Younger Abstention and Probation Violation Appeals: Commentary on Torres v. Office of Adult Probation (2d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s summary order in Torres v. Office of Adult Probation, No. 23-8084 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), a federal civil-rights case brought by Anthony Torres, a convicted sex offender in Connecticut, challenging the conditions of his probation and his placement at a sex-offender treatment facility known as the “January Center.”

Torres sued various state entities and individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the modification and enforcement of his probation conditions violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. Among his core grievances was his continued confinement at the January Center after completing his prison sentence, which he claimed amounted to unconstitutional punishment and unlawful restraint of liberty.

While his federal suit was pending, the State of Connecticut prosecuted Torres for a probation violation (“VOP”), based on many of the same conditions he attacked in federal court. The district court, invoking the doctrine of Younger abstention, dismissed his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and stayed his damages claims. Torres appealed, arguing principally that abstention was inappropriate because his VOP hearing had ended, and because he allegedly lacked an adequate opportunity in state court to raise his federal constitutional issues.

The Second Circuit (Judges Chin, Sullivan, and Lee) affirmed. Although the opinion is a non-precedential “summary order,” it provides a detailed and instructive application of Younger abstention where:

a state probation-violation prosecution is ongoing (including on appeal), and
a federal § 1983 challenge attacks the very same probation conditions and underlying facts.

The decision clarifies several key points:

A state criminal matter remains “pending” for Younger purposes so long as appellate remedies are available.
The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that state procedures do not provide an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims; mere speculation about state-law limits is insufficient.
Younger abstention is triggered where the federal civil suit would necessarily intrude upon or second-guess factual issues being adjudicated in the state criminal case.
Once the state criminal process (including appeals) concludes, a federal court may lift any stay on damages claims and, potentially, entertain non-moot equitable claims.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit’s summary order upholds the district court’s application of Younger abstention to Torres’s § 1983 action:

Ongoing State Proceeding:
- Although Torres’s initial VOP hearing had concluded, his state-court appeal was still pending when the district court ruled.
- The court, citing Gristina v. Merchan and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., held that a proceeding is “pending” for Younger purposes while state appellate remedies remain available.
Important State Interest:
- The case involved enforcement of state criminal law through probation-violation proceedings—a “classic case for abstention,” as in Davis v. Lansing.
- States have a strong interest in administering their criminal justice systems, including supervision and treatment of sex offenders on probation.
Adequate Opportunity to Raise Federal Claims:
- Torres argued that he could not adequately present his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims in the VOP case or on appeal.
- The panel rejected this, emphasizing that Connecticut law permits constitutional challenges in VOP proceedings, as illustrated by State v. Imperiale, where a defendant directly attacked a January Center condition on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
- Under Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct and Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, the question is whether the plaintiff has an opportunity to raise federal issues, not whether he in fact did so or would prevail.
Factual Overlap and Interference with State Proceedings:
- The federal suit challenged the same probation conditions (e.g., obligation to participate in and “successfully discharge” from the January Center) and relied on the same factual allegations (e.g., fences, handcuffing, Torres’s shock at conditions) that were central to the VOP prosecution.
- Relying on Washington v. County of Rockland, the court stressed that if resolving federal claims would “necessarily implicate factual issues pending in the underlying state proceeding,” Younger requires abstention.
Disposition:
- The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Torres’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under Younger.
- It also affirmed the stay of damages claims, while noting that now that the state appeal has concluded, the district court is free to lift the stay and allow Torres to proceed on his monetary claims, and possibly revive any non-moot equitable claims (citing Pathways, Inc. v. Dunne).

Although formally non-precedential, the order is a careful, textbook application of Younger abstention in the specific context of probation-violation proceedings and associated § 1983 litigation over probation conditions.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)

Younger is the foundational case establishing that federal courts generally must not enjoin or otherwise interfere with ongoing state criminal prosecutions, except in extraordinary circumstances (such as bad faith prosecutions or flagrantly unconstitutional laws).

The doctrine rests on:

Comity and federalism: Respect for state courts and state functions.
Avoidance of duplicative litigation: Preventing parallel proceedings and conflicting judgments.
Preserving the role of state juries and judges: Avoiding federal preemption of criminal adjudication.

In Torres, the Second Circuit applies this baseline principle: the federal court must not preempt or undermine an ongoing state probation-violation prosecution that implicates the same issues.

2. Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013)

Sprint narrowed and clarified Younger. It held that Younger abstention is appropriate only in three categories:

Ongoing state criminal prosecutions;
Certain “civil enforcement” proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions; and
Civil proceedings that uniquely implicate a state court’s ability to perform its judicial functions (e.g., contempt proceedings, bar discipline).

In Torres, the Second Circuit implicitly treats a probation-violation prosecution as within the core first category: an extension of criminal enforcement, squarely within Younger’s heartland.

3. Diamond “D” Construction Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2002)

Diamond “D” formulates the oft-cited three-part test for Younger abstention:

There is an ongoing state proceeding;
An important state interest is implicated; and
The state proceeding affords an adequate opportunity for judicial review of the federal constitutional claims.

It also emphasizes a “strong policy in favor of abstention,” a phrase the Torres panel quotes to underscore the default posture of federal courts when asked to intervene in matters entangled with ongoing state proceedings.

4. Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1988)

Davis describes federal suits parallel to ongoing state criminal proceedings as “classic case[s] for abstention.” The Second Circuit invokes that language in Torres to characterize Torres’s § 1983 action—which directly overlaps with his VOP prosecution—as precisely the sort of scenario Younger is meant to address.

5. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)

Hicks extends Younger to situations where state criminal proceedings begin after the federal complaint is filed but before “any proceedings of substance on the merits” occur in federal court. The Court held that Younger still applies in such circumstances.

The panel cites Hicks (and Eleventh Circuit authority in Tokyo Gwinnett, LLC v. Gwinnett County) to note that even if the VOP proceedings began after Torres filed his federal suit, Younger would still apply so long as the state case started before substantive federal adjudication. Torres did not, however, press that timing argument on appeal, so the Second Circuit did not need to reach it.

6. Gristina v. Merchan, 131 F.4th 82 (2d Cir. 2025)

Gristina provides two crucial clarifications that the Torres panel adopts:

A proceeding remains “pending” for Younger purposes if further state appellate remedies are available.
The Younger abstention question is determined at the time the federal court reaches the merits; it is not “continuously re-evaluated” as state proceedings later conclude.

In other words, federal abstention is judged as of the time the district court acts: later completion of state appeals does not retroactively invalidate the abstention decision (though it may justify lifting a stay on damages claims).

7. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)

Huffman holds that Younger abstention applies through the entire course of state proceedings, including appeals. A federal court should not intervene “prior to completion of state appellate proceedings,” because the same comity and anti-duplication concerns apply at the appellate stage.

The Torres panel quotes Huffman to reject Torres’s assertion that his case was no longer “ongoing” once the trial-level VOP hearing had ended, pointing out that his appeal was still live.

8. Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003)

Spargo is cited for two interconnected propositions:

“Under Younger, any uncertainties as to the scope of state proceedings or the availability of state remedies are generally resolved in favor of abstention.”
It is “the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that state remedies are inadequate,” and showing “potential ambiguities in state law” is not enough.

The Second Circuit uses this framework to refute Torres’s argument that he might have been barred from raising his constitutional challenges on appeal. Because he provided no concrete legal authority demonstrating that Connecticut courts would refuse to hear those claims, he failed to carry his burden.

9. Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982)

Middlesex, integrated into Spargo and echoed in Torres, states that the core question when evaluating adequacy of the state forum is whether there is an opportunity to present federal claims—not whether the state forum is certain to reach the constitutional issues or to rule in the plaintiff’s favor. The Second Circuit leans on this “opportunity” standard in responding to Torres’s contention that the specific issues he cared about were not the primary focus of his VOP proceeding.

10. Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 2004)

Washington is key for the “factual overlap” aspect of Younger abstention. It holds that if federal claims would “necessarily implicate” factual issues pending in an ongoing state proceeding, Younger abstention is appropriate—even if the legal theories differ.

In Torres, the panel notes that both the state VOP case and the federal § 1983 action revolved around:

the nature and conditions of Torres’s probation;
the specific January Center conditions (e.g., barbed wire, use of handcuffs, restrictions on movement); and
whether Torres complied with or violated the conditions of his probation, including the requirement to successfully complete the January Center program.

This factual overlap underscores the risk that a federal ruling would second-guess or undermine the state court’s factual determinations—precisely what Younger seeks to avoid.

