When Replacement Evidence Is Absent, Comparator Proof Must Be Concrete—Conclusory Comparator Testimony and Plaintiff Admissions Defeat Discrimination and Hostile-Environment Claims at Summary Judgment

Introduction

In Laquinta Hightower-Mathis v. Nextcare Michigan Providers, PLLC, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an urgent care clinic after it terminated a front-desk employee, Laquinta Hightower-Mathis (an African-American woman), following a patient interaction involving a uniformed police officer. Hightower-Mathis sued NextCare Michigan Providers, alleging race and gender discrimination and hostile work environment/harassment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA).

The key issues on appeal were whether Hightower-Mathis produced enough evidence to create an inference of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework—particularly the “similarly situated comparator” or “replacement” component of the prima facie case—and whether she could show harassment based on a protected trait, as required for a hostile work environment claim.

Summary of the Opinion

Race discrimination (Title VII, § 1981, ELCRA): Affirmed dismissal because Hightower-Mathis failed the fourth prong of the prima facie case—she offered no evidence she was replaced by someone outside her protected class and her comparator evidence was too vague and unsupported to permit a reasonable inference of discrimination.
Pretext: The court declined to reach pretext because the prima facie case failed.
Gender discrimination: Deemed abandoned on appeal because it was not argued in the opening brief.
Hostile work environment/harassment (race and gender): Affirmed dismissal because Hightower-Mathis admitted she did not believe NextCare harassed her because of race or gender, defeating the “based on protected trait” element.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Summary judgment framework and evidentiary burdens

El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. and Blount v. Stanley Eng'g Fastening supplied the de novo standard of review and the Rule 56 baseline: summary judgment is proper where no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. provided two core propositions the panel applied repeatedly: (1) a “genuine” dispute exists only if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant; and (2) courts must draw “justifiable inferences” for the nonmovant, while still requiring evidence capable of supporting a verdict.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett grounded the movant’s ability to prevail by showing an “absence of evidence” on an essential element, shifting the burden to the nonmovant to come forward with proof.
Jones v. City of Franklin, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, and Moore v. Holbrook reinforced the Sixth Circuit’s insistence that speculation, conclusory allegations, and unsubstantiated assertions do not create triable issues; the nonmovant must provide “specific facts” showing a genuine issue for trial.

Employment discrimination framework and comparator doctrine

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc. framed the circumstantial-evidence route: the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, the employer must articulate a legitimate reason, and the plaintiff may show pretext—though here the court never reached pretext.
Laster v. City of Kalamazoo supplied the four-element prima facie test and the fourth element’s alternative formulations: replacement by someone outside the protected class or less favorable treatment than a similarly situated person outside the class.
Jackson v. Quanex Corp. was used to treat Title VII, § 1981, and ELCRA race-discrimination frameworks as analytically parallel.
Arendale v. City of Memphis and Leadbetter v. Gilley guided how to evaluate whether proposed comparators are “similarly situated in all relevant respects,” rejecting mere “superficial similarities” and permitting consideration of job responsibilities, experience, and work record.
Fuelling v. New Vision Medical Laby's LLC supported the conclusion that comparator allegations lacking concrete, comparable facts cannot withstand summary judgment.

Limits of non-employment comparator logic

Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. was invoked by the plaintiff for the proposition that comparator evidence cannot be an exclusive route to proving intent. The panel distinguished it as a consumer-discrimination case and emphasized that its discussion explicitly contrasted the employment context—where coworkers may be traceable comparators— with the impracticality of requiring individual shoppers to identify similarly situated customers.

Issue abandonment on appeal

Robinson v. Jones supplied the rule that claims not raised and discussed in the appellant’s brief are abandoned.

Hostile work environment elements

Elzein v. Ascension Genesys Hosp. (citing Williams v. CSX Transp. Co.) provided the multi-element test, including the requirement that harassment be “based on” the protected trait and sufficiently severe or pervasive.
Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc, 517 F3d 321, 333 (6th Cir. 2008) was cited by the plaintiff for the idea that severe employment consequences can alter conditions of employment, but the panel effectively treated it as beside the point because the “based on protected trait” requirement was not met.

Legal Reasoning

1) Prima facie race discrimination: the opinion’s practical rule

The panel treated the fourth prong of Laster v. City of Kalamazoo as the fulcrum. It emphasized a functional point: if a plaintiff provides no evidence of replacement by someone outside the protected class, the plaintiff must identify a viable alternative route to an inference of discrimination—most commonly, actual comparators with enough detail to support a meaningful comparison.

