When Does Malicious Prosecution “Occur” for Insurance Purposes in Kentucky?
Commentary on Colemon v. Westport Insurance Company

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision in Jerel Colemon, as Administrator and Personal Representative of the Estate of William Virgil v. Westport Insurance Company, rendered December 18, 2025, is a significant insurance-law decision at the intersection of civil-rights litigation and municipal risk management.

The core question was not whether William Virgil was wronged—his wrongful conviction and 28-year incarceration are taken as given—but whether a municipal liability insurer, Westport Insurance Company, owed coverage to the City of Newport for Virgil’s federal § 1983 action alleging malicious prosecution and related constitutional violations.

The answer turned entirely on the interpretation of the law enforcement liability (“LEL”) endorsements in Westport’s “occurrence-based” policies, which were in force from July 1, 1997 to July 1, 2000. The Court had to decide:

• When, for insurance purposes, does the tort of malicious prosecution “occur” under an occurrence-based liability policy that covers “personal injury” including malicious prosecution and civil-rights violations?
• Does ongoing wrongful incarceration during the policy period trigger coverage, even though the criminal charges and conviction predate the policy period?
• How should Kentucky courts treat federal circuit decisions (notably the Sixth Circuit’s decision in St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. City of Newport) that interpreted similar disputes arising from the same underlying wrongful conviction?

The Court’s answer is clear and precedential: under Kentucky law, where an occurrence-based policy covers “personal injury” defined to include “malicious prosecution” and “violation/deprivation of civil rights” and applies only if the “personal injury occurs during the policy period,” the malicious prosecution “occurs,” for coverage purposes, when the underlying criminal charges are filed. Continuing confinement and suffering are damages flowing from that injury, not new triggering injuries, absent specifically pleaded distinct harms occurring during the policy period.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals and the Campbell Circuit Court, holding that:

• Westport’s LEL policies were clearly occurrence-based and unambiguously provided coverage only when “bodily injury,” “property damage,” or “personal injury” occurs during the policy period.
• Under those policies’ definitions, “personal injury” includes malicious prosecution and violations/deprivations of civil rights; and, critically, “occurrence” (in the earlier policies) is defined as “an offense that results in ‘personal injury’.” Thus, for insurance purposes, the malicious prosecution is the personal injury.
• Adopting the majority rule nationally, and following the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Genesis Ins. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, malicious prosecution “occurs” at the time the underlying criminal charges are filed.
• Because charges against Virgil were filed in 1987, more than a decade before Westport’s policies incepted in 1997, no covered “personal injury” occurred during Westport’s policy period.
• Virgil’s federal complaint alleged continuous damages—pain and suffering, loss of normal life, etc.—all flowing from the malicious prosecution and wrongful incarceration, but did not allege any separate, distinct bodily injuries during the 1997–2000 period comparable to the independent injuries alleged in Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mitchell.
• Accordingly, Westport had no duty to defend or indemnify Newport in Virgil’s § 1983 action, and the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment for Westport was proper.

The Court rejected arguments that Kentucky should follow the Sixth Circuit’s decision in St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. City of Newport (which had found coverage for different policies covering later years of Virgil’s incarceration) and reaffirmed Kentucky’s strong commitment to enforcing unambiguous insurance policy language as written, without judicial rewriting.

III. Background and Procedural History

A. The Underlying Wrongful Conviction

In 1987, Retha Welch was murdered. In 1988, William Virgil was charged with, and convicted of, her murder and sentenced to 70 years. The police investigation allegedly involved:

• Withholding exculpatory evidence, and
• Coercing a jailhouse informant to fabricate statements implicating Virgil.

Virgil remained incarcerated for 28 years, until DNA testing of the victim’s rape kit excluded him as the perpetrator. He was released in 2015, and a Campbell County grand jury declined to reindict him.

B. The Federal Civil-Rights Action

In 2016, Virgil filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Virgil v. City of Newport, No. 16-cv-224-DLB-EBA) against:

• The City of Newport, and
• Past and present Newport police officers

(collectively, “Newport”), alleging:

• Violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial,
• Malicious prosecution,
• Fabrication of evidence,
• Supervisory liability and negligent supervision,
• Failure to intervene,
• Conspiracy to deprive him of constitutional rights, and
• Intentional infliction of emotional distress.

