Younger Abstention Covers Connecticut Probation-Violation Proceedings Through Appeal and Requires Staying § 1983 Damages While Dismissing/Deferring Equitable Relief

Introduction

In Torres v. Off. of Adult Prob. (2d Cir. Dec. 30, 2025) (amended summary order), plaintiff-appellant Anthony Torres, a convicted sex offender on Connecticut probation, sued multiple state offices and individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Torres alleged that defendants violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments—and intentionally inflicted emotional distress—by modifying probation conditions without due process and by imposing restrictive conditions, including his placement in a treatment facility (the “January Center”) after completion of his prison sentence.

While Torres’s federal case was pending, he faced a Connecticut probation “violation of probation” charge (“VOP”) and pursued state appellate review. The central question on appeal was whether the federal court properly abstained under Younger v. Harris from adjudicating Torres’s equitable claims and from moving forward on damages while the state matter remained ongoing.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of Younger abstention. It held that Torres’s state VOP proceeding was “ongoing” for Younger purposes because state appellate remedies were still available and, in fact, being pursued while the federal action was pending. The court rejected Torres’s arguments that the state proceeding was not “pending” merely because his VOP hearing had concluded, or because he anticipated focusing his state appeal on factual issues rather than constitutional claims.

The court further concluded that Connecticut VOP proceedings can provide an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges to probation conditions, citing State v. Imperiale as an example where such defenses were litigated.

Finally, the panel noted that Torres’s state case had since concluded, meaning the district court is now free to lift the stay on Torres’s monetary claims. The court also indicated Torres may seek leave to assert or re-assert any equitable claims that are not moot.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971): The foundational abstention doctrine. The panel applied Younger to avoid federal interference with state enforcement proceedings—here, a VOP prosecution and related appellate process—emphasizing comity and respect for state functions.
Disability Rts. N.Y. v. New York, 916 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2019): Provided the appellate standard of review—de novo—for determining whether Younger abstention requirements are met.
Diamond "D" Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2002): Supplied the Second Circuit’s familiar three-part framework: (1) ongoing state proceeding; (2) important state interest; (3) adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Also reinforced the circuit’s “strong policy in favor of abstention.”
Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013): Used to articulate the purposes behind Younger—avoiding duplication, preventing erosion of state adjudicative processes, and respecting state functions.
Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1988): Characterized parallel federal suits interfering with state criminal proceedings as “classic” cases for abstention, supporting the district court’s approach given the VOP prosecution’s criminal-enforcement character.
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (and cited persuasive authority Tokyo Gwinnett, LLC v. Gwinnett County, 940 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2019)): Addressed timing: Younger can apply even when state proceedings begin after the federal complaint, so long as the federal court has not engaged in substantive merits proceedings. Although the panel did not need to reach the issue (Torres did not press it), its inclusion underscores how broadly “ongoing” can be construed.
Gristina v. Merchan, 131 F.4th 82 (2d Cir. 2025): Key to the “ongoing proceeding” holding: a matter remains pending for Younger if further state appellate remedies are available. Also contributed the rule that abstention is assessed at the time of the federal court’s relevant action and is not continuously re-evaluated as circumstances later change.
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975): Reinforced that the “evils” targeted by Younger—federal intrusion—exist if intervention occurs before completion of state appellate review. This directly defeated Torres’s effort to treat the end of the VOP hearing as the end of “pendency.”
Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003): Central to rejecting Torres’s “uncertainty” arguments. The panel relied on Spargo for two propositions: (1) uncertainties about scope/availability of state remedies are resolved in favor of abstention; and (2) the plaintiff bears the burden to show state remedies are inadequate—mere ambiguity is insufficient.
Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 2004): Supported abstention where the federal claims would necessarily implicate factual issues pending in the state proceeding. The panel used this to show that even “factual” state litigation can be enough to trigger abstention if federal adjudication would collide with it.
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982): Anchored the “adequate opportunity” element: the question is whether the plaintiff has an opportunity to raise federal issues in state proceedings, not whether he actually did so.
State v. Imperiale, 337 Conn. 694 (2021): The most fact-specific authority cited. It demonstrated that Connecticut VOP defendants may raise Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to probation conditions—precisely contradicting Torres’s claim that the state proceeding had “no room” for constitutional issues.
Pathways, Inc. v. Dunne, 329 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2003): Cited for the post-abstention procedural consequence: once the state case ends, the district court may lift any stay and allow federal claims—particularly damages claims—to proceed.

