With-Prejudice Dismissal for Shotgun Pleadings and Rule 12(b)(6) Reliance on Undisputed Bodycam Video Under Incorporation-by-Reference

Introduction

In Trekessa Gilliam v. Jari Sanders (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of Trekessa Gilliam’s third amended civil-rights complaint arising from a traffic stop in Fort Myers, Florida. Gilliam—who was a passenger—sued individual officers and the City of Fort Myers, alleging constitutional violations (including Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment theories) and related state-law torts.

The appeal presented three recurring issues in federal civil-rights litigation: (1) when a complaint qualifies as an impermissible “shotgun pleading” warranting dismissal with prejudice after repeated opportunities to amend; (2) whether a district court may consider body-worn and vehicle camera footage at the motion-to-dismiss stage under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine; and (3) whether reconsideration is warranted after dismissal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed two orders: (i) the order dismissing Gilliam’s third amended complaint with prejudice and (ii) the order denying her Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration.

Shotgun pleading: The court held the third amended complaint fit recognized shotgun-pleading categories, including group pleading and failure to specify which defendants committed which acts, and it upheld dismissal with prejudice given prior warnings and an opportunity to cure.
Video at the pleading stage: The court held the district court properly considered bodycam/vehicle footage under incorporation-by-reference because it was central to the claims and its authenticity was not challenged. The panel further held the footage contradicted Gilliam’s allegations of an unlawfully prolonged stop and unlawful searches.
Reconsideration: The court held the motion to reconsider identified no newly discovered evidence or manifest error and merely re-argued prior points.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015)
The opinion relied on Weiland for the taxonomy and rationale of shotgun pleadings: they violate Rule 8 by failing to provide adequate notice of claims and grounds, often through wholesale incorporation, failure to separate claims, or failure to tie specific acts to specific defendants. The panel invoked Weiland both descriptively (what shotgun pleadings look like) and normatively (why they burden defendants and courts).
Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018)
Vibe Micro anchored the standard of review (abuse of discretion for Rule 8 shotgun-pleading dismissals) and the remedial approach: district courts should typically offer an opportunity to replead, but dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to cure after being warned and given a chance to amend. The panel used this to justify finality after multiple defective iterations.
Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2024) and Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179 (11th Cir. 2024)
These cases supplied the incorporation-by-reference standard used to consider materials not attached to the complaint: the material must be central to the claims and undisputed (authenticity not challenged). The panel treated these authorities as directly supporting the district court’s use of the footage at the Rule 12 stage.
Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268 (11th Cir. 2023)
Baker was cited for extending incorporation-by-reference beyond documents to body camera footage and for the instruction that courts should “view the facts in the light depicted by the video” when video evidence squarely contradicts a plaintiff’s narrative. This principle did the decisive work in rejecting Gilliam’s Fourth Amendment theory at the pleading stage.
United States v. Banks, 3 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1993) and Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013)
These cases framed the probable-cause analysis. Banks was used for the proposition that probable cause arises upon a drug-trained canine’s alert. Florida v. Harris supplied the totality-of-the-circumstances formulation for probable cause. Together they supported the panel’s conclusion that the canine alert and ensuing discoveries justified further searches (including the search of Gilliam’s person).
Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc., 626 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2010)
This case provided the narrow grounds for reconsideration—newly discovered evidence or manifest error—supporting affirmance of the denial where the motion merely repeated earlier arguments.
Plowright v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 102 F.4th 1358 (11th Cir. 2024)
In a footnote addressing state-law tort theories, the court relied on Plowright for the stringent standard governing “outrageousness” in intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Teel v. Lozada, 99 F.4th 1273 (11th Cir. 2024) and Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 530 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2008)
Teel supported the proposition that where no underlying constitutional violation is plausibly alleged, a municipal claim (the opinion refers to a “Monell claim”) fails. Johnston supported the court’s treatment of Florida constitutional claims as tracking Fourth Amendment analysis.

Legal Reasoning

1) Rule 8, notice, and the shotgun-pleading bar

The panel’s first holding was procedural but dispositive: Gilliam’s third amended complaint was dismissed as a “quintessential shotgun pleading.” Relying on Weiland, the court emphasized two deficiencies:

Improper incorporation and structure: multiple counts adopted preceding allegations, obscuring what facts supported which claims.
Group pleading and attribution failure: the complaint did not specify which defendant committed which act or omission, despite distinct roles.

Importantly, the affirmance turned not only on the presence of defects but on litigation posture: the district court had already warned Gilliam and afforded opportunities to correct earlier pleadings. Under Vibe Micro, Inc., repeated failure to cure supports dismissal with prejudice.