His alleged damages included:

• Pain and suffering during incarceration,
• Difficulties rebuilding his life after release, and
• “Physical harm, mental suffering, and loss of a normal life.”

C. The Insurance Coverage Dispute

Newport tendered the defense of the federal case to all insurers who had provided liability coverage from 1987–2015. Westport (as successor to Coregis) insured Newport from July 1, 1997, to July 1, 2000, under three successive one-year policies, each modified by an LEL endorsement.

Westport initially denied coverage on the ground that “no triggering event occurred during the Westport policy period,” but ultimately agreed to defend under a reservation of rights and then sought a judicial declaration of its coverage obligations in Campbell Circuit Court.

In 2020, Westport filed a declaratory judgment action against Newport and Virgil, asking the court to declare that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Newport because the complaint did not allege “bodily” or “personal” injury occurring during the 1997–2000 policy periods.

The circuit court treated Westport’s motion as one for summary judgment (because matters beyond the pleadings were considered) and granted judgment to Westport. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Virgil’s alleged personal injury did not occur during Westport’s policy periods.

While the appeal was pending, Newport and the Estate of Virgil (represented by administrator Jerel Colemon) settled the § 1983 case. Newport assigned its rights to any insurance proceeds and any claims against Westport to the estate. Colemon then sought, and obtained, discretionary review in the Supreme Court of Kentucky.

IV. The Policy Language and Its Structure

A. Occurrence-Based Law Enforcement Liability Coverage

The Court emphasizes that Westport’s LEL endorsements were occurrence-based policies. As the Court recently explained in Kentucky State University v. Darwin Nat’l Assurance Co., 677 S.W.3d 294, 305 (Ky. 2023):

“An occurrence-based policy … provides coverage for incidents which occur during the life of the policy without regard to when a claim is brought.”

Thus the key question is not when the lawsuit is filed, but when the covered “bodily injury,” “property damage,” or “personal injury” occurs.

B. The 1997–1998 and 1998–1999 LEL Endorsements

The relevant portions read (emphasis added):

SECTION I – COVERAGES
COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE AND PERSONAL INJURY
1. Insuring Agreement
We will pay those sums that the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury,” “property damages,” or “personal injury” to which this insurance applies. …

c. This insurance applies to “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal injury” only if:
…
(2) The “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal injury” occurs during the policy period.

Key definitions:

“Occurrence” means:
a. An accident … that results in “bodily injury” or “property damage”; or
b. An offense that results in “personal injury.”

“Personal injury” means injury, other than “bodily injury,” arising out of one or more of the following offenses:
…
c. Malicious prosecution;
…
i. Violation of civil rights, including but not necessarily limited to violations of the Federal Civil Rights Act and similar laws.

Thus, for “personal injury,” the “occurrence” is defined as the offense that results in that personal injury, and the list of such offenses includes malicious prosecution and civil-rights violations.

C. The 1999–2000 LEL Endorsement

The later policy reorganized the wording but retained the same substantive trigger:

2. Insuring Agreement – LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as “damages” because of “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal injury” caused by an “occurrence” or offense, as more fully described in the definitions of “personal injury,” in the course of your “law enforcement activity” to which this insurance applies.…

b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal injury” only if:
…
(2) The “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal injury” occurs during the policy period.

The definitions:

“Occurrence” means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.

“Personal injury” means injury, other than “bodily injury,” arising out of one or more of the following offenses:
…
b. Malicious prosecution;
…
h. Deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution.

Although “occurrence” is no longer explicitly tied to “offense” in the definition, the insuring agreement still requires that the “personal injury” itself occur during the policy period, and “personal injury” is still defined by the same list of offenses, including malicious prosecution and deprivation of constitutional rights.

The Court treats all three policies as materially similar for purposes of the coverage-trigger analysis.

