When Legal Error Becomes Judicial Misconduct: Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts “Clear and Determined Law + Egregiousness” Test and Holds Rule 2.3(A) Requires Actual Bias

Introduction

In Inquiry into the Conduct of the Honorable John P. Dehen, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision that does far more than resolve the sanctions appropriate for a sitting district court judge. The court formally adopted, as a judicial standard, the “legal errors test” set forth in Rule 4(c) of the Rules of the Board on Judicial Standards (RBJS) to determine when legal error by a judge constitutes judicial misconduct. It also clarified that Rule 2.3(A) of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct—which commands judges to perform their duties “without bias or prejudice”—is violated only upon proof of actual bias or prejudice, not merely an appearance of bias.

The case arose from a formal complaint alleging three categories of misconduct by Judge John P. Dehen of the Tenth Judicial District:

Twice issuing writs of mandamus to compel the district court administrator to increase his court reporter’s pay (undertaken while he was the “beneficially interested” party, without disqualifying himself, and without affording a meaningful opportunity to respond).
Handling five “at-risk juvenile” guardianship petitions under Minn. Stat. ch. 257D in a manner allegedly reflecting bias against non-citizen juveniles seeking immigration-related benefits and contrary to the statute.
Conducting a remote juvenile calendar from a moving vehicle to attend a family function.

After a public hearing, a three-member fact-finding panel recommended censure and a six-month suspension without pay. On review, the Supreme Court:

Affirmed misconduct findings and increased the judicial suspension to nine months without pay (with “carry-over” suspension from the practice of law if he leaves the bench before the suspension ends).
Held that, although some rulings in the at-risk juvenile cases were reversed on appeal, the Board failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they amounted to judicial misconduct under Rule 2.3(A) because no actual bias was proven and the law was not “clear and determined.”
Imposed a public reprimand as attorney discipline under Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), but declined a concurrent attorney suspension unless the judicial suspension cannot be served on the bench.

Summary of the Opinion

New doctrinal clarity: The Court expressly adopts the “legal errors test” (RBJS Rule 4(c)) as its own benchmark in judicial discipline: legal error is not misconduct unless it contravenes “clear and determined law” and is “egregious, made in bad faith, or made as part of a pattern or practice of legal error.”
Rule 2.3(A) standard: “Without bias or prejudice” in Rule 2.3(A) refers to actual bias/prejudice, not mere appearance. Apparent bias remains governed by Rule 2.3(B)–(C) and disqualification under Rule 2.11 (“impartiality might reasonably be questioned”).
Mandamus/court reporter salary: Judge Dehen violated the Code by twice initiating, presiding over, and issuing writs of mandamus to compel an increase in his own court reporter’s pay, despite a clear conflict and without a fair opportunity to be heard. The error was contrary to clear and determined law and egregious, warranting serious sanction.
At‑risk juvenile guardianships (Minn. Stat. ch. 257D): Though some rulings were reversed, the record did not clearly and convincingly show actual bias or refusal to apply clear law; the statute was new, appellate guidance sparse, and relevant standards (e.g., “best interests,” “capable and reputable”) undefined. No Rule 2.3(A) violation.
Remote calendar from a moving car: Conducting a confidential remote juvenile calendar while in a moving vehicle—so as to travel to a family event—violated Rules 2.1, 2.4, and 2.8 (duties take precedence; family interests cannot influence judicial conduct; require order and decorum).
Sanction: Public censure and nine-month suspension without pay. If the judge departs the bench before the suspension ends, the remainder of the term becomes a suspension from the practice of law. Separate attorney discipline: public reprimand for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Analysis

Doctrinal Innovations and Clarifications

1) The “Legal Errors Test” is now the Court’s standard

The Court embraced Rule 4(c), RBJS—which previously bound the Board—stating that legal error constitutes misconduct only when the judge acts contrary to “clear and determined law” and the error is “egregious, made in bad faith, or made as part of a pattern or practice of legal error.” The Court explained:

Judges, being human, make mistakes. Ordinary reversible error is addressed by the appellate process, not discipline.
“Bad faith” for this purpose includes bias (citing Texas decisions In re Barr and In re Ginsberg for the proposition that misuse of judicial power for purposes beyond legitimate authority may constitute bad faith).
The panel’s failure expressly to recite Rule 4(c) was not fatal because the Supreme Court independently assesses misconduct and applied the standard itself.

2) Rule 2.3(A) requires actual bias or prejudice

Parsing Rule 2.3, the Court distinguished three related but separate commands:

Rule 2.3(A): perform duties “without bias or prejudice” — focuses on the judge’s actual mental state; discipline requires proof of actual bias.
Rule 2.3(B): do not “manifest” bias or prejudice — targets conduct that displays or gives the appearance of bias.
Rule 2.3(C): require lawyers to refrain from manifesting bias.

The Court emphasized that apparent bias is properly handled through disqualification under Rule 2.11 (appearance standard: impartiality might reasonably be questioned) and through Rule 2.3(B)–(C) if conduct manifests bias. But Rule 2.3(A) turns on evidence of actual bias. In applying this standard, the Court borrowed from contexts such as Liteky v. United States (510 U.S. 540), State v. Fraga (juror bias), and State v. Burrell (recusal), while recognizing the distinct posture of judicial discipline.

The Court announced operative principles: judges are presumed capable of setting aside personal views; adverse rulings alone “will by themselves almost never suffice” to prove actual bias; proof requires evidence of a “high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible or nearly so.”

Application to the Three Categories of Allegations

A. Mandamus and the Court Reporter Salary Dispute

The facts are stark and largely undisputed:

Judge Dehen supported his court reporter’s effort to secure a higher step on a union salary scale (following another reporter’s resign-and-rehire approach); district HR and the Court Administrator (Lindahl‑Pfieffer) advised this could not be done under Judicial Branch practices and the CBA.
He initiated a district court proceeding, identified himself as the “beneficially interested” party, assigned the case to himself, and issued a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the administrator to hire at the top step—without notice or opportunity to be heard. The Court of Appeals vacated. In re Lindahl‑Pfieffer (Lindahl‑Pfieffer I), 2023 WL 7103265.
He then issued a second writ, nominally “alternative,” demanding immediate mid‑range pay while simultaneously ordering the administrator to show cause—functionally a second peremptory writ. The Court of Appeals again vacated, expressly finding a conflict. In re Lindahl‑Pfieffer (Lindahl‑Pfieffer II), 2023 WL 7986439.

The Supreme Court’s legal analysis:

Clear and determined law: The conflict-of-interest principle was crystal clear. In Clerk of Court’s Compensation for Lyon County v. Lyon County Commissioners, 241 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn. 1976), the Court held that when judges assert inherent authority in funding/employment matters, the case must be heard “in an adversary context before an impartial and disinterested district court.” A judge cannot be the judge in their own dispute. Further, peremptory writs are reserved for indisputable facts, with notice and opportunity to be heard (Home Ins. Co. v. Scheffer, 12 Minn. 382 (1867)).
Egregiousness: The Court characterized the misconduct as “egregious,” invoking the foundational tenet that “no man can be a judge in his own case” (Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133). The conflict was both obvious and acknowledged (he called himself the interested party), yet he twice proceeded and denied a meaningful opportunity to respond.
Rules violated: Rules 1.1 (comply with law), 1.2 (promote confidence in integrity and impartiality), 2.2 (uphold/apply law and perform fairly and impartially), 2.5 (competence/diligence), 2.6(A) (right to be heard), and 2.11 (disqualification).

B. At-Risk Juvenile Guardianships (Minn. Stat. ch. 257D)

The Board alleged that five cases reflected a pattern of bias against non-citizen juveniles seeking immigration-related benefits. The panel agreed. The Supreme Court disagreed, taking a careful, statute-focused approach.

