When Mitigation Aggravates: The Tenth Circuit on Upward Variances, Socioeconomic Status, and Cyberstalking Sentences in United States v. Vega‑Acosta

I. Introduction

In United States v. Vega‑Acosta, No. 25‑3011 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a substantial upward variance in a cyberstalking case, approving a 48‑month sentence where the advisory Guideline range was only 18–24 months. Although issued as an unpublished “Order and Judgment” and therefore non‑precedential (except under law‑of‑the‑case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), the decision offers important, persuasive guidance on:

• How district courts may treat evidence traditionally framed as “mitigating” when it in fact cuts both ways or even aggravates culpability;
• The line between impermissible reliance on socioeconomic status and permissible consideration of a defendant’s background and life history under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1);
• The deference accorded to district courts’ assessments of recidivism risk and their weighing of § 3553(a) factors in imposing upward variances; and
• The seriousness with which the Tenth Circuit views cyberstalking conduct, especially when it exposes a child to risk and long‑term psychological harm.

The ruling sits at the intersection of federal sentencing law, technological harms, and evolving norms about how “privilege” and “advantage” can affect culpability. It clarifies that a defendant’s stable employment, education, pro‑social activities, and family support do not have an inherently mitigating effect. Instead, such factors may support a harsher sentence where they show that the crime was committed despite abundant lawful alternatives and support systems.

II. Case Overview

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

• Plaintiff–Appellee: United States of America.
• Defendant–Appellant: Jaime Vega‑Acosta.
• Charge: One count of cyberstalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) and (B).
• Plea: Guilty, without a plea agreement.
• Sentencing: Guideline range 18–24 months; district court imposed 48 months (statutory maximum was 60 months).
• Appeal: Challenge to procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), with appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The Tenth Circuit panel (Judges Hartz, Eid, and Rossman) resolved the appeal on the briefs, without oral argument, under Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

B. Factual Background

The underlying conduct involved a highly disturbing pattern of cyberstalking:

• Vega‑Acosta had an on‑again, off‑again intimate relationship with M.C., interrupted first by her discovery that he was married, then briefly resumed after his divorce.
• After the relationship soured in 2021–2022, M.C. began receiving disturbing, sexually explicit and hateful text messages.
• More alarmingly, unknown men began contacting and visiting her home, claiming to respond to online sex ads.
• These online profiles used M.C.’s photo, address, and telephone number; some:
  • Referenced her 10‑year‑old daughter by name;
  • Included the child’s photo and school;
  • Suggested sex with the child; and
  • Spoke of groups of men coming to the home.
• Men actually appeared at M.C.’s residence believing she was offering sex.
• Separately, the Kansas Department of Children and Families (KDCF) received an anonymous report alleging M.C. was intoxicated and neglecting her daughter. That report was traced to Vega‑Acosta.

These actions forced M.C. to install security measures, acquire self‑defense tools, and ultimately move and sell her house on the advice of the FBI. Victim impact statements from M.C. and her mother described severe psychological trauma and behavioral changes in both M.C. and her daughter.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. District Court Sentencing

The Presentence Report (PSR) calculated:

• Base offense level: 18.
• +2 for a pattern of activity involving stalking/threatening/harassing the same victim.
• −2 for being a “zero‑point” offender (no criminal history points).
• −3 for acceptance of responsibility.
• Final offense level: 15; Criminal History Category I; Range 18–24 months.

The government sought a sentence at the top of the range (24 months). The defense requested a downward variance to 13 months. The district court instead varied upward to 48 months, finding:

• The offense was “outside the heartland” of typical cases;
• The conduct showed an “extreme” level of “malice and vindictiveness and nastiness both personally and safety‑wise”;
• The involvement and endangerment of a child were particularly alarming, especially given that Vega‑Acosta is himself a parent; and
• A doubled Guideline range was justified to reflect seriousness, deterrence, and protection of the public under § 3553(a).

The court explicitly considered the mitigating factors (education, employment, family involvement, mental health treatment, pro‑social activities) but concluded they “impacted [its] decision nothing in light of all of the other significant exacerbating factors” and in fact “undermine[d]” the argument for a lower sentence.

B. Issues on Appeal

Vega‑Acosta argued:

1. Procedural unreasonableness:
   • The court failed to adequately explain why it gave his mitigating evidence no weight or aggravating weight;
   • The court improperly relied on his socioeconomic status (education, steady job, travel, parental status) as an aggravating factor; and
   • The court’s assessment of a significant risk of recidivism was based on clearly erroneous factual findings.
2. Substantive unreasonableness: The 48‑month sentence was greater than necessary under § 3553(a), overemphasized the nature of the offense, inadequately considered medical needs, Guideline advice, sentencing disparities, restitution, and his low recidivism risk.

Because he did not raise these specific procedural objections at sentencing, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the procedural claims for plain error. Substantive reasonableness was reviewed for abuse of discretion.

C. Holding

The Tenth Circuit:

• Rejected the procedural challenges, finding:
  • The district court’s explanation of its treatment of mitigation was adequate and not plainly erroneous;
  • The references to education, work history, and life experience concerned Vega‑Acosta’s background and characteristics, not impermissible reliance on “socioeconomic status” as such; and
  • The assessment of recidivism risk was a plausible inference from the record, not clearly erroneous.
• Rejected the substantive challenge, concluding that the 48‑month sentence fell within the permissible range of choices under § 3553(a), given the “extraordinary” nature of the conduct and its impact.

The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

IV. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Sentencing Procedure and Reasonableness Review

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007):
  • Defines procedural reasonableness (correct Guideline calculation, non‑mandatory guidelines, consideration of § 3553(a), no clearly erroneous facts, adequate explanation).
  • Emphasizes that major variances require “more significant justification” than minor ones.
• Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007):
  • Requires the sentencing court to provide enough explanation “to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis” for the sentence.
• United States v. Vazquez‑Garcia, 130 F.4th 891 (10th Cir. 2025):
  • Reiterates the two‑step reasonableness review (procedural then substantive) and applies abuse‑of‑discretion review for substantive reasonableness.
• United States v. Rocha, 145 F.4th 1247 (10th Cir. 2025):
  • Discusses procedural error when relying on non‑§ 3553(a) factors; recognizes that “impermissible” factors may sometimes be mentioned as context while the core analysis rests on permissible factors.
  • Upholds heavy reliance on the extraordinary recklessness of offense conduct when justifying a variance.

2. Plain Error and Factual Deference

• United States v. Capps, 112 F.4th 887 (10th Cir. 2024):
  • Articulates the four‑part plain‑error test: (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) affecting substantial rights; (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
• United States v. Romero, 132 F.4th 1208 (10th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Berryhill, 140 F.4th 1287 (10th Cir. 2025):
  • Clarify that for an error to be “plain,” it must be clearly or obviously wrong under well‑settled law with on‑point precedent, or a circuit consensus, and “could not be subject to any reasonable dispute.”
• United States v. Woodmore, 127 F.4th 193 (10th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Porter, 928 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2019):
  • Reaffirm deferential clear‑error review of factual findings at sentencing; appellate courts will not substitute their judgment if the district court’s view is “plausible” in light of the full record.
• Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985):
  • Foundational civil case cited here for the rule that when two views of the evidence are both permissible, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.

3. Explanation Requirements Under § 3553(c)(2)

• 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2):
  • Requires the district court to state “the specific reason” for imposing a sentence outside the Guideline range.
• United States v. Clark, 981 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2008):
  • Explain that a court must describe the salient facts and explain how they relate to § 3553(a); mere citation to the factors without discussion is insufficient.

4. Socioeconomic Status, Background, and Guideline Policy

• 28 U.S.C. § 994(d):
  • Instructs the Sentencing Commission to ensure Guidelines are “entirely neutral” as to socioeconomic status.
• U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10 (2023):
  • At the time of sentencing, designated socioeconomic status as “not relevant” to the determination of a sentence.
    (The opinion notes this provision was deleted effective Nov. 1, 2025, but § 994(d)’s statutory neutrality requirement remains.)
• United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737 (10th Cir. 1997) and United States v. Sample, 901 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2018):
  • Reiterate that courts should not rely on wealth or socioeconomic status in sentencing.
• 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 3661:
  • § 3553(a)(1) requires consideration of “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”
  • § 3661 states that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information” concerning the defendant’s background, character, and conduct that a court may consider.
• United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2008):
  • Recognize that district courts have broad discretion to consider individual characteristics—including those that may be “discouraged” as grounds for departure under the Guidelines—when deciding whether to vary.
• United States v. Burney, 992 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2021):
  • Distinguishes between impermissible reliance on socioeconomic status and permissible discussion of an individual’s background and life experiences; notes that this line can be difficult to draw.

5. Double‑Edged Mitigation and Culpability

• Smith v. Duckworth, 824 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2016) and Lott v. Trammell, 705 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2013):
  • Explain the concept of “double‑edged” evidence—facts that can be viewed as either mitigating or aggravating, depending on perspective.
• United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1999):
  • Famously observes that criminals with education and lawful means to make a decent living may be “more rather than less culpable” than those driven by deprivation.

6. Substantive Reasonableness and Variances

• United States v. Gross, 44 F.4th 1298 (10th Cir. 2022):
  • Defines the abuse‑of‑discretion standard for substantive reasonableness: a sentence is reversible only if “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.”
• United States v. Valtierra‑Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2006):
  • Notes that sentences outside the Guideline range are neither presumptively reasonable nor presumptively unreasonable.
• United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2008) (also cited on other points):
  • Requires that the justification for a variance be proportionate to its magnitude.
• United States v. Ware, 93 F.4th 1175 (10th Cir. 2024), United States v. Walker, 844 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Barnes, 141 F.4th 1156 (10th Cir. 2025):
  • Emphasize that appellate courts may not “reweigh” § 3553(a) factors; the district court has the “delicate task” of balancing them, and they do not carry equal weight in every case.
• United States v. Doty, 150 F.4th 1351 (10th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Rocha, 145 F.4th 1247 (10th Cir. 2025):
  • Confirm that heavy emphasis on unusually egregious offense conduct can justify an upward variance.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Adequacy of the Explanation for Treating “Mitigating” Evidence as Aggravating

Vega‑Acosta argued that the district court’s decision to assign either no weight or aggravating weight to his mitigating evidence—education, employment, family ties, mental‑health treatment, and pro‑social activities—was “counter‑intuitive” and inadequately explained. In his reply brief he clarified that he did not challenge the weight per se, but the adequacy of the explanation.

The Tenth Circuit held there was no plain error:

• The district court expressly acknowledged the mitigating evidence and explained that, in light of the “extreme” malice and danger posed, those factors “impacted [its] decision nothing.”
• The court reasoned that his advantages in life—college education, world travel, a stable job, pro‑social activities, existing mental‑health treatment—undermined the argument for leniency because he still chose to engage in calculated and dangerous cyberstalking that endangered a child he knew personally.
• By traditional sentencing logic (as reflected in Stefonek), a crime committed despite abundant lawful opportunities can be more culpable than the same crime committed by someone acting under pressure of severe deprivation.
• The Tenth Circuit characterized this as an example of “double‑edged” mitigation: facts that might seem to reduce blameworthiness at first glance but, in context, heighten it.

The panel recognized that the sentencing explanation was not “fulsome,” but held that, when combined with the oral remarks and the written Statement of Reasons, the record provided sufficient detail to allow appellate review and to satisfy § 3553(c)(2) and Rita.

2. Socioeconomic Status vs. Background and Characteristics

Vega‑Acosta next contended that the district court violated the prohibition on considering socioeconomic status by emphasizing his college education, work history as a teacher and electrician, world travel, and parental status as aggravating. The core legal tension is between:

• The ban on using socioeconomic status (28 U.S.C. § 994(d); U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10; Sample and Smith); and
• The requirement and freedom to consider background and characteristics (§ 3553(a)(1); § 3661; Pinson, Sells).

The Tenth Circuit resolved this by:

• Drawing on Burney to define “socioeconomic status” as a current status measure (education, income, employment) distinct from an individual’s broader background and life narrative.
• Observing that the district court referred to childhood, education, travel, work, and family circumstances as part of Vega‑Acosta’s life story and background, not as a basis for a wealth‑based sentencing preference.
• Noting that the defense itself had urged these same facts as mitigation (Peace Corps service, stable employment, rock climbing, marathon running) to support a lower sentence. The district court’s comments were reasonably read as rejecting that mitigation argument, not as adopting socio‑economic favoritism or bias.

The panel refused to find plain error where:

• The factors discussed were squarely within § 3553(a)(1)’s “history and characteristics” rubric;
• The record did not show that wealth or class status was used as a freestanding basis for punishment; and
• Any error in the fine line between “status” and “background” was at least debatable, and hence not “plain” under controlling standards.

3. Assessment of Recidivism Risk

Third, Vega‑Acosta argued that the district court clearly erred in implicitly finding a serious risk of recidivism and danger to the public, contrary to uncontroverted evidence of:

• Zero criminal history points;
• Stable employment;
• Family and community support;
• Engagement in therapy; and
• Compliance with pretrial release.

The Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s view was “plausible” and hence not clearly or plainly erroneous:

• The offense was not a one‑off impulsive act but a pattern over time involving multiple steps (creation of profiles, communications with strangers, posting of personal and child information, call to child services).
• Crucially, the very supports that were said to reduce recidivism risk—employment, family ties, therapy—had already been present when he committed the crime. They therefore did not inherently guarantee non‑recidivism.
• Expressed remorse and stated intent “not to be dangerous” did not bind the sentencing court, particularly in light of the court’s finding of “extreme” malice and vindictiveness.

Under Anderson and related cases, when two interpretations of the evidence are permissible, the appellate court may not overturn the district court’s inference as clear error. The panel accordingly upheld the district court’s conclusion that an enhanced sentence was necessary for deterrence and protection of the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C)).

4. Substantive Reasonableness of the 48‑Month Upward Variance

On the substantive challenge, the Tenth Circuit applied the familiar abuse‑of‑discretion standard. The key questions were:

• Did the district court consider the § 3553(a) factors?
• Was the upward variance supported by a justification proportionate to its magnitude (doubling the high end of the range)?
• Was the ultimate sentence within the bounds of permissible choice, or was it arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable?

The panel emphasized:

• The district court expressly walked through the nature and circumstances of the offense and Vega‑Acosta’s history and characteristics, and articulated rationales tied to:
  • Seriousness of the offense;
  • Respect for the law;
  • Just punishment;
  • Deterrence; and
  • Protection of the public.
• The court found the offense outside the “heartland” of typical cases—cyberstalking here involved active sexualization and endangerment of a known child, repeated publication of personal information, and generating real‑world intrusions and fear.
• The significant psychological and financial harm to M.C. and her daughter, and the need for relocation, powerfully supported a view that the Guideline range understated the seriousness.

Although Vega‑Acosta argued that the district court under‑weighted other § 3553(a) considerations (medical needs, restitution, disparities, Guideline advice), the panel held that such arguments amounted to an impermissible request that the appellate court reweigh factors. Under Ware, Walker, and Barnes, that is beyond the scope of substantive reasonableness review.

Given the extraordinary offense conduct and harms, the court concluded that the 48‑month sentence did not exceed the “bounds of permissible choice” and was therefore substantively reasonable, even though it represented a major upward variance.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Double‑Edged Mitigation and “Privilege as Aggravation”

Perhaps the most important doctrinal development in Vega‑Acosta is its clear validation of a “double‑edged mitigation” concept in routine sentencing (not just capital cases):

• Facts typically advanced as mitigating—education, service, employment, strong family ties, absence of criminal history, engagement in therapy—do not automatically require a lower sentence.
• Where those same facts show that the defendant knew better, had lawful alternatives, and was not driven by desperation, they may support a finding of heightened culpability.
• This perspective is anchored in Stefonek and now reaffirmed in a concrete cyberstalking context by the Tenth Circuit.