V. Legal Framework: Contract Interpretation in Kentucky

The Court begins by reaffirming longstanding Kentucky principles governing interpretation of insurance contracts:

• Plain meaning and freedom of contract. In Cheek v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 126 S.W.2d 1084, 1089 (Ky. 1939), the Court held that the terms of an insurance contract must control unless they contravene public policy or statute, and courts “cannot make a new contract for the parties under the guise of interpretation or construction.”
• Role of ambiguity. In Frear v. P.T.A. Indus., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2003), and Lynch v. Claims Mgmt. Corp., 306 S.W.3d 93 (Ky. App. 2010), Kentucky courts emphasized that ambiguity exists only where policy language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Absent ambiguity, the court enforces the written terms strictly.
• Ordinary meaning. Under Jackson Hosp. Corp. v. United Clinics of Ky., LLC, 545 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Ky. App. 2018), and Masler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 894 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1995), courts give policy terms their ordinary meaning and will not extend coverage beyond clear limits.
• No artificially created ambiguities. Sutton v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 971 S.W.2d 807, 808 (Ky. App. 1997), cautions that a party may not “muddy the water” to manufacture ambiguity where none exists.
• De novo review. Interpretation of insurance contracts is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. Morganfield Nat. Bank v. Damien Elder & Sons, 836 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Ky. 1992).
• Contra proferentem is a last resort. Policies are construed against the insurer only where there is genuine ambiguity. As Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Layne, 554 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky. App. 1977), held: that rule “has no application to a term so clearly defined in the policy as to exclude coverage under the circumstances.”

With these principles, the Court’s first task is to decide whether Westport’s policy language is ambiguous about when the covered “personal injury” occurs. Finding no ambiguity, the Court enforces the policy as written.

VI. The Core Legal Question: When Does Malicious Prosecution “Occur” for Coverage Purposes?

A. Kentucky’s General “Time of Occurrence” Rule

In Davis v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 495 S.W.3d 159, 162 (Ky. App. 2016), the Court of Appeals stated:

“For purposes of triggering insurance coverage … the time of the occurrence … is when the complaining party was actually damaged or injured and not the time when the wrongful act was committed.”

This rule focuses on when the claimant sustained injury, not when the defendant acted wrongfully. The Supreme Court accepts this principle and applies it here, but clarifies how it operates in the specific context of malicious prosecution.

B. Majority vs. Minority Approaches Nationally

The question “When does malicious prosecution occur for insurance?” has divided jurisdictions, but there is a strong majority rule:

• Majority rule: For occurrence-based coverage that applies to “personal injury” including malicious prosecution, the tort “occurs” when the underlying criminal charges are filed (i.e., at the initiation of prosecution). Damages may continue, but the initial injury is contemporaneous with the commencement of the prosecution.
• Minority rule: A small number of jurisdictions hold that the tort “occurs” upon exoneration or favorable termination of the criminal proceedings, on the theory that malicious prosecution is not complete until that element is satisfied.

The Eighth Circuit in Genesis Ins. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, 677 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2012), surveying national authority, concluded that “a clear majority of courts have held the tort occurs when the underlying criminal charges are filed.” It then adopted that rule in interpreting Iowa law and similar policy language.

The Kentucky Supreme Court, aligning itself with that majority rule, concludes:

“For claims of malicious prosecution, ‘[t]he wrong and damage are practically contemporaneous.’ … Therefore … malicious prosecution occurs ‘at the time the underlying charges are filed.’”

C. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision in St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. City of Newport

The appellant (Colemon) urged the Court to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s approach in St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. City of Newport, Ky., 804 F. App’x 379 (6th Cir. 2020), which also arose from Virgil’s wrongful conviction.

In St. Paul Guardian:

• St. Paul insured Newport under LEL policies from 2007–2010.
• The insuring agreement covered “personal injury or damage” that:
  • results from law enforcement activities,
  • happens while the agreement is in effect, and
  • is caused by a wrongful act (e.g., malicious prosecution).
• “Injury” was not defined, so the Sixth Circuit used dictionary definitions (“a wrong inflicted or suffered,” or “[h]urt or loss caused to or sustained by a person”).

