When Public Streets Become Part of a Private Ticketed Event: The Sixth Circuit’s Forum and Trespass Framework in Blankenship v. Louisville‑Jefferson County Metro Government

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I. Introduction

In Jacob Glenn Blankenship v. Louisville‑Jefferson County, Kentucky Metro Government; Elliott Young, No. 25‑5014 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025) (recommended for publication), the Sixth Circuit addressed the intersection of First Amendment rights, municipal permitting of large private events, and criminal trespass enforcement on temporarily closed public streets.

The dispute arose from street preaching and leafletting on Derby Day 2022 along Central Avenue outside Churchill Downs. The City (Louisville Metro) had issued a special event permit that fenced off several blocks of public streets and sidewalks as a restricted area around the Kentucky Derby, limiting access to ticketed or credentialed persons. Plaintiff Jacob Blankenship, a street preacher, entered the restricted area without a ticket, refused repeated requests to leave, and was ultimately arrested for third‑degree criminal trespass by Kentucky State Police Trooper Elliott Young. His criminal case was later dismissed.

Blankenship then brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging:

• Violation of his First Amendment free speech rights;
• Violation of his First Amendment free exercise rights;
• A due process vagueness challenge to Louisville Metro’s permitting scheme;
• Monell municipal liability against Louisville Metro; and
• Individual liability and lack of qualified immunity for Trooper Young.

The district court granted summary judgment to both defendants on all remaining claims. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The opinion is particularly significant for:

• Clarifying how public streets and sidewalks, when physically closed and fenced for a private, ticketed event, may be treated as a limited public forum (or, in any event, subject to content‑neutral time, place, and manner restrictions under intermediate scrutiny);
• Upholding the use of a general trespass statute to remove uncredentialed individuals from such restricted areas without violating the First Amendment, provided the enforcement is content‑neutral and leaves ample alternative channels for speech; and
• Reiterating that vague free exercise arguments are forfeited on appeal if not meaningfully developed, and that municipal permitting schemes are not presumed unconstitutional absent specific proof of vagueness or arbitrary enforcement.

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II. Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges Moore, Clay, and White; opinion by Judge Clay) held:

1. Protected Speech: Blankenship’s activities—preaching, leafletting, and displaying religious signs—were undisputedly protected by the First Amendment.
2. Forum Characterization:
   • The place of arrest was within a fenced restricted area along Central Avenue, under a special event permit for the Kentucky Derby.
   • Although streets and sidewalks are usually “traditional public forums,” the court held that this Derby‑time zone was more akin to a state fair or festival grounds, and constituted a limited public forum because it was:
     • Temporarily closed to the general public;
     • Accessible only to ticketed/credentialed persons; and
     • Physically demarcated with fencing and “NO TRESPASSING” signage.
   • Nonetheless, the court expressly stated that, even if it were treated as a traditional public forum, the restriction would still be valid under intermediate scrutiny.
3. Free Speech – Content Neutrality and Intermediate Scrutiny:
   • The enforcement of the restricted area through trespass arrests was content‑neutral—it rested on lack of tickets/credentials and refusal to leave, not on the plaintiff’s religious message.
   • The restrictions served significant governmental interests in public safety, security, and traffic control around a major sporting event with up to ~160,000 attendees.
   • The restrictions were narrowly tailored: without a restricted area, the government could not as effectively manage crowds and security in the immediate vicinity.
   • There were ample alternative channels of communication:
     • His speech would still reach Derby patrons due to proximity and use of amplification.
   • Accordingly, his free speech claim failed as a matter of law.
4. Free Exercise:
   • Blankenship forfeited any distinct Free Exercise Clause argument by failing to develop it in his summary judgment briefing and in his appellate brief.
   • The court declined to analyze the free exercise claim on the merits.
5. Due Process / Vagueness:
   • Blankenship framed a vagueness challenge to Louisville Metro’s permitting “policy,” i.e., the special event permitting regime under the local code.
   • The court held he failed to show:
     • That the ordinance failed to give persons of ordinary intelligence notice of what it prohibited; or
     • That it authorized or encouraged arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
   • Crucially, the court emphasized that the permitting scheme was not enforced against him at all; he was arrested solely under Kentucky’s third‑degree criminal trespass statute.
   • The due process claim therefore failed.
6. Monell Municipal Liability:
   • Because the court found no underlying constitutional violation, Blankenship’s § 1983 claim against Louisville Metro under Monell necessarily failed.
7. Qualified Immunity for Trooper Young:
   • Absent a showing that Young violated any constitutional right, the court held he was entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity.

