“Assumption Is Not Evidence”: Fifth Circuit Tightens the Nexus Requirement for Residential Search Warrants and Limits Good‑Faith Reliance for Portable Firearms Evidence

Commentary on United States v. Wilson, No. 25-30105 (5th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025)

Introduction

United States v. Wilson squarely addresses a recurring Fourth Amendment problem: what factual connection—what “nexus”—must a search warrant affidavit show between a crime and a residence before a judge may authorize a home search? The case arises from a Waffle House altercation in which Ricky Wilson allegedly displayed a green pistol with a drum magazine. Two weeks later, police sought and obtained a warrant to search the apartment rented by Wilson’s girlfriend at 212 Central Avenue, where officers believed they would find the gun and related items. The search yielded ammunition, marijuana, and a firearm, leading to federal charges.

The district court suppressed the fruits of the search. The Government appealed, arguing that—even if the warrant lacked probable cause—the officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on it under the good‑faith exception of United States v. Leon. The Fifth Circuit affirmed suppression. Writing for the court, Judge Willett held that the affidavit was “bare bones”—so devoid of facts connecting the Waffle House incident to the residence that no reasonable officer could rely on it in good faith. The court further held that probable cause was lacking. Judge Ho dissented, emphasizing common‑sense inferences about where people keep their possessions (including firearms), the proximity of the residence to the crime scene, and the significant costs of exclusion.

The opinion announces, clarifies, and sharpens several important principles: that probable cause to arrest is not probable cause to search a residence; that the home is “first among equals” for Fourth Amendment protection; that the “nexus” requirement demands case‑specific facts rather than generic assumptions; and—critically for law enforcement—that generalized inferences about portable items like firearms will not, without more, salvage an affidavit under the Leon good‑faith exception.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s suppression order.
• The court held the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause”—i.e., bare bones—that reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable; the Leon good‑faith exception therefore did not apply.
• Because the good‑faith exception failed and the affidavit lacked a factual nexus between the evidence sought (gun and related items) and the residence searched, the warrant was unsupported by probable cause.
• Key clarifications:
  • Probable cause to arrest does not equal probable cause to search a home; a particularized nexus to the place is required.
  • “Common sense” inferences must be contextual and anchored in the facts of the case; generic assumptions about where evidence “usually” is kept do not suffice—especially for portable “guns‑on‑the‑go” items.
  • The “low” bar for good‑faith reliance under United States v. Morton is “not subterranean”—conclusory “ipse dixit” that evidence is “believed to be located” at a residence, without supporting facts, is inadequate.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Outcome

• United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984): Established the good‑faith exception—evidence is admissible if officers reasonably rely on a warrant later found invalid. The majority applied Leon’s limit: no good‑faith when an affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” that reliance is unreasonable. Wilson fits that limit.
• Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): The “totality of the circumstances” test and “fair probability” standard for probable cause. Wilson’s affidavit failed because it presented no circumstances connecting the residence to the evidence sought.
• United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc): Clarifies how “bare bones” an affidavit must be to defeat good‑faith, using examples from Nathanson and Aguilar. The Wilson affidavit resembled those conclusory affidavits—assertion without facts—so good‑faith could not save the search.
• United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1991): Affidavits must contain the facts establishing probable cause; the magistrate’s decision must rest on what is in the four corners of the affidavit. Wilson’s affidavit lacked the necessary factual content.
• United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2003): Requires a nexus between the place and the evidence, shown by direct observation or “normal inferences.” Wilson refines “normal inferences,” stressing they must be tied to case‑specific facts.
• United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1982): Probable cause to believe a person committed a crime is not probable cause to search his home; distinguished between inherently domestic “papers and effects” and other items. Wilson leans on Freeman to reject a generalized inference for firearms.
• United States v. Gramlich, 551 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1977): Presence at a residence and crime evidence alone do not create a nexus without signs of related activity at or near the home; supports Wilson’s outcome.
• Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295 (2021); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013): Reiterate the home’s special status—“archetype” of Fourth Amendment protection and “first among equals.” Wilson invokes these to justify a rigorous nexus requirement.
• United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1992): Good‑faith reliance upheld where the affidavit tied criminal activity to the very apartment searched. Wilson distinguishes Satterwhite: there was no comparable tie to 212 Central.
• United States v. Bell, 832 F. App’x 298 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam): Affidavit noted well‑recognized patterns in drug trafficking linking contraband to residences. Wilson notes the absence of any analogous pattern for a public altercation with a portable firearm.
• United States v. Green, 634 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1981): Acknowledged a general inference that people hide fruits/instrumentalities at home, but suppressed a residential search where the crimes occurred thousands of miles away and there was no nexus. The majority cautions that “common sense” is contextual, not categorical; the dissent leans on Green’s general inference and proximity.
• United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Maestas, 546 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1977): Recognized logical inferences for items people typically keep at home (e.g., mail, records). Wilson limits those inferences for portable firearms absent case‑specific facts.
• Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1973): Warrant valid where an informant tied pistols to the apartment and addressed staleness. Wilson highlights that kind of concrete tie is missing here.
• United States v. Chew, 1 F.3d 1238 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished), and United States v. Flanders, 468 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2006): Dissent relies on these. The majority distinguishes them: those affidavits had connective tissue (recognized trafficking patterns, on‑point digital evidence theory). Wilson’s affidavit did not.
• United States v. Alqahtani, 73 F.4th 835 (10th Cir. 2023): Dissent cites for the inference that people keep firearms at home even months later. The majority says Alqahtani turned on facts linking the gun to the home; in any event, Wilson requires case‑specific tethering.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Framework and Standard of Review
   • Two‑step inquiry: (1) good‑faith exception; (2) probable cause. Legal issues de novo; factual findings for clear error.
   • Deference to magistrates applies in close cases—but not where affidavits are devoid of facts.
2. No Good‑Faith Reliance
   • The affidavit labeled 212 Central as “Wilson’s apartment,” stated witnesses saw him there, and asserted that items “related to” the Waffle House incident were “believed to be located” there. It offered no specific fact linking the gun (or any evidence) to that address.
   • Morton teaches that an affidavit that “alleges only conclusions” is bare bones. The Wilson affidavit was ipse dixit—not a recital of underlying facts permitting reasonable inferences.
   • Because the affidavit lacked any factual bridge between the Waffle House events and the home, officers could not reasonably rely on it. Good‑faith failed.
3. No Probable Cause
   • Probable cause requires a “fair probability” that evidence will be found in the place searched. The affidavit did not establish the required nexus.
   • Probable cause to arrest ≠ probable cause to search. One concerns the person; the other the place. The Constitution demands a particularized nexus between the two.
   • “Common sense” inferences must derive from case‑specific facts. The court rejected a categorical inference that firearms displayed in public are likely at home two weeks later, noting the portability and disposability of guns and the time lapse.
   • Given the home’s “special protection,” generalized assumptions cannot substitute for evidence.

The Dissent and the Majority’s Response

• Dissent’s position:
  • Courts may draw the “normal” inference that people keep possessions—including firearms—at home. Proximity to the Waffle House (a dozen miles), plus identifying 212 Central as Wilson’s residence, should suffice for good‑faith reliance.
  • Ventresca cautions against hypertechnical readings of affidavits, which are drafted amid investigations by non‑lawyers.
  • Cases like Green, Freeman, Chew, Flanders, Anderson, and Alqahtani support reliance on common‑sense inferences, especially where proximity is reasonable and judges are entitled to deference.
• Majority’s rejoinder:
  • “Common sense” is contextual, not categorical; it cannot conjure missing facts. Without case‑specific tethering, adopting a general “home” inference would collapse the distinction between arrest and search.
  • Green suppressed evidence when the nexus was missing; the constitutional flaw is the absence of a factual bridge, not simply distance.
  • Chew and Flanders involved affidavits with connective reasoning tailored to the offense (drug trafficking patterns; digital evidence rationales). Wilson’s affidavit had “no meat on the bones.”
  • For portable firearms, the likelihood a gun remains in a home diminishes with time. The affidavit offered no observation, informant tip, or corroboration tying the gun to 212 Central at any point.