The Sixth Circuit held that:

• Malicious prosecution was the wrongful act, not the “injury.”
• Virgil’s ongoing incarceration and suffering during the policy period were continuing injuries that “happened” while the policy was in effect.
• Therefore, St. Paul owed a duty to defend, because at least some covered “injury” occurred during its policy period, even though the wrongful act pre-dated coverage.

The court also noted that later St. Paul policies contained “deemer clauses,” expressly deeming some damages to occur at the time of the wrongful act, suggesting that St. Paul knew how to contract for that result when it wished.

D. Why Kentucky Declined to Follow St. Paul Guardian

The Supreme Court distinguishes St. Paul Guardian on policy language, not policy preference:

1. Different structural role of “malicious prosecution.”
   In St. Paul’s policy, “malicious prosecution” was characterized as the wrongful act causing “injury,” whereas “injury” itself was not defined and was construed broadly as “hurt or loss.” The Sixth Circuit was therefore free to conceptualize:
   • malicious prosecution = wrongful act, and
   • injury = the ongoing harms (lost liberty, dignitary and emotional harms) that continued into the policy period.
   By contrast, under Westport’s policies:
   • “Personal injury” is expressly defined as injury arising out of enumerated offenses, including malicious prosecution, and
   • “Occurrence” (for the earlier policies) is defined as the offense that results in personal injury.
   The Court concludes that under these policies, malicious prosecution is itself the insured personal injury for coverage purposes.
2. Absence of deemer clauses.
   Unlike some St. Paul policies, Westport’s policies contain no “deemer clause” deeming injuries to occur at the time of the wrongful act. Instead, the definitional structure already links the injury (personal injury) to the offense (malicious prosecution) and the policy applies only if that personal injury occurs during the policy period. The Court declines to speculate about hypothetical terms Westport “could have” negotiated and focuses on what it actually did.

Accordingly, the Court holds that St. Paul Guardian does not control and is factually and contractually distinguishable. In Kentucky, where policy language mirrors Westport’s, the “trigger” of coverage is the initial malicious prosecution (the filing of charges), not the continuing incarceration.

E. The Eighth Circuit’s Decision in Genesis Ins. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs

In Genesis, 677 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2012), plaintiffs brought a § 1983 malicious prosecution suit against a city and officers. The Genesis policy covered “personal injury” that “occurs during this policy period,” with “personal injury” defined by a list of offenses including malicious prosecution and violation of civil rights, and “occurrence” (for personal injury) defined as “an offense or series of related offenses.”

These terms are substantially similar to Westport’s. The Eighth Circuit:

• Surveyed national caselaw and adopted the majority rule that malicious prosecution “occurs” at the time charges are filed.
• Under Iowa law, reasoned that for insurance purposes, “a tort occurs when the claimant sustains damages, not when the act or omission causing the damage takes place,” but found that in malicious prosecution, the wrongful act and first damages are essentially contemporaneous at charging.

The Kentucky Supreme Court expressly finds Genesis “helpful” and adopts its reasoning, pairing it with Kentucky’s own rule from Davis that an occurrence is timed by injury, not act. In malicious prosecution, those coincide at charge-filing.

F. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mitchell

The Court also distinguishes Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mitchell, 925 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2019), a case that:

• Involved wrongful convictions from 1980;
• Travelers insured the county for 2005–2011 under St. Paul-style LEL policies; and
• The estates/plaintiffs alleged not only malicious prosecution and wrongful imprisonment, but also specific injuries occurring during the Travelers policy periods (e.g., infections, diseases, and emotional distress tied to denial of early-release petitions during those years).

The Fifth Circuit held Travelers owed a duty to defend because the complaint alleged distinct “bodily injuries” and separate harms that occurred during the policy periods and would not have arisen but for the earlier wrongful acts.

However, the court also emphasized that “continued imprisonment, alone, did not trigger coverage” for the malicious prosecution claim, because the triggering event—the filing of charges—occurred decades earlier.

