When the Only Direct Evidence Is Untested Testimonial Hearsay: Indiana Tightens Harmless-Error Review for Confrontation Violations in Taylor v. State

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Ricky L. Taylor v. State of Indiana (Dec. 17, 2025), authored by Chief Justice Rush. The case sits at the intersection of:

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause;
The harmless-error doctrine for constitutional violations;
Drug-induced homicide (dealing resulting in death); and
The evidentiary difference between direct and circumstantial proof.

Ricky Taylor was prosecuted in connection with the fentanyl-related death of a 17‑year‑old, K.L. The State’s theory was that Taylor supplied counterfeit oxycodone (“M30”) pills to dealer Jaxon Engle, who then sold them to K.L., causing his death. Central to the prosecution’s case was an out-of-court police statement by Engle identifying Taylor as the source of the fatal pills.

Engle later recanted, shifting blame to another supplier (Matt Sheets), and announced he would invoke the Fifth Amendment if called. The State chose not to call Engle, but instead introduced his earlier police statement through a testifying officer in a bench trial. Taylor was convicted of a Level 1 felony (aiding, inducing, or causing dealing resulting in death) and two Level 5 felonies (dealing and conspiracy to deal).

On appeal, the State conceded that admitting Engle’s out-of-court testimonial statement without cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause. The only question was whether this constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals said yes and affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed, granted transfer, vacated the Level 1 conviction, and remanded for a new trial on that count.

This opinion meaningfully clarifies how Indiana courts must apply harmless-error review when the improperly admitted evidence is the only direct proof linking a defendant to a critical element of the offense, especially in Confrontation Clause cases.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Factual Background

In 2023, Ricky Taylor lived in Muncie and sold blue M30 pills—counterfeit oxycodone pills typically containing fentanyl.
He regularly sold M30s to Jaxon Engle, who both used and resold them. Engle also bought M30s from other suppliers, including Matt Sheets.
On September 11, Taylor messaged Engle on Facebook that he had “good ones” for sale. Engle questioned whether they were the “[s]ame ones” Sheets had. Taylor became irritated; the September 14 exchange ended with Taylor saying: “Either buy them or don’t,” and he stopped responding. The record did not show that an actual sale between Taylor and Engle occurred on that date.
On September 15, Engle went to a local drag-racing strip. According to a later statement to police, he sold “blue pills” obtained from Taylor to 17‑year‑old K.L., who died that night from fentanyl and cocaine intoxication.
Police recovered part of an M30 pill from K.L.’s nightstand, later confirmed to contain fentanyl.
The investigation led police to Taylor, who said he did not think he sold Engle pills on September 14, but could not be sure.
Police also obtained Facebook messages between Taylor and Sheets discussing joint drug deals in the days after K.L.’s death.

The State charged Taylor with:

A Level 1 felony for aiding, inducing, or causing Engle to commit dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death (Indiana Code §§ 35‑41‑2‑4; 35‑42‑1‑1.5(a)(1));
Two Level 5 felonies for dealing a narcotic drug and conspiracy to deal a narcotic drug.

For the Level 1 “aiding” charge, the State alleged that Taylor was the “distributor or supplier” of the pills Engle sold to K.L.

2.2 Engle’s Changing Story and Trial Posture

The State initially planned to call Engle and offered him immunity in exchange for testimony implicating Taylor.
A few days before trial, Engle changed his story: he told the State that Sheets, not Taylor, had supplied him with M30s “approximately one hour” before he went to the drag strip.
The State withdrew immunity and elected not to call Engle.
Engle made clear that, if summoned, he would invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

At Taylor’s bench trial:

Officer Steve Coffman testified—over Taylor’s objection—that Engle had earlier told police that Taylor supplied the “blue pills” Engle sold to K.L.
The trial court, acting as factfinder, found Taylor guilty on the Level 1 aiding charge and on the two Level 5 charges.
Sentencing: 35 years on the Level 1, 6 years concurrent on the dealing count, and 6 years consecutive on the conspiracy count, for a total of 41 years executed.

2.3 Appellate Proceedings

On appeal, Taylor challenged only the Level 1 conviction. He argued:

Admission of Engle’s uncross-examined testimonial statement to police violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause; and
The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Engle’s statement was the only direct evidence that Taylor supplied the fatal pills.

