Introduction

In Shockley v. Vandergriff, 604 U.S. ___ (2025), the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a capital habeas case that squarely presents an entrenched split among the federal courts of appeals: when 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1) says that a certificate of appealability (COA) may issue if “a circuit justice or judge” grants it, does a single judge’s vote on a panel compel issuance of the COA, or may a panel majority override that vote and dismiss the appeal?

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented from the denial of certiorari. The dissent urges that the statutory text and the COA standard together strongly indicate that one judge’s vote should suffice. The Eighth Circuit, however, dismissed petitioner Lance Shockley’s appeal over one judge’s vote to grant a COA and despite multiple dissents from the denial of rehearing en banc. The dissent would have granted certiorari to resolve this circuit conflict.

Although the Court set no binding precedent by denying review, the dissent articulates a clear rule of decision and provides a roadmap for circuits reconsidering their practices under §2253(c).

Case Background and Procedural Posture

• The parties and underlying case: Lance Shockley was convicted in Missouri of the capital murder of a police officer. At voir dire, a venire member mentioned he had authored a self-published book; neither the court nor defense counsel followed up. That venire member became the jury foreperson.
• Juror misconduct/bias allegations: After the guilty verdict, defense counsel learned that the foreperson’s book was a fictionalized autobiography depicting a graphic revenge killing of a defendant who had caused the protagonist’s wife’s death in a drunk-driving incident, and that the foreperson brought the book into guilt-phase deliberations and shared it with jurors (Shockley v. State, 579 S.W.3d 881, 893 (Mo. 2019)).
• Trial court hearing opportunity declined: The trial court offered the defense an opportunity to call jurors at a mistrial hearing; counsel declined to call any witnesses (State v. Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 179, 201 (Mo. 2013)). The court removed the foreperson for sentencing but left the guilt verdict intact. The jury deadlocked on sentencing; the court imposed a death sentence.
• State appellate/postconviction proceedings: On direct appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a plain-error challenge given counsel’s refusal to call witnesses. In postconviction proceedings, the court held counsel was not ineffective for declining to develop the record; Judge Stith dissented, finding no valid strategy for that decision (579 S.W.3d at 921).
• Federal habeas and COA: After the federal district court denied habeas relief, Shockley sought a COA in the Eighth Circuit. Judge Kelly voted to grant a COA on one claim; two panel judges voted to deny, and the appeal was dismissed. Two judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc.
• Supreme Court proceedings: The Court denied certiorari. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented, urging resolution of the COA-issuance question.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent contends:

• There is an entrenched circuit split on whether a single circuit judge’s vote to grant a COA is dispositive. The Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits treat one judge’s vote as sufficient. The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth have allowed a panel majority to deny a COA notwithstanding a judge’s vote to grant.
• The statutory text—“a circuit justice or judge” in §2253(c)(1)—signals that any one judge may grant a COA, contrasting with provisions that require action by “the court of appeals” or a “majority” under 28 U.S.C. §46(d).
• The COA standard is “debatability” among reasonable jurists, not ultimate merit. A judge’s vote to grant is itself strong evidence of debatability, warranting appeal.
• Efficiency and fairness favor proceeding to merits after any judge votes to grant a COA—especially given the abbreviated motion practice at the COA stage, the general absence of oral argument, and the fact that COA grants often trigger appointment of counsel for indigent appellants.
• The Eighth Circuit’s approach deprived Shockley of appellate review of an obviously debatable ineffective-assistance claim arising from counsel’s refusal to call jurors at a mistrial hearing despite the trial court’s invitation to do so.

