“An Employer Cannot Aid and Abet Its Own Discriminatory Conduct” –
Commentary on Collins v. Federal Express Corp., 24-1478-cv (2d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

Collins v. Federal Express Corp. is a non-precedential summary order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Although summary orders do not create binding precedent, they often provide persuasive authority and illuminate the court’s application of existing doctrine. This 2025 decision affirms a District of Connecticut judgment granting summary judgment to FedEx on all of Sam Collins’s discrimination, hostile-work-environment, and retaliation claims under:

• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
• The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and
• The Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA).

Collins, a 61-year-old Black ramp-transport driver, alleged that FedEx: (1) aided and abetted discriminatory acts by a white mechanic; (2) subjected him to a racially hostile work environment; (3) terminated him because of race and age; and (4) retaliated for prior complaints. The Second Circuit rejected each theory and, in doing so, underscored several doctrinal points—foremost, that an employer cannot be liable for aiding and abetting its own discriminatory conduct under the CFEPA.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Aiding & Abetting: § 46a-60(b)(5) CFEPA liability lies only against third parties; an employer cannot “aid and abet” its own acts.
• Hostile Work Environment: All alleged harassment occurred outside the 300-day charge-filing window; the “continuing violation” doctrine did not rescue the claim because the one timely act (the termination) was unrelated to the alleged harassment.
• Disparate Treatment (Race & Age): Collins failed to identify any “similarly situated” comparator treated more favorably. The same position was filled by another Black employee of similar age, further weakening any inference of discrimination.
• Retaliation: A 29-month gap between protected complaints and termination is, standing alone, insufficient to establish causation.
• Disposition: Summary judgment for FedEx AFFIRMED.

3. Analytical Commentary

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Farrar v. Town of Stratford, 537 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D. Conn. 2008)
   – Held that an employer cannot aid and abet its own discrimination under CFEPA. The panel relied on Farrar to dispose of Collins’s aiding-and-abetting theory.
2. Delaney v. Bank of America Corp., 766 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2014)
   – Provides the standard of viewing facts in the non-movant’s favor at summary judgment.
3. King v. Aramark Services Inc., 96 F.4th 546 (2d Cir. 2024)
   – Articulates the “continuing violation” doctrine for hostile environments. Distinguished here because the sole timely act (termination) was not tied to earlier harassment.
4. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2000)
   – Sets the “similarly situated in all material respects” standard for comparators in disparate-treatment cases.
5. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001)
   – Establishes that extended temporal gaps (20 months in Clark) negate causal inference for retaliation. The panel applied this logic to a 29-month gap.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Aiding & Abetting (CFEPA § 46a-60(b)(5))
   The court treated the statutory phrase “any person, whether an employer or an employee or not” as permitting liability only when the defendant assists a third party’s discrimination. Where the employer itself performs the discriminatory act, there is logically no separate “aiding” entity.
2. Hostile Work Environment & Limitations
   • 300-day charge-filing requirement applies across Title VII, ADEA, and CFEPA.
   • Continuing-violation doctrine salvages serial harassment only if a related act falls within the limitations period.
   • The panel found the termination investigation to be an independent event, not an extension of the mechanic’s alleged harassment.
3. Disparate Treatment Framework (McDonnell Douglas burden shifting)
   • Prima facie stage: Collins produced no valid comparator; “different treatment” element failed.
   • Employer’s reasons: FedEx cited workplace-violence investigation findings.
   • Pretext: No evidence indicated the stated reasons were false or discriminatory; fact that the replacement was a similarly aged Black employee further undercut pretext.
4. Retaliation Causation
   • Panel applied the “very close” temporal-proximity rule—29 months is too attenuated.
   • Collins offered no additional circumstantial evidence (e.g., supervisory hostility, shifting reasons) bridging the gap.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

• Employer Liability Parameters under CFEPA: Reinforces district-court consensus that aiding-and-abetting liability targets only third-party actors—not the employer itself. Plaintiffs must therefore name individual supervisors or co-workers, or allege discrete corporate entities, when relying on § 46a-60(b)(5).
• Clarification of Continuing Violation Doctrine: Confirms that King v. Aramark’s generous approach still requires a logical link between the timely act and earlier harassment.
• Comparator Stringency: Signals the Second Circuit’s continued insistence on “comparable seriousness” and “same workplace standards” before drawing inference of discrimination.
• Temporal Proximity Threshold: Affirms that gaps surpassing roughly two years will seldom, if ever, suffice to infer retaliation without additional evidence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Order

A short appellate decision without precedential effect, but still citable under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.

Aiding and Abetting (Employment Context)

Claim that a defendant helped someone else commit an unlawful employment practice. Under CFEPA, only a third-party assistant can be liable.

Continuing Violation Doctrine

Allows aggregation of related, repeated discriminatory acts into one “ongoing” claim so long as one act occurred within the limitations period.

Comparator Employee

A co-worker whose disciplinary or employment outcome is measured against the plaintiff’s to prove differential treatment. Must share similar role, misconduct level, and supervisory chain.

Temporal Proximity

The time span between protected activity (e.g., filing a complaint) and adverse action (e.g., firing). Short gaps (days or weeks) may imply causation; long gaps (20+ months) do not.

5. Conclusion

Collins v. FedEx provides a concise yet instructive survey of modern discrimination doctrines as applied in the Second Circuit. The court:

• Reaffirmed that employers cannot “aid and abet” their own wrongdoing under CFEPA.
• Cabined the continuing-violation doctrine by demanding a related timely act.
• Maintained strict comparator and causation requirements to reach trial on disparate-treatment and retaliation claims.

While non-precedential, the decision is likely to be cited by district courts and litigants as persuasive authority on these points, shaping pleading and proof strategies in Connecticut and throughout the Second Circuit.