for nexus. Defendants may still argue lack of but‑for causation where the location is happenstance.
Constitutional foundation strengthened: The opinion fortifies § 245’s Thirteenth Amendment footing (independent of Commerce Clause arguments) and articulates a detailed historical justification for treating road‑travel interference as a slavery badge. That reasoning may also support other Thirteenth Amendment‑based hate‑crime provisions targeting racially motivated private violence.
Inter‑circuit friction: By explicitly rejecting the specific‑intent gloss adopted by some pre‑Bostock decisions, the Eleventh Circuit creates doctrinal tension that could prompt harmonization—potentially by the Supreme Court—regarding the meaning of “because of” in § 245(b)(2)(B).
Separation‑of‑powers and federalism clarity: The panel’s reaffirmation that Jones—not Boerne or Shelby County—governs Thirteenth Amendment enforcement provides guidance for future constitutional challenges to § 245 and related statutes, signaling robust judicial deference to congressional findings of slavery badges when regulating private conduct nationwide.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Badge or incident of slavery: Think of “slavery” not only as legal ownership of people, but also as the cluster of practices that made a group unfree—like restricting movement, forbidding property ownership, excluding from courts, and enforcing pass systems with violence. Congress may target these practices and their modern analogues.
But‑for causation (“because of”): A cause is “but‑for” if the outcome would not have happened without it. Change one thing at a time—in this context, assume the victim was not using the public road at that moment—and ask whether the attack would still have happened. If not, the “because of” element is met.
Specific intent vs. but‑for cause: “Specific intent” requires proving the defendant acted for the purpose of achieving some result (e.g., to stop the victim from using the facility). But § 245(b)(2)(B) requires only causation: that the victim’s facility use was a necessary condition of the attack, regardless of the attacker’s purpose beyond race animus.
Facial vs. as‑applied constitutional challenge: A facial challenge argues a statute is invalid in all applications—a high bar. An as‑applied challenge claims the statute is unconstitutional in the defendant’s specific circumstances.
Constructive amendment: Occurs when the court’s instructions effectively change the charged offense’s elements, permitting conviction on grounds not alleged. Here, the instructions tracked the indictment’s identification of Starkey Road, avoiding any amendment.
Allen charge: A supplemental instruction encouraging a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating.

Conclusion

United States v. Leahy is a consequential Eleventh Circuit decision on two fronts. First, it forcefully reaffirms Congress’s broad power under the Thirteenth Amendment to criminalize racially motivated private violence that interferes with state‑administered travel—recognizing such interference as a classic badge of slavery within Jones’s rational‑determination framework. Second, it clarifies the mens rea/causation architecture of § 245(b)(2)(B): “because of” means but‑for causation, not specific‑intent to suppress facility use—a reading supported by the statute’s structure and modern Supreme Court causation jurisprudence.

The court’s careful statutory textualism, coupled with an historically rich constitutional analysis (and a noteworthy original‑meaning concurrence), provides clear guidance to trial courts on instructions, to prosecutors on proof burdens, and to defense counsel on viable lines of challenge. It also positions the Eleventh Circuit at the leading edge of a likely circuit‑wide realignment toward a uniform but‑for “because of” standard for § 245(b)(2)(B) and fortifies the Thirteenth Amendment’s role as an engine of federal authority against racially motivated private violence that perpetuates the vestiges of slavery.