Zherka v. Bondi – The Second Circuit Confirms Congress’s Power to Disarm All Felons, Violent or Not, Without Individualized Review

1. Introduction

In Zherka v. Bondi, Docket No. 22-1108-cv (decided 9 June 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted two questions that have lingered in the wake of District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and, more recently, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022):

Does the categorical federal ban on firearm possession by all felons in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) survive the Supreme Court’s new history-and-tradition test—even when the felony is non-violent?
Do due-process principles require the Government to afford an individualized determination of dangerousness before stripping a felon of Second-Amendment rights?

The plaintiff, Selim Zherka (“Sam”), pled guilty to a large-scale financial conspiracy—nonviolent but nonetheless felony conduct. Having completed his sentence, he sought a declaration that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him or, alternatively, that he is entitled to a procedure (akin to the long-dormant § 925(c) restoration mechanism) to prove that he is not dangerous.

The district court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that:

(i) under Bruen and Rahimi, Congress’s choice to disarm felons as a class is solidly grounded in the Nation’s historical tradition, and
(ii) because the statute turns solely on the fact of conviction, procedural due process does not mandate a person-specific hearing.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Second-Amendment claim: Applying Bruen’s two-step text-and-history framework, the Court agreed that felons are part of “the people,” so the burden shifted to the Government to show a historical analogue. Surveying English, colonial, and early-American laws that categorically disarmed various groups deemed dangerous, the panel (Newman, Lynch, Pérez, JJ.) concluded that § 922(g)(1) comfortably fits within that tradition—even for nonviolent felons.
• Due-process claim: Relying on Connecticut Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe (2003), the Court found no liberty interest in an individualized assessment because the statute turns exclusively on a valid conviction, a fact already adjudicated with full criminal process.
• Holding: Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional both facially (citing the Circuit’s pre-Bruen precedent United States v. Bogle) and as applied to a nonviolent felon; there is no constitutional requirement to revive § 925(c) or create another danger-assessment mechanism.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) – Identified “long-standing prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” as “presumptively lawful.” The Second Circuit treats this statement as still operative.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) – Incorporated the Second Amendment against the States; reaffirmed Heller’s “presumptively lawful” footnote.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) – Replaced means-end scrutiny with a text-and-history test; allowed shall-issue licensing that screens out “non-law-abiding, non-responsible” actors.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) – Upheld § 922(g)(8) (domestic-violence restraining-order disarmament) based on historical analogues regulating “dangerous” persons; confirmed that analogues need not be “dead ringers.”
United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013) – Pre-Bruen approval of § 922(g)(1) facially; survives because Bruen did not disturb Heller’s felon carve-out.
Connecticut Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) – No individualized hearing required when a restriction is triggered by a valid conviction.
Other circuit decisions (Duarte, Hunt, Vincent) reaffirming the felon-in-possession ban after Bruen/Rahimi are marshalled for persuasive support.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step 1 – Text
• Felons are still “the people.” The Court rejected arguments that past criminality removes a person from the constitutional community.
Step 2 – History & Tradition
• Severity gap explained: Colonial-era felonies were often capital; thus, few historical “felon-disarmament” statutes exist.
• Status-based disarmament: Laws disarmed Catholics, Loyalists, slaves, free Blacks, Native Americans, and “tramps.” Although objectionable today, they demonstrate legislative authority to bar whole classes viewed as dangerous, without individualized findings.
• Continuity: Modern § 922(g)(1) is merely the twentieth-century manifestation of that longstanding approach.
• Not a ‘dead-ringer’ standard: Rahimi allows looser analogies when societal conditions differ.
As-Applied dimension
• The Court rebuffed the Sixth Circuit’s dicta in Williams suggesting non-violent felons deserve a carve-out because history shows no tradition of mandatory exceptions.
• Congress’s defunding of § 925(c) reflects a policy choice courts must respect.
Due-Process analysis
• Because § 922(g)(1) hinges exclusively on a conviction—already decided with full procedural safeguards—no further hearing is constitutionally required (Doe).

3.3 Likely Impact

Second-Circuit practice: Litigants challenging § 922(g)(1) (or similar state provisions) on the ground that their crimes were “non-violent” now face a formidable barrier.
National split narrowed: The decision aligns with the Fourth, Ninth (en banc), Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, leaving the Sixth (dicta) and Third (Range) as the principal outliers.
Due-process challenges dampened: Plaintiffs cannot demand dangerousness hearings absent statutory authorization; political, not judicial, remedy is signalled.
Legislative incentives: If Congress wishes to create a narrow relief valve, it must fund (or redesign) a restoration program; courts will not compel it.
Future as-applied litigation: Challenges by misdemeanants or those convicted of very old offenses may pivot to different historical arguments, but Zherka significantly tightens the window.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 922(g)(1): A federal statute making it a crime for anyone convicted of “a crime punishable by more than one year” (felony) to possess firearms or ammunition.
As-Applied v. Facial Challenge: A facial challenge attacks a law in all circumstances; an as-applied challenge concedes the statute is generally valid but unconstitutional for this person or set of facts.
Bruen Test: Step 1 – Does the Second Amendment’s text cover the conduct? Step 2 – If so, does historical tradition nonetheless allow the regulation?
Categorical Approach: A method (familiar from sentencing law) that looks only at the legal elements of the prior crime, not its factual circumstances, when classifying offenses as violent or nonviolent.
Section 925(c): A dormant provision letting felons petition the Attorney General to restore gun rights by proving they are not dangerous; Congress has withheld funds since 1992.
Procedural Due Process: The constitutional requirement that the Government provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard when it adjudicates new facts that affect liberty or property; it does not apply when a statute relies solely on an existing valid conviction.

5. Conclusion

Zherka v. Bondi cements, within the Second Circuit, a principle only hinted at post-Bruen: the categorical felon-in-possession ban stands regardless of violence, and courts will not force Congress to create individualized exemptions. By rooting its analysis in centuries-old status-based disarmament laws—and expressly acknowledging their moral infirmities—the Court reaffirms that constitutional interpretation under Bruen depends on historical practice, not modern policy preferences. The decision thus supplies a roadmap for evaluating other “status” prohibitions (mental-health, age, domestic-violence, etc.) and signals that any relief for nonviolent felons must originate with the political branches, not the judiciary.