When Opinions Become Facts: Baseless Personal‑Knowledge Vouching Is Actionable Under §1001; False Invoices Can Support §1956(h) Concealment Without Merger Because Bribery Proceeds Arise at Agreement

Case: United States v. Pittmann, No. 24-2044 (1st Cir. Oct. 22, 2025)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Panel: Judges Gelpí, Thompson, and Kayatta (opinion by Kayatta, J.)

Introduction

This appeal arises from a scheme in which a former U.S. Navy Reserve officer, Jeromy Pittmann, sold recommendation letters for Afghan nationals seeking Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs). The SIV program, created by statute to protect Afghan partners who assisted U.S. and NATO missions, requires a letter from a U.S. supervisor attesting to the applicant’s service and assessing any security risk. The government charged Pittmann with conspiracy (§371), bribery of a public official (§201(b)(2)(A)), making false writings (§1001(a)(3)), and conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering (§1956(h), (a)(1)(B)(i)).

On appeal, Pittmann launched a multi-front attack: he argued the evidence was insufficient to prove falsity in his letters (which he said affected counts I–III), that he was entitled to a lesser-included instruction on illegal gratuities for the §201 count, and that the money-laundering conspiracy impermissibly merged with the underlying bribery and did not involve “proceeds.” The First Circuit affirmed on all counts, clarifying two points of broader significance:

• Statements phrased as present-tense, personal-knowledge vouching in official letters (e.g., “I have known [applicant] to be diligent” and “I do not see [applicant] as a threat”) can constitute materially false statements under §1001 when the writer lacks present knowledge of the individuals and is merely parroting information supplied by others.
• For a §1956(h) concealment-laundering conspiracy following bribery, “proceeds” are deemed tainted at the moment of the quid pro quo agreement; creating a false invoice to disguise the payment is a secondary, independent concealment step that avoids merger with the underlying offense, and concealment can be planned or attempted before the defendant actually receives the funds.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed all four convictions.

• False writings (§1001): Viewing the evidence favorably to the government, a rational jury could find that Pittmann’s letters contained materially false statements. Although the government advanced two falsity theories (he never supervised the applicants; and he lacked personal knowledge of their character), the court found the second theory sufficient: emails showed Pittmann did not recognize many names, sought guidance on which to “approve,” and relied on information provided by his Afghan contact. Yet his letters asserted personal, present knowledge of each applicant’s character and non-dangerousness. That was enough to sustain Count III, and, to the extent falsity mattered to Counts I and II, enough there as well.
• Bribery (§201) lesser-included instruction: Pittmann waived any request for an illegal-gratuities instruction by failing to ask for it when invited and by not briefing plain error on appeal.
• Concealment money-laundering conspiracy (§1956(h), (a)(1)(B)(i)): No plain error. The indictment’s laundering object was the creation of a false invoice to disguise the bribe as “consultant services,” not the bribe payment itself. Because bribery is complete upon the quid pro quo agreement, the funds were “tainted” before the concealment step, defeating merger. Further, concealment steps may occur before the defendant receives the money; pre-receipt concealment still supports conspiracy liability.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• False statements framework:
  • United States v. Vázquez-Soto, 939 F.3d 365 (1st Cir. 2019): Elements of §1001(a)(3): material false statement, within federal jurisdiction, made knowingly. The court used this structure to focus the falsity inquiry.
  • Standards of review and sufficiency: United States v. Buoi, 84 F.4th 31 (1st Cir. 2023) (de novo review after Rule 29 motions); United States v. Falcón-Nieves, 79 F.4th 116 (1st Cir. 2023); United States v. Rodríguez-Martinez, 778 F.3d 367 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Guerrero-Narváez, 29 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2022). These cases guided the court to credit the verdict and draw reasonable inferences for the government.
• Jury instructions and waiver:
  • United States v. Simon, 12 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2021): Waiver where counsel approves instructions after the court invites edits.
  • United States v. Pérez-Greaux, 83 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2023): Failure to brief the prongs of plain-error review waives the argument.
• Bribery and timing:
  • United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), and United States v. McDonough, 727 F.3d 143 (1st Cir. 2013): Bribery is complete upon the agreement to take money for an official act; payment is not required. This timing point underpinned the “proceeds” analysis.
• Money laundering, merger, and proceeds:
  • United States v. Richard, 234 F.3d 763 (1st Cir. 2000): Laundering cannot occur in the same transaction through which funds first become tainted (merger principle).
  • United States v. Cardona, 88 F.4th 69 (1st Cir. 2023): No double punishment where separate steps conceal proceeds; the court analogized to find the invoice a secondary, independent concealment step.
  • United States v. Misla-Aldarondo, 478 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2007): Conspiracy to launder can be based on concealment steps taken before the defendant personally receives the money (pre-receipt concealment).
  • United States v. Castellini, 392 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2004), and United States v. Mankarious, 151 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1998): Proceeds can exist before completion of an ongoing crime; separation in time is not strictly required. Congress aimed to prevent concealment that makes the underlying crime harder to detect.
  • Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2010): Unraised claims are waived; the court declined to reach an undeveloped “financial transaction” argument regarding the false invoice.

Legal Reasoning

1) False writings: personal-knowledge vouching as actionable falsity

The government pursued two falsity theories. The First Circuit rested on the second: that the letters’ present-tense, personal-knowledge assertions were false because Pittmann did not know or remember the applicants. Each letter stated “I have known [the applicant] to be” diligent, etc., and opined, without attribution, that the applicant was not a threat. The letters were materially identical across at least twenty-two applicants. Emails showed Pittmann did not recognize all the names, asked which he should “approve,” and relied on his Afghan contact to supply the names, facts, and even desired formats. From this, a rational jury could infer:

• The asserted “personal knowledge” was illusory or stale; he could not truthfully vouch for character and non-dangerousness when he did not know who was who.
• The statements’ materiality was apparent: SIV adjudications depend on the recommender’s personal, present knowledge and judgments about risk.
• Intent could be inferred from the pattern of boilerplate letters and the payment arrangement.

Crucially, the court treated the personal-knowledge framing and definitive, present-tense conclusions (“I do not see [Applicant] as a threat”) as factual for §1001 purposes because they conveyed that the author had a current, personal basis for those assertions. Even if some content could be characterized as opinion, the representation that such opinions rested on personal knowledge was itself a factual assertion that could be false.

2) Bribery instruction: waiver of lesser-included illegal gratuities

Although illegal gratuities (§201(c)) can be a lesser-included offense of bribery (§201(b)), the court found waiver. Pittmann did not request the instruction despite an invitation to comment, and on appeal he did not brief plain error. The panel relied on Simon and Pérez-Greaux to find the argument waived, leaving intact the bribery conviction.

3) Concealment money-laundering conspiracy: no merger; proceeds at agreement; pre-receipt concealment

The defense’s merger argument failed for two reasons tied to the indictment’s framing and the timing of “proceeds” in bribery:

• Object of the laundering conspiracy: The indictment targeted the agreement to create and send a false invoice that disguised the payment as “consultant services” and asked which company name to list so it would “look[] official.” This was a separate, concealing step—“secondary, independent manipulation”—not the bribe payment itself. That separation defeats merger under Richard and Cardona.
• When proceeds become tainted: Drawing on Brewster and McDonough, the court reiterated that bribery under §201(b) is complete upon the quid pro quo agreement. The panel then made the key move: “They were tainted from the moment a quid pro quo was agreed to.” Thus, the later creation of a false invoice concealed already-tainted proceeds; it did not occur in the very transaction that created the proceeds. No merger.

The court also rejected the contention that a pre-payment invoice cannot support laundering because no proceeds existed yet. Misla-Aldarondo and Castellini foreclose that view: conspiracy (and attempt) liability attaches to concealment steps taken even before the defendant personally receives funds, and proceeds can precede the final step of an ongoing offense. Finally, the panel noted that Pittmann did not develop an argument that generating and sending an invoice is not itself a “financial transaction” under §1956(c)(4); the court therefore did not address that point, and in any event the conviction was for conspiracy under §1956(h), which is complete upon agreement to conduct such a transaction.

Impact

A. False statements doctrine and immigration-adjacent attestations

• Personal-knowledge vouching is dangerous territory: When federal forms or processes require attestation grounded in personal knowledge (as SIV letters do), boilerplate or second-hand assertions can be treated as factual misrepresentations under §1001. This extends beyond SIVs to any federal process relying on letters of recommendation or certifications (e.g., contracting past performance, grant reports, security clearances).
• Opinions are not immune if they imply facts: Statements like “I do not see [X] as a threat” can be actionable if presented as the author’s own, current judgment based on personal knowledge that the author lacks.
• Proof can be circumstantial: The government need not call each letter’s subject to prove falsity. Patterns of identical letters, external authorship, and contemporaneous admissions (e.g., “I don’t recognize them all”) suffice.

B. Bribery and money laundering charging strategies

• Prosecutors can avoid merger by charging distinct concealment steps: Papering transactions (false invoices, sham contracts) is classic concealment. Where the underlying crime is complete at agreement (as in §201 bribery), concealment acts—even before payment—support §1956(h) conspiracy charges without merging.
• “Proceeds” timing clarified for bribery: The First Circuit’s articulation that funds are “tainted from the moment a quid pro quo was agreed to” strengthens the foundation for pre-receipt concealment theories in bribery cases. Expect broader use of §1956(h) where concealment planning is contemporaneous with (or anticipates) payment.
• Defense vigilance on “financial transaction”: Because the court noted but did not decide whether sending a false invoice is itself a §1956(c)(4) “financial transaction,” future defendants may litigate whether the conspiratorial agreement contemplated qualifying transactions or whether additional steps are required.