The Kentucky Supreme Court seizes on this distinction:

• In Mitchell, there were additional, distinct injuries during the policy period.
• In Virgil’s case, the complaint alleged only continuous harms—pain and suffering, loss of normal life, etc.—flowing from the original malicious prosecution and wrongful incarceration.

Therefore, under the Westport policies, Virgil’s allegations are pure damages arising from the single personal injury (malicious prosecution) that occurred in 1987, not new, independent injuries that could separately trigger coverage during 1997–2000.

VII. The Court’s Legal Reasoning Applied to the Facts

A. Step 1: Is There Any Ambiguity?

The Court finds no ambiguity in the Westport policies:

• The policies are clearly occurrence-based.
• They explicitly require the “bodily injury,” “property damage,” or “personal injury” to “occur during the policy period.”
• “Personal injury” is defined to include malicious prosecution and constitutional-rights violations.
• In the earlier policies, “occurrence” is expressly “an offense that results in ‘personal injury.’”

Because the injury-trigger terms are “so clearly defined … as to exclude coverage under the circumstances” (Layne), the Court refuses to invoke the rule that ambiguities are construed against the insurer.

B. Step 2: What Is the Relevant Covered Injury?

Under these policies:

• For personal injury coverage, the covered injury is the injury arising out of the offense of malicious prosecution or civil-rights deprivation.
• The Court reads the structure to mean that malicious prosecution itself is the insured personal injury (in contrast to St. Paul’s policy where malicious prosecution was only a wrongful act causing “injury”).

Once that conceptualization is accepted, the next question is temporal: when does that personal injury occur?

C. Step 3: When Did the Personal Injury Occur?

The Court then applies:

• Kentucky’s occurrence-timing rule from Davis (occurrence is when the claimant is actually damaged or injured), and
• The majority rule on malicious prosecution from Genesis and the national caselaw it cites.

It concludes that:

• The malicious prosecution occurred, for coverage purposes, when charges were filed in 1987.
• The wrong and the initial damages (loss of liberty, stigma, etc.) were “practically contemporaneous” at that time.
• All subsequent harms—years of incarceration, missed life experiences, continuing emotional pain—are damages from that single injury, not separate triggering events.

D. Step 4: Did Virgil Allege Any Independent Injuries During 1997–2000?

The Court carefully contrasts Virgil’s allegations with those in Mitchell:

• Virgil alleged:
  • “Pain and suffering” endured during incarceration,
  • Disadvantages in rebuilding his life post-release, and
  • “Physical harm, mental suffering, and loss of a normal life” flowing from Newport’s misconduct.
• He did not allege:
  • Specific infections, diseases, or physical conditions caused by prison conditions during 1997–2000,
  • Particular discrete events (e.g., assaults, denial of specific parole petitions) in that time window that produced new, separate injuries.

Thus, unlike the plaintiffs in Mitchell, Virgil’s complaint does not identify independent bodily or personal injuries during Westport’s policy period. His alleged damages are characterized as the consequences of the 1987 malicious prosecution, not as new instances of injury.

The Court therefore holds that “Westport’s policies were not triggered” by any allegation in Virgil’s federal complaint.

E. Step 5: Response to Appellant’s Policy and Fairness Arguments

Colemon argued that:

1. The Court of Appeals’ reliance on the majority rule was inconsistent with Kentucky jurisprudence.
2. The majority rule is “manifestly unjust” in wrongful conviction contexts, because it rewards insurers by relieving them from liability where injury continues for decades and coverage exists during much of the confinement.

The Supreme Court responds in two ways:

• Consistency with Kentucky law. The Court shows that adopting the majority rule for malicious prosecution is consistent with Davis, because in malicious prosecution the first injury and the wrongful act align at the filing of charges. There is no doctrinal inconsistency.
• No judicial rewriting of policies. Citing Cheek and Layne, the Court reiterates that it cannot “draft a new insurance policy” or “add both an exclusion and a condition which were not bargained for.” To require coverage for post-conviction incarceration under these occurrence-based policies would be to rewrite them, not interpret them.