The Sixth Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for both defendants in full.

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III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background in Context

To appreciate the legal analysis, it is important to understand how the City and Churchill Downs structured control over the Derby environment, and how Blankenship interacted with that system.

1. The Special Event Permit and Restricted Area

In advance of the 2022 Kentucky Derby, Churchill Downs applied for a “Special Event Permit” from Louisville Metro. The application emphasized:

• Perimeter and event security;
• Traffic control and access; and
• Protection of the venue and spectators.

The permit authorized:

• Street closures and restricted access on several blocks around Churchill Downs;
• Temporary fencing and physical barriers; and
• Coordination with private security and law enforcement, including the Kentucky State Police.

Along Central Avenue, fencing and signage were erected. Of particular importance were signs reading:

NO TRESPASSING
VALID CREDENTIALS ONLY BEYOND THIS POINT
CONSENT TO SEARCH OF PROPERTY OR PERSON BEFORE ENTERING

Metro’s special events manager testified that Churchill Downs could establish a ticket requirement anywhere within the restricted area, though Churchill Downs could not undertake any action “not allowed by established law.” State Police leadership likewise understood that the permit allowed Churchill Downs to limit access.

2. Blankenship’s Activities and Arrest

On Derby Day, Blankenship and several companions:

• Approached Churchill Downs carrying religious signs, flags, megaphones, and other equipment;
• Entered the fenced restricted area via a tunnel under Central Avenue, passing the “NO TRESPASSING” signs without tickets or credentials;
• Stopped on Central Avenue between Third and Fourth Streets—well within the fenced zone—and began preaching, distributing literature, and interacting with Derby patrons.

Private security guards promptly told the group they were “trespassing” and had to leave, and pointed them to the “other side” as an available alternative location. Blankenship, believing he stood on a public sidewalk/right‑of‑way, refused to leave and announced on camera that he would not move unless ordered by “cops.”

After continued non‑compliance and at least one altercation between Blankenship and a Derby patron, Churchill Downs’ security director, Josh Ball, requested assistance from Kentucky State Police Major Matt Johnson. Johnson confirmed that security had already asked the groups to leave.

When state troopers—including Trooper Young—arrived about an hour after initial warnings:

• They detained one member of the group (Estephane) and warned the others that they were trespassing and could leave or be arrested;
• Blankenship continued to argue, disputed having been properly warned, and delayed departing while the rest of his group relocated;
• Trooper Young ultimately arrested Blankenship for third‑degree criminal trespass under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 511.080.

Blankenship’s trespass charge was later dismissed without prejudice on condition that he not have unlawful contact with Churchill Downs.

3. The Federal Litigation

Blankenship sued Louisville Metro and Trooper Young under § 1983 in the Western District of Kentucky, alleging:

• First Amendment free speech and free exercise violations;
• Fourteenth Amendment due process violations (specifically, vagueness of the permitting scheme);
• A false arrest claim against Young; and
• Municipal liability under Monell against Louisville Metro.

The district court:

• Dismissed the false arrest claim and all official-capacity claims against Young;
• At summary judgment, rejected the free speech, free exercise, and due process claims on the merits; and
• Held that Metro could not be liable under Monell and that Trooper Young was entitled to qualified immunity.

Blankenship appealed, but did not contest the dismissal of his false arrest claim.

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B. Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning rests on a well‑developed First Amendment doctrinal framework, with extensive reliance on Supreme Court and circuit cases concerning:

• Forum analysis and special event areas;
• Content neutrality and time, place, and manner restrictions;
• Vagueness and unbridled discretion doctrines; and
• Municipal liability and qualified immunity standards.