Pragmatically, the case signals to defense counsel that:

• Mitigation presentations must anticipate and address the possibility that the court will view the same facts as aggravating, especially where the offense reflects planning, cruelty, or exploitation of trust.
• It is critical to tie mitigating characteristics to a plausible causal narrative that reduces culpability or risk (e.g., trauma‑based explanations, recent-onset mental health crises) rather than simply listing positive traits.

2. Socioeconomic Status vs. Background Post‑Guideline Amendment

The opinion notes that U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10’s explicit mention of socioeconomic status was deleted in 2025, but the statutory neutrality command in § 994(d) remains. Vega‑Acosta contributes a practical framework:

• Courts may discuss education, employment, travel, and family context as part of the defendant’s “background, character, and conduct” (§ 3661; § 3553(a)(1)).
• Courts may not impose harsher or more lenient sentences because of wealth or class status per se (e.g., “rich defendants should be punished more/less”).
• Where the discussion is closely tethered to culpability, deterrence, and the overall sentencing goals, and not framed in wealth‑based terms, appellate courts are unlikely to find plain error.

This will likely make it harder, especially under plain‑error review, for defendants to overturn sentences by pointing to brief references to education or professional status, so long as the record shows the court’s focus remained legally grounded in § 3553(a).

3. Recidivism Assessments for First‑Time Offenders

Vega‑Acosta underscores that:

• Criminal‑history Category I and zero points are important but not conclusive in evaluating recidivism risk.
• Where the instant offense itself involves deliberate, repeated, and escalating conduct, a district court may reasonably infer that a substantial risk to public safety remains, even in the absence of prior convictions.
• Prior access to treatment and support that did not prevent the offense may justify a pessimistic view of the defendant’s likelihood of desistance without a significant custodial sentence.

This approach reinforces a trend toward individualized, fact‑specific assessments of future dangerousness rooted in offense conduct and treatment history, rather than a mechanical reliance on criminal-history scores alone.

4. Cyberstalking as Serious, “Outside the Heartland” Conduct

On the substantive side, the case is a strong signal that:

• Cyberstalking that weaponizes sexual imagery, doxxing, and false profiles to direct third parties to a victim’s home is treated as gravely serious, even absent physical assault or direct contact by the defendant.
• Involving a child—especially a child personally known to the offender—by posting photos and school information and inviting sexual exploitation is an aggravating circumstance of the highest order.
• The long‑term psychological harm, fear, and forced relocation of victims are fully relevant sentencing considerations under § 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness, respect for law, just punishment).

Future cyberstalking defendants in the Tenth Circuit should expect that:

• Guideline ranges may be treated as understated for such conduct;
• Victim impact statements regarding ongoing fear and forced lifestyle changes will carry substantial weight; and
• Upward variances can be affirmed where the conduct is viewed as “outside the heartland” of typical stalking or harassment cases.

5. Appellate Preservation and the Plain‑Error Barrier

The opinion also has a significant procedural lesson:

• Because defense counsel did not contemporaneously object that the sentencing explanation was inadequate, that the court improperly used socioeconomic status, or that its recidivism findings were clearly erroneous, the appellate court applied only plain‑error review.
• Plain error is a demanding standard: the alleged error must be indisputable in light of existing law, affect the outcome, and seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
• On such deferential review, arguments that the court should have weighed factors differently or explained itself more thoroughly rarely succeed.

The case thus illustrates the importance of:

• Making specific, on‑the‑record objections at sentencing to preserve full de novo or abuse‑of‑discretion review on appeal; and
• Pressing the court to clarify potentially problematic statements (e.g., about socioeconomic status) at the time they are made.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

• Procedural Reasonableness asks: Did the court use the right process?
  • Correctly calculate the Guideline range;
  • Recognize the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory;
  • Consider the § 3553(a) factors;
  • Base the sentence on accurate facts; and
  • Explain the sentence adequately, especially if departing or varying from the Guidelines.
• Substantive Reasonableness asks: Is the length of the sentence reasonable in light of all the circumstances and § 3553(a)?
  • Appellate courts do not decide what sentence they would impose; they only decide whether the one imposed falls within the broad range of permissible outcomes.