Thus, fairness concerns about wrongful conviction and long-term incarceration cannot override clear policy language. The parties’ allocation of risk—who insures what years, under what triggers—must be respected.

VIII. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

A. Occurrence-Based vs. Claims-Made Policies

• Occurrence-based policy: Provides coverage if the injury (e.g., personal injury, bodily injury) occurs during the policy period, even if the lawsuit is brought years later. The focus is on when the injury happens.
• Claims-made policy: Provides coverage if the claim or lawsuit is first made during the policy period (sometimes with retroactive dates). The focus is on when the insured is sued or reports a claim.

Westport’s LEL policies are occurrence-based. That is why the timing of Virgil’s injury, not the timing of his lawsuit, controls.

B. Law Enforcement Liability (LEL) Coverage

LEL coverage is a specialized liability insurance form for governmental entities and their law enforcement officers. It typically covers:

• Claims of excessive force,
• False arrest or imprisonment,
• Malicious prosecution,
• Certain civil-rights violations, and
• Other “personal injuries” arising out of law enforcement activities.

It is especially relevant in § 1983 litigation, where plaintiffs allege constitutional violations by local police and municipalities.

C. Malicious Prosecution (in a Coverage Context)

Substantively, malicious prosecution requires:

• The institution or continuation of criminal proceedings,
• Without probable cause,
• With malice, and
• Termination of the proceedings in the plaintiff’s favor.

For coverage purposes, however, the question is not when all elements are formally complete, but when the plaintiff is first “actually damaged or injured” by the tort. The Kentucky Court, following the majority rule, holds that in malicious prosecution:

• The first injury occurs when charges are filed and the plaintiff’s liberty and reputation are invaded.
• Favorable termination is a condition of actionability (i.e., when the claim can be sued upon), not the date when injury first occurs.

D. Trigger of Coverage vs. Amount of Damages

A critical distinction:

• Trigger of coverage asks: When did the first covered injury occur, such that the policy “kicks in”?
• Scope of damages asks: Once a policy is triggered, which damages (even those years later) can be recovered as flowing from that injury?

The Court treats all of Virgil’s 28 years of suffering as damages from the single malicious prosecution in 1987, which would trigger whatever insurer covered Newport at that time. But they do not create additional triggers each policy year during incarceration.

E. Contra Proferentem (Construing Ambiguities Against the Insurer)

Because insurers typically draft policies, courts often resolve true ambiguities in favor of the insured. But:

• This rule applies only when the language is genuinely “susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations” by a reasonable person.
• Where terms are clear—as here regarding the temporal requirement that “personal injury” occur during the policy period and that “personal injury” includes malicious prosecution—courts do not rewrite the contract against the insurer.

The Court reaffirms this limit, resisting the temptation to stretch coverage by recharacterizing ongoing damages as new injuries.

IX. Impact and Implications

A. For Kentucky Insurance Law

This decision establishes a clear Kentucky precedent governing malicious prosecution and similar “personal injury” offenses under occurrence-based liability policies:

• Trigger rule: Malicious prosecution (and analogous personal injuries defined as offenses) “occurs” for coverage purposes at the time the underlying criminal charges are filed, not at exoneration and not continuously during incarceration.
• Policy-structure sensitivity: Kentucky courts will carefully parse how policies define “personal injury,” “occurrence,” and “offense.” When the definitional structure makes the offense itself the personal injury, courts will time the occurrence accordingly.
• Alignment with majority rule: Kentucky joins the majority of jurisdictions that follow the “filing of charges” rule for malicious prosecution in the insurance context.
• Limited scope for federal predictions: Federal courts applying Kentucky law in coverage disputes must now follow this state precedent, and cannot rely on St. Paul Guardian’s broader continuing-injury theory when interpreting similar policy language.