Hightower-Mathis could not supply replacement evidence (she testified she did not know who replaced her, if anyone). That left comparator proof. But her comparator accounts consisted of undeveloped anecdotes: an unidentified white woman at another facility suspected of theft (unknown job, unknown outcome, unknown facts), and an unidentified African-American trainee who “went off” on patients (unknown job status, unknown separation reason, unknown details). Applying Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Jones v. City of Franklin, and Moore v. Holbrook, the court held these were not “specific facts” that could let a jury infer “less favorable treatment” of similarly situated employees outside her class.

2) The court’s handling of “comparator-only test” arguments

The plaintiff argued the district court unlawfully demanded strict comparator proof. The Sixth Circuit rejected that characterization: comparator evidence is not always the exclusive way to prove discriminatory intent, but in this record it became the only remaining way to satisfy the fourth prong because replacement evidence was absent. The opinion used Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. to clarify that the “no comparator requirement” language from a consumer context does not displace the comparator/replacement structure of the employment prima facie case.

3) No impermissible credibility weighing

The panel rejected the assertion that the district court credited the employer’s narrative over the plaintiff’s. It noted the district court explicitly stated it credited the plaintiff’s testimony for summary judgment purposes and treated coworker evidence neutrally. The decisive problem was not whose story about the incident was correct; it was the absence of evidence tying the termination decision to race.

4) Pretext was not reached

Although the plaintiff argued reputational concerns and a rapid response showed improper motive, the court declined to proceed to pretext because the prima facie case failed. This reinforces a sequencing point in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green litigation: without the prima facie inference, pretext analysis is unnecessary.

5) Hostile work environment: admissions defeated the “based on” element

Under Elzein v. Ascension Genesys Hosp. (citing Williams v. CSX Transp. Co.), harassment must be “based on” the protected trait. The opinion treated the plaintiff’s deposition admissions as dispositive: she testified she did not believe she was harassed because of race or gender, but rather because the police officer complained and the employer “listened to him.” Even if the termination was fast and severe, the panel held no reasonable jury could find trait-based harassment on this record.

6) Gender discrimination abandoned

Applying Robinson v. Jones, the court held the gender discrimination claim was abandoned because it was not argued in the appellant’s brief.

Impact

Comparator allegations must be usable, not merely asserted: The decision underscores that a plaintiff’s generalized recollections about other employees—without names, roles, outcomes, or circumstances—will not create a triable comparator issue. Courts will treat such accounts as speculation rather than “significantly probative” evidence.
No replacement evidence means the plaintiff must find another concrete inference path: If a plaintiff cannot show replacement by someone outside the protected class, the record must still support the fourth prong through some concrete comparator or other circumstantial evidence; mere disagreement with the employer’s investigation is not, by itself, an inference of discrimination.
Hostile work environment claims are trait-anchored: The opinion highlights that adverse action—even termination—does not itself establish hostile environment. The harassment must be because of the protected trait, and a plaintiff’s own testimony disavowing trait causation can be fatal.
Appellate practice consequence: The ruling reiterates that undeveloped or omitted arguments (here, gender discrimination) are forfeited/abandoned on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment: A case can end before trial if, even viewing the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor, no reasonable jury could rule for that party because an essential element lacks supporting evidence.
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting: A common structure for proving discrimination with circumstantial evidence: (1) plaintiff shows a minimal “prima facie” inference; (2) employer offers a legitimate reason; (3) plaintiff shows that reason is a pretext for discrimination. If step (1) fails, courts generally do not reach step (3).
Prima facie case (fourth prong: replacement or comparator): The plaintiff must show a circumstance suggesting discrimination—often either that they were replaced by someone outside the protected class, or that a similarly situated employee outside the class was treated better for comparable conduct.
Similarly situated comparator: Another employee who is alike in the relevant ways (job, duties, standards, disciplinary context) so that differences in discipline can reasonably suggest discrimination rather than differences in circumstances.
Hostile work environment “based on” a protected trait: The workplace mistreatment must be because of race, sex, etc.—not merely unfair, unpleasant, or triggered by a workplace incident unrelated to the protected trait.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms a practical evidentiary boundary in discrimination litigation: when a plaintiff cannot identify a replacement outside the protected class, she must supply concrete, comparable facts supporting differential treatment—vague anecdotes and speculation will not satisfy the prima facie inference. The opinion also reinforces that hostile work environment claims require harassment tied to a protected trait and that a plaintiff’s own testimony disclaiming trait-based causation can defeat the claim at summary judgment.