The dissent would have granted certiorari to decide whether courts of appeals may dismiss an appeal after a judge votes to issue a COA. The denial leaves the split unresolved but invites circuits to reconsider their rules in light of §2253’s text and purpose.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) and Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983): These decisions articulate the COA threshold: a certificate should issue when “reasonable jurists could debate” the district court’s resolution or when issues are “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further” (Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, quoting Barefoot).
• Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) and Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017): The Court reaffirmed that COA review is a threshold, non-merits determination; it is not a demand that the petitioner prove entitlement to relief, nor even that some jurist would ultimately grant habeas. The question is whether the claim is debatable among jurists of reason (Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 338; Buck, 580 U.S. at 115, 122).
• Textual canons and statutory comparators: The dissent relies on Congress’s “careful” word choices (Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 172 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)) and the presumption that different words carry different meanings (Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274, 279 (2018); Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 86 (2017)). Unlike statutes that require action by “the court of appeals” or a majority of a panel—see 28 U.S.C. §46(d); §§2342, 2349(b)—§2253(c)(1) authorizes “a circuit justice or judge” to issue a COA.
• Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018): Cited for the institutional interest in maintaining public perception of fairness and respect for litigants, supporting an approach that affords merits consideration to debatable claims.
• Johnson v. Vandergriff, 600 U.S. ___ (2023) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting): Quoted for the commonsense proposition that disagreement among judges “might be thought to indicate that reasonable minds could differ” on a claim’s resolution.
• Rules and circuit practices evidencing the split: - Seventh Circuit: Thomas v. United States, 328 F.3d 305, 309 (7th Cir. 2003) (single judge may grant COA).
  - Third Circuit: Rule 22.3 (2011) (similar).
  - Fourth Circuit: Rule 22(a)(3) (2023) (single judge authority derives from §2253).
  - Ninth Circuit: General Order 6.3(b) (2024) (any one judge on the assigned panel may grant or expand COA).
  - Eighth Circuit: Williams v. Kelley, 858 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2017) (panel majority may deny despite a vote to grant).
  - Fifth Circuit: Crutsinger v. Davis, 929 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 2019) (similar).
  - Tenth Circuit: United States v. Ellis, 779 F. App’x 570 (10th Cir. 2019) (similar).
• Appellate procedure constraints at the COA stage: The dissent notes the abbreviated nature of COA motion practice—limited words and presumptive denial of oral argument (Fed. R. App. P. 27(d)(2), 27(e), 28.1(e)(2))—and that COA grants often trigger appointment of counsel (e.g., Third Circuit I.O.P. 10.3.2 (2018); Fourth Circuit Rule 22(a)).
• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): The governing standard for ineffective assistance claims—deficient performance and prejudice—frames Shockley’s underlying habeas claim. The dissent underscores how counsel’s refusal to call juror-witnesses at a court-invited mistrial hearing is at least debatable under Strickland.

Legal Reasoning in the Dissent

• Textual argument: Section 2253(c)(1) conditions the right to take an appeal on the issuance of a COA by “a circuit justice or judge.” Congress knows how to require collective action by “the court of appeals” or by “a majority” (see §46(d)), yet chose the singular, individual-authority formulation here. Under standard interpretive canons, the different choice of words carries a different legal effect: the decision to issue a COA may be made by any one circuit judge.
• Harmonization with the COA standard: The COA threshold is intentionally low: debate among reasonable jurists is enough. When at least one federal judge determines that a claim is worthy of encouragement to proceed, that determination itself is strong evidence that the claim is debatable. Aligning the decisionmaker (any one judge) with the standard (debatability) avoids internal inconsistency in the COA regime.
• Institutional efficiency and fairness: Because COA determinations should be relatively noncontentious, prolonged panel disputes and en banc skirmishes at the certificate stage are counterproductive. If the question divides judges, the more efficient and legitimate response is to grant the COA and proceed to merits briefing and argument before a full merits panel. This is particularly compelling where COA denial cuts off counsel appointment for indigent prisoners and where capital sentences are at stake.
• Application to Shockley: The merits issue—whether counsel was ineffective for declining to call jurors at a court-invited mistrial hearing to probe juror bias and misconduct—is plainly debatable, as evidenced by dissenting views in the Missouri Supreme Court, disagreement among Eighth Circuit judges, and the vote of an Eighth Circuit judge to grant the COA. Under the dissent’s view, that single grant vote should have compelled issuance of a COA and allowed full appellate consideration.