C. Litigation practice and preservation

• Instructional issues must be preserved: Requests for lesser-included instructions should be expressly made and supported. Failure to brief plain error on appeal is fatal.
• Ambiguity defenses must be developed: Although Pittmann raised ambiguity of State Department requirements below, he abandoned it on appeal; future litigants should fully preserve and brief any ambiguity-in-the-question defenses in §1001 cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Materially false statement (§1001): A statement that has a natural tendency to influence a federal decision-maker. “I have known [X] to be diligent” is material where the program relies on personal-knowledge endorsements.
• Opinion vs. fact under §1001: Pure opinions are generally not false. But when an opinion is presented as based on personal knowledge (e.g., “I know this to be true”), the implied factual assertion—“I have the basis to opine”—can itself be false.
• Bribery vs. illegal gratuity:
  • Bribery (§201(b)): Quid pro quo—payment in return for a specific official act or agreement to be influenced. Complete upon agreement; payment need not occur.
  • Illegal gratuity (§201(c)): Payment as a reward or thanks for an official act; no quid pro quo required. Sometimes a lesser-included offense of bribery.
• Merger in money laundering: The laundering transaction cannot be the very transaction that generated the criminal proceeds; there must be a separate step designed to conceal the source or nature of the funds.
• Proceeds and timing: “Proceeds” are the fruits of a crime. For some crimes (like §201 bribery), proceeds are deemed to arise upon the illicit agreement, even if the payment comes later. This allows concealment planning to be prosecuted as conspiracy to launder.
• Concealment money laundering (§1956(a)(1)(B)(i)): Conducting (or agreeing to conduct) a financial transaction with criminal proceeds knowing it is designed to conceal the nature, source, or ownership of the funds.
• Conspiracy under §1956(h): Agreement to commit money laundering; no overt act is required in federal law. The agreement itself is the offense.
• Plain-error review: On unpreserved claims, an appellant must show a clear or obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously undermined the proceeding’s integrity. Failure to brief each prong waives the claim.
• Rule 29 sufficiency review: After a timely motion, the appellate court asks whether any rational juror could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence favorably to the verdict.

What the Court Did Not Decide (Signals for Future Cases)

• Whether Counts I (conspiracy) and II (§201 bribery) require proof of falsity in this context: The court assumed arguendo and held the evidence sufficient; it did not create a rule requiring falsity for those counts.
• Whether the State Department’s SIV letter prompts are ambiguous as a matter of law: The ambiguity argument was not pursued on appeal.
• Whether generating and sending a false invoice, standing alone, is a “financial transaction” under §1956(c)(4): The court flagged the definitional issue but deemed it waived because the defense did not develop it.
• Whether Pittmann actually supervised the applicants: The court found it unnecessary to resolve because the “lack of personal knowledge” theory was independently sufficient.

Conclusion

United States v. Pittmann contributes two notable refinements to First Circuit criminal law. First, it confirms that in federal programs that rely on attestations grounded in personal knowledge, present-tense vouching about an individual’s character and risk profile can constitute a materially false statement under §1001 when the signer lacks actual, current knowledge—circumstantial proof suffices, and the government need not parade the subjects to the stand. Second, it clarifies the money-laundering landscape in bribery cases: bribery is complete, and the funds are tainted, at the moment of the quid pro quo agreement; separate concealment steps—such as crafting a false invoice to make a bribe “look official”—avoid merger and support §1956(h) conspiracy liability, even when planned or executed before the defendant receives the money.

The opinion also underscores familiar but critical practice points: preserve instructional issues and brief plain error; develop ambiguity defenses; and recognize that paperwork formalities can themselves be powerful evidence of concealment. For public officials and others who write official recommendations, the message is plain: if you do not truly know, do not say you do—and do not sell your signature. For prosecutors and defense counsel, Pittmann provides a clear doctrinal map for §1001 prosecutions premised on personal-knowledge attestations and for structuring or challenging §1956(h) charges alongside bribery without running afoul of merger.

Key Takeaways

• Present-tense, personal-knowledge assertions in SIV letters are factual for §1001 and can be false if the recommender lacks actual knowledge.
• Falsity can be proved circumstantially (boilerplate letters, admissions of unfamiliarity, third-party drafting) without testimony from each subject.
• Bribery under §201(b) is complete at agreement; funds are “tainted” then, enabling separate concealment steps to support §1956(h) conspiracy without merger.
• Pre-receipt concealment planning (e.g., false invoices) can trigger laundering-conspiracy liability.
• Instructional issues are waived if not requested and not briefed under plain error on appeal.