Whisnant v. State: Georgia Supreme Court Limits the Use of Battered Person Syndrome at Self-Defense Immunity Hearings

1. Introduction

On 12 August 2025 the Supreme Court of Georgia released its decision in Whisnant v. State, S25A0523. Karen Michelle Whisnant had been convicted by a Jackson County jury of felony murder, aggravated assault, cruelty to children in the second degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, all stemming from the shooting death of her husband, Michael Whisnant, on 4 February 2020.

The appeal raised three principal questions:

1. Was the evidence sufficient—as a constitutional matter and under Georgia’s circumstantial-evidence statute—to support the convictions?
2. Did the trial court err by denying a motion for new trial on the statutory “general grounds” (OCGA §§ 5-5-20, -21)?
3. Did the court misapply OCGA § 16-3-24.2 when it denied Whisnant pre-trial immunity, particularly in light of expert testimony that she suffered from Battered Person Syndrome (BPS)?

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed (Land, J. not participating). Key holdings include:

• Sufficiency of the Evidence: Ample direct evidence—including Whisnant’s own admissions and an eyewitness account—supported the felony-murder verdict. Consequently, OCGA § 24-14-6 (circumstantial-evidence standard) did not apply.
• Motion for New Trial – General Grounds: Appellate courts review only for an abuse of discretion. Absent affirmative evidence that the trial court failed to exercise that discretion, denial of a new trial stands.
• Self-Defense Immunity & BPS: The defendant bears the burden, by a preponderance, of proving that force was justified. Battered Person Syndrome is not an independent defense; it merely informs the reasonableness inquiry. Here, conflicting testimony allowed the trial court to find the burden unmet.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Henderson v. State, 317 Ga 66 (2023) – Recited the constitutional standard for evidentiary sufficiency (“any rational trier of fact”). Guided the Court’s refusal to re-weigh evidence.
• Perkins v. State, 313 Ga 885 (2022) – Emphasised that credibility determinations are for the jury, supporting deference to the verdict.
• Hopwood v. State, 307 Ga 305 (2019) & Maynor v. State, 317 Ga 492 (2023) – Both stress that jurors may disbelieve a defendant’s self-serving accounts. Undercut Whisnant’s accident/self-defense narrative.
• Scott v. State, 306 Ga 417 (2019) – Reinforced that felony-murder requires intent to commit the underlying felony, not intent to kill.
• Bates v. State, 317 Ga 809 (2023) & Walker v. State, 314 Ga 390 (2022) – Admissions and eyewitness testimony constitute direct evidence, rendering OCGA § 24-14-6 inapplicable.
• Anderson, Adams, King, Gray, Ward – A line of cases clarifying that trial courts have “sole discretion” on general-grounds motions and appellate review is extremely limited.
• Russell v. State, 319 Ga 556 (2024); State v. Copeland, 310 Ga 345 (2020) – Set procedural posture for immunity hearings: burden on defendant, deferential factual review, de novo legal review.
• Virger v. State, 305 Ga 281 (2019) & Demery v. State, 287 Ga 805 (2010) – Confirmed that BPS evidence is admissible only to shed light on the reasonableness of perceived threat; it does not create a standalone defense.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Evidentiary Sufficiency
   
   • The Court applied the Jackson v. Virginia due-process standard (via Henderson). When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the combination of Whisnant’s on-scene statements, her recorded interview, eyewitness Garcia’s testimony, and ballistic forensics allowed a rational juror to find every element of felony murder.
   • Because direct evidence existed, the “reasonable hypothesis” rule of OCGA § 24-14-6 did not come into play.
2. General Grounds
   
   • Under OCGA §§ 5-5-20, -21 the trial judge acts as a “thirteenth juror.” The Supreme Court’s role is not to substitute its view but solely to confirm that the judge exercised discretion. The written order showed consideration of conflicts, weight, and credibility, which sufficed.
3. Self-Defense Immunity
   
   • OCGA § 16-3-24.2 places the burden on the defendant to show, by a preponderance, that deadly force was justified under OCGA § 16-3-21(a). This is a distinct question from trial sufficiency.
   • The trial judge credited evidence that (a) Whisnant armed herself before re-entering the house, (b) no long guns were found despite her claim that Michael charged her with two shotguns, and (c) ballistic evidence placed her at least five feet away. Accordingly, the court could find the preponderance not satisfied even taking BPS into account.
   • While accepting that Whisnant “likely” suffered from BPS, the judge concluded that syndrome evidence did not explain all inconsistencies and did not compel a finding of reasonable fear of great bodily harm.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Although much of the ruling applies existing doctrine, Whisnant clarifies and cements three practical points for Georgia litigators:

1. Battered Person Syndrome is Evidentiary, Not Substantive.
   The Court’s explicit statement that BPS “is not an independent defense” will constrain efforts to cast the syndrome as a quasi-excuse. Expert testimony remains relevant, but only to the reasonableness prong of OCGA § 16-3-21.
2. Burden Allocation at Immunity Hearings Remains on the Defendant.
   Defense counsel must produce persuasive, coherent evidence—mere inconsistencies can doom immunity, even where there is a history of abuse.
3. Appellate Review of General Grounds Is Narrow.
   The Court reiterated that unless the record affirmatively shows failure to exercise discretion, denials of new-trial motions will stand.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Felony Murder: A homicide committed, regardless of intent to kill, during the commission of another felony (here, aggravated assault).
• General Grounds (OCGA §§ 5-5-20, -21): Statutes allowing a trial judge to grant a new trial if the verdict is against the weight of evidence or contrary to justice—essentially a safety valve entrusted to the judge’s conscience.
• Battered Person Syndrome (BPS): A psychological condition akin to PTSD arising from sustained intimate-partner violence, affecting perception of danger and response to threats.
• Preponderance of the Evidence: More likely than not (>50%); a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but still requires persuasive proof.
• Self-Defense Immunity (OCGA § 16-3-24.2): A statutory mechanism allowing dismissal of charges before trial if the accused proves her use of force was justified.
• Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence: Direct evidence proves a fact without inference (e.g., eyewitness account), whereas circumstantial evidence requires the fact-finder to draw an inference.

5. Conclusion

Whisnant v. State breaks no radical doctrinal ground, but it crystallises Georgia law on three fronts:

1. The evidentiary sufficiency standard remains stringent yet deferential; direct admissions or eyewitness accounts swiftly defeat OCGA § 24-14-6 arguments.
2. Trial courts’ “general-grounds” discretion is virtually unassailable on appeal unless the record reveals a clear failure to weigh evidence.
3. Most significantly, Battered Person Syndrome, while admissible and potentially persuasive, does not shift the burden at immunity hearings and cannot substitute for proof of objective reasonableness. Defense counsel must therefore corroborate abuse narratives with clear, consistent facts demonstrating imminent danger.

By reaffirming these principles, the Court tightens the analytical lens through which family-violence defendants must frame self-defense claims. Future litigants should treat Whisnant as a cautionary roadmap: expert testimony on psychological trauma complements but does not supplant the factual showing required for statutory immunity.