Legal Reasoning

Ongoing state proceeding included the appellate phase. Torres argued Younger should not apply because the VOP hearing had concluded. The panel held that, for Younger purposes, a proceeding remains “pending” if appellate remedies are available and being pursued. Torres conceded his appeal was “still live” while the federal action was pending; under Gristina v. Merchan and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., that concession was decisive.
Speculation about what can be argued on appeal does not defeat abstention. Torres suggested Connecticut law “conceivably” barred him from raising certain constitutional issues on appeal and that he planned to focus on factual issues. The court refused to treat such predictions as negating “pendency” or “adequacy,” emphasizing that uncertainties are resolved in favor of abstention and that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving inadequacy (Spargo).
State VOP proceedings provided an adequate opportunity to raise federal constitutional claims. Torres asserted the state VOP proceeding was too narrow to litigate constitutional issues. The panel rejected this, pointing to State v. Imperiale, where the defendant challenged the January Center-related condition under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n and Spargo, the relevant inquiry is opportunity, not whether Torres chose to raise the claims.
Parallel factual issues made federal intervention especially problematic. The court emphasized that the state VOP case and federal case overlapped: both concerned the probation conditions (including the January Center requirement) and the factual circumstances surrounding those conditions. Citing Washington v. County of Rockland, the court reinforced that when federal claims would implicate factual issues pending in state proceedings, abstention (often via stay) is appropriate.
Procedural disposition: equitable claims dismissed, damages stayed; stay can be lifted after state case ends. The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of declaratory/injunctive claims and its stay of monetary claims during the pendency of the state proceedings. Importantly, the panel acknowledged the state case has since concluded, meaning the district court may lift the stay and proceed on damages (Pathways, Inc. v. Dunne). It also left open the possibility that Torres could seek leave to assert non-moot equitable claims.

Impact

Although issued as a nonprecedential summary order, the decision consolidates several practical points likely to guide litigants and district courts in the Second Circuit:

“Ongoing” includes appeals: A VOP matter remains “pending” under Younger through completion of state appellate review, limiting federal court involvement even after a trial-level hearing ends.
Burden on the federal plaintiff: Plaintiffs challenging probation conditions must do more than hypothesize limits in state law; they must demonstrate state remedies are inadequate, and ambiguity will be resolved toward abstention.
Constitutional defenses belong in VOP proceedings: By highlighting State v. Imperiale, the order signals that Connecticut VOP proceedings are a viable forum for Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment challenges to probation conditions, especially those tied to treatment placements like the January Center.
Stay of damages as a safety valve: The order underscores a common structuring: damages claims may be stayed (rather than dismissed) to avoid interference while preserving a federal forum once state proceedings conclude.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Younger abstention: A doctrine requiring federal courts to refrain from deciding cases that would interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings, especially state criminal prosecutions, out of respect for state courts and to avoid duplicative litigation.
“Ongoing” state proceeding: Not limited to the trial-level hearing. If the case is on appeal (or appeal is still available), it is generally still “pending” for Younger purposes.
Adequate opportunity to raise federal issues: The question is whether state procedures allow the party to raise constitutional arguments—not whether the party actually raised them or whether the state court is expected to agree.
Stay vs. dismissal: A stay pauses a claim (often damages) until the state case finishes; a dismissal ends the claim in federal court (often used for equitable relief that would directly interfere with the state proceeding).
VOP (Violation of Probation) proceeding: A state proceeding determining whether a person on probation violated probation conditions, potentially resulting in additional penalties or modifications.

Conclusion

Torres v. Off. of Adult Prob. reaffirms a robust application of Younger abstention to probation-violation litigation: a Connecticut VOP case remains “ongoing” through appeal, and federal courts should avoid adjudicating constitutional attacks on probation conditions while that state process is live—especially where the same facts and conditions are at issue and state law provides an opportunity to raise constitutional defenses (as illustrated by State v. Imperiale). At the same time, the decision preserves a path forward for plaintiffs by indicating that stayed damages claims may proceed once the state proceedings end and that non-moot equitable claims may be sought anew in district court.