11. State v. Imperiale, 337 Conn. 694 (2021)

Imperiale is a decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court, not a federal authority, but it serves a crucial role in the panel’s reasoning on the adequacy of state remedies.

In Imperiale, a probationer charged with violating probation specifically argued that the condition requiring his participation in the January Center program violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In other words, Connecticut courts have actually entertained constitutional attacks on the same type of probation condition at issue in Torres’s case and in the same procedural setting (a VOP prosecution).

The Second Circuit invokes Imperiale to show that:

There is precedent for raising federal constitutional claims about January Center conditions in a VOP proceeding;
Torres could have followed that path, even if he chose not to;
The availability of such an avenue strongly undercuts his argument that Connecticut provided no adequate forum for his federal claims.

12. Pathways, Inc. v. Dunne, 329 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2003)

Pathways addresses how to handle federal damages claims when Younger abstention bars injunctive or declaratory relief. The Second Circuit there recognized that, while Younger generally forecloses immediate equitable relief, federal damages claims should often be stayed rather than dismissed, so they can proceed after the state proceeding concludes.

In Torres, the panel:

Approves the district court’s decision to stay (rather than dismiss) Torres’s monetary claims; and
Explicitly notes that, with the conclusion of the state appeal, the district court “is free to lift the stay” and allow those damages claims to move forward, citing Pathways.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Younger Framework Applied

The Second Circuit applies the Diamond “D” three-part test for Younger abstention, as informed by Sprint and other precedent.

(a) Ongoing State Proceeding

Torres argued that his VOP hearing had concluded, so there was no ongoing proceeding to justify Younger abstention. The panel rejected this, relying on Gristina and Huffman:

A state proceeding remains pending for Younger purposes if appellate remedies remain available.
Torres conceded that his state-court appeal was still active while his federal case was pending.

Thus, the “ongoing proceeding” prong was clearly satisfied. The court also alluded to (but did not have to decide) timing rules from Hicks: even if the VOP case began after the federal complaint, it still could trigger Younger if it commenced before any substantive federal proceedings.

(b) Important State Interest

The opinion does not dwell on this prong because it is almost self-evidently satisfied:

The case involves enforcement of criminal law via probation-violation proceedings.
States have a vital interest in supervising probationers—especially sex offenders—and enforcing conditions designed to protect public safety and facilitate rehabilitation.

By classifying the case as a “classic” scenario for Younger, the court reinforces that criminal supervision and probation enforcement are core state functions entitled to federal deference.

(c) Adequate Opportunity to Raise Federal Claims

This was the heart of Torres’s challenge and the core of the panel’s analysis.

Torres argued:

He did not challenge the lawfulness of his probation conditions during the initial VOP hearing;
Connecticut law might prevent him from raising those issues on appeal (for example, by treating them as waived or beyond the permissible scope of review); and
He intended to focus his appeal on factual questions rather than constitutional claims.

The Second Circuit responds on multiple fronts:

Speculation about state law is insufficient.
Invoking Spargo, the court stresses that any uncertainties about the scope of state review or the availability of remedies are resolved in favor of abstention. The plaintiff must show that state remedies are actually inadequate; mere “potential ambiguities” in state law will not do.
Opportunity, not actual use, is the test.
Drawing on Spargo and Middlesex, the panel notes that the relevant question is whether Torres could have raised his constitutional claims in the state proceeding, not whether he in fact did so, nor whether the state courts would ultimately agree with him.
Connecticut case law (Imperiale) shows that such challenges are permissible.
Imperiale demonstrates that Connecticut VOP proceedings can accommodate Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to January Center conditions. Therefore, Torres had a procedural avenue to assert the very claims he brought in federal court.
Narrow framing of the appeal does not defeat Younger.
Torres’s intention to confine his state appeal to factual disputes does not negate the adequacy of the forum; it just reflects a strategic choice. Federal courts will not treat a self-imposed limitation as a basis to circumvent Younger.

Collectively, these points led the panel to conclude that the “adequate opportunity” prong was satisfied.

2. Factual Overlap and Interference with State Proceedings

The court emphasizes that Younger abstention is particularly apt where the federal suit would necessarily intrude on factual issues before the state court.

