Introduction

In State v. Rogers, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed a recurring and consequential problem in criminal trials: when, if ever, does a prospective juror’s equivocal voir dire answers demonstrate “actual bias” sufficient to render defense counsel ineffective for not seeking that juror’s removal for cause? The Court’s answer carries two central teachings.

• First, a defendant who failed to object to a juror at trial can prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim only by showing that the juror was actually biased—a deliberately high bar.
• Second, in evaluating actual bias on appellate review, courts must consider the entire voir dire record, and they may take into account group-directed questions and responses rather than limiting themselves to individual “rehabilitation” exchanges. There is no categorical rule forbidding reliance on group answers.

The case arose from Todd Jeffrey Rogers’s convictions for sexual offenses against his minor daughter. On appeal, Rogers argued that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge for cause a juror—referred to as “Juror McCarthy”—who expressed discomfort with child-witness testimony and initially struggled with the presumption of innocence. The Twelfth District Court of Appeals rejected the claim after an “extensive review” of the voir dire transcript, concluding that the juror’s statements reflected understandable unease rather than actual bias. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.

Justice DeWine authored the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Kennedy and Justices Fischer, Deters, Hawkins, and Shanahan. Justice Brunner dissented.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed Rogers’s convictions. The Court held that:

• Where counsel did not object to a juror’s seating, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance must show that the juror was actually biased against the defendant to obtain relief.
• In determining whether a juror was actually biased, appellate courts must review the entire voir dire record, which may include group-oriented questions and answers; there is no blanket prohibition on considering “group answers.”
• On the facts presented, the voir dire transcript did not establish that Juror McCarthy was actually biased. His statements indicated initial discomfort with the subject matter and a struggle with the presumption-of-innocence hypothetical, but the record as a whole showed no unshakeable predisposition against Rogers or unwillingness to follow the law.

Because actual bias was not shown, the Court did not need to decide whether counsel’s performance was deficient; under Strickland’s framework, failure to satisfy the prejudice component (here, actual bias) defeats the ineffective-assistance claim.

Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Established the two-pronged test for ineffective assistance—deficient performance and prejudice. The Court reiterates Strickland’s allowance to resolve claims on the prejudice prong alone, and its narrow set of contexts where prejudice is presumed (actual/constructive denial of counsel, state interference, conflicts of interest).
• State v. Mundt, 2007-Ohio-4836: Ohio’s adoption of the “actual bias” route to proving Strickland prejudice when counsel allows an actually biased juror to be seated. The Rogers Court applies Mundt’s rule that the defendant must show the seated juror was actually biased.
• Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988); United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000): Recognize that a properly preserved claim of a biased juror mandates reversal. These cases underpin lower courts’ acceptance that actual bias, if proven, can suffice to establish prejudice under Strickland.
• United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936): Define “actual bias” as “bias in fact”—a state of mind indicating the juror will not act with entire impartiality.
• Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); State v. Warner, 55 Ohio St.3d 31 (1990): Mere preconceived notions are insufficient; the inquiry is whether the juror can lay aside opinions and decide based on in-court evidence.
• Griffin v. Bell, 694 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2012): Prior beliefs (e.g., about credibility of certain witnesses) do not necessitate removal unless they reveal irrational/unshakeable bias preventing faithful application of law.
• Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984): Juror ambiguity and inconsistencies in voir dire are not dispositive from a cold record; juror assurances that they can be fair may suffice despite pre-formed views. Rogers analogizes McCarthy’s comments about presumption of innocence to the Patton juror’s ambivalence, finding no actual bias.
• Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011): Reemphasizes the “highly deferential” posture toward trial counsel’s performance; voir dire strategy is especially subjective.
• State v. Conway, 2006-Ohio-2815; State v. Mason, 1998-Ohio-370: Courts will not second-guess debatable trial tactics, notably in jury selection.
• State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76; State v. King, 2008 UT 54; State v. Romero, 2023-NMSC-014: Out-of-state guidance emphasizing the hazard of treating “potential bias” as “actual bias” and counseling restraint in upending trial counsel’s voir dire decisions absent unequivocal bias.
• Holder v. Palmer, 588 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2009): In assessing actual bias, courts consider the totality of the juror’s statements—supporting Rogers’s whole-record approach.
• State v. Madison, 2020-Ohio-3735: A juror’s nuanced views that depend on circumstances do not reflect a bias preventing individualized weighing of facts.
• Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2001): An initial belief that “few innocent people are indicted” does not show actual bias unless coupled with an intransigent refusal to be persuaded by evidence.
• Johnson v. Armontrout, 961 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1992); Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2001); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992): Cited by Rogers to argue group responses are inadequate. The Court distinguishes these cases, clarifying they do not impose a blanket rule against considering group answers and are context-specific.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Framing under Strickland and Mundt. Because defense counsel did not object to seating the juror, Rogers could only prevail by proving ineffective assistance. Under Mundt, a defendant may satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement by showing “actual bias” of a seated juror. The Court opted to decide the claim on the prejudice (actual bias) prong, consistent with Strickland.
2. The “actual bias” standard is exacting. Jurors are presumed impartial. Appellate courts must be cautious assessing cold transcripts, remain highly deferential to counsel’s strategic choices at voir dire, and distinguish between discomfort, potential bias, and a fixed inability to be fair.
3. Application to the two clusters of statements.
   • Child-witness discomfort: McCarthy initially said he “might have a hard time” and did not have an immediate answer about being fair. The Court read these as candid reflections of the heavy subject matter, not as unalterable predispositions. Importantly, McCarthy later pushed back on assumptions about child-victim reactions and agreed children are impressionable—positions that aligned with the defense theory (fabrication/parental influence). This showed openness to both sides’ narratives, not partiality.
   • Presumption-of-innocence struggle: In a defense hypothetical asking for a verdict “right now,” McCarthy said it would be hard to say “not guilty” because “we’re here” and “people don’t wind up here from not doing anything.” The Court analogized this to Patton: an expression of an initial belief that does not necessarily translate to an inability to follow the law. After defense counsel explained why “not guilty” is the only correct “right now” answer, no juror—including McCarthy—expressed disagreement or confusion, and McCarthy had shown he was candid and willing to speak up. This undercut any assertion of entrenched bias.
4. Whole-record review includes group answers. The Court rejected Rogers’s legal propositions that group answers can never “rehabilitate” a juror or that only an individualized affirmation can suffice. Instead, trial and appellate actors should consider the entire record—individual and group exchanges together. The Court cautioned that a purely generalized group question (e.g., “Can everyone follow the law?”) might not overcome an unequivocal declaration by a specific juror that they cannot be fair, but that was not the situation in this case.
5. Distinguishing Rogers’s cited authorities.
   • Johnson v. Armontrout: Prior service on a co-defendant’s jury posed a unique risk; collective silence could not suffice. Rogers is different; McCarthy never made an unequivocal disqualifying admission.
   • Hughes v. United States: “Silence in the face of generalized questioning” could not cure a juror’s admission of inability to be fair. Again, McCarthy did not make such an unequivocal admission here.
   • Morgan v. Illinois: Capital cases require specific voir dire on death penalty views; generic fairness questions do not substitute. That targeted principle does not impose a blanket prohibition on considering group answers in non-capital, actual-bias analyses.
6. Conclusion under the standard. Reviewing the entire voir dire—including McCarthy’s pushback, his acknowledgment of child suggestibility, his affirmation (when asked directly with another juror) that he could “sit in judgment” and “do the right thing,” and his silence after the presumption explanation—the Court found no “bias in fact.” Without actual bias, the prejudice prong fails, and the ineffective-assistance claim necessarily fails. Judgment affirmed.

C. Impact and Practical Consequences

• Whole-record principle reaffirmed and clarified. Ohio appellate courts assessing actual bias must review the totality of voir dire and may consider group-oriented responses. This discourages hyper-technical, snippet-driven challenges that isolate an anxious remark while ignoring subsequent clarifications or context.
• No categorical “individual-rehabilitation-only” rule. The Court declined to require individual, on-the-record affirmations to cure every ambiguous answer. That said, the opinion strongly implies best practices: when a juror expresses clear difficulty, targeted follow-ups—including individualized questions—remain prudent.
• High bar for post hoc ineffective-assistance claims. Because “actual bias” is required to presume prejudice, defendants face an uphill climb when they did not object to a juror at trial. Counsel’s voir dire decisions receive robust deference, especially given the subjective, strategic nature of jury selection.
• Trial practice: structured group questioning remains valuable. Prosecutors and defense counsel can use group questions to explore juror attitudes efficiently, knowing that reviewing courts may consider those responses. But counsel should not rely solely on generalized prompts to “follow the law”—especially where a juror has made an unequivocal statement signaling partiality.
• Child sex-abuse cases. The opinion recognizes the emotional difficulty for jurors without treating that difficulty as disqualifying. Counsel should anticipate and normalize discomfort while securing clarifications that jurors can decide solely on the evidence and instructions.
• Preservation matters. Rogers illustrates the cost of non-objection. Where a juror expresses strong partiality, counsel should make a for-cause challenge (and, if necessary, use a peremptory) and build a clear record of the grounds. Absent that, appellate relief will rarely be available.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Voir dire: The questioning of prospective jurors to assess whether they can be fair and impartial.
• Challenge for cause: A request to remove a juror because a specific, legally cognizable reason (like bias) shows they cannot be impartial. Unlike peremptory challenges, there is no fixed numerical limit.
• Peremptory challenge: Removal of a juror without stating a reason, limited in number, and subject to constitutional limits (e.g., Batson).
• Strickland ineffective assistance: A claim that counsel performed deficiently and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome. Courts can decide either prong first.
• Actual bias: A juror’s state of mind indicating they will not act with full impartiality—more than discomfort or a tentative opinion; it’s an unshakeable predisposition or refusal to follow the law.
• Presumed prejudice under Strickland (in this context): If a seated juror was actually biased, prejudice is presumed, satisfying Strickland’s second prong—even without proof of a different outcome.
• Group answers vs. individual rehabilitation: Group questions are posed to the whole panel (or subgroups). “Rehabilitation” means clarifying whether a juror who expressed concern can, despite that, be fair. Rogers holds courts may consider group answers when assessing actual bias, though generic group prompts cannot cure an unequivocal admission of bias.
• Presumption of innocence: The defendant is presumed not guilty unless and until the State proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; jurors must not infer guilt from indictment or arrest.

