Zheng v. Bondi – The Second Circuit’s Reinforced Approach to Cumulative Inconsistencies and Corroborative Evidence in Immigration Credibility Determinations

1. Introduction

In Zheng v. Bondi, No. 22-6178 (2d Cir. June 11, 2025) (summary order), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied a Chinese national’s petition for review after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) adverse credibility finding. Although rendered as a non-precedential summary order, the decision is an instructive refresher on how the Second Circuit evaluates cumulative inconsistencies and corroborative shortcomings in asylum, withholding, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims.

The petitioner, Wanri Zheng, asserted that Chinese authorities persecuted and would continue to persecute him for attending an underground Christian church. The IJ found Zheng not credible, pointing to several inconsistencies and a lack of persuasive corroboration; the BIA agreed. Zheng petitioned for review, arguing the credibility ruling lacked substantial evidence. The Second Circuit—applying its well-settled “substantial evidence” review—upheld the agency’s assessment.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Scope of Review: The court reviewed only those aspects of the IJ’s decision that the BIA expressly adopted (Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268).
Standard Applied: Substantial-evidence review for factual findings, requiring that no reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion (Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67).
Main Holding: Three core inconsistencies—(1) the name of the individual who introduced Zheng to Christianity, (2) the frequency of his church attendance, and (3) whether police sought him—coupled with weak corroboration, supplied substantial evidence to sustain the adverse credibility determination.
Outcome: Petition for review denied; claims for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief failed because they all rested on the discredited factual predicate.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Yan Chen v. Gonzales (2005) – Confirmed that the appellate court looks to the IJ’s reasoning only to the extent adopted by the BIA, limiting the review scope.
Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions (2018) – Elaborated on the totality-of-the-circumstances test for credibility; quoted here for the “specific and cogent reasons” requirement.
Singh v. Garland (2021) – Re-affirmed the “specific and cogent” articulation standard.
Likai Gao v. Barr (2020) – Emphasized that even one inconsistency may suffice; several inconsistencies only fortify the finding.
Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey (2008) – Provides the deferential posture: courts will not disturb credibility findings unless no reasonable fact-finder could hold them.
Majidi v. Gonzales (2005) – Petitioner must show a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to accept his explanation for discrepancies.
Biao Yang v. Gonzales (2007) – Failure to corroborate can shore up an adverse credibility finding.
Y.C. v. Holder (2013) – Affords the agency leeway in weighing documentary evidence.

These precedents collectively supply a framework in which minor inconsistencies, weak corroboration, and departures from written statements interplay to sustain an adverse credibility determination. Zheng applies each precedent sequentially: articulating specific reasons, viewing them cumulatively, and then declining to reweigh the evidence.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Cumulative Inconsistencies: The panel reiterated that inconsistencies need not go to the “heart” of the claim; any relevant inconsistency may suffice (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). Zheng had three:
- Name of the proselytizer: initial ignorance vs. later disclosure of “Uncle Ling.”
- Attendance frequency: written once every 1–2 months versus oral twice monthly.
- Police interest: written “police came several times” versus initial oral “do not know.”
Failure to Persuasively Explain Discrepancies: Invoking Majidi, the court found Zheng’s explanations—“I only knew a last name,” “I didn’t pay attention,” “I misheard”—insufficient to compel a contrary finding.
Corroboration Deficit: The IJ discounted an unsworn letter from Zheng’s wife and a U.S. baptismal certificate, noting the absence of evidence from the Chinese congregation or U.S. church members. Under Biao Yang and Y.C., this further undermined Zheng’s credibility.
Dispositive Effect on All Relief: Because asylum, withholding, and CAT claims shared the same factual core, the single adverse credibility finding foreclosed all three (Hong Fei Gao).

3.3 Potential Impact

Although a summary order lacks precedential value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it nevertheless:

Reinforces the Second Circuit’s tolerance for IJs relying on multiple minor inconsistencies rather than a single “smoking gun.”
Signals that unsworn, interested-party letters will rarely rescue a credibility-beset claim, especially where other, more objective evidence could be produced.
Encourages practitioners to marshal contemporaneous, third-party documentation—particularly from religious organizations—when the claim centers on religious activity.
Illustrates the utility of the “cumulative approach” in agency adjudications, an approach likely to be invoked in future immigration matters and persuasive in sister circuits.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial Evidence Standard: A deferential form of appellate review; the court asks whether a reasonable fact-finder could reach the same conclusion, not whether it agrees with the conclusion.
Adverse Credibility Determination: A finding by the IJ that the applicant’s testimony is not believable. One inconsistency can suffice; multiple inconsistencies strengthen the determination.
Cumulative Inconsistency Doctrine: The principle that several small discrepancies, viewed together, may justify disbelief even if each individually appears trivial.
Corroborative Evidence: Independent documents or testimony that support the applicant’s story (e.g., church letters, arrest warrants). Weak or absent corroboration can reinforce an adverse credibility finding.
CAT Relief: Protection under the Convention Against Torture requires proving it is more likely than not that the applicant would be tortured with government acquiescence if removed.

5. Conclusion

Zheng v. Bondi underscores the Second Circuit’s unwavering adherence to the principle that credibility rulings rest squarely within the fact-finder’s province, subject only to substantial-evidence review. The decision highlights four practical lessons:

Even seemingly peripheral inconsistencies matter when aggregated.
Applicants must proactively provide robust, objective corroboration—unsworn or interested-party letters rarely suffice.
Explaining discrepancies at the hearing stage is critical; cursory explanations almost never negate an adverse inference.
An adverse credibility determination extinguishes all derivative relief when the claims share the same factual basis.

While non-precedential, Zheng offers a potent, easily citable (as “Summary Order”) primer for litigants and adjudicators on the mechanics of credibility analysis, the evidentiary burden on asylum applicants, and the jurisprudential harmony among Second Circuit cases on these points.