Introduction

In Matter of Goldstein v. Village of Mamaroneck Board of Ethics, the Appellate Division, Second Department, squarely addressed two recurring questions in municipal ethics: (1) whether a recusal rule that turns on the “appearance of impropriety” is unconstitutionally vague, and (2) what evidentiary showing suffices to sustain a local ethics board’s determination that a planning board member should have recused and made public disclosures about conflicts.

The petitioner, Cynthia Greer Goldstein, a member of the Village of Mamaroneck Planning Board, was found by the Village’s Board of Ethics (BOE) to have violated former sections 21-4(C) and 21-4(N) of the Village Code by participating in two land-use matters—the “203 Hommocks Road” project and the “Hampshire” development—and by failing to make required disclosures. Goldstein brought a hybrid CPLR article 78/declaratory judgment action challenging the BOE’s decision and arguing that former section 21-4(C)(1), which mandates recusal when there is a reasonable “appearance of a conflict of interest or impropriety,” is void for vagueness.

The Second Department affirmed across the board: it held the “appearance of impropriety” recusal standard is not unconstitutionally vague; it confirmed the BOE’s determination under the substantial evidence standard; it rejected a due process bias claim; and it remitted for entry of a declaratory judgment that the provision is constitutional.

Summary of the Opinion

• Vagueness challenge rejected: The court held that Village Code former § 21-4(C)(1)—requiring recusal when participation “may benefit” covered persons or “give the reasonable appearance of a conflict of interest or impropriety”—is not unconstitutionally vague. The term “appearance of impropriety” is well-established in ethics law, widely used, and judicially construed, providing adequate notice and enforcement standards.
• Administrative determination upheld: Applying the substantial evidence standard, the court confirmed the BOE’s finding that Goldstein violated former §§ 21-4(C) and 21-4(N) with respect to both development projects. Her involvement created a reasonable appearance of a conflict, requiring recusal, and her proximity and susceptibility to construction impacts required on-the-record disclosures to the Board of Trustees—which she failed to make.
• Due process claim denied: The presence of an allegedly biased BOE member did not deprive petitioner of due process. The record showed a fair and impartial hearing; no showing of actual bias or prejudgment was made.
• Procedural posture resolved: On the court’s own motion, leave to appeal was granted (CPLR 5701[c]). The court remitted for entry of a declaratory judgment stating § 21-4(C)(1) is constitutional (per Lanza v Wagner).

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Vagueness doctrine:
  • Matter of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Fin. Servs., 39 NY3d 56: Articulates the modern two-pronged vagueness test—(i) fair notice to persons of ordinary intelligence, and (ii) clear enforcement standards to prevent arbitrary application. The court applied this framework to § 21-4(C)(1).
  • Ulster Home Care v Vacco, 96 NY2d 505; Matter of R.M. v C.M., 226 AD3d 153; Matter of CRP Sanitation, Inc. v Solid Waste Commn., 86 AD3d 608; and Police Benevolent Assn. of the City of New York, Inc. v City of New York, 40 NY3d 417: These cases reinforce the two-part test and the emphasis on preventing ad hoc, discriminatory enforcement.
  • 41 Kew Gardens Rd. Assoc. v Tyburski, 70 NY2d 325: A pivotal citation for the proposition that terms “defined by judicial construction or commonly used in other statutes” are not impermissibly vague. The Second Department relied on this to uphold the “appearance of impropriety” language.
  • References to 22 NYCRR 100.2 and 100.4 (Judicial Conduct Rules), Matter of Sims (State Commn. on Jud. Conduct), 61 NY2d 349; Counties of Warren & Washington, IDA v Village of Hudson Falls Bd. of Health, 168 AD2d 847; and Letizia v Letizia, 117 AD2d 587: Demonstrated that “appearance of impropriety” is entrenched in New York ethics jurisprudence—especially in judicial ethics—and thus carries an understood, objective meaning.
• Administrative review and substantial evidence:
  • Matter of Cruz v NYC OATH, 236 AD3d 651; Matter of Call-A-Head Portable Toilets, Inc. v NYS DEC, 213 AD3d 842; Matter of Sekul v City of Poughkeepsie, 195 AD3d 622; Matter of Formica v Fariello, 186 AD3d 1365; Matter of Diner v NYC HPD, 237 AD3d 1200; Matter of Black v Molina, 234 AD3d 848; Matter of Ciganik v NYC OATH, 224 AD3d 898; Matter of Lisa v NYS DMV, 233 AD3d 870: Together, these cases define “substantial evidence” as more than a scintilla and focus on rationality of inference. They underscore that courts do not reweigh conflicting evidence; deference is owed to the agency’s factfinding and choice among reasonable inferences.
• Land-use ethics and recusal/disclosure:
  • Matter of Titan Concrete, Inc. v Town of Kent, 202 AD3d 972; Matter of Noonan v Chong, 186 AD3d 713: Both support the principle that participation by an official in land-use decisions can create a reasonable appearance of conflict requiring recusal, even absent proof of actual financial gain. These decisions provided direct substantive support for the BOE’s conclusions in Goldstein.
• Due process and bias in administrative adjudication:
  • Matter of Whitehead v Lamanna, 188 AD3d 1224; Matter of Noonan v Chong, 186 AD3d 713: These cases reflect the strong presumption of administrative regularity and impartiality. They guide courts to look to the record for indications of unfairness or actual bias—none of which were found here.
• Declaratory judgment procedure:
  • Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334: In a declaratory judgment action, courts must enter a declaration of rights rather than dismiss; hence the remittal to enter judgment declaring § 21-4(C)(1) constitutional.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The decision proceeds in two primary stages: resolving the constitutional vagueness challenge, then reviewing the BOE’s determination under the substantial evidence standard.