2) Incorporation-by-reference and video evidence on a motion to dismiss

Gilliam argued that relying on video improperly resolved factual disputes and effectively converted the motion to dismiss into summary judgment. The panel rejected that framing by situating the video within incorporation-by-reference doctrine (Johnson v. City of Atlanta; Swinford v. Santos) and the specific extension to bodycam footage (Baker v. City of Madison).

The court treated two predicates as satisfied: (i) the footage was central to Gilliam’s claims because it captured the incident at issue, and (ii) authenticity was undisputed because Gilliam did not challenge it. Once those predicates were met, the court applied Baker’s directive to accept the video depiction where it contradicts the complaint’s account.

3) Fourth Amendment plausibility in light of the video depiction

On the merits (as the video depicted them), the panel concluded Gilliam could not plausibly allege an unlawfully prolonged stop or unlawful search:

Duration and mission of the stop: The stop began with a tint violation. While one officer wrote a ticket, another initiated a canine sniff. The canine sniff began about four minutes after initial contact and took about one minute.
Probable cause from canine alert: The canine alerted, which the panel treated as establishing probable cause to search the vehicle under United States v. Banks.
Probable cause to search Gilliam’s person: After contraband was found in the vehicle and cocaine residue was found on the driver’s sandal/foot (field-tested), the court held there was a “fair probability” a search of Gilliam would yield evidence, citing Florida v. Harris. The court also noted the search of Gilliam’s person took approximately one minute and that there was no cavity search.

4) Equal protection and state-law tort claims

The panel stated the video also undermined Gilliam’s equal protection theory and the tort claims (battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress), observing that Gilliam (female) was not searched differently than the driver (male), and that the record did not depict the kind of extreme and outrageous conduct required for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Plowright v. Miami-Dade Cnty.

5) Municipal and Florida Constitution claims as downstream claims

Having concluded the complaint did not plausibly allege individual constitutional violations, the court treated the municipal claim as necessarily failing under Teel v. Lozada. It likewise treated the Florida constitutional claims as failing under Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., which the panel invoked for the proposition that Fourth Amendment analysis applies equally to Florida constitutional search-and-seizure claims.

6) Reconsideration

Applying Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc., the panel held reconsideration was properly denied because Gilliam offered neither newly discovered evidence nor a manifest error of law or fact, instead reiterating previously raised arguments.

Impact

Reinforcement of anti-shotgun enforcement with finality: Even in civil-rights cases, repeated noncompliance with Rule 8—especially group pleading and unclear attribution—can justify dismissal with prejudice after warnings and an opportunity to amend.
Growing centrality of video at the pleadings stage: The opinion exemplifies a practical dynamic after Baker v. City of Madison, Johnson v. City of Atlanta, and Swinford v. Santos: undisputed bodycam footage can be dispositive at Rule 12(b)(6), allowing courts to reject allegations that are contradicted by video rather than deferring those disputes to discovery.
Downstream claim vulnerability: The court’s chain reasoning underscores that municipal liability and related state constitutional claims may fall quickly once the underlying constitutional violation is deemed implausible at the outset.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Shotgun pleading: A complaint that is so unclear—often by lumping defendants together, incorporating all prior allegations into every count, or failing to tie facts to specific legal claims—that defendants cannot tell what they are alleged to have done wrong. The Eleventh Circuit treats this as a Rule 8 notice failure.
Dismissal “with prejudice”: The case is terminated and cannot be refiled based on the same claim. Courts may do this after a plaintiff has been warned and given chances to fix pleading defects.
Incorporation-by-reference doctrine: A Rule 12(b)(6) rule allowing courts to consider certain materials outside the complaint (including video) if they are central to the claim and their authenticity is not disputed—without converting the motion to summary judgment.
Probable cause: A common-sense standard asking whether there is a “fair probability,” based on the totality of circumstances, that evidence of a crime will be found in a place or on a person. Here, the court treated a canine alert and subsequent discoveries as establishing that probability.
Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration: A post-judgment request to alter or amend a judgment. It is not a “do-over” and is generally limited to newly discovered evidence or manifest legal/factual error.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms two tightly connected propositions: (1) district courts may dismiss with prejudice when plaintiffs persist in filing shotgun pleadings after warnings and opportunities to amend; and (2) when bodycam/vehicle footage is central to the claims and undisputed, courts may consider it at the motion-to-dismiss stage and adopt the video’s depiction where it contradicts the complaint’s allegations. In practice, the opinion highlights how modern video evidence can defeat implausible Fourth Amendment and related claims early, and how unclear, collective pleading can independently end a case before discovery.