Practice Guidance

For Defense Counsel

• When a prospective juror voices difficulty (e.g., “I might have a hard time” or “I don’t have an answer”), follow up with targeted, concrete hypotheticals and ask the juror to affirm in their own words that they can apply the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.
• Preserve error: move to strike for cause when answers remain equivocal or reflect a predisposition; use peremptories where appropriate; state reasons on the record.
• Avoid confusing hypotheticals that may provoke unhelpful answers (e.g., verdict “right now” questions). If used, promptly explain the law and confirm juror understanding on the record.
• If a juror reveals a concerning general belief (e.g., “people don’t wind up here for nothing”), probe whether they will hold the State to its burden and disregard the indictment as evidence.

For Prosecutors

• Use a combination of group and individual questions to elicit commitments to follow the law, especially regarding burden of proof and credibility assessments in sensitive cases (e.g., child witnesses).
• Where a juror expresses unease, consider obtaining targeted affirmations that the juror can sit in judgment, wait for all the evidence, and apply instructions.
• Be cautious about over-reliance on generalized “Can everyone follow the law?” prompts if a specific juror has offered a strong statement of partiality; seek individualized clarification.

For Trial Courts

• Develop a clear, thorough record combining group and individual exchanges, particularly when a juror expresses difficulty.
• Where a juror’s statement approaches an unequivocal inability to be fair, do not rely solely on generalized group assurances; solicit specific follow-ups.
• Recognize that appellate courts will review the entire voir dire; ensure the transcript reflects critical demeanor-independent facts (e.g., juror confirms understanding after an explanation).

Noteworthy Passages from the Opinion

“In determining whether a juror was actually biased, a reviewing court must consider the entire record and determine whether it demonstrates that the juror was actually biased against the defendant.”

“We reject … a blanket rule forbidding consideration of group answers. … If a prospective juror makes an unequivocal declaration that he cannot afford the defendant a fair trial, we doubt that the prospective juror’s mere silence in response to a judge’s [general] question … would be sufficient to overcome the actual bias … But that is not the case that we confront today.”

“Actual bias means ‘bias in fact’—the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.”

Open Questions and Limits

• Boundary of group-answer sufficiency: Rogers clarifies there is no blanket prohibition on considering group answers but does not specify how much individualized follow-up is constitutionally required in closer cases where a juror makes stronger statements of partiality.
• Role of demeanor: The opinion reiterates the difficulty of evaluating demeanor from a transcript; future cases may test how much deference is due when the trial court finds rehabilitation adequate based on in-court observations.
• Dissent’s rationale: Justice Brunner dissented, but the reasoning is not included here; it may offer a different view on when equivocal answers cross into actual bias or on the sufficiency of group responses.

Conclusion

State v. Rogers refines Ohio law at the intersection of voir dire practice and ineffective-assistance claims. It reaffirms that:

• The actual-bias standard governs prejudice when counsel does not object to a seated juror, and that standard is demanding.
• Appellate courts must assess the entire voir dire record—including group questions and responses—in determining actual bias; there is no categorical requirement for individualized “rehabilitation.”

On this record, the Court found a juror’s candid expressions of discomfort with a child sex-abuse case and struggle with a hypothetical about the presumption of innocence to be understandable and ultimately not disqualifying. The juror’s later statements and the context of group exchanges showed no unshakeable predisposition against the defendant or unwillingness to follow the law. The decision thus underscores both the importance of full-context voir dire review and the heavy burden defendants face when raising post-trial claims predicated on juror bias without having preserved objections at trial.

Practically, Rogers gives trial courts and practitioners permission to use and rely on group voir dire techniques, while sounding a note of caution: where a juror declares an unequivocal inability to be fair, generalized group assurances will not suffice. The opinion’s disciplined, whole-record approach is likely to shape Ohio voir dire practice and appellate review for years to come.

Case Information

• Case: State v. Rogers
• Citation: 2025-Ohio-4794
• Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
• Date: October 22, 2025
• Author: Justice DeWine
• Disposition: Judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed.