When Administrative Mismanagement Becomes Judicial Misconduct: The New CJC 2.5(A) Standard in In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Flood

I. Introduction

The Washington Supreme Court’s decision in In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against the Honorable Judge Tracy S. Flood, No. 202239-1 (Wash. Dec. 4, 2025), is a significant development in Washington judicial discipline law. It does three important things:

It rejects the Commission on Judicial Conduct’s recommendation of censure and removal, and instead imposes censure and a 30‑day unpaid suspension.
It articulates, for the first time in clear terms, a substantive standard for when administrative failures constitute a violation of CJC Rule 2.5(A) (competence and diligence).
It reaffirms and sharpens the high threshold for judicial removal, while expressly recognizing the role of racial and gender bias in the workplace context in which judicial conduct is evaluated.

Judge Tracy S. Flood, the first woman and first Black judge to serve as the sole judge of the Bremerton Municipal Court, faced charges under four provisions of the Washington Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC): Rules 1.1 (compliance with the law), 1.2 (promoting confidence in the judiciary), 2.5(A) (competence and diligence), and 2.8(B) (decorum and courtesy). She stipulated to violations of CJC 1.1, 1.2, and 2.8(B); the Commission additionally found a violation of CJC 2.5(A) and recommended removal.

Under article IV, section 31(8) of the Washington Constitution, that removal recommendation triggered an automatic suspension with salary as of January 31, 2025. The Supreme Court, exercising de novo review under DRJ 2(a) and 3(a), now largely accepts the Commission’s factual findings but substantially disagrees on sanction and on the interpretation of certain factors, including alleged noncooperation and amenability to rehabilitation.

The opinion is notable in several respects:

It gives a precise definition of what kind of court mismanagement crosses the line into a violation of CJC 2.5(A).
It reaffirms that removal is reserved for “flagrant and intentional” violations of the oath of office or misuse of power, aligning this case with prior removal precedents (Deming, Ritchie, Anderson).
It explicitly acknowledges the presence of racial and gender bias in the court workplace and explains how that context is relevant—but not dispositive—in judicial discipline.
It endorses the use of remedial mentoring or coaching as a formal component of the sanction framework.

Justice Johnson dissents narrowly on remedy, agreeing that removal is unwarranted but concluding that, given Judge Flood’s year-long suspension resulting from an erroneous removal recommendation, no additional suspension should be imposed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture and Scope of Review

The case reaches the Supreme Court under DRJ 2(a) and 3(a) following:

A public evidentiary hearing before a nine-member panel of the Commission on Judicial Conduct.
A Commission decision finding violations of CJC 1.1, 1.2, 2.5(A), and 2.8(B), and recommending censure and removal.
An automatic suspension with pay under article IV, section 31(8) triggered by the removal recommendation.

The Court confirms:

It reviews judicial discipline matters de novo, while giving “considerable weight” to Commission findings and “serious consideration” to the recommended sanction, citing In re Keenan¹ and In re Anderson².
The nine-member panel of the Commission was validly constituted under CJCRP 3(c), which allows six of eleven members to constitute a quorum. Article IV, section 31 is silent on quorum size and grants the Commission authority to establish its own procedural rules.
A stipulation to certain violations does not preclude consideration of additional violations supported by the record; thus, the Court may consider both the stipulated CJC 1.1, 1.2, and 2.8(B) violations and the Commission-found CJC 2.5(A) violation.

B. Findings on Misconduct

The Court accepts that:

Judge Flood’s conduct toward court staff and attorneys was, on multiple occasions, “impatient, discourteous, harsh, or condescending.” Staff reported depression, anxiety, increased medication usage, panic attacks, and being reduced to tears as a result of interactions with her.
Nineteen staff members left the court during the relevant period, including some whom she had hired as replacements.
Operational dysfunction in the court went beyond what staffing attrition alone would explain and was causally linked to policies or practices instituted or not corrected by Judge Flood, including:
- Delays in exonerating bail bonds and in updating dockets.
- Failure to timely disburse restitution, with approximately $40,000 held rather than paid out at one point.
- Mislabeling of docket entries and failure to correct these errors.
- Serious communication failures regarding warrants, no-contact orders, and competency restoration orders, including at least one false arrest due to an uncommunicated quashed warrant and a 30-day jail stay due to an untransmitted restoration order.

