When Video Shows Ongoing Resistance, K‑9 Force to Secure Handcuffs Is Not “Malicious and Sadistic” Under the Eighth Amendment

Introduction

This commentary examines the Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential decision in Akheem (Ahkeem) Scott‑Manna v. Adam Calloway, et al., No. 23‑2956 (7th Cir. Nov. 7, 2025), affirming summary judgment against an incarcerated plaintiff who alleged that a corrections sergeant used excessive force by commanding a dog to bite him, and that two other officers failed to intervene. The panel—Judges Easterbrook, Ripple, and Pryor—resolved the case without oral argument under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2)(C).

The appeal raised two principal issues:

Whether a brief K‑9 deployment during a rapidly unfolding incident—captured on video—constituted excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying multiple motions to recruit counsel for the pro se plaintiff.

The court held that, on the summary‑judgment record and especially in light of video evidence, no reasonable jury could find that the dog was deployed “maliciously and sadistically” rather than in a good‑faith effort to restore order. Because no underlying constitutional violation occurred, the related failure‑to‑intervene claims necessarily failed. And although the district court’s discussion of counsel recruitment was cursory, the Seventh Circuit concluded that any deficiency was harmless because the dispositive video rendered counsel unable to change the outcome.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to three correctional officers. The court accepted, with corrections, the plaintiff’s account to the extent consistent with the record but applied the Scott v. Harris principle: where video evidence clearly contradicts a party’s version, the court adopts the video’s depiction.

Key facts the court deemed decisive included:

Scott‑Manna started a fire to attract attention to his cellmate’s medical distress, leading officers to place him on “strip cell status.”
After being uncuffed for a strip search, he fled up the stairs into his cell, shut the door, and resisted orders, requiring the use of a taser and a chemical agent.
When officers opened the cell, Scott‑Manna swung at Lieutenant Morgan, was tased again, and—still not fully restrained—rose and moved toward Morgan.
Only then did Sergeant McCray ascend with a K‑9 and command the dog to bite Scott‑Manna’s lower leg; the dog held for roughly 30 seconds—long enough for Morgan to secure handcuffs—after which McCray immediately pulled the dog back.

Applying Hudson v. McMillian and Whitley v. Albers, the panel held that no reasonable jury could find that the force was applied “maliciously and sadistically.” Given the lack of an underlying constitutional violation, the failure‑to‑intervene claims against Morgan and Calloway could not proceed (Rosado v. Gonzalez). As to counsel, the court acknowledged the district court’s thin analysis under Pruitt v. Mote and James v. Eli, but deemed any error harmless because counsel could not overcome the dispositive video evidence (McCaa v. Hamilton).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) — The Supreme Court’s directive that courts should not adopt a nonmovant’s version of facts at summary judgment when it is “clearly contradicted” by video evidence. Here, Scott‑Manna testified that he had been handcuffed when the dog was deployed; the video showed he was not fully restrained and could move his arms and rise. The panel repeatedly used the video to resolve disputes in the defendants’ favor.
Moore v. Western Illinois Correctional Center, 89 F.4th 582 (7th Cir. 2023) — Reiterates summary‑judgment review in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, subject to the Scott v. Harris exception. The panel invoked Moore to frame its approach to the record and the video’s primacy.
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) — Establish the Eighth Amendment standard for force during prison disturbances: was force applied in a good‑faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm? Hudson also lists guideposts: need for force; relationship between need and amount of force; extent of injury; threat reasonably perceived; and efforts to temper force.
Smith v. Kind, 140 F.4th 359 (7th Cir. 2025) — Cited for the Hudson factors. The panel used Smith to confirm the controlling analytical framework in this circuit.
Rosado v. Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2016) — A failure‑to‑intervene claim requires an underlying constitutional violation. Because the dog deployment was not excessive force, the claims against Morgan and Calloway fell with it.
Quinn v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 8 F.4th 557 (7th Cir. 2021) — Summary‑judgment rulings are reviewed de novo. The panel invoked Quinn to signal independent appellate review of the record.
Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) and James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320 (7th Cir. 2018) — These cases set the framework and emphasize meaningful engagement with a pro se litigant’s reasons for seeking counsel (including mental health and resource constraints). The panel acknowledged the district court’s light engagement but, citing McCaa v. Hamilton, 959 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2020), concluded the denial was within discretion because the merits were foreclosed by video evidence.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) — Quoted in Whitley for the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in three steps: standard of review and evidentiary posture, the Eighth Amendment analysis, and counsel recruitment.

1) Evidentiary posture and video control. The court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing inferences for Scott‑Manna unless contradicted by the video. Two facts were critical:

The video showed Scott‑Manna was not fully restrained when the dog was deployed—he could stand and move his arms; and
The K‑9 bite was time‑limited (about 30 seconds) and ceased immediately after handcuffs were secured.

2) Eighth Amendment application (Hudson/Whitley). The Seventh Circuit applied the five Hudson factors as follows:

Need for force: High. The incident involved a prison disturbance that escalated from a fire to flight, active resistance, and a closed‑in struggle in a cell doorway or interior space. Even after taser and chemical agent use, Scott‑Manna rose and moved toward an officer, having just swung at him.
Relationship between need and amount of force: Reasonable. The dog was deployed only after multiple lesser measures (commands, taser twice, chemical agent) failed to secure compliance, and only once Scott‑Manna reengaged and moved toward Morgan.
Extent of injury: Significant and lasting, but not dispositive. The court acknowledged chronic pain and immobility but emphasized that injury severity does not transform otherwise good‑faith force into malicious force.
Threat reasonably perceived: Acute and evolving. Within seconds, after nominal submission, Scott‑Manna swung at Morgan, was tased, rose, and advanced on Morgan while still not fully restrained. The dog handler approached only at this point.
Efforts to temper: Multiple and decisive. Officers began with less‑lethal options (taser, chemical agent) and ended force once compliance was achieved; the handler pulled the dog off immediately after cuffs were secured.