1. Forum Analysis and Special Event Areas

• Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
  • Heffron is the Supreme Court’s foundational case on treating a state fair as a limited public forum despite including streets and walkways.
  • The Court emphasized differences between “a typical public street” and a fair: fairs are temporary, crowded, and designed for orderly presentation of attractions.
  • The Sixth Circuit here extends that analogy to the Kentucky Derby—another temporary, large‑scale event—by treating the fenced Derby perimeter as akin to fairgrounds rather than ordinary city streets.
• Parks v. City of Columbus, 395 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2005)
  • In Parks, the court held that a city arts festival occurring on public streets remained a traditional public forum because the event was free and open to the public.
  • Blankenship relied heavily on Parks to argue that the Derby perimeter remained traditionally public despite the permit.
  • The panel distinguished Parks on the critical ground that the Kentucky Derby is a ticketed, private event with restricted perimeter access, not an open public festival.
• Spingola v. Village of Granville, 39 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2002)
  • In Spingola, a festival area comprised of public streets functioned more like a fair, such that the festival grounds were not treated as traditional public forums during the event.
  • The court here invokes Spingola to justify treating the Derby restricted zone as a limited public forum while applying intermediate scrutiny to content‑neutral restrictions.
• Hartman v. Thompson, 931 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2019)
  • Hartman held that fairgrounds where admission is charged constitute a limited public forum because the public cannot enter without paying.
  • The panel uses Hartman to reinforce the conclusion that an area requiring tickets/credentials—like the Derby restricted zone—can be treated as limited public forum space.
• Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194 (6th Cir. 1996)
  • Sistrunk upheld a city’s ability to grant exclusive use of a public area for a political rally, thereby allowing the permit holder to control the content of its event.
  • Blankenship tried to rely on Sistrunk to argue that non‑exclusive permits preserve traditional forum status.
  • The panel instead uses Sistrunk to confirm that cities may temporarily close public spaces for private, permitted events. It emphasizes that Churchill Downs did not seek to exclude Blankenship from its own “message,” but to manage access to a private sporting event.

2. Content-Neutral Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions

• Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) and Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015)
  • These cases supply the standard three‑step framework for free‑speech claims:
    1. Is the plaintiff’s speech protected?
    2. What type of forum is at issue?
    3. Is the restriction permissible under the applicable level of scrutiny?
  • The court applies that structure directly in Blankenship’s case.
• Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)
  • Ward is the leading case on content‑neutral time, place, and manner regulations.
  • The opinion draws on Ward for:
    • The definition of content neutrality (justification “without reference to the content” of speech); and
    • The “narrow tailoring” requirement, which does not demand the least restrictive means but only that the government’s interests would be achieved less effectively without the regulation.
• Saieg v. City of Dearborn, 641 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2011)
  • Saieg struck down a restriction on leafletting on sidewalks near a festival because:
    • The sidewalks remained open for general public use; and
    • The city’s asserted interests in crowd control and safety were deemed conjectural in light of how the area was actually used (including vendor presence on the same sidewalks).
  • The panel distinguishes Saieg by emphasizing that the Derby sidewalk at issue was not open to the general public; it was fenced, marked “NO TRESPASSING,” and used as a pathway for Derby attendees only.
• Reform America v. City of Detroit, 37 F.4th 1138 (6th Cir. 2022)
  • Reform America upheld a “restricted area” around a major political event (the Sixth Circuit there emphasized ticketed entry, content‑neutral security concerns, and alternative protest locations).
  • The court extensively analogizes to Reform America:
    • Both cases involve fenced‑off, credential‑only zones with content‑neutral enforcement.
    • Both stress that protesters can speak just outside the restricted area and still reach their intended audience.
• McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014)
  • McCullen invalidated 35‑foot “buffer zones” around abortion clinics, holding that the broad restriction burdened more speech than necessary to achieve the state’s interests.
  • Blankenship invoked McCullen to argue the Derby restrictions were overbroad.
  • The panel distinguishes McCullen:
    • The Derby restriction is geographically narrow (immediate perimeter of a single event) and temporary, not a statewide regime.
    • There were no comparably effective but substantially less speech‑restrictive alternatives identified by the plaintiff.

