When State Law Speaks, Federal Panels Must Listen:
United States v. Rowe and the Supremacy of Intervening State-Court Interpretations in Federal Sentencing Analysis

Introduction

United States v. Charles Rowe, No. 23-10042 (11th Cir. July 15, 2025) is a precedential decision that harmonises the federal “prior-panel-precedent” rule with the categorical approach used to classify prior state convictions for sentencing enhancements. The Eleventh Circuit re-affirmed that when a state’s highest court later construes the elements of a crime in a manner inconsistent with an earlier federal panel’s understanding, the federal court must yield—even if that earlier panel precedent has not been overruled en banc.

The case arose after Charles Edward Rowe pleaded guilty to three federal counts involving drug trafficking and firearms. His guidelines range was enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (the “career offender” guideline) because of a prior Florida conviction for trafficking in cocaine. Rowe invoked United States v. Shannon (2011), where a different Eleventh Circuit panel had held that Florida cocaine trafficking was not a “controlled substance offense.” The government countered that intervening Florida Supreme Court authority— particularly Conage v. State, 346 So.3d 594 (Fla. 2022) (“Conage II”)—had changed the state-law landscape, thereby dissolving Shannon’s foundation.

The appellate court agreed with the government, reaffirmed the validity of Rowe’s plea, and held that Florida cocaine trafficking is now categorically a “controlled substance offense.”

Summary of the Judgment

• Plea-related issues: The court found no Rule 11 error. Rowe’s plea was voluntary, supported by an adequate factual basis, and his pro se attempt to withdraw the plea was properly stricken under Local Rule 11.1(F).
• Sentencing issue: The court held that after Conage II, trafficking in cocaine under Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b) necessarily entails possession of a distributable quantity with intent to distribute. Thus it fits squarely within § 4B1.2(b)’s definition of a “controlled substance offense.”
• Doctrinal holding: Where (1) a prior federal panel decision’s state-law premise is later rejected by the state’s highest court, and (2) that state-law premise was essential to the federal holding under the categorical approach, the prior panel precedent rule does not preclude a new panel from reaching a different conclusion.
• Disposition: Conviction and 360-month sentence affirmed.

Analysis

a. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Shannon, 631 F.3d 1187 (11th Cir. 2011) – Earlier panel held Florida cocaine trafficking was not a controlled substance offense because the “purchase” prong did not necessarily require possession. Formed the backbone of Rowe’s appeal.
• United States v. Conage Trilogy
  • Conage I, 976 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020) – Certified question to Florida Supreme Court.
  • Conage II, 346 So.3d 594 (Fla. 2022) – State high court held that purchasing a trafficking quantity necessarily entails constructive possession.
  • Conage III, 50 F.4th 81 (11th Cir. 2022) – Adopted the Florida court’s answer and applied it under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
• Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) – Clarified that sentencing courts look to statutory elements, not underlying facts.
• Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) – Emphasised state-versus-federal questions in categorical analysis; cited by Rowe panel.
• United States v. Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) & United States v. James, 430 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir. 2005) – Analogous decisions finding similar Georgia and Florida trafficking statutes to be predicate drug offenses.

b. Legal Reasoning

1. Two-Step Categorical Approach
   Step 1 (state law): identify the “least culpable conduct” that can support conviction.
   Step 2 (federal law): determine whether that conduct matches the federal generic offense.
2. Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule v. State-Court Supremacy
   Under Sneed and Clarke, Eleventh Circuit panels are bound by earlier holdings unless a higher authority— the Supreme Court or a state’s highest court on matters of state law—overrides them. Conage II is precisely such an override.
3. Effect of Conage II on Shannon
   Shannon’s key premise—that “purchase” does not imply possession—was repudiated. Because that premise was indispensable to Shannon’s mismatch analysis, the entire Shannon holding no longer controls.
4. Guidelines Comparison
   Post-Conage, the minimum conduct under § 893.135(1)(b) is possession of ≥28 grams with intent to distribute. Section 4B1.2(b) expressly covers possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The match is categorical, leaving no “divisible” statutory sections to parse.

c. Impact of the Judgment

• Immediate Sentencing Practice: Defendants in the Eleventh Circuit with prior Florida trafficking convictions (cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, etc.) will almost invariably qualify as career offenders, unless another distinct statutory quirk is shown.
• Erasure of Shannon’s Safe Harbour: Defense strategies that relied on Shannon to avoid guideline enhancements are now foreclosed; plea negotiations and trial strategy will adjust accordingly.
• Clarifies Interaction Between State and Federal Law: Reinforces that the state-court articulation of elements controls for categorical purposes, thus promoting consistency across ACCA, § 2L1.2, and § 4B1.1 analyses.
• Procedural Guidance: Provides a blueprint for litigants: when a state supreme court modifies elements, parties should promptly alert sentencing courts and invoke the modified categorical analysis.
• Potential Ripple Effects Beyond Eleventh Circuit: Other circuits confronting similar state-law reinterpretations may cite Rowe to justify departing from earlier federal panel decisions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule: Normally, one Eleventh Circuit panel cannot contradict an earlier panel. Exception: later decisions by the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit en banc, or a state’s highest court on state law can free a panel from the earlier ruling.
• Categorical Approach: A “rubber-stamp” comparison of statutory elements—not facts— to see if they line up with a federal generic offense. Think of it as comparing checklists: if the state checklist fits inside the federal checklist, the conviction “counts.”
• Controlled Substance Offense (Guideline § 4B1.2(b)): A felony that outlaws (a) manufacturing, importing, exporting, distributing, or dispensing drugs, or (b) possessing drugs with intent to do any of those acts. Mere simple possession or purchase without intent normally does not qualify.
• Constructive Possession: Legal doctrine whereby a person can be deemed to possess contraband even if it is not in their hands—so long as they have the power and intent to control it.
• Career Offender Guideline (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A provision that sharply increases the advisory sentencing range if the defendant (i) is at least 18, (ii) is convicted of a felony “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense,” and (iii) has two or more prior such convictions.

Conclusion

United States v. Rowe cements an important doctrinal point: federal sentencing courts must anchor their categorical analysis in the latest authoritative pronouncement of state law, even if that upends earlier federal precedent. By subordinating Shannon to the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Conage II, the Eleventh Circuit has clarified the hierarchy of interpretive authority and eliminated a long-standing circuit split between Shannon and its own later ACCA jurisprudence. Going forward, Florida trafficking convictions will nearly always serve as predicates under the career offender guideline, and litigants should scrutinise state-court developments as carefully as Supreme Court case law when litigating federal sentencing issues.