At the same time, the Court recognizes countervailing contextual facts:

Evidence of racial and gender-based bias by some staff and attorneys in a “predominantly white environment,” including gossip, disrespectful references to the judge by first name, and celebration of an attorney who spoke belligerently to her.
Significant workplace tension and staff resistance to change, some of which may have been influenced by conscious or unconscious bias against a Black woman in a position of judicial authority.
Efforts by Judge Flood to obtain external assistance from court management professionals, even if she did not implement all recommendations.

The Court carefully states that it will “neither deny the role of racism in our justice system and workplace dynamics nor disregard the power dynamics at play in a court environment where court staff and litigants must ultimately answer to the presiding judge.”

C. Determination of Violations

The Court finds:

Violations of CJC 1.1, 1.2, and 2.8(B) are established and properly stipulated.
The record “substantiates a violation of CJC 2.5(A)” based on administrative and operational failures that significantly affected the functioning of the court and the rights of litigants.
The argument that the stipulation bars consideration of CJC 2.5(A) is rejected; both stipulated and non‑stipulated allegations can be considered in fashioning the sanction.

Crucially, the Court articulates a general standard for what constitutes a violation of CJC 2.5(A), discussed in detail below.

D. Sanction: Rejection of Removal, Imposition of 30-Day Unpaid Suspension and Censure

Applying the Deming factors (through CJCRP 6(c)), the Court:

Unanimously rejects the Commission’s recommendation of censure and removal, emphasizing that removal is the “ultimate, permanent sanction” reserved for “flagrant and intentional violation of the oath of office or misuse of power,” echoing Turco and Kaiser.
Holds, by majority, that a proportionate sanction would ordinarily fall in the range of a 60–90 day suspension, but reduces that to 30 days in light of:
- The automatic suspension with salary since January 31, 2025, under article IV, section 31(8).
- The public and professional impact of that lengthy suspension.
- The fact that Judge Flood did not seek reelection in 2025; her term ends December 31, 2025.
Orders:
- Censure and a 30-day suspension without compensation, effective immediately, potentially extending beyond the expiration of her term.
- That she “shall be eligible to pursue a judicial position” only after completing “a program of remedial services involving judicial mentoring or coaching approved by the chief justice.”

The majority explicitly rejects the Commission’s conclusion that Flood is not amenable to coaching or mentoring, emphasizing a “central premise” of judicial discipline: a presumption that judges will heed court orders.

E. The Dissent

Justice Johnson concurs that removal is not justified but dissents from imposing any additional suspension. He reasons that because Judge Flood has effectively already been suspended for nearly a year as a result of the Commission’s erroneous removal recommendation, she should not now be suspended again. In his view, the time already spent suspended should effectively satisfy the sanctioning needs of the system.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Procedural and Standard-of-Review Authorities

Article IV, section 31, Washington Constitution.
- Subsection (8) mandates automatic suspension with salary when the Commission recommends removal.
- Subsection (10) authorizes the Commission to “establish rules of procedure,” supporting the validity of CJCRP 3(c)’s quorum rule and the nine-member panel.
Discipline Rules for Judges (DRJ).
- DRJ 2(a), 3(a): Provide for Supreme Court review of Commission recommendations.
- DRJ 7: Allows the Court, on its own motion, to accept supplementary materials without remand. The Court uses this to accept Flood’s additional medical documentation without sending the matter back to the Commission.
- DRJ 9(c): Authorizes the Court to impose “the sanction recommended by the commission, or any other sanction that the Supreme Court deems proper.”
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Keenan, 199 Wn.2d 87 (2022). Cited for the principle that:
“[T]he ultimate decision to issue discipline lies with the Washington State Supreme Court,” and that it conducts an “independent evaluation of the record,” while giving considerable weight to Commission findings.
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anderson, 138 Wn.2d 830 (1999). Quoted for two propositions:
- The Court gives “considerable weight” to Commission findings and “serious consideration” to Commission-recommended sanctions.
- The Court “necessarily give[s] considerable weight to credibility determinations by the Commission, as the body that had the opportunity directly to observe the witnesses and their demeanor.”
Commission on Judicial Conduct Rules of Procedure (CJCRP).
- CJCRP 3(c): Six members of the eleven-member Commission constitute a quorum. Used to validate the nine-member panel.
- CJCRP 6(c): Lists sanction factors substantially overlapping with the Deming factors. The Court uses these as the operative formulation of sanction considerations.

