Introduction

In an unpublished per curiam decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a K–12 Title IX claim brought by LaToya Monroe on behalf of her minor child, ZS, against the Aldine Independent School District. The panel (Judges Jones, Duncan, and Douglas) held that the complaint failed to plausibly allege that an appropriate school official had actual knowledge of sexual misconduct involving ZS prior to February 2023, and—once actual knowledge was acquired—failed to plausibly allege a deliberately indifferent response.

The opinion squarely rejects two common plaintiff theories at the pleading stage: (1) that general behavioral “warning signs” or rule violations (e.g., a child not remaining seated on a school bus) impose a duty to investigate that, if not satisfied, becomes “actual knowledge” for Title IX purposes; and (2) that a child’s own sexualized misconduct necessarily alerts the school to the child’s status as a victim. The court reiterates that Title IX liability requires an official with authority to take corrective action to be aware of facts and actually infer a substantial risk of sexual misconduct, and then to respond in a way that is clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances.

Although unpublished (and thus non-precedential under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5), the opinion is a crisp restatement of the circuit’s demanding “actual knowledge” and “deliberate indifference” requirements and will likely shape district court practice on motions to dismiss in student-on-student Title IX suits.

Case Background and Procedural Posture

ZS attended a school in Aldine ISD during the 2022–2023 year. The complaint alleged:

• Between September and October 2022, older student(s) sexually abused ZS on the school bus. No report of these alleged assaults reached the district during this window.
• In November 2022, the district received a report of “inappropriate touching involving ZS,” identifying ZS as the perpetrator of misconduct against classmates.
• In February 2023, the district discovered bus video showing an older student sexually assaulting ZS. The district immediately notified ZS’s mother and district police and began an investigation. The pleadings did not allege further harm after the investigation began.

After two amendments to the complaint, the district court dismissed the Title IX claim with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding the complaint did not plausibly allege that an appropriate school official had actual knowledge of sexual misconduct targeting ZS before February 2023. Monroe appealed. The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit held:

• September–October 2022 incidents: No Title IX liability lies because the district had no notice of the alleged assaults during that period. A bus-driver note that ZS refused to remain seated did not convey sexual misconduct and did not trigger actual knowledge. The court emphasized that “possible knowledge does not equal actual knowledge.”
• November 2022 incident: The report identified ZS as the perpetrator of inappropriate touching, not the victim. Allegations that a young child’s sexualized behavior is a “warning sign” of victimization, without more, allege at most that the school “should have known.” Title IX requires actual knowledge—i.e., an actual inference by an appropriate official that ZS faced a substantial risk of sexual assault—not constructive notice.
• February 2023 video discovery: At that point, the district undeniably had actual knowledge. But the complaint did not allege that the district’s response was clearly unreasonable or that ZS suffered further harm after notice. The plaintiff did not pursue a “post-notice” deliberate-indifference theory. Accordingly, no Title IX claim was stated as to this episode either.

Result: Affirmance of the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice.

Note: The opinion mentions “February 1, 2025” in one sentence, likely a typographical error, given the factual narrative and earlier references to February 2023.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Sanches v. Carrollton–Farmers Branch ISD, 647 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2011): The court cites Sanches for the anchor proposition that Title IX liability attaches only when an appropriate person—an official with authority to take corrective action—has actual knowledge of sexual harassment or a substantial risk thereof. This frames the inquiry around who knew what, and when.
• Rosa H. v. San Elizario ISD, 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997), incorporating Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994): The panel quotes the Farmer formulation adopted in Rosa H.: the official must both be aware of facts indicating a substantial risk and actually draw the inference. This decisively rejects mere constructive knowledge or negligent failure to investigate as a basis for Title IX liability.
• M.E. v. Alvin ISD, 840 F. App’x 773 (5th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) and J.T. v. Uplift Educ., 679 F. Supp. 3d 540 (N.D. Tex. 2023), aff’d, 2024 WL 5118486 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024): These cases underscore that “should have known” theories are insufficient in this circuit. The panel uses them to reinforce that “warning signs” or general concerns do not cross the actual-knowledge threshold absent allegations that an appropriate official actually inferred a substantial risk to the plaintiff.
• Doe v. Edgewood ISD, 964 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2020) and Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999): These authorities establish the stringent “deliberate indifference” standard: after actual knowledge, the school’s response must be “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” The opinion leverages these to dispose of any post-February claim, noting that the complaint and briefing did not plausibly allege an unreasonable response or post-notice harm.
• Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): The pleading gatekeepers. The court applies the plausibility standard to reject “labels and conclusions” and “naked assertions” of knowledge or indifference without factual enhancement.
• Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2000): The district could attach, and the court could consider, the school bus conduct report at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage because the complaint referenced it and it was central to the claim. That report showed no sexual misconduct notice in the fall of 2022.
• Sonnier v. State Farm, 509 F.3d 673 (5th Cir. 2007) and In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007): These precedents provide the de novo standard of review and the requirement to accept well-pleaded facts as true, but not legal conclusions, at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Legal Reasoning Applied

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three clean steps anchored to the timeline:

1. Fall 2022 alleged assaults (no notice to district): Because the complaint did not allege that any appropriate official knew of these assaults, there could be no Title IX liability. The court rejects the argument that a bus-driver observation (ZS not remaining seated) should have prompted a video review that “might have” uncovered abuse. Title IX does not impose a negligence or “should have discovered” standard. Without allegations that an appropriate official actually inferred a substantial risk of sexual misconduct from known facts, the element of actual knowledge is not satisfied.
2. November 2022 “inappropriate touching” report (ZS as perpetrator): The plaintiff argued that a young child’s sexualized misconduct is a “warning sign” that should trigger an inference that the child is also a victim. The panel characterizes this as at most a “should have known” allegation. Absent facts showing that an appropriate official did, in fact, draw the inference that ZS faced a substantial risk, the actual-knowledge requirement is unmet under Rosa H., Farmer, and Alvin.
3. February 2023 video discovery (actual knowledge achieved): Once the district saw the video, it had actual knowledge of a sexual assault against ZS. But the complaint neither alleged that the district’s response was “clearly unreasonable” nor that ZS suffered post-notice harm. The panel notes plaintiff’s focus on alleged indifference to the November event, not the February response. Without a plausible deliberate-indifference allegation tied to the post-notice period, the claim fails as a matter of law.

What This Opinion Adds

• It crystallizes, in a K–12 setting, that “warning signs” and generalized behavior problems—even those that might prompt a prudent investigation—do not constitute actual knowledge under Title IX absent allegations that an appropriate official actually inferred a substantial risk of sexual misconduct to the plaintiff.
• It underscores the need for plaintiffs to plead a post-notice deliberate-indifference theory, including either a clearly unreasonable response or further actionable harm following actual knowledge.
• It confirms that schools are not strictly liable for failing to proactively review surveillance footage absent triggering notice; Title IX imposes no constructive-knowledge duty.

Impact and Practical Implications

For School Districts

• No duty to proactively scour for misconduct absent notice: Failing to review bus video or to infer abuse from nonspecific misconduct (e.g., not remaining seated) does not create Title IX liability.
• Documentation matters: Contemporaneous reports that specify the nature of a concern (e.g., discipline versus sexual misconduct) can be outcome-determinative at the pleading stage.
• Rapid post-notice action remains critical: Prompt notification of parents and law enforcement and initiation of an investigation, as alleged here, will generally defeat deliberate-indifference claims unless additional post-notice harm or clearly unreasonable decisions are plausibly pled.

For Plaintiffs and Counsel

• Plead the mental state of an appropriate official: Allegations must plausibly show that an official with authority actually drew the inference of a substantial risk to the plaintiff—e.g., through emails, meeting notes, prior complaints naming the plaintiff, or explicit acknowledgments of risk.
• Target the right time window: If actual knowledge was acquired on a certain date, plead how the subsequent response was clearly unreasonable and whether the plaintiff suffered additional harm afterward. Absent post-notice harm, courts may dismiss under Davis’s framework.
• Avoid reliance on “warning signs” alone: Behavioral red flags, standing alone, are classic “should have known” allegations insufficient in the Fifth Circuit.
• Anticipate Rule 12(b)(6) document consideration: Documents referenced in the complaint and central to the claim can be considered on a motion to dismiss (Collins), potentially undercutting conclusory allegations.

On Future Litigation in the Fifth Circuit

Expect continued rigorous enforcement of the actual knowledge threshold in K–12 student-on-student cases, with district courts leaning on Rosa H., Alvin, and Uplift to dismiss complaints grounded in constructive notice. The opinion also implicitly reinforces the “post-notice harm” orientation drawn from Davis: without allegations of further harm or a clearly unreasonable response after actual knowledge arises, Title IX claims will falter.

Because the decision is unpublished, it does not create binding precedent, but it is aligned with existing published Fifth Circuit law and will carry persuasive weight—especially at the pleading stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Actual knowledge vs. constructive knowledge: “Actual knowledge” means an appropriate school official both knew facts suggesting a substantial risk of sexual misconduct and actually drew that inference. “Constructive knowledge”—what the school “should have known” if it had investigated—is insufficient for Title IX liability in the Fifth Circuit.
• Appropriate person: The knowledge must be held by an official with authority to take corrective action (e.g., principal, Title IX coordinator). Knowledge limited to lower-level employees may not suffice unless communicated to an appropriate person.
• Deliberate indifference: After actual knowledge, the school is liable only if its response is “clearly unreasonable” given what it knew. This is a high bar; imperfect or negligent responses generally do not qualify.
• Post-notice harm: In student-on-student cases, courts often ask whether the plaintiff suffered further actionable harassment after the school had notice and responded. Without post-notice harm or a clearly unreasonable response, Title IX claims typically fail.
• Pleading standards (Twombly/Iqbal): Complaints must allege facts that make the claim plausible, not merely possible. Labels, conclusions, and speculation are insufficient.
• Rule 12(b)(6) documents (Collins): Courts can consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss if the complaint references them and they’re central to the claim—important in school cases with incident reports and policy documents.
• Unpublished opinions (5th Cir. R. 47.5): Not binding precedent, but often persuasive and indicative of how the court applies established doctrine to common fact patterns.

Key Takeaways

• Title IX liability in the Fifth Circuit requires more than red flags: it requires proof that an appropriate official actually inferred a substantial risk to the plaintiff.
• Behavioral “warning signs,” including a child’s own sexualized misconduct, do not by themselves satisfy the actual-knowledge requirement.
• Once actual knowledge arises, plaintiffs must plausibly allege a clearly unreasonable response and typically post-notice harm; prompt reporting and investigation will usually defeat deliberate-indifference claims.
• At the pleading stage, courts will scrutinize the complaint’s timeline, the identity and authority of the officials alleged to have knowledge, and any referenced documents that clarify what the school actually knew.

Conclusion

Monroe v. Aldine ISD reinforces the Fifth Circuit’s stringent approach to Title IX liability in K–12 settings. By insisting that actual knowledge requires an actual inference of substantial risk and by reiterating the high bar for deliberate indifference, the court closes the door on negligence-flavored theories rooted in “warning signs” or speculative duties to investigate. For school districts, the decision validates prompt, documented, and reasonable responses to known incidents. For plaintiffs, it underscores the need to plead specific facts showing that an appropriate official actually perceived the risk to the plaintiff and then responded in a way that was clearly unreasonable, causing post-notice harm. While unpublished, the opinion is doctrinally consistent with controlling authority and offers a clear roadmap for how Title IX student-on-student claims will be assessed at the motion-to-dismiss stage in the Fifth Circuit.

Case Metadata

• Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Case: Monroe v. Aldine Independent School District; Superintendent Latonya Goffney
• No.: 25-20057
• Date: September 30, 2025
• Panel: Jones, Duncan, and Douglas, JJ.
• Opinion: Per curiam; not designated for publication (5th Cir. R. 47.5)
• Disposition: Affirmed (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice)

Note on dates: The opinion’s narrative describes discovery of the video in February 2023, but one sentence refers to February 1, 2025. The context strongly suggests a typographical error, with 2023 being the correct date.