3. Vagueness and Due Process

• Belle Maer Harbor v. Charter Twp. of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999) and Brown v. City of Albion, 136 F.4th 331 (6th Cir. 2025)
  • These decisions frame the void‑for‑vagueness doctrine as rooted in due process and set out the two core tests:
    1. Whether an ordinance fails to give people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what it prohibits; or
    2. Whether it authorizes or encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
  • The court applies this two‑part test to Louisville Metro’s permitting scheme.
• 600 Marshall Entertainment Concepts, LLC v. City of Memphis, 705 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2013)
  • 600 Marshall emphasizes that a plaintiff must identify specific terms or provisions it claims are vague.
  • Relying on this approach, the panel criticizes Blankenship for not pointing to any particular language in the code alleged to be vague or enforcement‑enabling.

4. Monell and Qualified Immunity

• Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and progeny
  • Monell established that local governments may be directly liable under § 1983 for constitutional injuries caused by an official “policy or custom.”
  • But later cases make clear—applied here—that there is no municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation (e.g., Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606; Zucker v. City of Farmington Hills, 643 F. App’x 555).
• Qualified Immunity Cases – Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Phillips v. Roane County, 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008)
  • These cases provide the modern framework:
    • Officials are shielded from damages unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right.
    • Courts typically ask:
      1. Has the plaintiff established a violation of a constitutional right?
      2. Was that right clearly established at the time of the conduct?
  • The panel stops at step one: no underlying right was violated, so Trooper Young is immune.

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C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Free Speech: Forum, Content Neutrality, and Intermediate Scrutiny

a. Protected Speech

The court swiftly resolves the first step: preaching, leafletting, and religious advocacy are undisputedly protected speech. It cites Parks v. City of Columbus for this proposition and moves to the more contested forum and scrutiny questions.

b. Nature of the Forum: Limited Public Forum vs. Traditional Public Forum

Ordinarily, sidewalks and streets are classic traditional public forums—spaces historically dedicated to public assembly and expressive activity. But the court notes “limited circumstances” in which public streets, during certain uses, are not treated this way, especially when:

• An area is temporarily transformed into a fair or festival ground (e.g., Heffron, Spingola); and
• Access is restricted by ticketing or admissions (e.g., Hartman).

Applying those precedents, the court highlights:

• The Derby is a temporary, massive event attracting very large crowds for a short, fixed period;
• The relevant blocks of Central Avenue were physically fenced, marked “NO TRESPASSING,” and subject to street closures;
• By design, entry into that perimeter required tickets or credentials—it was not intended as an open public thoroughfare during the event; and
• Video evidence shows that the sidewalk inside the fence functioned as a controlled pathway for Derby patrons, not for general public use.

The panel thus concludes that, for the duration of the event, this fenced Derby perimeter is “more akin to a fair than a normal city street” and constitutes a limited public forum. In such a forum, the government may limit access based on reasonable, content‑neutral criteria tied to the forum’s purpose.

At the same time, the court explicitly states that the outcome would be the same under traditional public forum analysis, because the regulation at issue is content‑neutral and survives intermediate scrutiny.

c. Content-Neutrality of Enforcement

Blankenship’s principal argument was that Louisville Metro had effectively “ceded” control of public property to Churchill Downs, enabling private censorship of unwanted speech. The court rejects this characterization and instead finds that:

• The stated and actual basis for his removal and arrest was his presence in a restricted, ticketed area without credentials, and his refusal to leave after repeated warnings;
• Security and police acted for trespass reasons, not because of hostility to the religious content of his preaching;
• Churchill Downs requested removal of multiple groups, not only Blankenship’s, and those groups had different messages, reinforcing the evenhanded nature of enforcement (echoing Reform America); and
• Louisville’s permitting rules (§ 100.08) explicitly require permittees to comply with all applicable laws, undermining the claim of “unbridled discretion” to exclude disfavored speakers.

The panel also addresses specific content‑discrimination allegations:

• T‑shirt vendor: Blankenship claimed at oral argument that a t‑shirt vendor was allowed to remain within the restricted area. The court notes:
  • This claim was neither raised nor supported in the record below; and
  • There is no evidence that any vendor present lacked authorization or credentials.
• Estephane’s prior treatment: The record actually shows that state troopers had previously threatened Estephane with trespassing, undercutting arguments that religious preaching had been selectively tolerated at other times.