The State:

Conceded the Confrontation Clause violation (Engle’s statement was testimonial; Engle was unavailable; Taylor had no prior opportunity for cross-examination).
But argued the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because other evidence allegedly tied Taylor to the fatal pills.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the State and affirmed, but on transfer the Indiana Supreme Court:

Granted transfer and vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion;
Held that, under Koenig v. State, the State failed to carry its burden to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt; and
Vacated Taylor’s Level 1 conviction and remanded for a new trial on that charge.

Justices Goff and Molter joined the majority. Justices Massa and Slaughter dissented, preferring to deny transfer and reinstate the Court of Appeals’ affirmance.

3. The Court’s Holding and Core Principle

3.1 Formal Holding

The Court held:

Because the State has not carried its burden to show that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we vacate Taylor's Level 1 felony conviction and remand for a new trial on that charge.

3.2 Substantive Principle Announced

More broadly, the decision stands for a sharpened rule in Indiana:

When a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is violated by the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement, reversal is required unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
When the improperly admitted testimonial statement:
- is the only direct evidence tying the defendant to a critical element (here, supplying the fatal pills),
- is non-cumulative,
- is uncorroborated by other evidence, and
- has not been tested by cross-examination,
the State typically cannot show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.

In other words, the Court signals that in Confrontation Clause cases, untested testimonial hearsay functioning as the sole direct link to guilt is exceedingly unlikely to be deemed harmless.

4. Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.1 Federal Confrontation Clause Canon

The opinion anchors its reasoning in core U.S. Supreme Court Confrontation Clause decisions:

4.1.1 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)

Quoted for the Confrontation Clause’s core purpose:

“to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.”

This sets the conceptual frame: confrontation is not a technical formality; it is a mechanism for reliability and truth-finding. The Court uses Craig to reaffirm that in-person, adversarial testing remains the constitutional ideal.

4.1.2 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)

Cited for the famous phrase:

“testing in the crucible of cross-examination”

Crawford revolutionized Confrontation Clause doctrine by holding that testimonial hearsay is inadmissible absent unavailability and prior cross-examination. Taylor’s case falls squarely within this Crawford framework: Engle’s statement to police was testimonial; he was unavailable (invoking the Fifth); Taylor never had a chance to cross-examine.

4.1.3 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011)

Cited for the black-letter rule:

Out-of-court testimonial statements cannot be used against a defendant at trial “unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront that witness.”

Here, both conditions failed: although Engle was unavailable, Taylor had no prior opportunity for cross-examination. Thus, the admission violated Bullcoming/Crawford.

4.2 Indiana Harmless-Error Standard

4.2.1 Koenig v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. 2010)

Koenig provides the harmless-error test for constitutional violations:

Constitutional errors require reversal unless “the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”

Koenig also supplies the analytic factors the Court applies:

Significance of the improperly admitted evidence to the State’s case;
Whether the evidence was cumulative;
Whether other evidence corroborated it; and
The extent of cross-examination or questioning of the improperly admitted evidence.

Taylor’s case is an application—and, in practice, a tightening—of Koenig in the Confrontation Clause context where the challenged evidence is uniquely powerful direct evidence.

4.3 Indiana Cases on Types of Evidence and Cross-Examination

4.3.1 Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480 (Ind. 2012)

Hampton (citing Black’s Law Dictionary) defines:

Direct evidence: evidence based on personal knowledge, which, if believed, proves a fact without inference or presumption.
Circumstantial evidence: evidence that requires inferences to connect it to the fact in question.

The Taylor opinion leans on Hampton’s recognition of a:

“qualitative difference between direct and circumstantial evidence with respect to the degree of reliability and certainty they provide as proof of guilt.”

That distinction is crucial. Engle’s statement was direct evidence of Taylor’s role as supplier of the fatal pills. The circumstantial evidence (earlier sales, Facebook messages, joint deals with Sheets) could suggest suspicion, but did not directly establish that Taylor supplied the specific fatal pills.

4.3.2 Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172 (Ind. 2022)

Young is cited for the uncontroversial rule that:

Circumstantial evidence alone can support a conviction.

The Court acknowledges that Indiana allows convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence. But by contrasting Young with Hampton, the Court emphasizes that while circumstantial evidence can be sufficient, direct evidence (especially when untested) carries distinctive weight and must be scrutinized in harmless-error analysis.

4.3.3 Smith v. State, 721 N.E.2d 213 (Ind. 1999)

Smith is invoked for the importance of cross-examination in exposing witness bias:

Cross-examination is critical for demonstrating a witness’s bias.