Key statutory features:

Enacted in 2022, chapter 257D authorizes guardianships for “at-risk juveniles” aged 18–21 (Minn. Stat. § 257D.01, subd. 4), expressly cross-referencing potential eligibility for federal “special immigrant juvenile” (SIJS) classification (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)).
To grant a guardianship, the court must find, among other things: the guardian is “capable and reputable”; guardianship is in the juvenile’s “best interests”; reunification with one/both parents is not viable due to abandonment/abuse/neglect; and it is not in the juvenile’s best interests to return to the prior country. (Minn. Stat. § 257D.08, subd. 1.)
“Best interests” is defined only by cross-reference to a separate statute (Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a)), which states “all relevant factors” must be considered.

The Court observed a real, initial tension: the statute’s stated purposes (§ 257D.02) focus on meeting the juvenile’s needs or protecting against trafficking/violence—not on immigration outcomes—yet the definitional cross-reference to SIJS eligibility implicitly positions the guardianship as a pathway to a predicate state-court order often needed for federal SIJS applications. The statute itself is silent about “immigration benefits” as a purpose.

Timing mattered: when Judge Dehen handled these petitions, the statute was new; the first instructive appellate decision (In re Guardianship of Corpeno, 2 N.W.3d 595 (Minn. App. 2024)) post-dated most of his actions and only cautioned against deciding petitions based on “collateral consequences.” The later nonprecedential reversal in In re Guardianship of Ayala (2024 WL 763624) also post-dated his hearings and reflected a different view about “best interests.”

Against that backdrop, the Supreme Court concluded:

No clear and determined law dictated the precise factors subsumed in the undefined standards (“capable and reputable,” “best interests,” “not viable” reunification). Absent clear law, disagreement or even reversible error is not misconduct.
No proof of actual bias by clear and convincing evidence. Some questions (e.g., “legally or illegally present”) and some findings (e.g., weighing English proficiency in a guardian’s capability) were viewed as irrelevant or ill-advised, but did not prove actual antagonism rendering fair judgment impossible. The Chief Judge’s removal of Judge Dehen from one case addressed appearance concerns (Rule 2.11), not actual bias (Rule 2.3(A)).
Result: No violation of Rule 2.3(A), nor of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 2.2, or 2.5 insofar as the claims were premised on legal error alone.

C. Conducting a Remote Calendar from a Moving Car

The Court affirmed misconduct for holding a confidential juvenile calendar from a moving vehicle to attend a family event:

Rule 2.1: judicial duties must take precedence over personal/extrajudicial activities.
Rule 2.4: family or social interests must not influence judicial conduct.
Rule 2.8: a judge must require order and decorum; administering confidential juvenile matters from a moving car was incompatible with decorum and undermined dignity of proceedings.

The judge acknowledged it was a “bad idea,” and practitioners reported it was inappropriate and distressing.

Sanctions and Their Rationale

The Court emphasized that discipline aims to protect the public and the integrity of the judiciary, not to punish. It reviewed its sanction precedents:

Removals: Pendleton (residency violations and false affidavit), Ginsberg (criminal conduct and abuse of office), Winton (prostitution with minors), Gillard (grave pre-bench professional misconduct warranting disbarment). The Court declined removal here as disproportionate.
Suspensions: Blakely (public censure + 6 months for appointing one’s own lawyer to paid matters while negotiating fee reductions); Miera (public censure + 1 year for sexual misconduct toward staff and intemperate remarks).

Weighing the factors, the Court imposed:

Judicial sanction: public censure and nine-month suspension without pay, longer than the panel’s six-month recommendation—reflecting the egregious misuse of office in the mandamus episodes (conflict, lack of process, repetition after an appellate rebuke, resource waste, institutional harm). The remote-calendar misconduct and disciplinary history aggravated.
Carry-over mechanism: If Judge Dehen leaves the bench before the term ends, the balance converts to a suspension from the practice of law for the remaining term.
Attorney discipline: public reprimand under Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). The Court declined a concurrent attorney suspension while he remains a judge (judges cannot practice law under Rule 3.10, CJC).
Reinstatement: The Court clarified that no petition for reinstatement is required for this suspension, including if the carry-over attorney suspension applies (waiving the usual RLPR Rule 18 petition requirement for suspensions over 90 days).