B. Substantive Discipline Framework: Deming and Progeny

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Deming, 108 Wn.2d 82 (1987).
- Origin of the multi-factor proportionality test (the “Deming factors”), which consider, among other things:
  - Nature and circumstances of the misconduct.
  - Extent to which it affects the integrity of and respect for the judiciary.
  - Whether it involved moral turpitude, dishonesty, or personal gain.
  - The judge’s experience, prior discipline, and prospects for rehabilitation.
- Also a key removal case, involving sexual misconduct, harassment, and threats to staff.
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Michels, 150 Wn.2d 159 (2003).
- Confirms use and continued vitality of the Deming factors.
- Illustrates that a judge’s long tenure can aggravate sanctions when the judge “should know better.”
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eiler, 169 Wn.2d 340 (2010).
- A plurality opinion imposing a 5-day suspension and censure on a judge for insulting and condescending conduct toward pro se litigants.
- Important comparandum in Flood for harsh courtroom demeanor and prior sanctions; the Court distinguishes Eiler and notes that Eiler had been previously disciplined and sometimes defied prior orders—a factor not present in Flood’s case.
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Turco, 137 Wn.2d 227 (1999), and In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kaiser, 111 Wn.2d 275 (1988).
- Cited together to reaffirm that removal is appropriate only when there is a “flagrant and intentional violation of the oath of office or misuse of power” and that “the people’s choice in judicial elections should not be ‘lightly set aside.’”
- These cases establish the high constitutional and democratic threshold for nullifying an elected judge’s mandate.
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Ritchie, 123 Wn.2d 725 (1994).
- Removal case involving improper conversion of public funds for personal benefit and related dishonesty.
- Serves as a comparator to show that Flood does not involve similar self-dealing or willful financial misconduct.
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anderson, 138 Wn.2d 830 (1999).
- Another removal case, involving financial self-dealing through for-profit corporations, deliberate misrepresentation, and nondisclosure.
- Again, the Court contrasts these facts with Flood’s misconduct to show the difference between mismanagement/temperament and deliberate self-enrichment and deceit.
In re Tollefson, No. 70051-6 (Wash. Aug. 30, 2000) (order).
- Unpublished order but referenced as precedent, imposing a five-month suspension on a judge who used intemperate language toward staff and other judges, entered ex parte orders without notice, conducted independent investigations, and tried to influence media coverage.
- Used in Flood as an upper-bound comparator for harsh staff treatment combined with serious procedural abuses and ex parte conduct.

Key Point:

Collectively, these precedents frame the Court’s approach in Flood: serious but non-corrupt and non-deceitful misconduct—especially from a relatively new judge—typically warrants suspension, not removal, albeit sometimes a lengthy one, and must be calibrated using the Deming/CJCRP 6(c) factors.

IV. Legal Reasoning in Depth

A. The New CJC 2.5(A) Standard: When Mismanagement Becomes Misconduct

One of the most consequential aspects of the opinion is the Court’s articulation of an operative standard for CJC 2.5(A):

“We find that CJC 2.5(A) is violated when, as here, a judge knows or should have known that policies or practices they enact or fail to correct substantially impact the court’s normal functioning in a way that potentially harms the life, liberty, property, or other substantial interests of those subject to the court’s power.”

This definition has several important components:

Knowledge element: The judge must “know or should have known” of the impact of their policies or practices. This incorporates both actual and constructive knowledge and aligns with negligence-based standards elsewhere in law.
Policy/practice focus: The violation arises from “policies or practices” the judge “enact[s] or fail[s] to correct,” emphasizing that both affirmative decisions and passive inaction can trigger responsibility.
Substantial impact on court functioning: The effect must go beyond minor inefficiencies; it must “substantially impact the court’s normal functioning.”
Potential harm to protected interests: The consequences must at least potentially affect “life, liberty, property, or other substantial interests” of those subject to the court’s power.

Applied to Flood’s case, the Court links this standard to concrete harms:

Delayed restitution to crime victims, implicating property interests.
Delayed competency restoration orders, resulting in a defendant sitting in jail for 30 days longer than necessary, implicating liberty.
Failure to communicate quashed warrants leading to a false arrest, again implicating liberty.
Systemic docketing, bond, and communication failures that undermined basic functioning of the municipal court.

By articulating this standard, the Court effectively transforms what might otherwise be seen as management failures or “mere” incompetence into cognizable judicial misconduct when they cross a threshold of systemic impact and potential harm to core legal interests.