On that record, no reasonable jury could find the dog deployment was “malicious and sadistic” rather than a good‑faith effort to regain control of a rapidly moving situation.

3) Failure to intervene. Because the predicate excessive‑force claim failed, the failure‑to‑intervene claims against Morgan and Calloway necessarily failed under Rosado.

4) Requests to recruit counsel. The district court denied four motions. The Seventh Circuit noted that the district court’s written analysis did not meaningfully address the Pruitt/James factors (mental health, resource constraints, complexity). Even so, the panel affirmed because, under McCaa, district courts have broad discretion to allocate scarce pro bono resources and may consider the evident merits. The court concluded that, given the decisive video evidence, appointing counsel would not alter the outcome; thus, any analytical shortfall was harmless.

Impact and Forward‑Looking Implications

Although designated “nonprecedential” under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, the decision reinforces several durable themes in Eighth Amendment and prisoner litigation:

Video can be outcome‑determinative. Where video clearly depicts a prisoner’s ongoing resistance and the constrained timing and scope of force, courts may grant summary judgment even over contrary testimony.
Brief, targeted K‑9 deployment can be reasonable in active‑resistance scenarios. The panel’s application of Hudson suggests that a dog bite lasting only as long as necessary to secure handcuffs, especially following failed lesser measures, will often be found to be a good‑faith use of force.
Injury severity is not dispositive. Substantial injury alone does not prove malicious intent; the focus remains on purpose and context.
Failure‑to‑intervene lives or dies with the underlying violation. Absent excessive force, there is nothing to interrupt.
Counsel recruitment decisions are informed by the merits. Even if a district court’s Pruitt analysis is sparse, affirmance is likely where the record (especially video) forecloses a viable claim.

Practical effects:

For correctional agencies: Preserve clear video; stage force incrementally; terminate force immediately upon compliance; document sequencing. These practices are repeatedly credited under Hudson.
For incarcerated litigants: Anticipate that video will control disputed facts; focus arguments on what the video shows about purpose, timing, and proportionality; identify any moments where force continued after control was achieved.
For courts: The opinion underscores that even where counsel recruitment analysis is imperfect, harmless‑error principles apply when the merits are not close.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Excessive force under the Eighth Amendment: In prison settings, force is unconstitutional only if used “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm, not when applied in good faith to maintain or restore discipline during disturbances.
Hudson factors: Courts weigh the need for force, how much force was used relative to that need, injury extent, the threat reasonably perceived, and whether officers tempered force.
Scott v. Harris video principle: At summary judgment, courts ordinarily credit the nonmovant’s story. But if a video plainly contradicts that story, the video governs.
Failure to intervene: Officers may be liable for not stopping another officer’s constitutional violation, but only if there was an underlying violation to stop and a realistic opportunity to intervene.
Summary judgment: A case is resolved without trial if no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant on the evidence.
Recruitment of counsel for pro se litigants (Pruitt framework): Courts consider (1) whether the litigant tried to obtain a lawyer and (2) whether the litigant seems able to litigate the case in light of its difficulty, including mental health and resource constraints. Still, courts retain discretion, particularly when the merits appear weak or foreclosed by the record.
“Strip cell status”: A custodial measure after serious misconduct (e.g., starting a fire) in which an inmate’s property is removed and a search is conducted, often including a strip search for safety and security.
Nonprecedential disposition (FRAP 32.1): The decision may be cited under Rule 32.1, but it is not binding precedent. It signals how a court presently views issues but does not establish a controlling rule.

Additional Observations

Temporal sequencing mattered. The panel stressed the order of events: commands, taser, chemical agent, momentary compliance, sudden assault on an officer, renewed resistance, K‑9 deployment, immediate cessation after handcuffing. This sequence supported a good‑faith use of force.
Fact corrections did not affect the outcome. The court noted that some filings misidentified the facility; it was the Miami Correctional Facility, not “Westerville.” The correction was immaterial to the legal analysis.
Scope of the holding. The court did not decide whether other dog deployments or longer bites would be reasonable; its conclusion turned on video‑documented active resistance and the short, purpose‑limited bite.
Qualified immunity not reached. Because the panel found no constitutional violation, there was no need to address qualified immunity.

Conclusion

Scott‑Manna v. Calloway reinforces two enduring lessons in prison‑force litigation: first, when an inmate continues to resist in a confined setting and lesser measures have failed, a short K‑9 deployment limited to the time necessary to secure handcuffs is unlikely to be deemed “malicious and sadistic”; and second, clear video evidence can be dispositive, both on the merits and on collateral issues such as counsel recruitment. While nonprecedential, the decision offers practical guidance: officers who escalate force incrementally and cease as soon as control is achieved are well‑positioned under Hudson, and plaintiffs challenging force must grapple with what the video shows about timing, purpose, and proportionality. The Seventh Circuit’s affirmance underscores that even significant injuries do not by themselves establish an Eighth Amendment violation; the constitutional inquiry centers on why and how the force was used, not solely on its aftermath.