a) Vagueness Analysis

Applying the two-part test from Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, the court held that former § 21-4(C)(1) provides both fair notice and clear enforcement standards.

• Fair notice: The pivotal phrase “appearance of impropriety” is not obscure. It permeates ethics regimes (e.g., judiciary rules) and has been repeatedly invoked by New York courts. Under 41 Kew Gardens, the widespread, judicially construed usage of a term cuts strongly against a finding of vagueness. The Village Code’s surrounding “general prohibitions” further contextualize what conduct is improper, enhancing notice.
• Clear enforcement standards: The court emphasized that the Code “sets forth a standard for commencement of a proceeding,” which helps cabin official discretion and avert arbitrary enforcement. The standard is objective—the “reasonable” appearance of conflict—grounded in a reasonable person’s viewpoint, not subjective suspicion.

The result: The recusal provision, including its “appearance of impropriety” clause, passes constitutional muster. The Supreme Court’s determination to that effect is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to enter a declaratory judgment stating the provision is not unconstitutionally vague.

b) Substantial Evidence Review of the BOE’s Determination

The court reaffirmed classic administrative law tenets: when a determination is made after a hearing required by law, judicial review asks only whether substantial evidence supports it. Courts do not reweigh conflicting evidence; they ask whether the agency’s inferences are reasonable and plausible.

Two separate violations were sustained:

• Recusal violation (former § 21-4(C)): The record showed that Goldstein’s involvement in both the 203 Hommocks Road and Hampshire matters created a reasonable appearance of a conflict of interest or impropriety. Under Titan Concrete and Noonan, such appearances suffice to trigger recusal obligations. Notably, the Code’s language encompasses benefits “financially or otherwise” and extends to both “acting” and “failing to act,” reflecting a broad prophylactic rule.
• Disclosure violation (former § 21-4[N]): The court identified objective, case-specific factors—Goldstein’s proximity to the projects and her susceptibility to the construction impacts—that required on-the-record disclosures to the Board of Trustees at a regular public meeting. Her failure to make those disclosures violated the Code.

c) Due Process and Alleged Bias

Goldstein argued that due process was denied by the participation of an allegedly biased individual on the BOE. The Second Department concluded the hearing was fair and impartial and that the determination did not stem from bias. The ruling aligns with Whitehead and Noonan, which require concrete proof of bias or unfairness; allegations alone, without record support, do not suffice to upset an administrative decision.

d) Procedural Disposition

• The court deemed the notice of appeal to be an application for leave and granted leave under CPLR 5701(c).
• Affirmance on the declaratory judgment issue required remittal for entry of a judgment declaring the Code provision constitutional, consistent with Lanza v Wagner’s directive that courts issue declarations rather than dismissals in DJ actions.
• Costs were awarded to respondents.

3) Impact and Practical Implications

The decision is significant for municipal governance, ethics enforcement, and land-use administration across New York.