In Taylor’s case, cross-examination would have been particularly important to explore:

Engle’s possible motive to implicate Taylor initially in order to secure immunity; and
The circumstances of his later recantation blaming Sheets.

Because Engle never appeared and was never cross-examined, this core constitutional safeguard was entirely absent.

4.4 Indiana Constitutional Cases (Waiver and Encouragement)

4.4.1 Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. 1997)

Cited in a footnote to hold that Taylor waived any independent claim under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution by failing to provide separate analysis from the federal Sixth Amendment claim.

4.4.2 Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307 (Ind. 2018)

Also in the footnote, the Court again:

encourages attorneys to embrace our state constitution’s “uniqueness” and advance separate arguments for “independent analysis” of its protections.

The Court signals that counsel should not treat the Indiana Constitution as duplicative of the federal Constitution; separate state constitutional analysis may yield greater or different protections.

4.5 Persuasive Federal Authority

4.5.1 United States v. Jones, 930 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2019)

The Court cites Jones as persuasive authority where the Fifth Circuit reversed a conviction because an informant’s statement—emphasized in closing—was:

the only direct evidence implicating the defendant; and
its admission was erroneous.

The analogy is straightforward: in both Jones and Taylor, the core problem is reliance on a single, untested, direct statement to prove a critical element that the rest of the evidence only circumstantially supports.

4.6 Statutory References

Indiana Code § 35‑41‑2‑4 – Aiding, inducing, or causing an offense (accomplice liability): liability for aiding or inducing another to commit a crime.
Indiana Code § 35‑42‑1‑1.5(a)(1) – Dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death: enhanced liability when dealing causes death.

These statutes frame the Level 1 charge: to convict Taylor, the State had to prove he knowingly aided, induced, or caused Engle to deal the specific M30 pill that resulted in K.L.’s death, making the source of the fatal pill central.

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.1 Step One: Confrontation Clause Violation (Conceded)

There is no dispute that:

Engle’s statement to police naming Taylor as the supplier of the pills sold to K.L. was testimonial (a formal police interrogation statement);
Engle was unavailable at trial (he would invoke the Fifth Amendment); and
Taylor never had a prior opportunity to cross-examine Engle.

Under Crawford and Bullcoming, this combination makes the statement inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment. The State properly conceded the violation.

5.2 Step Two: Harmless-Error Framework (Koenig)

Because the error is constitutional, the Court proceeds under Koenig:

The conviction must be reversed unless the State shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

To apply that standard, the Court examines:

The significance of Engle’s statement to the State’s case;
Whether Engle’s statement was cumulative of other evidence;
Whether other evidence corroborated or contradicted it; and
The extent to which the statement was subject to cross-examination or other testing.

5.3 Significance: Only Direct Evidence Linking Taylor to the Fatal Pills

The Court emphasizes that Engle’s statement to Officer Coffman:

Was direct evidence of Taylor’s guilt:
It was based on Engle’s personal knowledge; and
If believed, it proved Taylor supplied the fatal pills “without inference or presumption.”

Because the theory of the Level 1 charge was that Taylor aided Engle by supplying the fatal pills, this statement was critical to the State’s ability to prove that particular element.

The State itself underscored this significance in closing argument by emphasizing that Engle’s statement showed that Taylor supplied the fatal pills.

5.4 Non-Cumulative: No Other Direct Evidence

The Court finds that Engle’s statement was:

Not cumulative—no other evidence directly stated that Taylor supplied the pills sold to K.L.;
The rest of the evidence was circumstantial and required inferences.

The circumstantial evidence included:

Prior sales of M30s from Taylor to Engle;
Facebook messages the day before K.L.’s death indicating Taylor “had good ones” but then showing Taylor cutting off communication when Engle asked questions;
The absence of any concrete arrangement in those messages (no meeting place specified, unlike prior deals);
Evidence from Engle’s father, Engle’s brother’s ex-girlfriend, and messages showing that Engle had multiple suppliers, including Sheets; and
Post-death Facebook messages between Taylor and Sheets about arranging drug deals.

This evidence suggested that Taylor was a drug dealer who sold M30s to Engle, but it did not specifically demonstrate that the fatal pills came from Taylor, rather than from Sheets or someone else.