Impact and Forward‑Looking Implications

• Affidavit Drafting and Police Practice
  • In the Fifth Circuit, officers and prosecutors must supply case‑specific facts linking a residence to sought evidence; generic “people keep things at home” assertions are insufficient for portable items like firearms and ammunition.
  • Investigators should develop nexus facts: surveillance of the suspect carrying the specific item into the home; informant statements with credibility bases; contemporaneous social media posts geolocated to the residence; admissions; video footage; or other corroboration.
  • Time matters. As the interval between the crime and the search grows, so does the need for updated observations showing the item’s continued presence.
• Good‑Faith Exception Calibrated
  • Morton’s “low bar” remains, but Wilson underscores it is not “subterranean.” Bare conclusory affidavits that skip the nexus step cannot be rescued by Leon.
  • Expect more litigation over what counts as sufficient “connective tissue” for particular categories of evidence—especially portable items versus inherently domestic “papers and effects.”
• Home as “First Among Equals”
  • Wilson confirms robust protection of the home, requiring more than hunches or generalized assumptions. The court’s refrain—“Assumption is not evidence; geography is not nexus; and intuition is not cause”—will likely be quoted in future challenges.
• Inter‑Circuit Tensions
  • The majority narrows reliance on broad, category‑based inferences for firearms, distinguishing decisions like Alqahtani. While not a clean circuit split, the potential for divergent approaches may attract Supreme Court attention if similar cases proliferate.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Probable Cause: A fair probability, based on all the circumstances, that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. Probable cause to believe a person committed a crime does not automatically create probable cause to search a home.
• Nexus Requirement: The affidavit must factually connect the specific place to the specific evidence sought. The link can be direct observation, reliable tips with detail and credibility, or reasonable inferences grounded in the case’s facts—not mere assumptions.
• Bare‑Bones Affidavit: One that provides conclusions without supporting facts. Example: “We believe contraband is in the home,” without any basis showing why.
• Good‑Faith Exception (Leon): Evidence may be admitted despite a defective warrant if officers reasonably relied on it. Exception to the exception: good‑faith fails when the affidavit is so lacking in facts that reliance is unreasonable.
• Deference to Magistrate: Courts generally defer to the issuing judge’s probable‑cause determination in close cases. But deference does not apply where the affidavit’s factual content is essentially absent.
• Staleness and Portability: The more time that passes and the more portable the item (e.g., a firearm taken to a public altercation), the more facts are needed to show the item is likely still at a specific location.

Practical Takeaways and Best Practices

• For law enforcement and prosecutors:
  • Document observations placing the particular item at the residence (e.g., surveillance of the suspect arriving with the distinctive backpack; movement of a green pistol into or out of the residence).
  • Use informants or witnesses: include detail, basis of knowledge, and corroboration (e.g., “CI observed the green Glock with drum magazine under the bed at 212 Central on May 12”).
  • Account for time: explain why the item is likely still there (recent sightings, lack of movement, defendant’s patterns).
  • Tailor inferences to the item category: domestic records may legitimately be inferred to be at home; portable contraband requires more case‑specific facts.
  • Avoid conclusory language without facts. Replace “believed to be located” with the factual why and how.
• For defense counsel:
  • Scrutinize the nexus: is there any factual bridge between the place and the evidence, or just labels and assumptions?
  • Highlight portability and elapsed time when the item is easily moved or discarded.
  • Invoke Morton’s ceiling on good‑faith: show the affidavit “alleges only conclusions.”

Conclusion

United States v. Wilson is a rigorous reassertion of first principles in Fourth Amendment law. It emphasizes that the sanctity of the home demands a particularized, fact‑based showing that evidence is likely to be found there. It distinguishes probable cause to arrest from probable cause to search, and it refuses to let generic “keep‑it‑at‑home” assumptions or geographic proximity substitute for a concrete nexus—especially for portable firearms.

By holding that a conclusory affidavit is “bare bones” and cannot be rescued by the Leon good‑faith exception, the Fifth Circuit sets a clear drafting benchmark: connect the dots with facts. The opinion’s memorable coda—“Assumption is not evidence; geography is not nexus; and intuition is not cause”—captures the core lesson. Going forward, affidavits must articulate case‑specific reasons to believe that the items sought will be in the residence to be searched. The decision thus fortifies the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home while providing a practical roadmap for building constitutionally sound search warrants.