B. For Municipalities and Public Risk Pools

Municipalities and public entities in Kentucky should take note:

• Coverage lies with earlier insurers. For wrongful prosecution cases, coverage responsibility will rest primarily with insurers on the risk in the year criminal charges are filed (and possibly, in some policy structures, when prosecution is instituted), not with insurers on the risk during lengthy incarceration decades later.
• Importance of historical coverage records. Cities must maintain and be able to prove coverage going back to the era of the challenged prosecution (sometimes 20–30 years prior), or risk major uninsured liabilities.
• Risk allocation in public pools. Risk pools such as county or municipal “all-lines funds” (one of the amici) will structure premiums and reserves knowing that wrongful conviction risks are concentrated at prosecution dates.

C. For Civil-Rights Plaintiffs and Their Counsel

For victims of wrongful conviction and their lawyers, this case has strategic implications:

• Pleading strategy. To engage later-year insurers, plaintiffs may need to allege specific, independent injuries that occurred during those later policy periods (e.g., distinct physical ailments, traumas, or denials of rights tied to particular years), not just generalized continuing pain and suffering.
• Settlement leverage. Coverage availability often influences municipal willingness and ability to settle. With this decision, earlier insurers (near the time of prosecution) carry the primary exposure for malicious prosecution coverage, while later insurers can more readily deny coverage absent distinct alleged injuries.
• Time-bar and coverage gaps. In older cases, insurance from the prosecution year may be lost, insolvent, or disputed, potentially leaving municipalities themselves (and ultimately taxpayers) bearing the costs, and plaintiffs may face practical collection issues despite winning liability verdicts.

D. For Insurers

Insurers writing law enforcement liability coverage for Kentucky risks can draw several lessons:

• Drafting clarity pays. The outcome here rests heavily on precise definitional structure. Insurers who wish to limit or expand coverage can do so clearly, and courts will generally enforce those choices.
• Use of deemer clauses. If an insurer wants to ensure that all injuries (including continuing harms) are deemed to occur at the time of the wrongful act, it may explicitly include deemer clauses, as St. Paul did in later policies.
• Underwriting long-tail risks. Wrongful prosecution and conviction claims are classic long-tail risks. This decision allocates that risk to the earliest occurrence year, which insurers must price accordingly.

E. Doctrinal Clarification: Davis and Malicious Prosecution

The decision also clarifies how Kentucky’s general occurrence-timing principle in Davis operates with intentional torts like malicious prosecution:

• The focus remains on when the plaintiff was first “actually damaged or injured.”
• In malicious prosecution, that moment is the initiation of baseless criminal charges, not the later formal exoneration or ongoing custody.
• Thus, even where favorable termination occurs decades later, insurance coverage is triggered once, at the start of the prosecution, under occurrence-based policies like Westport’s.

X. Conclusion

Colemon v. Westport Insurance Company provides a clear and consequential answer to an important coverage question in Kentucky: when does malicious prosecution “occur” under an occurrence-based law enforcement liability policy that defines “personal injury” to include malicious prosecution and civil-rights violations?

The Court holds that:

• Under unambiguous policy language, malicious prosecution is itself the insured “personal injury.”
• That injury occurs, for coverage purposes, when the underlying criminal charges are filed.
• Ongoing wrongful incarceration and its attendant suffering are damages resulting from that single injury, not new, independently triggering injuries—unless the plaintiff specifically pleads distinct harms occurring during later policy periods.
• Because Virgil’s charges were filed in 1987, and because his complaint did not allege new injuries during 1997–2000, Westport’s policies were never triggered, and Westport owed no duty to defend or indemnify Newport in his § 1983 action.

In reaching this result, the Supreme Court of Kentucky:

• Aligns itself with the national majority rule on malicious prosecution coverage triggers,
• Clarifies the interaction of Kentucky’s occurrence-timing rule with intentional torts,
• Distinguishes federal decisions like St. Paul Guardian based on differences in policy structure, and
• Reaffirms Kentucky’s commitment to enforcing insurance policies as written, without judicial reallocation of long-tail risks driven by sympathy for harsh underlying facts.

For Kentucky practitioners, insurers, and municipalities, this opinion now sets the governing framework for analyzing coverage in wrongful conviction and malicious prosecution cases: identify the policy’s structure and definitions, locate the date of the underlying criminal charging decision, and treat that as the operative “occurrence” unless the complaint alleges truly distinct injuries in later years.