5.5 Lack of Corroboration: Evidence Equally Consistent with Another Supplier

The Court is careful to distinguish evidence that Taylor dealt drugs generally from evidence that he supplied the particular pills that killed K.L.:

The prior pattern of sales and the “good ones” message make it plausible that Taylor could have been a supplier, but not that he was the supplier on that specific occasion.
Engle’s father and other witnesses, plus Facebook messages, confirm that Engle had multiple sources, including Sheets.
The messages between Taylor and Sheets about joint deals arose after K.L.’s death and do not clearly show that they were partners supplying the fatal pills, undermining the State’s “partner” theory.

Thus, the Court finds that the circumstantial evidence:

Does not truly corroborate Engle’s statement; and
Is consistent with the possibility that someone else, such as Sheets, supplied the fatal pills.

In that sense, Engle’s statement “stood alone” as the only direct, non-inferential evidence tying Taylor to the fatal pills.

5.6 Lack of Adversarial Testing: No Cross-Examination, No Bias Exposure

The Court stresses the complete absence of cross-examination:

No witness had personal knowledge of Engle’s later recantation naming Sheets (so this contradiction could not be meaningfully developed);
Taylor had no opportunity to expose Engle’s shifting stories, his motives, or potential bias;
Taylor could not question whether Engle initially blamed Taylor in pursuit of immunity, then later changed his story for other self-serving reasons.

Quoting Smith v. State, the Court reiterates that cross-examination is essential to uncover bias and test credibility. Here, Engle’s key inculpatory statement was “never tested—the very harm the Confrontation Clause seeks to prevent.”

5.7 Cumulative Assessment: Error Not Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Bringing the Koenig factors together, the Court concludes:

Engle’s statement was vital to the State’s case;
It was non-cumulative (the only direct evidence linking Taylor to the fatal pills);
It was uncorroborated and, if anything, the circumstantial evidence undermined its certainty by showing multiple possible suppliers;
It was untested—Taylor never cross-examined Engle; and
The State highlighted the statement in closing argument.

Under those circumstances, the Court cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error “did not contribute to the verdict” on the Level 1 aiding charge. The conviction therefore cannot stand.

6. Impact and Broader Significance

6.1 Confrontation Clause Enforcement in Indiana

This decision sends a strong message to trial courts and prosecutors:

No end-run around confrontation: The State cannot sidestep the Confrontation Clause by putting a police officer on the stand to relay testimonial accusations from a non-testifying witness, especially when that witness is central to the prosecution theory.
Unavailability does not cure lack of confrontation: A witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment does not allow the State to substitute that witness’s out-of-court testimonial statement without prior cross-examination.
Bench trials are not immune: Even in bench trials, where judges are trained to discount improper evidence, Confrontation Clause violations are subject to the same strict harmless-error standard.

6.2 Harmless-Error Review: Elevating the Role of Direct Evidence

The opinion refines how Indiana courts should conduct harmless-error review when:

The improperly admitted evidence is direct, not circumstantial;
And it is the sole direct proof of a crucial element.

Key implications:

Direct evidence carries unique weight: Courts must recognize the “qualitative difference” Hampton identifies. A single piece of direct, untested evidence may overshadow a mass of circumstantial evidence.
State’s burden heightened in such configurations: It will be difficult for the State to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt where the inadmissible statement is the only direct link between the defendant and the criminal act.
Closing argument emphasis matters: When the prosecution highlights the challenged evidence in closing (as in Jones and Taylor), that undercuts any claim that it was unimportant to the verdict.

6.3 Practical Effects on Drug-Induced Homicide and Accomplice Cases

In drug-induced homicide cases and accomplice liability prosecutions:

Prosecutors often rely on cooperating witnesses or drug users to trace the chain of distribution back to suppliers.
If those witnesses recant, become hostile, or invoke the Fifth, the temptation may arise to rely on their prior statements through police testimony.

Taylor makes clear:

Such prior testimonial statements are inadmissible absent prior cross-examination, even if the witness is now unavailable.
If the statement is central and uncorroborated, convictions resting on it are vulnerable on appeal.

This will likely impact how prosecutors approach immunity deals, plea agreements, and witness preparation, and may encourage greater reliance on corroborating physical, digital, or forensic evidence.

6.4 Defense Strategies Going Forward

Defense counsel can draw several lessons:

Vigorous and precise Confrontation Clause objections are critical, especially when officers testify about what non-testifying witnesses said.
On appeal, counsel should meticulously distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence, showing that the tainted direct evidence was the linchpin of the State’s case.
Lawyers should heed the Court’s encouragement to raise independent state constitutional arguments under Article 1, Section 13, providing separate analysis that may offer broader protections than the federal Sixth Amendment.