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Rule 4(c), RBJS (“legal errors test”): now expressly applied by the Supreme Court to its own determinations, not just to Board action.
Clerk of Court’s Compensation for Lyon County v. Lyon County Commissioners, 241 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. 1976): judges asserting inherent power in compensation/administration disputes must bring the matter before an impartial court; a judge cannot decide his own funding controversy; foundational to finding a clear conflict.
Home Ins. Co. v. Scheffer, 12 Minn. 382 (1867): peremptory mandamus is reserved for indisputable facts with process protections; undercuts both writs issued here.
In re Lindahl‑Pfieffer (I & II), 2023 WL 7103265; 2023 WL 7986439 (Minn. App.): vacated writs; the second expressly condemned the conflict and clarified lack of inherent authority to set salary.
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133: “No man can be a judge in his own case”; the Court invoked these to characterize the conflict as egregious.
In re Guardianship of Corpeno, 2 N.W.3d 595 (Minn. App. 2024): reversed for insufficient findings and warned against basing decisions on collateral consequences; timing limited its applicability to Dehen’s earlier rulings.
In re Guardianship of Ayala, 2024 WL 763624 (Minn. App.): nonprecedential reversal emphasizing best-interests findings; noted concerns about irrelevant inquiries but did not order relief for bias.
In re Karasov, 805 N.W.2d 255 (Minn. 2011): standard of review—independent assessment by the Supreme Court, with deference to panel fact findings unless clearly erroneous.
In re Miera, 426 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1988): clear and convincing standard; sanction calibration (public censure + one-year suspension) for comparison.
In re Blakely, 772 N.W.2d 516 (Minn. 2009): sanction calibration; also attorney discipline (Rule 8.4(d)) for judicial misconduct; noted judges cannot practice law (Rule 3.10, CJC).
In re Ginsberg, 690 N.W.2d 539 (Minn. 2004): removal for grave misconduct, and articulation that judicial standards are higher than attorney standards; “independent consideration” of lawyer discipline in judicial cases.
In re Pendleton, 870 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. 2015); In re Winton, 350 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1984); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978): removal benchmarks showing why removal was not warranted here.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994); State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 2015); State v. Burrell, 743 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. 2008): bias standards informing the requirement of actual bias for Rule 2.3(A).
Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. App. 1986); Wiedemann v. Wiedemann, 36 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 1949): appearance-based recusal principles—distinguished from the actual-bias requirement for discipline.
In re Jacobs, 802 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 2011): disqualification standard (reasonable examiner would question impartiality) contrasted with Rule 2.3(A)’s actual bias requirement.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) and 8 C.F.R. § 204.11: federal SIJS framework that informs (but does not control) Minnesota’s at-risk guardianship scheme.

Impact and Practical Consequences

For Minnesota judges and judicial discipline practice

Boundaries around legal error: A clear safe harbor against discipline for ordinary legal error. Misconduct attaches only when judges contravene “clear and determined law” and the error is egregious/bad-faith/patterned.
Bias claims refined: Rule 2.3(A) now definitively requires actual bias; appearance-based concerns belong under Rule 2.11 and Rule 2.3(B)–(C). This sharpens charging decisions and defense strategy in future Board matters.
Conflicts and self-initiated writs: Judges cannot be the judge in their own administrative/funding disputes; mandamus against court administration requires impartial assignment and regular process.
Remote decorum: Even in virtual proceedings, decorum and precedence of duties remain paramount; conducting court from a moving car is misconduct.