B. Plain Error

Plain‑error review applies when a party did not object in the trial court. An appellant must show:

1. An error occurred;
2. The error is “plain”—clear or obvious under current law;
3. The error affected substantial rights (usually, it changed the outcome); and
4. The error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

If any element is not met, the appellate court must affirm even if it would have ruled differently under a more forgiving standard.

C. Upward Variance vs. Departure

• Guideline Departure: A sentence outside the range based on a specific Guideline provision authorizing departure (e.g., under‑ or over‑stated criminal history).
• Variance: A sentence outside the Guideline range based on the broader statutory § 3553(a) factors, independent of a formal departure standard.

Vega‑Acosta involves an upward variance: the court accepted the Guideline calculation but concluded that, in light of the statutory factors, the range was too low for this particular case.

D. “Heartland” Concept

The “heartland” refers to the typical cases envisioned by a Guideline provision. When a case is “outside the heartland,” it means:

• The facts are materially more (or less) serious than what the Guideline normally assumes; and
• This may justify a departure or variance to a higher (or lower) sentence than the Guideline range.

In Vega‑Acosta, the district court explicitly found the cyberstalking conduct—especially the deliberate targeting of a child and the real‑world intrusion—as “outside the heartland.”

E. Socioeconomic Status vs. Background

• Socioeconomic status usually means where someone sits in the economic and social order—wealth, occupation, and similar structural markers. Sentencing rules say this should not affect the length of a sentence.
• Background and characteristics include everything about the person’s life history, experiences, education, work, trauma, health, and relationships. Courts must consider these under § 3553(a)(1).

The subtlety is that the same fact—say, “college educated”—can be:

• Impermissible if used as a pure class marker (“we punish college‑educated people more harshly”); or
• Permissible if used to understand culpability (“he had the knowledge and alternatives to avoid crime”).

Vega‑Acosta places weight on this distinction and accepts that the latter use is permissible.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Vega‑Acosta is a significant Tenth Circuit contribution to federal sentencing law, particularly in three respects:

1. Double‑Edged Mitigation: The case reinforces that positive life circumstances—education, employment, travel, service, family support—are not uniformly mitigating. Where a defendant has had every opportunity to live lawfully yet chooses calculated, malicious, and dangerous conduct, those same circumstances can justify a stiffer sentence.
2. Socioeconomic Neutrality vs. Background Consideration: The opinion draws a workable line between impermissible reliance on socioeconomic status and permissible use of background and characteristics under § 3553(a)(1). It confirms district courts’ wide latitude to discuss and weigh a defendant’s life history, so long as they do not punish based on class or wealth alone.
3. Cyberstalking Gravity and Appellate Deference: The decision underscores the gravity of cyberstalking that weaponizes sexual imagery and doxxing to endanger victims and children, and it illustrates the high level of deference appellate courts afford district judges in both factual recidivism assessments and the balancing of § 3553(a) factors, particularly where objections are not preserved below.

Though non‑precedential, Vega‑Acosta will likely be cited for its persuasive value on these themes. For practitioners, it offers both a warning and a roadmap:

• Mitigating narratives must be carefully constructed to avoid backfiring; and
• Specific, contemporaneous sentencing objections are crucial to preserve robust appellate review.

In the broader legal context, the case reflects the judiciary’s effort to reconcile individualized sentencing, modern forms of technological harm, and longstanding principles about fairness and neutrality in punishment. It signals that in the Tenth Circuit, a defendant’s “advantages” in life may be seen not as a shield from punishment, but as a reason to hold him more fully accountable when he chooses to endanger others—especially children—through deliberate, technologically mediated crimes.