When Parties Fail to Provide Valuation Evidence, a District Court May Order Appraisal or Sale and Still Equitably Divide the Estate: Nonprecedential Affirmance in Marriage of Schafer

Court: Supreme Court of Montana

Date: October 21, 2025

Case: In re the Marriage of Schafer, DA 25-0070, 2025 MT 241N (memorandum opinion; noncitable under Mont. Sup. Ct. IOR § I(3)(c))

Introduction

This memorandum decision arises from the dissolution of the marriage between Kristen Jean Schafer (Petitioner/Appellee) and Thomas Andrew Schafer (Respondent/Appellant). The parties cohabited since 2011, married in 2015, and have twin daughters born in 2012. They lived in Tom’s premaritally acquired residence at 125 Mountain View Road, Butte, Montana, throughout their cohabitation and marriage.

Financial stress marked the relationship: both parties accumulated credit card debt; Tom refinanced the home in 2013, significantly increasing the mortgage; and both withdrew retirement funds (Kristen: $9,700 to pay property taxes; Tom: $200,000, triggering penalties). Tom retired after a 2019 injury, receiving about $56,000/year in SSDI plus two dependent benefits of $811/month each for the twins. Kristen, after years as a stay-at-home parent, earns $49,500/year.

In August 2023, Kristen petitioned to dissolve the marriage and requested equitable distribution, sale of the marital residence, and adoption of a parenting plan. Pretrial, discovery was contentious; Kristen moved to compel and sought sanctions, alleging Tom failed to disclose Workers’ Compensation benefits and a pending claim. Tom proceeded pro se by trial in December 2024. The district court entered a final decree on December 31, 2024.

On appeal, Tom argued: (1) the district court failed to value the marital estate and divided it inequitably; (2) the court erred in imposing discovery sanctions; and (3) the court mishandled proceedings and showed bias against him as a self-represented litigant.

Summary of the Opinion

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. Noting the sparse record and Tom’s undeveloped appellate briefing, the Court held:

Valuation and distribution: The district court did not clearly err by abstaining from fixing a value for the residence in the face of sharply divergent, unsupported estimates and Tom’s obstruction of a certified market analysis (CMA). Ordering an appraisal or sale at fair market value to determine the home’s value was a reasonable solution. More broadly, where parties fail to supply sufficient valuation evidence, a court may make common-sense judgments and is not required to compute a precise net worth.
Equitable apportionment: The division—each party responsible for his/her own debts, equal division of equity in the residence in recognition of Kristen’s monetary and homemaker contributions, and allocation of one SSDI dependent benefit to each parent—was not an abuse of discretion given the limited record and the statutory factors in § 40-4-202(1), MCA.
Sanctions: Tom’s challenge was rejected for failure to develop legal argument or cite authority; the district court’s sanction of $2,500 for discovery misconduct (non-disclosure of benefits and filing motions “to harass”) stands.
Alleged bias and mishandling: The record showed the trial judge was lenient and properly controlled argumentative cross-examination; no deprivation of a fair trial was shown.

The Court emphasized the opinion’s nonprecedential status under its Internal Operating Rules.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

