“Any” Means “Any”: Eleventh Circuit Removes Temporal Citizenship Barriers in Helms-Burton Title III Actions

Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in José Ramón López Regueiro v. American Airlines, Inc. (No. 23-12568, decided 30 July 2025) is the first published appellate decision squarely holding that Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (“Helms-Burton Act”) does not require:

the owner of confiscated Cuban property to have been a U.S. citizen at the time of confiscation; or
the plaintiff to have been a U.S. citizen at the time he or she acquired an interest in that property.

The case arose after José Ramón López Regueiro—the son of a Cuban businessman whose company owned Havana’s international airport before the 1959 revolution—sued American Airlines for “trafficking” in the expropriated airport by running commercial flights. The district court dismissed his complaint, accepting American Airlines’ argument that Title III silently requires contemporaneous U.S. citizenship. Judge Jill Pryor, writing for a unanimous appellate panel, reversed, concluding that the district court’s additional prerequisites “contradict the plain language of the statute.” The court remanded the matter for further proceedings and, importantly, reaffirmed earlier circuit precedent that shareholders may sue under Title III for confiscations of corporate assets.

Summary of the Judgment

Issue Decided: Whether Title III imposes implicit “citizenship timing” requirements and whether a shareholder can sue for confiscation of corporate property.
Holding: The Act “unambiguously” allows any U.S. national—regardless of when citizenship was obtained—to sue for post-1996 trafficking in property confiscated after January 1, 1959. Shareholders possess a recoverable “claim” under Title III for underlying corporate assets.
Outcome: District court’s dismissal vacated; case remanded.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel threaded its reasoning through a line of Eleventh Circuit decisions interpreting the Helms-Burton scheme:

Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., 57 F.4th 916 (11th Cir. 2023) – defined Title III elements and confirmed plaintiffs’ standing to sue cruise lines for use of expropriated port facilities.
Glen v. Club Méditerranée, S.A., 450 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006) – a pre-activation case containing dicta suggesting contemporaneous citizenship might be required. The panel expressly treated that footnote as non-binding dicta.
Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine Ltd., 135 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. 2025) – decided three weeks earlier; held shareholders have actionable “claims” under Title III even when the corporation, not the shareholder, held legal title to the asset.

By relying chiefly on Garcia-Bengochea (standing) and Fernandez (shareholder claims), the court signaled a coherent, plaintiff-friendly trajectory for Helms-Burton jurisprudence in the Circuit.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Textual Interpretation. The panel adopted a straightforward textualist approach:
Title III makes “any person that traffics… liable to any United States national who owns the claim.” [22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A)]
“Any” receives its ordinary broad meaning absent limiting modifiers. The Act’s definition of “United States national” as “any United States citizen” (§ 6023(15)) likewise reflects breadth, not qualification.
Structural Reading. Congress simultaneously amended the Cuban Claims Act (§ 1643l) to permit referral of Title III suits to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (“FCSC”) “whether or not the United States national qualified… at the time of the [Cuban] action.” Reading Title III together with § 1643l “confirms” the absence of temporal citizenship conditions.
Canons of Interpretation.
- Expressio unius – Congress expressly created one timing limitation: plaintiffs must have acquired the claim (not citizenship) before March 12 1996 for pre-1996 confiscations (§ 6082(a)(4)(B)). Adding citizenship timing would violate the canon.
- Plain-meaning rule – Because the text is unambiguous, legislative findings and purpose clauses (relied upon by the district court and the Glen footnote) cannot create new elements.
Rejection of Corporate-Law “Separate Entity” Objection. Citing Fernandez, shareholders’ indirect ownership qualifies: Title III protects “those who had an interest in confiscated property, including shareholders, even if they did not own the property itself.”

3. Potential Impact

The ruling is poised to reshape Helms-Burton litigation in several ways:

Larger Plaintiff Pool. Naturalized U.S. citizens who were Cuban nationals at the time of confiscation—and heirs who inherited claims before naturalization—now have a clear path to Title III relief in the Eleventh Circuit.
Increased Exposure for Corporate Defendants. Airlines, cruise lines, hotel chains, shipping companies, and financial institutions operating in Cuba face greater litigation risk because they can no longer argue that claimants “arrived too late” to citizenship.
Forum Shopping & Circuit Splits. Other circuits lack binding precedent on the timing issue. If another circuit adopts the stricter view, a split ripe for Supreme Court resolution may emerge.
FCSC Referrals. District courts may increasingly use § 1643l referrals to quantify damages, adding an administrative overlay but also creating valuation consistency across cases.
Settlement Pressure & Diplomatic Stakes. The decision may intensify calls for a global Cuba-U.S. claims settlement, echoing historic settlement programs with Eastern European states.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Helms-Burton Act, Title III. A 1996 U.S. statute allowing U.S. nationals to sue anyone “trafficking” in property the Cuban government seized after the 1959 revolution. The private right of action was suspended by successive presidents until May 2019.
“Trafficking.” Broadly defined commercial use, control, or benefit from confiscated property (e.g., flying planes, docking ships, operating hotels).
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC). A quasi-judicial agency that validates and values foreign-takings claims. Under Helms-Burton, district courts can refer cases to the FCSC even if the claimant was not a U.S. citizen at the time of the taking.
Shareholder vs. Asset Ownership. Traditionally, a corporation owns its assets, while shareholders own shares. Fernandez and now López Regueiro recognize that Title III uses “own the claim” broadly enough to include shareholders injured by confiscations of corporate property.
Timing Cut-Off (March 12 1996). For property taken before that date, the plaintiff (regardless of citizenship status) must have obtained the claim by that date; otherwise, no suit. The court confirmed that this restriction concerns claim acquisition, not citizenship.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit has delivered a robust, text-centric interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act: “Any United States national” means any U.S. citizen holding a claim, without regard to when naturalization occurred. By knocking down the temporal citizenship barriers erected by the district court and reinforcing shareholder standing, the court substantially widens the statute’s reach and solidifies the Eleventh Circuit as a plaintiff-friendly venue for Cuban expropriation litigation. Unless and until Congress amends Title III or the Supreme Court weighs in, corporations engaging with Cuban assets must account for the heightened litigation risk created by this precedent.