6.5 Bench vs. Jury: No Lower Standard

Although not expounded at length, the case underscores that:

The harmless-error standard for Confrontation Clause violations does not relax merely because the trier of fact is a judge rather than a jury.
Appellate courts will not assume that trial judges are unaffected by powerful inadmissible evidence simply because they are legally trained.

6.6 Dissent’s Posture (Inferred)

While the dissenting Justices’ reasoning is not provided, their position—believing transfer should be denied and the Court of Appeals’ affirmation reinstated—suggests they were more comfortable with the Court of Appeals’ view that:

The circumstantial evidence was sufficient; and
The constitutional error could be deemed harmless.

The majority’s contrary view marks a stronger insistence that constitutional trial-right violations be rigorously policed on appeal when central, untested evidence is involved.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

7.1 The Confrontation Clause

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees:

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”

In practical terms:

If someone accuses a defendant in a way that is “testimonial” (like a statement to police during an investigation), the defendant is entitled to see that person in court and question them.
Simply having a police officer report what that person said is not enough.
The idea is that direct questioning in open court exposes lies, mistakes, bias, and inconsistencies.

7.2 Testimonial vs. Non-Testimonial Statements

Testimonial statements include formal statements to police, sworn affidavits, prior testimony, or other statements given with the understanding they may be used in prosecution.
Non-testimonial statements (e.g., certain casual remarks, statements made for emergency assistance) are treated differently under the Confrontation Clause.

Engle’s statement to police naming Taylor as the supplier was clearly testimonial—it was given during a criminal investigation specifically to establish events for prosecution.

7.3 Harmless Error “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”

A constitutional error at trial does not automatically require reversal. But under the harmless-error standard:

The State (not the defendant) has the burden;
It must show, “beyond a reasonable doubt,” that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

“Beyond a reasonable doubt” here functions as a very strict assurance: the reviewing court must be highly confident that, even without the error, the outcome would be the same. If there is real doubt, reversal is required.

7.4 Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence

Direct evidence—if believed—proves a fact immediately. Example: “I saw Taylor hand Engle the pills that Engle then sold to K.L.”
Circumstantial evidence suggests a fact and requires the factfinder to draw inferences. Example: “Taylor often sold M30s to Engle in the past, and they were texting about pills the day before.”

Courts allow convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence, but:

Direct evidence can be especially powerful and persuasive; and
When such evidence is improperly admitted, it is often difficult for an appellate court to say the error had no effect on the verdict.

7.5 Aiding, Inducing, or Causing (Accomplice Liability)

Under Indiana Code § 35‑41‑2‑4:

A person can be convicted of a crime not only by committing it directly, but also by aiding, inducing, or causing another person to commit it.
In this case, Taylor was charged not with selling directly to K.L., but with aiding Engle’s drug dealing that resulted in K.L.’s death by supplying the pills.

Thus, the critical factual question was whether Taylor supplied the specific M30 pill that killed K.L. Engle’s statement was the only direct answer to that question.

7.6 Witness Unavailability and the Fifth Amendment

A witness is “unavailable” when they cannot or will not testify—for example, because they assert the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
But unavailability alone does not allow the State to use that witness’s testimonial statements without confrontation; there must also have been a prior opportunity for cross-examination.

Engle’s planned invocation of the Fifth made him unavailable, but Taylor had never cross-examined him before, so his statement to police remained inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.

8. Conclusion

The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Ricky L. Taylor v. State of Indiana firmly reinforces the constitutional requirement that a criminal conviction not rest on the untested words of an absent witness, particularly when those words constitute the only direct evidence of a critical element of the offense.

By applying Koenig’s harmless-error framework with emphasis on the nature and centrality of the tainted evidence, the Court holds that:

A conceded Confrontation Clause violation is not harmless where the erroneously admitted testimonial statement:
- is direct evidence of guilt,
- is non-cumulative,
- is uncorroborated by other evidence,
- is highlighted by the State, and
- has never been tested through cross-examination.

The ruling has significant implications for drug-induced homicide and accomplice prosecutions, for harmless-error review in Confrontation Clause cases, and for trial strategy on both sides. It also renews the Court’s call for robust, independent analysis under the Indiana Constitution.

At bottom, Taylor reaffirms a fundamental principle: when liberty is at stake, untested testimonial accusations—however convenient or incriminating—cannot substitute for the adversarial testing that lies at the heart of the Sixth Amendment.