On these facts, the court concludes that the Derby restrictions were justified without reference to the content of Blankenship’s speech, satisfying the requirement of content neutrality under Ward and Saieg.

d. Significant Governmental Interests

Next, the court assesses whether the restrictions serve a significant governmental interest. The City and Churchill Downs asserted:

• Public safety and protection of spectators at one of the world’s largest sporting events;
• Perimeter and event security; and
• Traffic control and access management.

Relying on Heffron and prior Sixth Circuit precedent, the court recognizes crowd control, safety, and orderly movement of large assemblies as substantial government interests—especially when tens of thousands of people are funneled through constrained access points.

The panel distinguishes Saieg, where the sidewalks remained open for general public use and the government’s concerns about crowding were undercut by its own decision to allow vendors on those same sidewalks. Here, by contrast:

• The Derby sidewalk in question was not left open to unrelated public traffic;
• It was instead part of a fenced, credential‑only pathway to the event; and
• There is no record that multiple competing vendors were stationed there in a way that contradicted the safety rationale.

As a result, the court finds no “conjectural” or pretextual interest; rather, the security, safety, and traffic‑control interests are concrete and substantial.

e. Narrow Tailoring

For narrow tailoring under intermediate scrutiny, the question is whether the government’s interests would be achieved less effectively in the absence of the regulation.

The court reasons that:

• Without a fenced, credential‑only restricted area, security personnel would have no meaningful control over who was present immediately around the Derby gates;
• Managing crowd size, screening for threats, and ensuring orderly access would be substantially more difficult if any member of the public could occupy those blocks or block the walkways; and
• The regulation is temporary and geographically focused on the immediate perimeter of one event, not a broad, permanent, or statewide speech ban.

The court thus finds that the restricted‑area regime burdens no more speech than reasonably necessary under Ward and rejects the argument that the City “ceded complete control” in a way that expands the restriction beyond its security purposes.

The court also addresses McCullen v. Coakley and McMahon v. City of Panama City Beach:

• McCullen involved a statewide, fixed buffer rule at all abortion clinics, with less speech‑restrictive alternatives on the table. The Derby setting is narrower in scope, time, and geography.
• McMahon, a district court case, criticized “unquestioning deference” to permit holders at a free and open‑to‑the‑public event. The Sixth Circuit distinguishes:
  • The Derby is not free and open to the public; it is a ticketed, private event;
  • Louisville’s code cabins any discretion by requiring compliance with other laws; and
  • In any event, McMahon is not binding in the Sixth Circuit.

f. Alternative Channels of Communication

The final intermediate‑scrutiny element is whether ample alternative channels of communication remain open that allow speakers to reach their intended audience.

Assuming Blankenship’s intended audience was primarily Derby patrons (and perhaps the general public), the court notes:

• Security expressly told him he could preach “on the other side” of the barrier;
• His companions did in fact relocate and continue preaching from another spot outside the restricted area;
• He had access to “virtually anywhere” outside the fenced zone (public sidewalks, street corners, etc.); and
• Given his use of megaphones and loud preaching, he could still reach Derby attendees from just outside the fence.

Citing Contributor v. City of Brentwood, Reform America, Spingola, and Grider v. Abramson, the court finds that such nearby locations are adequate alternative channels. The restriction is on his presence inside the restricted Derby perimeter, not on his speech at or near Churchill Downs more generally.

With all three intermediate‑scrutiny prongs met—significant interest, narrow tailoring, and alternative channels—the Free Speech Clause claim fails.

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2. Free Exercise: Forfeiture by Inadequate Briefing

Although Blankenship pleaded a Free Exercise Clause claim, the court declines to analyze it on the merits because he failed to preserve it properly.

Under Sixth Circuit standards (e.g., United States v. Huntington Nat’l Bank and Buetenmiller v. Macomb County Jail), an issue is forfeited if:

1. It is not articulated with sufficient clarity to give notice; and/or
2. It is not accompanied by at least “some minimal level of argumentation” and developed analysis.