Crowley v. Crowley, 2014 MT 42, 374 Mont. 48, 318 P.3d 1031
Provided the clear-error standard for findings of fact and the requirement that findings be sufficient to permit review of net worth and distribution without speculation. Here, the Supreme Court distinguished Crowley: the insufficiency of valuation evidence—much of it attributable to Tom’s noncooperation—meant the district court’s decision to order an appraisal or sale was an acceptable means to avoid speculative valuation findings.
Bock v. Smith, 2005 MT 40, 326 Mont. 123, 107 P.3d 488
Quoted within the Crowley formulation for clear error. The Court applied that familiar three-part test and found no clear error in the district court’s approach.
Hutchins v. Hutchins, 2018 MT 275, 393 Mont. 283, 430 P.3d 502
Supplies the abuse-of-discretion standard for property distributions—reversal requires a substantially inequitable division that results in substantial injustice. Given the sparse record and the court’s reliance on the statutory factors, no such abuse was shown.
In re Marriage of Robinson, 269 Mont. 293, 888 P.2d 895 (1994)
Stands for the requirement that courts make a reasonable valuation before distributing property. The district court’s direction to obtain an appraisal or to sell at fair market value satisfied this principle when direct valuation was infeasible due to inadequate and unreliable evidence.
Downs v. Downs, 181 Mont. 163, 592 P.2d 938 (1979)
Key authority emphasizing that parties, not the court, bear the burden to provide valuation data; judges “must not become an appraiser, an accountant, a computer, and an all-around genius” to decide the case. The Court leaned heavily on Downs to justify affirming despite undeveloped valuation evidence.
In re Marriage of Richards, 2014 MT 213, 376 Mont. 188, 330 P.3d 1193; In re Marriage of Foreman, 1999 MT 89, 294 Mont. 181, 979 P.2d 193
These cases endorse a district court’s discretion to make reasonable, common-sense judgments when parties fail to present sufficient valuation evidence. The district court’s sell-or-refinance directive fits comfortably within that discretion.
Section 40-4-202(1), MCA; In re Funk, 2012 MT 14, 363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39; Richards v. Trusler, 2015 MT 314, 381 Mont. 357, 360 P.3d 1126
Collectively frame equitable apportionment: all property “however and whenever acquired” is subject to equitable distribution; courts consider length of marriage, age/health, incomes and growth potential, contributions/dissipations, and homemaker contributions. Equitable need not be equal; circumstances govern. The district court expressly considered Kristen’s homemaker and monetary contributions, the parties’ incomes, and dissipation (e.g., tax issues and withdrawals), and drew an equitable conclusion.
Admin. R. M. 37.62.144 (2017); In re Marriage of Cowan, 279 Mont. 491, 928 P.2d 214 (1996)
Clarify child support treatment of Social Security dependent benefits: they are not included in a parent’s income under the guidelines but may be credited toward the disabled parent’s support obligation. The district court’s allocation of one dependent benefit to each parent coexisted with the parties’ stipulation to let CSSD set support.
State v. Bailey, 2004 MT 87, 320 Mont. 501, 87 P.3d 1032; In re Estate of Bayers, 1999 MT 154, 295 Mont. 89, 983 P.2d 339
Stress the appellant’s burden to present developed argument with legal authority, and that self-represented status does not excuse noncompliance. These authorities supported affirmance of sanctions where Tom’s briefing was undeveloped.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s reasoning proceeds from settled standards of review and the parties’ evidentiary failings.

Valuation of the residence: The parties’ home-value estimates were dramatically divergent ($275–290k vs. $620k), based on outdated data and tax assessments that did not address condition. The district court observed that Kristen’s attempt to obtain a CMA was thwarted by Tom, who refused access on three occasions. In these circumstances, the court’s decision not to make a speculative finding and instead to order an appraisal or sale to establish market value was reasonable and not clearly erroneous under Robinson, Crowley, and Downs.
Findings on estate net worth: Although a court should provide findings sufficient for review, it need not produce a precise ledger when the parties themselves do not supply evidence. Here, the record lacked reliable data on personal property values, account balances, tax liabilities, and even the business Tom operated from home. The Supreme Court refused to fault the district court for not doing what the parties declined (or failed) to do, citing Downs, Richards, and Foreman.
Equitable apportionment: The district court required each party to pay personal debts (e.g., Tom’s early withdrawal penalties; Kristen’s credit cards), recognized Kristen’s homemaker and monetary contributions by awarding her one-half of the home equity, and—consistent with equal parenting—allocated one $811 dependent SSDI payment to each parent. While Tom argued his disability limited work prospects, the court noted he receives permanent SSDI of about $56,000/year, slightly more than Kristen’s salary. On this record, no “substantially inequitable” division producing “substantial injustice” was shown (Hutchins; § 40-4-202(1), MCA).
Sanctions: The district court found Tom failed to disclose Workers’ Compensation benefits and a pending claim, and that his motions lacked merit and were intended to harass, warranting $2,500 in attorney’s fees. On appeal, Tom offered no legal analysis or citation—invoking Bailey and Bayers, the Supreme Court declined to develop arguments for him and affirmed the sanction.
Alleged bias/mishandling: The trial judge accommodated Tom’s procedural missteps but properly curtailed argumentative cross-examination after warnings, assuring Tom he could present his case in turn. The record did not substantiate bias or an unfair trial.

