“Any Action” Includes Probate Appeals: Rutherford v. Slagle and the Availability of Summary Judgment in De-Novo Probate Proceedings

1. Introduction

In Rutherford v. Slagle, 349 Conn. ___ (May 27, 2025), the Connecticut Supreme Court confronted two intertwined questions: (ol>

The dispute arose between Jeffrey A. Rutherford (plaintiff) and Richard J. Slagle, Esq. (defendant), co-trustees of the William A. Rutherford Trust. When the trustees disagreed on how to distribute the post-mortem trust estate, Slagle obtained a Probate Court decree ordering equal distribution among the settlors’ four children. Rutherford appealed “in toto” to the Superior Court, but in his amended reasons for appeal complained only that discovery in the Probate Court had been curtailed. The trial court granted Slagle’s motion for summary judgment, holding that because the plaintiff never actually sought discovery below there were no material facts in dispute.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court delivered a split but decisive ruling:

• Availability of Summary Judgment: The term “any action” in Practice Book §17-44 encompasses probate appeals. Consequently, parties may invoke summary judgment in de-novo appeals from Probate Court decrees.
• Error in Granting Summary Judgment: The Superior Court nevertheless erred because it failed to conduct the required de novo review of the substantive probate issue—how the trust should be distributed. By limiting its analysis to discovery grievances, the trial court ignored its duty to reconsider the decree anew. The matter is remanded for further proceedings.

3. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Slattery v. Woodin, 90 Conn. 48 (1915) – Previously suggested that probate appeals are not “actions.” The Court distinguished, explaining that Slattery interpreted jury-trial statutes, not Rule §17-44, and that the meaning of “action” varies by context.
• Gardner v. Balboni, 218 Conn. 220 (1991) – Confirmed that a probate appeal without a record is “a trial de novo.” The decision bolstered the Court’s insistence that the Superior Court must ignore the Probate Court’s result and retry the merits.
• Berkeley v. Berkeley, 152 Conn. 398 (1965) & Satti v. Rago, 186 Conn. 360 (1982) – Established that in de-novo probate appeals, the original proponent retains the burden on statutory issues regardless of the appellant’s stated reasons. The Court imported this reasoning to hold the defendant still needed to justify the distribution decree.
• Gipson v. Commissioner, 257 Conn. 632 (2001) & Metcalfe v. Sandford, 271 Conn. 531 (2004) – Provided interpretive principles that the definition of “action” is functional and context-specific.
• Practice Book lineage (1929–2024) – The Court traced amendments to §17-44, noting progressive expansion and the deliberate removal of most categorical exclusions.

B. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Textual Ambiguity Recognised
   The phrase “any action” can reasonably include or exclude probate appeals. Because Practice Book §13-2 expressly lists “probate appeals” while §17-44 does not, ambiguity exists.
2. Genealogical & Functional Interpretation
   The Court looked to the history of §17-44: initial narrow scope (1929), expanding to “any action” except certain enumerated categories, and the later deletion of nearly all exclusions. Because probate appeals were never explicitly excluded, inclusion was deemed more consistent with the rule’s purpose—avoiding unnecessary trials.
3. Purpose of Summary Judgment
   Efficiency and judicial economy are universal values; no policy reason exists to deny them in probate appeals, where factual disputes can be equally or more limited than in ordinary civil actions.
4. Limitation of Superior Court’s Approach
   Even if summary judgment is available, the Superior Court must still decide the same underlying controversy that the Probate Court decided. By narrowing its focus to discovery arguments, it abdicated its de-novo responsibility.
5. Burden of Proof Remains with the Proponent
   Following Berkeley/Satti, Slagle, as proponent of the distribution scheme, bore the burden of proving its correctness in the Superior Court.

C. Potential Impact

• Procedural Toolset Expanded: Litigants in Connecticut probate appeals may now seek summary judgment, enabling earlier resolution of purely legal issues (e.g., construction of instruments, standing, limitations).
• Heightened Strategic Drafting: Appellants must still plead specific “reasons for appeal,” but they—and appellees—must anticipate that the Superior Court will, and now must, examine the entire decree on a de-novo basis.
• Uniformity Across Forums: Because Probate and Superior Courts share concurrent jurisdiction over many trust and estate questions (per §45a-98), availability of summary judgment in both venues ensures consistent procedural expectations.
• Judicial Economy with Safeguards: Trial judges can filter meritless probate appeals without sacrificing substantive review; however, they must beware of granting judgment merely on pleading technicalities.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Probate Appeal

A statutory right allowing an “aggrieved” party to challenge a Probate Court order in the Superior Court. If no transcript (“record”) exists, the Superior Court conducts a brand-new trial.

Trial de novo

Latin for “anew.” The Superior Court hears the matter as though the Probate Court proceedings never occurred—fresh evidence, fresh findings, fresh conclusions.

Practice Book

Connecticut’s codified Rules of Practice which govern procedure in state courts, similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Summary Judgment

A pre-trial mechanism allowing a judge to award judgment when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the movant deserves judgment as a matter of law.

“Reasons of Appeal”

The probate-appeal equivalent of a complaint’s counts: specific statements explaining why the decree is purportedly wrong.

5. Conclusion

Rutherford v. Slagle cements two critical propositions in Connecticut probate jurisprudence:

1. Summary judgment procedure under Practice Book §17-44 applies to probate appeals, rendering them “actions” for that limited procedural purpose.
2. Notwithstanding the new procedural avenue, the Superior Court’s duty in a probate appeal remains a full de novo reassessment of the Probate Court’s decree; technical pleading defects or subsidiary procedural squabbles cannot relieve the decree’s proponent of its substantive burden.

The ruling harmonises efficiency with due process, promising swifter resolutions where appropriate while safeguarding the right to a genuine “second bite” at the apple when statutory probate jurisdiction is invoked. Practitioners should now treat probate appeals as fully equipped civil actions, deploying or defending against summary judgment with the same vigor as in any other Superior Court litigation—yet always mindful that the court must, ultimately, decide the core probate question “afresh and unfettered.”