The court notes:

• In the district court, Blankenship’s summary judgment motion focused almost entirely on free speech; he “hardly distinguishes” free exercise, and the district court treated his conduct as speech‑based.
• On appeal, he mentions “free exercise” only in passing and does not develop any distinct doctrinal argument under the Free Exercise Clause.

Because free exercise and free speech claims are doctrinally different (as underscored in cases like Kennedy v. Bremerton School District and Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius), the panel refuses to treat a generalized “First Amendment” complaint as sufficient to preserve both. Accordingly, the Free Exercise claim is treated as forfeited.

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3. Due Process: Vagueness Challenge to the Permitting Scheme

Blankenship also invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, arguing that Louisville Metro’s permitting scheme is unconstitutionally vague and grants unbridled enforcement discretion.

a. Threshold: Protected Liberty Interest

To even raise a due process claim, a plaintiff must show a deprivation of “life, liberty, or property.” Here, the court accepts that:

• First Amendment rights to speech and association qualify as a protected “liberty” interest, citing Bauer v. Montgomery;
• This suffices to trigger the void‑for‑vagueness analysis.

b. Identifying the Challenged Law

Blankenship’s briefing was imprecise; he criticized “Metro’s censorship, instilled in the permitting process” and its “permitting scheme,” but did not pinpoint any particular text. The court reads his challenge as directed toward:

• Louisville‑Jefferson Code of Ordinances § 100.02(A), which requires a permit for any “parade or public assembly” in Jefferson County; and
• The associated permitting regime that allows Metro to issue special event permits, like the one for Churchill Downs.

c. No Showing of Vagueness in Notice

Under the first vagueness prong, a law is invalid if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence reasonable notice of what conduct it prohibits. Here:

• Blankenship did not even argue that the permitting code is unclear to ordinary people;
• He himself was not a permit applicant or permit holder, and the scheme did not directly regulate his conduct; and
• The ordinance simply requires permits for certain organized events, a relatively straightforward requirement.

Because he made no effort to show that persons of ordinary intelligence could not understand what the code required, this prong fails as a matter of law.

d. No Showing of Arbitrary or Discriminatory Enforcement

The second prong asks whether a law authorizes or encourages arbitrary/discriminatory enforcement. Here, the court emphasizes:

• Blankenship never identified any specific term in the ordinance that allegedly confers unbridled discretion, as 600 Marshall requires.
• Louisville’s code affirmatively constrains permittees via § 100.08, which states that a permit holder must comply with “all other applicable laws and ordinances.”
• Metro’s special events manager confirmed that the permit does not authorize Churchill Downs to do anything “not allowed by established law.”

Most importantly, the court stresses that the permitting scheme was not enforced at all against Blankenship:

• No Metro official played any role in his arrest; and
• The only law actually enforced against him was the state trespass statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 511.080.

Since his constitutional complaint realistically concerns the application of the trespass statute in the context of the permitted event—which the court has already upheld as content‑neutral and valid—he cannot show that Metro’s code, on its face or as applied, authorized arbitrary enforcement in his case.

On this record, the due process vagueness challenge fails.

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4. Monell Municipal Liability

Blankenship also sued Louisville Metro under Monell, arguing that Metro’s permitting practices and policies caused his constitutional injuries.

However, as the court notes, Monell liability presupposes a constitutional violation. Without a violation, there is nothing for which the municipality can be held responsible.

Since:

• The court found no violation of Blankenship’s free speech rights;
• The free exercise claim was forfeited; and
• The due process vagueness challenge failed,

his municipal liability claim necessarily collapses. The opinion cites prior Sixth Circuit cases (e.g., Zucker, Martin v. Maurer) reinforcing that where no constitutional violation is established, a Monell claim cannot proceed.

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5. Qualified Immunity for Trooper Young

Finally, the court addresses Trooper Young’s qualified immunity defense. The analysis is straightforward:

• Under Harlow and Wilson v. Layne, a plaintiff must show both:
  1. That a constitutional right was violated; and
  2. That the right was clearly established at the time.
• The panel concludes that Blankenship failed at step one—no constitutional violation—so it need not reach step two.
• On that basis, Trooper Young is shielded from personal liability for damages.