Here:

In state court, Torres was charged with violating probation conditions requiring him to:
- abide by the January Center’s rules; and
- successfully complete the program.
In federal court, Torres alleged that many (indeed, “99 percent”) of his probation conditions, including those related to the January Center, were unconstitutional and unenforceable.
The same factual allegations were central in both proceedings—for example:
- the physical conditions at the January Center (fences, barbed wire, confinement features);
- the way he was transported and treated (e.g., use of handcuffs);
- his subjective reaction and understanding of those conditions (“shock” at learning of the restrictions).

Under Washington, when federal claims “would necessarily implicate factual issues pending in the underlying state . . . proceeding,” the federal suit should be stayed (or abstained from) under Younger. The court finds that Torres’s federal case and VOP case are “parallel” in just this way.

Torres himself acknowledged some of this overlap, conceding that federal adjudication of his probation conditions could have “possible interference with the state-court proceeding.” The court seizes on this admission to underscore that his position is incompatible with Younger’s limits on federal intervention.

3. Treatment of Different Types of Relief

The district court distinguished between Torres’s requests for equitable relief (injunctions and declaratory judgments) and his claims for monetary damages:

Equitable Relief: The district court dismissed these claims under Younger, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Enjoining enforcement of the probation conditions or declaring them invalid while the VOP appeal was pending would have directly interfered with the state criminal process.
Monetary Damages: Rather than dismissing these claims outright, the district court stayed them—consistent with Pathways. The panel approved this approach and explicitly stated that, now that the state proceedings have ended, the district court is “free to lift the stay” on the damages claims and allow them to proceed.

As to prospective equitable relief now that the state case has concluded, the panel adds a qualifier: if Torres believes he has equitable claims that are not moot, he may seek leave in the district court to assert or reassert them. This leaves open the possibility of some forward-looking relief, subject to usual doctrines of mootness, preclusion, and remedial discretion.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Practical Impact on Probationers and Criminal Defendants

For probationers and criminal defendants in the Second Circuit, Torres (though a summary order) sends a clear practical message:

Raise constitutional objections in the state process. If you believe that probation conditions (including specialized treatment programs like the January Center) violate federal constitutional rights, you must, as a practical matter, be prepared to raise those arguments in your probation-violation proceeding and on direct appeal.
You cannot hold back constitutional arguments for a parallel federal case while your criminal matter is still pending. Younger abstention will almost certainly block your federal suit if it calls into question the same facts or conditions being litigated in state court.
State appellate processes matter. As long as an appeal is available and pending, the case is deemed “ongoing,” and Younger remains fully applicable.

This is especially salient for sex offenders, whose probation and post-release conditions are often intensive and invasive. Challenges to such conditions must be integrated into the state criminal process, not pursued in parallel federal litigation.

2. Guidance to Federal Courts on Managing Parallel § 1983 Actions

The decision also provides operational guidance to district courts:

When to abstain entirely: Where a § 1983 plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with an ongoing state criminal or probation-violation proceeding (including appeals), courts should abstain under Younger from deciding those claims.
When to stay, not dismiss: Damages claims that are intertwined with pending state proceedings should generally be stayed rather than dismissed, so that they can be revived once the state case is fully resolved.
How to treat “no-opportunity” arguments: Courts should demand concrete evidence that the state process cannot hear federal claims. Vague assertions of procedural limitations, or litigants’ personal choices not to raise certain arguments, do not suffice to avoid abstention.

3. Clarifying the Concept of “Ongoing” Proceedings

Torres reinforces and applies the principle, drawn from Huffman and articulated in Gristina, that state proceedings remain “ongoing” for Younger purposes until appellate courts have spoken. This prevents litigants from claiming that a case is over (for abstention purposes) after trial but before the appellate process ends.

The opinion also embeds the temporal rule that the Younger question is fixed at the time the federal court undertakes substantial adjudication; later developments in the state courts do not retroactively alter the validity of the abstention decision, though they may justify lifting stays or revisiting remedies going forward.

4. Federal–State Comity and Sex-Offender Treatment Programs

The case highlights the tension between:

Federal constitutional oversight (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments) of restrictive treatment programs for sex offenders; and
State authority to design and enforce probation conditions and post-release supervision regimes.