Impact and Prospective Consequences

• Immediate effect: The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari leaves the circuit split intact. In the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, a single judge’s vote to grant a COA remains sufficient; in the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth, a panel may deny despite a grant vote by one judge.
• Access to appellate review: In single-judge-grant circuits, habeas petitioners have a clearer, more predictable path to appellate merits review when any judge sees debatable issues. In the contrary circuits, petitioners face a higher, panel-majority gate at the threshold, which can be outcome-determinative given the COA’s role as a jurisdictional prerequisite.
• Appointment of counsel and development of the record: Because COA grants often trigger appointment of counsel, jurisdictions that require a panel majority for a COA may systematically reduce counseled appellate review in indigent cases, particularly troubling in capital cases and complex ineffective-assistance claims that benefit from professional briefing.
• Judicial economy and legitimacy: The dissent posits that allowing a single judge to grant promotes efficiency (avoiding extended certificate-stage litigation) and enhances public confidence by ensuring that debatable constitutional claims receive merits consideration rather than summary dismissal.
• Incentive for circuit rulemaking: The dissent expressly invites courts of appeals to reevaluate their operating rules and local practices to align with §2253’s text and purpose, even absent Supreme Court resolution. Expect targeted proposals to clarify that any judge on the assigned panel may grant or expand a COA and that such a grant is dispositive of the threshold.
• Substantive habeas jurisprudence: While the dispute concerns a procedural gateway, the downstream effect is substantive: more debatable claims reaching full merits review may incrementally refine standards for ineffective assistance, juror bias, and trial fairness, especially in cases involving juror misconduct and counsel’s duty to develop the record when invited by the trial court.

Application of the Dissent’s Framework to Shockley’s Claim

The dissent uses Shockley’s case to illustrate why a single-judge COA rule matters. The underlying claim alleges ineffective assistance where counsel declined the trial court’s invitation to call jurors to explore a foreperson’s potential bias and misconduct—the foreperson authored a revenge-murder book mirroring the case’s core facts and brought it into deliberations. Under Strickland, whether declining to call juror-witnesses in a capital case at a court-invited hearing can be reasonable strategy is at least debatable. Because one Eighth Circuit judge voted to grant a COA and other judges dissented at multiple stages, the case exemplifies the “reasonable jurists could debate” threshold. On the dissent’s view, the Eighth Circuit erred in treating the claim as not even debatable and dismissing the appeal despite a grant vote.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. §2254/§2255): A postconviction procedure allowing prisoners to challenge the legality of their detention based on constitutional or jurisdictional defects.
• Certificate of Appealability (COA): A statutory prerequisite to appeal from a habeas denial. A COA issues if the applicant makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” which the Supreme Court has construed to mean that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s disposition or that the issues warrant further encouragement.
• “A circuit justice or judge” (§2253(c)(1)): The statutory phrase authorizing either a Supreme Court Justice assigned to the circuit or any individual circuit judge to issue a COA. The dispute is whether a panel majority may override a single judge’s grant vote.
• Panel majority vs. single-judge authority: Many appellate actions require a majority of the panel or the court (see §46(d)). A single-judge power is exceptional and must be grounded in statute or rule. The dissent argues §2253(c) is such a grant.
• Voir dire / venire: Voir dire is the process of questioning potential jurors (the venire) to identify bias and select an impartial jury.
• Plain error: A standard allowing appellate correction of unpreserved errors affecting substantial rights and the fairness and integrity of proceedings; Missouri’s decisions here turned on counsel’s choices that limited plain-error review.
• Ineffective assistance (Strickland): A Sixth Amendment claim requiring a showing that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strategic choices can be reasonable, but failing to investigate or develop critical evidence—especially when the court invites it—can be constitutionally deficient.
• En banc rehearing: Review by all active judges of a circuit (or a larger en banc panel) to resolve intra-circuit conflicts or address questions of exceptional importance. Dissents from denial of en banc review often signal the debatability of an issue.

Conclusion

Shockley v. Vandergriff does not establish new Supreme Court precedent; the Court declined to resolve the question. But Justice Sotomayor’s dissent crystallizes a coherent rule grounded in statutory text, the Supreme Court’s COA jurisprudence, and institutional values: under §2253(c)(1), a single circuit judge’s vote to grant a COA should be sufficient to permit an appeal to proceed. The alternative practice—allowing a panel majority to veto a grant vote—sits uneasily with the statutory language, the deliberately modest COA threshold, and the practical realities of COA proceedings, including limited briefing, presumptive lack of argument, and the often decisive role of COA in appointing counsel for indigent prisoners.

The case vividly illustrates the stakes. Shockley’s ineffective-assistance claim—rooted in counsel’s refusal to call jurors at a court-invited mistrial hearing despite evidence of potential juror bias—has divided judges in multiple forums. That very division is the hallmark of debatability. Until the Supreme Court resolves the split, the circuits remain free to recalibrate their rules to align with §2253’s text and the COA standard, thereby ensuring that debatable constitutional claims, especially in capital cases, receive appellate merits consideration rather than summary dismissal at the gateway.