The underlying facts supporting this conclusion include:

• Young’s understanding, consistent with the permit and security instructions, that Blankenship was in a credential‑only area without authorization;
• Repeated warnings to leave being ignored or delayed; and
• Probable cause to believe Blankenship was “knowingly” remaining unlawfully on premises, as required by § 511.080.

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D. Impact and Future Implications

1. Municipal Permitting and the Use of Public Streets for Private Events

The opinion provides a clear, published framework for cities within the Sixth Circuit that temporarily close public streets and sidewalks for major private events (e.g., sports contests, concerts, conventions, marathons, large private festivals).

Key takeaways for municipalities and event organizers:

• It is constitutionally permissible to:
  • Temporarily close streets and sidewalks around a large event;
  • Fence those areas and mark them with “No Trespassing”/“Credentials Only” signage; and
  • Condition entry on possession of tickets or credentials, enforced through trespass laws.
• Such zones can be treated as limited public forums (or at least subject to content‑neutral intermediate scrutiny), provided that:
  • The closure is tied to significant governmental interests (safety, security, crowd and traffic control);
  • Enforcement is content‑neutral and not used as a pretext for viewpoint discrimination; and
  • Ample alternative spaces remain nearby for would‑be speakers to reach the event audience.
• Ordinances and permits should expressly:
  • Require compliance with all state and local laws;
  • Avoid language that vests “unbridled discretion” in private actors; and
  • Document security and crowd‑management rationales.

In combination with Reform America, Hartman, and Spingola, this opinion provides a relatively robust doctrinal support for restricted perimeters around large events, reinforcing a practical model already used for political conventions, debates, and national sports events.

2. Protesters and Speakers at Ticketed Events

For street preachers, protesters, and other speakers, Blankenship confirms that:

• They do not have a constitutional right to remain inside a credential‑only restricted area created for security/crowd control around a private, ticketed event;
• They may be removed (and arrested for trespass) if they enter such a zone without credentials and refuse to leave, so long as enforcement is:
  • Evenhanded across viewpoints; and
  • Anchored in generally applicable laws (like trespass) rather than in the content of speech.
• However, they retain full rights to speak on public property outside the restricted zone, including sidewalks and street corners just beyond the fence, and to aim their speech at event patrons entering and leaving.

Practically, this shifts the battleground from whether speakers can be excluded from the immediate gate area to how close they can position themselves while remaining outside the restricted perimeter.

3. Forum Doctrine: Emphasis on Access and Function Rather than Permit Exclusivity

The opinion also refines the Sixth Circuit’s forum analysis by:

• De‑emphasizing the exclusivity of the permit as a dispositive forum factor; and
• Focusing instead on whether the area remains:
  • Physically and legally open to the general public; and
  • Functionally used as a general thoroughfare versus as event‑specific fairgrounds.

Parks v. City of Columbus had emphasized that the arts festival there remained free and open to the public; Blankenship makes clear that ticketing and restricted access can shift the analysis toward fairground‑type limited public forums, even when the underlying property is ordinarily a public street.

4. Litigation Practice: Preservation of Free Exercise Claims

On the procedural side, the opinion is a cautionary tale for litigators:

• Bundling “free speech” and “free exercise” arguments under a generic “First Amendment” heading may not suffice to preserve distinct doctrinal claims on appeal.
• Courts expect separate analysis and at least minimal development for each theory invoked.
• Failure to do so invites a forfeiture ruling, as happened here.

This has particular relevance for religious speakers, whose speech and conduct can implicate both clauses. Counsel must be explicit about:

• What aspect of the government’s action burdens speech as speech; and
• What aspect burdens religious exercise qua religion (e.g., neutrality, general applicability, or targeted burdens on religious practice).

5. Vagueness and Delegation to Private Actors

Another important implication concerns delegations of control to private permittees:

• Where a city allows a private entity to manage space that is ordinarily public, First Amendment challenges often focus on “unbridled discretion” and potential for private censorship.
• Blankenship confirms that such arrangements are more likely to withstand void‑for‑vagueness attacks if:
  • They are anchored in a clear permitting code;
  • Permittees are expressly required to follow all applicable laws; and
  • The actual enforcement against speakers is done under neutral, generally applicable statutes (like trespass), not special, speech‑targeting rules.