• Constitutional validation of “appearance” standards: Local ethics codes that use “appearance of impropriety” as a recusal trigger are on solid constitutional footing in the Second Department. This reduces the viability of vagueness challenges and supports proactive recusal regimes designed to protect public trust, even when no provable actual conflict exists.
• Broader scope of “benefit” and “action”: By acknowledging that benefits can be “financial or otherwise,” and that both action and inaction can violate conflict rules, the opinion underscores the breadth of ethical obligations on board members.
• Objective, fact-driven triggers: Proximity to a project and exposure to construction impacts can, by themselves, create a reasonable appearance of conflict and trigger both recusal and disclosure. Officials should not wait for concrete financial ties; the appearance to a reasonable observer is enough.
• Deference to local ethics boards: The substantial evidence standard affords significant leeway to ethics bodies. Practitioners challenging ethics determinations must focus on deficiencies in the record or procedural unfairness rather than asking courts to reweigh facts.
• Training and compliance: Municipalities should train appointees on recusal and disclosure obligations, emphasizing objective appearance standards and the necessity of on-the-record disclosures at public meetings. Maintaining robust procedures for initiating and documenting ethics proceedings helps forestall claims of arbitrary enforcement.

4) Complex Concepts, Simplified

• Appearance of impropriety: Even if no actual bias or financial gain exists, if a reasonable observer could think an official’s judgment might be compromised, there is an “appearance of impropriety.” Ethics rules aim to preserve public confidence by avoiding such situations.
• Vagueness doctrine: A rule is unconstitutionally vague if ordinary people can’t tell what’s prohibited or if it invites arbitrary enforcement. Courts ask (i) whether there is fair notice and (ii) whether there are clear enforcement standards. Longstanding, commonly used terms interpreted by courts are typically not vague.
• Substantial evidence: This is not a high bar. It means enough relevant proof that a reasonable mind could accept to support a conclusion. Courts do not second-guess how agencies weigh conflicting evidence if the agency’s inference is reasonable.
• Recusal vs. disclosure: Recusal means stepping aside from deliberation and voting on a matter. Disclosure means publicly stating on the record the nature of an interest or relationship so the public and colleagues are informed. Codes often require both—disclose and then recuse where appropriate.
• Hybrid Article 78/declaratory judgment: Article 78 review tests the legality of the agency decision (e.g., substantial evidence). Declaratory judgment determines the validity of a law (e.g., whether an ethics provision is constitutional). When both are raised together, different standards and remedies apply.
• Remittal for entry of judgment: When an appellate court decides a declaratory judgment issue, it sends the case back to the trial court to enter a formal judgment declaring the parties’ rights. This creates a clear, enforceable declaration on the books.

5) Practical Guidance

For municipal board members:

• Assess both actual conflicts and appearances. If a reasonable person could question your impartiality—because of proximity to a project, personal relationships, or foreseeable impacts—disclose and seriously consider recusal.
• Disclose on the record at a regular public meeting, as required by your local code. Written disclosures are valuable, but most codes demand an in-meeting, on-the-record statement.
• When in doubt, consult counsel or the ethics board before participating. Early advice can prevent violations.
• Remember that “failing to act” can also be problematic. Abstaining without a formal recusal and disclosure can still breach ethics rules if your non-participation could indirectly benefit covered persons or create an appearance problem.

For municipalities and ethics boards:

• Retain “appearance of impropriety” language. Goldstein confirms its enforceability in the Second Department.
• Provide concrete examples in training materials: proximity to the site, construction impacts, and non-financial benefits are salient. Make procedures for recusal and disclosure explicit.
• Build a clear record in ethics proceedings: identify objective facts supporting appearance concerns; reference code subsections; document notice, hearing process, and findings. A strong record aids substantial evidence review.
• Adopt and follow clear initiation standards and hearing procedures. This reduces exposure to claims of arbitrary enforcement and due process violations.

Conclusion

Matter of Goldstein delivers a clear message: municipal ethics codes may—and should—reach beyond provable, concrete financial interests to guard against the “appearance of impropriety.” That standard is not constitutionally vague; it is a widely understood, judicially grounded, objective benchmark that affords fair notice and disciplined enforcement.

On the merits, the decision shows how ordinary, objective facts—like a board member’s proximity to development and susceptibility to construction impacts—can create a reasonable appearance of conflict, triggering both recusal and disclosure obligations. Courts will defer to ethics boards’ reasonable factfinding under the substantial evidence standard, and generalized allegations of bias will not undo a fair and orderly hearing.

In the broader legal context, Goldstein strengthens the hand of local governments seeking to preserve public confidence in land-use decision-making. It encourages officials to err on the side of transparency and recusal and supports municipalities in crafting and enforcing robust ethics regimes anchored in objective, appearance-based standards.