By requiring Torres to channel his constitutional objections through state VOP proceedings and appeals, the Second Circuit reinforces that primary responsibility for supervising probation and evaluating the lawfulness of such conditions rests with state courts. Federal courts will step in only after the state process is complete (and then only within the bounds of doctrines like preclusion and, where applicable, the rule of Heck v. Humphrey, though that doctrine is not addressed directly in this order).

5. Litigation Strategy for Civil-Rights Counsel

For lawyers planning § 1983 litigation, Torres suggests several strategic considerations:

Sequence matters. Filing a federal suit while a criminal or probation-violation case is active in state court will generally trigger Younger abstention.
Use the state record. Because Younger forces litigants to raise constitutional claims in state proceedings, the resulting state-court record (including any appellate opinions) may later frame or constrain federal damages claims.
Injunctive relief may be time-sensitive and vulnerable to mootness. By the time state proceedings end, the plaintiff’s circumstances may have changed, potentially undermining the availability or advisability of forward-looking relief, even if damages remain viable.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Younger Abstention, in Plain Terms

Younger abstention is a rule that says:

Federal courts generally should not interfere with ongoing state criminal cases (and certain related proceedings) by issuing orders that would stop, alter, or undermine those state proceedings.

In practice, this means:

If you are being prosecuted (or pursued for violating probation) in state court, you cannot usually ask a federal court to step in and declare your prosecution or probation conditions unconstitutional while that state case is still going on.
Instead, you must raise your constitutional arguments in the state case and then, if needed, in the state appellate courts.
Only after the state process ends might a federal court hear a related damages case or, in some situations, limited forms of equitable relief.

2. Probation-Violation (VOP) Proceedings

A VOP proceeding is a type of criminal proceeding where:

The State accuses a probationer of failing to follow conditions imposed at sentencing (e.g., attend treatment, obey facility rules, avoid certain conduct).
If the court finds a violation, it can impose sanctions, including imprisonment, extension of probation, or modification of conditions.

Because VOP proceedings directly enforce criminal judgments and conditions of release, they fall squarely within the category of proceedings protected by Younger abstention.

3. Section 1983: Injunctions, Declarations, and Damages

42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows individuals to sue state officials and entities in federal court for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights. Plaintiffs may seek:

Injunctive relief: A court order telling officials to stop enforcing certain laws or conditions, or to take specific corrective actions.
Declaratory relief: A binding statement from the court that certain actions or rules are unconstitutional.
Monetary damages: Financial compensation for past harm caused by constitutional violations.

Younger abstention mostly affects injunctive and declaratory relief, because such orders directly interfere with ongoing state proceedings. Monetary damages, while they still relate to the underlying events, do not typically halt or alter an ongoing state case and are therefore more often stayed rather than dismissed.

4. “Adequate Opportunity” to Raise Federal Claims

When courts ask whether the state proceeding is an “adequate” forum for federal claims, they are asking:

Does the state system provide a reasonable chance for the person to present their federal constitutional arguments (at the trial level and/or on appeal)?

If the answer is yes—even if the state court ultimately rejects those arguments—Younger abstention is usually appropriate. The plaintiff cannot avoid abstention simply because:

He chose not to raise the arguments in state court; or
He believes (or fears) that the state courts will not rule in his favor.

V. Conclusion

Torres v. Office of Adult Probation is a non-precedential but substantively robust application of Younger abstention to a probation-violation context. The Second Circuit affirms that:

A state criminal or probation-violation matter remains “ongoing” for Younger purposes as long as appellate remedies are available.
Federal courts must abstain from deciding § 1983 claims that would interfere with or undermine such state proceedings, especially where the federal claims rest on the same facts and conditions being litigated in state court.
The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that state processes do not provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal constitutional issues; speculative or strategic reasons for not raising them in state court do not suffice.
While equitable relief is typically unavailable during ongoing state proceedings, damages claims should ordinarily be stayed and can resume once the state process concludes.

In the specific setting of sex-offender treatment and probationary confinement at facilities like the January Center, the decision underscores that constitutional challenges to those conditions must first be litigated in state VOP proceedings and appeals. Federal courts will respect that state primacy, stepping in—if at all—only after the state system has had its full say.

Even as a summary order without formal precedential effect, Torres reinforces and clarifies core features of Younger abstention within the Second Circuit, offering practical guidance to litigants, counsel, and courts on how to manage the intersection of § 1983 civil actions and ongoing state supervision of criminal defendants.