The opinion does not foreclose future challenges where a permit is used as an overt tool of viewpoint discrimination; it simply holds that, on this record, there was no evidence of such misuse, and the plaintiff failed to target any specific vague provision.

6. Qualified Immunity and Officer Reliance on Event Restrictions

Finally, Blankenship signals a degree of protection for officers who:

• Reasonably rely on a facially valid special event permit and clear signage/fencing to assess trespass;
• Ensure that warnings to leave are given; and
• Act primarily on status (credentialed vs. uncredentialed presence) rather than on what a speaker is saying.

So long as officers avoid acting directly on the content of speech and maintain documentary support (body‑camera footage, prior warnings, etc.), qualified immunity will be difficult to overcome in similar contexts.

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IV. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

For easier reference, this section briefly explains the main doctrines used in the opinion.

1. Traditional Public Forum vs. Limited Public Forum

• Traditional Public Forum:
  • Includes public streets, sidewalks, and parks historically open to expressive activity.
  • Speech restrictions here are subject to:
    • Strict scrutiny if content‑based; and
    • Intermediate scrutiny if content‑neutral time, place, and manner regulations.
• Limited Public Forum:
  • Government opens property to certain expressive activity or limited classes of speakers or subjects (e.g., state fairgrounds, city‑run meeting rooms, ticketed event perimeters).
  • Government may:
    • Impose reasonable, content‑neutral restrictions consistent with the forum’s purpose; and
    • Exclude speakers who do not meet access criteria (e.g., lack credentials) so long as it does not discriminate by viewpoint.

2. Content-Neutral Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions

A law is content‑neutral if it is justified without reference to what the speaker is saying. Such regulations are valid if they:

1. Serve a significant governmental interest (e.g., safety, crowd control);
2. Are narrowly tailored (i.e., the interest would be achieved less effectively without them, and they do not burden substantially more speech than necessary); and
3. Leave open ample alternative channels for communication.

Trespass enforcement based solely on lack of credentials typically qualifies as content‑neutral if applied evenly.

3. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine

Under the Due Process Clause, a law is void for vagueness if:

• It is so unclear that ordinary people cannot understand what conduct is prohibited; or
• It is so standardless that it invites arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.

Vagueness challenges require plaintiffs to identify specific language they claim is unclear or enforcement‑enabling, and to show how it harmed them.

4. Monell Liability

Under Monell, a municipality can be liable for constitutional violations caused by:

• An official policy;
• A longstanding custom or practice; or
• Actions of a final policymaker.

However, absent proof of a constitutional violation by someone acting under color of law, there is no Monell liability—even if one can identify a questionable policy in the abstract.

5. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity shields government officials from money damages unless:

1. The plaintiff proves that the official violated a constitutional right; and

2. That right was clearly established at the time of the conduct, such that a reasonable officer would understand that what he was doing was unlawful.

Courts may resolve cases at either step. If no constitutional violation is found, the official wins on qualified immunity without further inquiry.

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V. Conclusion

Blankenship v. Louisville‑Jefferson County Metro Government is a significant, published Sixth Circuit decision that:

• Validates the use of fenced, credential‑only restricted zones on public streets around large private, ticketed events such as the Kentucky Derby;
• Clarifies that such zones may be treated as limited public forums and that content‑neutral enforcement via trespass laws can pass intermediate scrutiny when aimed at security and crowd control and when alternative protest locations remain available;
• Emphasizes the importance of content‑neutrality and evenhanded enforcement—including against multiple groups with differing messages—to survive First Amendment challenge;
• Underscores that vague or underdeveloped free exercise and vagueness challenges will not be entertained on appeal;
• Reaffirms that no constitutional violation means no Monell liability and that officers acting reasonably under such a regime enjoy qualified immunity.

Taken together with earlier Sixth Circuit decisions on fairs, festivals, and political events, this opinion supplies a coherent doctrinal template for how governments may temporarily reconfigure public streets as controlled event space without running afoul of the First Amendment, provided they scrupulously avoid content‑based enforcement and leave open meaningful alternative avenues of expression.