Impact

Although nonprecedential, Marriage of Schafer reinforces several practical and doctrinal points that will likely influence litigation strategy and trial court management in Montana dissolution cases:

Burdens on the parties to prove value are real. Courts will not rescue parties from incomplete or obstructed valuation records. If a party thwarts an appraisal or refuses to provide documentation, a court can decline to fix values, order an appraisal or sale to determine fair market value, and still proceed to equitable division.
“Sell or refinance” remains a sensible remedy. Particularly where valuations are unreliable or access for inspection is denied, directing a sale (or refinance buyout) ensures that equity can be divided without speculation.
Homemaker contributions matter, even for separately titled property. § 40-4-202(1), MCA, directs courts to consider non-monetary contributions. Here, Kristen’s homemaking and her retirement withdrawal to pay property taxes supported awarding one-half of the home’s equity despite Tom’s premarital title.
Discovery obligations apply equally to pro se litigants. Non-disclosure of income/benefits and filing dilatory or harassing motions can result in fee-shifting sanctions. Self-representation does not confer leniency on substantive obligations.
Dependent SSDI benefits and child support. The court’s allocation of one dependent payment to each parent, coupled with the parties’ decision to have CSSD set support, illustrates that these benefits are not counted as income in Montana’s child support guidelines but may be credited toward the disabled parent’s support obligation (Cowan; Admin. R. M. 37.62.144). Practitioners should coordinate orders with CSSD and, where appropriate, the Social Security Administration’s representative-payee framework.
Appellate briefing must be developed. Unadorned assertions without legal authority are insufficient. Appellants bear the burden to demonstrate error; undeveloped arguments are effectively waived.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Memorandum opinion (nonprecedential): A short decision resolving a case on settled law; it cannot be cited as precedent (Mont. Sup. Ct. IOR § I(3)(c)).
Clear error (findings of fact): A finding is clearly erroneous if unsupported by substantial evidence, if the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if a review of the record convinces the appellate court a mistake was made.
Abuse of discretion (property division): Reversal is warranted only if the distribution is substantially inequitable and results in substantial injustice; the trial court has wide latitude.
Equitable vs. equal distribution: “Equitable” means fair under the circumstances, not necessarily 50/50. Courts weigh statutory factors, including homemaker contributions and dissipations.
Parties’ burden to provide valuation evidence: Courts rely on the parties to submit appraisals, statements, and exhibits. Without them, courts may use practical measures (e.g., sale at market) rather than speculate.
Homemaker contributions: Non-monetary efforts—childcare, maintenance, household management—are recognized contributions that support sharing in property value, even for property titled in one spouse’s name.
SSDI dependent benefits: Benefits paid on behalf of a disabled parent’s child. In Montana, they are not counted as parental income for child support calculations, but they can be credited toward the disabled parent’s obligation.
Discovery sanctions: Court-ordered penalties (including attorney’s fees) for failing to disclose information or for abusive litigation conduct. These apply regardless of whether a party is represented by counsel.

Conclusion

Marriage of Schafer affirms, in a nonprecedential format, a set of consistent Montana principles: parties must supply valuation evidence; when they do not—or obstruct valuation—the trial court may order an appraisal or sale to determine value and proceed to an equitable division grounded in the statutory factors. Homemaker contributions can justify awarding equity in a residence titled to one spouse. Dependent SSDI benefits intersect with child support by way of credits rather than income inclusion. Discovery obligations are real and enforceable, even against pro se litigants, and undeveloped appellate arguments will not be entertained.

For practitioners and parties alike, the case is a practical reminder: build a record, cooperate with valuation efforts, document debts and assets, and brief appellate issues with authority. Failing those basics, the trial court’s common-sense, equitable solutions will likely be sustained on appeal.