B. Removal vs. Suspension: Reaffirming a High Threshold

The Court restates and applies its long-standing doctrine on removal:

“Removal is the ultimate, permanent sanction for judicial misconduct and has been limited to flagrant and intentional violation of the oath of office or misuse of power. Absent misconduct meeting this high threshold, ‘the people’s choice in judicial elections should not be “lightly set aside.”’”

The Court compares Flood’s misconduct with the three prior removal cases:

Deming: Sexual misconduct and harassment, threats to staff.
Ritchie: Conversion of public funds and dishonesty.
Anderson: Ongoing for-profit business involvement, self-dealing, and concealment.

It concludes:

Flood’s misconduct—harsh, belittling treatment of staff, mismanagement of operations, and consequent harm—was serious but not “flagrant and intentional” in the sense of deliberate exploitation of office for personal benefit or egregiously abusive or corrupt conduct.
She did not engage in sexual misconduct, financial self-dealing, or systematic deceit.
Therefore, removal would be disproportionate and inconsistent with precedent.

This analysis reinforces a structural principle: elected judicial office carries a popular mandate that can only be overridden in the most serious circumstances. The Court explicitly grounds this in democratic legitimacy—“the people’s choice”—and constitutional design.

C. Proportionality and the Deming / CJCRP 6(c) Factors

Using the Deming / CJCRP 6(c) framework, the Court weighs aggravating and mitigating factors. Although the opinion does not systematically list each factor in a numbered way, its reasoning tracks that structure.

1. Nature and Seriousness of Misconduct (Aggravation)

Repeated discourteous conduct: Not limited to isolated incidents; staff and attorneys reported a pattern of harsh, condescending, impatient behavior.
Real harm to staff: Evidence of depression, anxiety, panic attacks, and tearful episodes as a direct response to interactions with the judge.
Operational dysfunction: A “drawer full of bail bonds” not exonerated, large sums of undistributed restitution, serious mislabeling of dockets, and critical communication breakdowns with prosecutors, police, and Western State Hospital.
Impact on public confidence: The Court links these failures to core constitutional interests—life, liberty, property—and thus to the integrity of the judicial system.

2. Context, Experience, and Intent (Mitigation)

Relative inexperience: Unlike judges in Eiler and Tollefson (with nearly 20 years of experience), Flood had less than four years on the bench. Long tenure, in prior cases, is treated as aggravating, not mitigating.
One-judge court management: Flood presided over a solo municipal court with significant staffing shortages. The Court acknowledges the “formidable challenges” such courts face.
Evidence of bias and resistance: The Court credits testimony indicating racial and gender-based resistance to Flood’s leadership in a predominantly white staff environment, including “micro- and macroaggressions” even if not always overtly recognized as such.
Efforts to seek help: Flood reached out to court management professionals (e.g., Maurice Baker and LaTricia Kinlow) for assistance with court operations.
Absence of prior discipline or defiance: Unlike Eiler, who had previously been disciplined and did not fully heed earlier orders, Flood had no prior record of defying disciplinary directives.

3. Noncooperation and Health Issues

The Commission had treated Flood’s delays and reticence in providing medical information as evidence of noncooperation, justifying a harsher sanction. The Court takes a nuanced view:

It acknowledges some lack of full cooperation, especially early in the process.
However, it accepts supplementary medical documentation attached to Flood’s reply brief under DRJ 7.
It concludes that her behavior does not rise to “deliberative defiance,” and thus does not warrant elevating the sanction to removal or a longer suspension.

This flexible approach underscores that health-related delays and privacy concerns cannot be reflexively equated with bad faith in disciplinary proceedings.

4. Amenability to Rehabilitation and Role of Mentoring

A core disagreement between the Court and the Commission involves Flood’s capacity to benefit from mentoring or coaching. The Commission doubted her openness to change. The Court responds:

Flood entered into a formal stipulation admitting misconduct and agreeing to take affirmative remedial steps.
The Court finds she has a “desire to be a successful judge” and “might yet pursue a judicial position” with proper training.
It emphasizes a foundational assumption of judicial discipline: sanctions such as censure and suspension would be meaningless if courts presumed judges would ignore them.
Even Kinlow, the Commission’s key witness on court operations, agreed that Flood could benefit from judicial mentoring, as had other solo-court judges.

The Court thus concludes that removal, which assumes permanent incapacity or unfitness, is premature and disproportionate.

5. Calibrating the Specific Sanction: Why 30 Days?

After comparing Eiler (5-day suspension) and Tollefson (5-month suspension), the Court indicates that, abstractly, Flood’s misconduct would justify a 60–90 day suspension. However, it then explicitly factors in:

The nearly year-long suspension with pay under article IV, section 31(8), which, though not a “sanction” in the technical sense, has significant real-world impact on Flood and public confidence.
The public nature of the suspension and the reputational consequences that flow from the Commission’s (ultimately rejected) recommendation for permanent removal.
The fact that Flood did not run for reelection, leading to the natural end of her term at the close of 2025.

This leads the Court to settle on a 30-day suspension without pay, coupled with censure and a requirement of remedial mentoring or coaching before she may again serve as a judge.

D. The Role of Racism and Workplace Dynamics

The Court’s treatment of race and gender is unusually explicit for a judicial discipline opinion. It:

Recognizes testimony that some staff and attorneys treated Flood with less respect, referred to her by her first name, gossiped and rolled their eyes, and celebrated a hostile attorney’s behavior—conduct suggestive of racialized and gendered resistance to authority.
Affirms that these dynamics likely contributed to “escalating tension” and “workplace friction.”
Nevertheless insists that the presiding judge holds institutional power and responsibility: staff and litigants are compelled to answer to the judge, which heightens the duty to be patient, dignified, and courteous.

The opinion thus walks a fine line:

It refuses to sanitize the racialized context of the conflict.
But it refuses equally to use that context as an excuse to absolve judicial misconduct, especially when the misconduct harms staff and litigants and undermines court operations.

This approach signals to future cases that allegations of bias in the courthouse must be taken seriously and can bear on mitigation, but they do not negate the judge’s ethical obligations.

E. Stipulations, Scope of Review, and Supplemental Evidence

Two additional procedural rulings are worth highlighting:

Scope of Stipulation: The Court rejects Flood’s argument that the pre-hearing stipulation limited the case to enumerated allegations. This preserves the Commission’s and Court’s ability to address all misconduct supported by the evidentiary record, which:
- Prevents parties from “sanitizing” the universe of misconduct through narrow stipulations.
- Reinforces that the Court’s disciplinary authority is not contractually constrained by the parties’ pre-hearing agreements.
Supplementary Medical Evidence: By denying the Commission’s motion to strike and accepting Flood’s new medical documentation under DRJ 7, the Court demonstrates:
- Willingness to consider post-hearing developments that illuminate the reasons behind a judge’s conduct during proceedings.
- A preference for a complete and fair record over rigid formalism, especially where health and disability concerns are involved.

V. Impact and Future Significance

A. Administrative Competence as Enforceable Judicial Ethics

The Court’s articulation of the CJC 2.5(A) standard is likely the most enduring doctrinal contribution of Flood. It turns administrative performance—long viewed in some quarters as a management matter—into clearly delineated ethical territory:

Judges who institute or maintain practices that they know or reasonably should know are causing systemic delays or failures, where those failures risk harming litigants’ liberty or property interests, now clearly risk formal discipline.
Solo and small-court judges, in particular, are on notice that “being overwhelmed” or “short-staffed” will not excuse a failure to correct operational problems once they become apparent.
Court administrators, prosecutors, defenders, and clerks gain a clear standard for when to escalate concerns about court mismanagement to the Commission.

Over time, this standard may encourage earlier intervention in struggling courts, with an emphasis on training and remediation before dysfunction reaches the threshold of a 2.5(A) violation.

B. Reinforcing Removal as an Extraordinary Remedy

The decision continues a consistent line of Washington cases treating removal as a constitutional last resort:

By declining to extend removal to a case involving severe but non-corrupt mismanagement and harsh workplace behavior, the Court reaffirms that only egregious, intentional, oath-violating misconduct justifies permanently overriding the electorate.
This ensures stability in the judiciary, signaling to judges that serious mistakes and poor management, while sanctionable, will not typically end their careers absent flagrant abuse of power.
At the same time, it prevents the Commission from effectively nullifying elections through overaggressive removal recommendations in borderline cases.

C. Elevating Mentoring and Coaching as Sanction Components

By conditioning future eligibility for judicial office on completion of a chief-justice-approved mentoring or coaching program, the Court:

Institutionalizes the idea that discipline should be corrective, not purely punitive.
Recognizes that many discipline issues—especially involving temperament and management skills—are amenable to structured professional development.
Signals to the Commission that recommendations need not be binary (retain vs. remove); intermediate sanctions with remedial components are both viable and preferred where feasible.

Questions of implementation remain (e.g., how such a requirement will interact with electoral processes, and how completion will be certified), but Flood clearly expands the toolbox of judicial discipline remedies.