For at-risk juvenile guardianships and SIJS-adjacent proceedings

Statutory interpretation space: Until more appellate guidance develops, reasonable judicial variance in applying open-ended terms (“best interests,” “capable and reputable”) will not, without more, support discipline—though appellate reversal remains a check.
Immigration “collateral consequences”: Courts should decide under Chapter 257D’s criteria rather than immigration outcomes per se; yet the statute’s SIJS linkage remains relevant context. Counsel should focus on satisfying § 257D.08 findings.

For court administration and HR

Salary-setting authority: Judicial Branch personnel policies and CBAs—not unilateral judicial orders—govern court reporter compensation; administrative channels must be respected.

For attorneys who are judges

Dual-discipline coordination: Judicial misconduct can simultaneously violate Rule 8.4(d); attorney sanctions will be calibrated to the different standards and practicalities (e.g., inability to practice while on the bench). Public reprimand may suffice where judicial sanctions already protect the public.
Carry-over suspensions: The Court reaffirmed a mechanism to ensure sanctions are effective regardless of status changes (judicial suspension converts to an attorney suspension for any unserved balance).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Legal errors test (RBJS 4(c)): A judge’s mistake becomes misconduct only if it violates “clear and determined law” and the error is egregious, in bad faith (including bias), or part of a pattern. Otherwise, errors are for appeal, not discipline.
Peremptory vs. alternative mandamus:
- Peremptory writ: Issued only when facts are indisputable; requires notice and proper procedural safeguards.
- Alternative writ: Orders the respondent to do the act or “show cause” why not; it presupposes a real chance to be heard before coercive relief.
Inherent authority: Courts have inherent powers to administer justice and maintain operations, but those powers cannot be used to bypass statutes, CBAs, or to adjudicate one’s own disputes. Impartial assignment is mandatory.
Actual bias vs appearance:
- Actual bias (Rule 2.3(A)): A genuine mental state of favoritism/antagonism that makes fair judgment impossible; needed for discipline under 2.3(A).
- Appearance of bias (Rule 2.11): Recusal is warranted if a reasonable observer would question impartiality, even without actual bias.
- Manifesting bias (Rule 2.3(B)–(C)): Words/conduct that display bias are prohibited, regardless of internal mental state.
SIJS linkage: State findings in guardianship cases do not confer immigration status; they can be predicate facts for a federal SIJS application (which requires DHS consent). Chapter 257D aligns with SIJS criteria but has its own, state-specific purposes and findings.
Censure vs public reprimand vs suspension:
- Censure: A formal, public condemnation of judicial misconduct.
- Public reprimand: An attorney-discipline analogue; formal public admonition without suspension.
- Suspension: Temporary removal from judicial duties (no pay) or from law practice; here, nine months judicially, with carry-over to law practice if necessary.

Conclusion

This opinion is a watershed for Minnesota’s judicial-discipline jurisprudence. By explicitly adopting the RBJS Rule 4(c) “legal errors test” as the Supreme Court’s own standard, the Court draws a principled line between reversible error and disciplinable misconduct. It likewise brings overdue clarity to Rule 2.3(A): only actual bias or prejudice—proved by clear and convincing evidence—violates the command to perform duties “without bias or prejudice,” while appearance-based concerns remain the province of disqualification and the “manifest bias” provisions.

Applying those guardrails, the Court rightly condemned as egregious the conflict-tainted mandamus proceedings engineered to raise a staff member’s pay—proceedings that ignored well-settled law, denied process, and misused judicial power—while declining to label as misconduct judicial rulings in a brand-new guardianship regime where the law was unsettled and appellate guidance sparse. The remote-hearing violation underscores that the veneer of informality in virtual court cannot displace core requirements of precedence, independence, and decorum.

Ultimately, the sanctions—public censure and a nine-month suspension without pay, with a carry-over attorney-suspension mechanism, plus a public reprimand as a lawyer—serve the systemic ends of discipline: reaffirming that judicial power is bounded by law, process, impartiality, and professionalism, and that when those boundaries are breached, the judiciary will respond decisively to protect public confidence in the courts.