When PHC Felonies Eclipse MRTMA Misdemeanors:
The Practical Effect of the Supreme Court’s Denial of Leave in People v. Julia Kathleen Soto

1. Introduction

Case name: People of the State of Michigan v. Julia Kathleen Soto
Court: Michigan Supreme Court (Order, July 11 2025)
Procedural posture: Defendant sought leave to appeal a published Court of Appeals decision (Soto II) that affirmed her felony bind-over under Article 7 of the Public Health Code (PHC). The Supreme Court denied leave; Justice Bolden dissented.
Core issue: Does the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA) pre-empt felony prosecution under the PHC for possession with intent to deliver 5–45 kg of marijuana (or 20–200 plants), or may prosecutors circumvent the Act’s civil/ misdemeanor penalty scheme by charging PHC felonies?

The denial of leave, though procedurally minimal, effectively cements a split between two published Court of Appeals opinions—Soto II (2024) and People v. Kejbou (2023)—thereby leaving trial courts without definitive guidance and allowing wide prosecutorial discretion. Justice Bolden’s dissent urges both the Court and the Legislature to harmonize Michigan’s dual marijuana statutes.

2. Summary of the Judgment (Supreme Court Order)

The Supreme Court denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal (no majority opinion).
Justice Bolden’s dissent argues the case raises an issue of significant public importance—the interaction between MRTMA and PHC—and highlights an apparent conflict with Kejbou.
Because leave was denied, the Court of Appeals decision in Soto II stands: felony prosecution under PHC § 7401(2)(d)(ii) is permissible for possession with intent to deliver 5–45 kg of marijuana, notwithstanding MRTMA.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

MRTMA (2018 initiative): MCL 333.27951 et seq.
Public Health Code, Article 7: MCL 333.7401 (felony manufacture/possession with intent to deliver schedules).
People v. Kejbou, 348 Mich App 467 (2023): held MRTMA “supplanted” PHC for unlicensed commercial grow operations (>200 plants) and limited prosecution to MRTMA misdemeanor penalties.
People v. Soto (Soto II), ___ Mich App ___ (Oct 7 2024): distinguished Kejbou, permitting PHC felony charges for possession with intent to deliver 5–45 kg; reasoned MRTMA § 15(4) omits “possess with intent to deliver.”
People v. Peltola, 489 Mich 174 (2011): cited for textual-interpretation canon that omission is deliberate.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning (as inferred from dissent and COA)

MRTMA safe-harbor language (“[a]ll other laws inconsistent with this act do not apply to conduct that is permitted by this act.” § 4(5)).
• Kejbou: Concluded conflict existed; therefore PHC felonies cannot apply where MRTMA provides a penalty.
• Soto II: Found no conflict because MRTMA § 15(4) does not cover “possession with intent to deliver” large quantities; thus MRTMA does not “permit” the conduct, leaving PHC intact.
Textual omission: The COA treated the omission of “possession with intent to deliver” in § 15(4) as intentional, signifying voters’ desire to leave serious trafficking to existing felony framework.
Scope of MRTMA’s penalties: MRTMA sets civil infractions for ≤ statutory limit, misdemeanors for > 2× limit, but imprisonment only when habitual/willful/commercial or violent. The COA maintained that intent-to-deliver large volumes is categorically commercial and thus outside personal-use framework.
Legislative silence ≠ repeal: Absent express repeal, felonies under PHC remain viable unless “inconsistent.” According to Soto II, no inconsistency exists because MRTMA simply omits the offense category.

3.3 Potential Impact

Charging discretion becomes outcome-determinative: For identical conduct (e.g., a home grow of 200+ plants), a prosecutor may charge either a misdemeanor (Kejbou-style) or a felony (Soto-style) depending on which PHC subsection fits.
Forum shopping & unequal application: Defendants in different counties may face divergent exposure—civil fine vs. 7-year felony—contrary to the electorate’s goal of decriminalization.
Legislative pressure: Justice Bolden explicitly calls on lawmakers to reconcile MRTMA and PHC. Expect bills clarifying: (i) whether PHC felonies survive; (ii) thresholds distinguishing personal use, careless excess, and commercial trafficking.
Defense strategy shift: Practitioners will invoke Kejbou wherever possible, arguing MRTMA pre-emption; prosecutors will point to Soto II. Motion practice over bind-over is likely to spike.
Possible future high-court review: The order is non-precedential, but mounting trial-level conflicts may force the Supreme Court to grant leave in a future, better-postured case.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Bind-over: At a preliminary exam, a district judge decides whether probable cause exists to send (‘bind over’) a felony case to circuit court for trial.
Pre-emption / Supplanting: When two statutes conflict, the newer or more specific statute may render the older one inapplicable to the overlapping conduct.
“Possession with Intent to Deliver” vs. “Cultivation”: Both involve large quantities but are separate statutory elements. The prosecutor chooses which label best fits evidence; that choice controls which statute—and penalties—apply.
Schedule 1 controlled substance: Under federal/many state laws, a category of drugs deemed to have high potential for abuse and no accepted medical use—marijuana remains listed in PHC Schedule 1.
Civil Infraction vs. Misdemeanor vs. Felony:
• Civil infraction – ticket-like, only fines.
• Misdemeanor – criminal conviction, jail ≤ 1 year.
• Felony – conviction, prison > 1 year, collateral consequences (voting, firearms, employment, immigration).

5. Conclusion

By denying leave in People v. Julia Kathleen Soto, the Michigan Supreme Court left standing a Court of Appeals decision that authorizes felony prosecution under the Public Health Code for large-scale marijuana possession with intent to deliver, despite the voter-enacted MRTMA. The order deepens a split with Kejbou, institutionalizing uncertainty.

Key takeaways:

MRTMA does not unequivocally displace PHC felonies; its protections hinge on whether the misconduct is expressly “permitted” or “penalized” within the Act.
Absent Supreme Court reconciliation, prosecutorial charging decisions dictate exposure to misdemeanor or felony liability for comparable conduct.
Legislative action is the most immediate avenue to resolve the statutory conflict, restore uniformity, and respect the electorate’s intent to move away from punitive marijuana policies.

For now, Michigan courts and practitioners must navigate a dual, and at times contradictory, legal landscape—one statute signaling leniency, the other preserving harsh sanctions. The Soto order does not create new doctrinal law, but it powerfully shapes the real-world operation of marijuana policy by leaving the tension unresolved.

When PHC Felonies Eclipse MRTMA Misdemeanors: The Practical Effect of the Supreme Court’s Denial of Leave in People v. Julia Kathleen Soto