D. Contextualizing Misconduct in Racial and Gender Dynamics

The opinion’s explicit acknowledgment of racial and gender dynamics is likely to influence how future disciplinary matters are framed and litigated:

Commissions and courts may be more attentive to evidence of bias in staff and bar responses to judges from historically underrepresented groups.
Judges who experience racially or gendered-charged resistance will have precedent supporting the relevance of that context to sanction analysis (though not to liability itself).
At the same time, Flood warns that judges cannot respond to bias with corresponding incivility or mismanagement; the ethical standards of patience, dignity, courtesy, and competence apply regardless of provocation.

E. Commission–Court Dynamics and Noncooperation Analysis

The Court’s relatively charitable reading of Flood’s partial noncooperation, and its willingness to consider her health concerns, may recalibrate how the Commission frames noncooperation allegations:

Health-related delays or reluctance to share sensitive information may no longer be presumptively treated as aggravating noncooperation absent clearer evidence of defiance.
The Supreme Court’s explicit rejection of the Commission’s “pessimism” about Flood’s amenability to coaching may discourage the Commission from speculating too far about future behavior when the record contains evidence of openness to change.

F. The Dissent’s Warning on “Double Suspension”

Justice Johnson’s dissent, though brief, raises a practical concern with broader implications:

When the Commission erroneously recommends removal, the judge suffers a de facto suspension with pay under article IV, section 31(8) that can last many months or even years.
If the Court later rejects removal but then imposes a new suspension without pay, the judge has effectively been kept off the bench twice.

The dissent’s argument suggests that, in future cases, the Court may wish to weigh more heavily whether the time already spent on automatic suspension sufficiently vindicates the protective and symbolic goals of discipline, thereby possibly reducing or eliminating additional sanction.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Censure vs. Suspension vs. Removal

Censure: A formal, public condemnation of a judge’s conduct. It does not by itself remove or suspend the judge but is more serious than a private admonition or reprimand.
Suspension: Temporary removal from judicial duties.
- In Flood, the Court imposes a 30-day suspension without pay as a disciplinary sanction.
- Separately, the Constitution provided for an earlier automatic suspension with pay when the Commission recommended removal; that was not, strictly speaking, a “sanction” but a procedural safeguard.
Removal: Permanent ouster from judicial office—effectively ending the judge’s current judicial service and often their career. In Washington, removal is reserved for the most serious, flagrant, intentional violations of the oath or misuse of power.

B. De Novo Review vs. Deference to the Commission

De novo review: The Supreme Court independently reviews the record and is not bound by the Commission’s conclusions.
Deference: Despite this independence, the Court:
- Gives “considerable weight” to the Commission’s factual findings, especially where credibility and demeanor are concerned.
- Gives “serious consideration” to the Commission’s recommended sanction, but can accept, modify, or reject it.

In Flood, the Court accepts most factual findings but rejects the Commission’s sanction and some of its inferences (particularly about noncooperation and amenability to coaching).

C. The Deming Factors and CJCRP 6(c)

The Deming factors—reflected in CJCRP 6(c)—are a set of considerations used to tailor sanctions to misconduct. In simpler terms, they ask:

How bad was the conduct, and how often did it occur?
Did it harm litigants, the public, staff, or the dignity of the courts?
Was it intentional, reckless, or negligent?
Did the judge gain personally (money, sex, power) from it?
How experienced is the judge, and have they been disciplined before?
Have they acknowledged wrongdoing and shown willingness to improve?
What sanction is needed to protect public confidence and deter future misconduct?

These factors allow the Court to distinguish between, for example, a one-time lapse in judgment and a pattern of serious abuse or corruption.

D. Key CJC Rules in Plain Terms

CJC 1.1 – Compliance with the Law: Judges must follow the law, including the ethics code itself.
CJC 1.2 – Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary: Judges must act in ways that build public trust in the courts’ independence, integrity, and impartiality, and avoid both actual impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.
CJC 2.5(A) – Competence and Diligence: Judges must do their jobs competently and diligently, including both case decisions and administrative responsibilities.
CJC 2.8(B) – Decorum and Courtesy: Judges must be “patient, dignified, and courteous” toward everyone they deal with in an official capacity—litigants, lawyers, staff, witnesses, and jurors.

VII. Conclusion

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Flood is a landmark in Washington judicial ethics for several reasons:

It provides a clear, substantive standard for when administrative failures rise to the level of a CJC 2.5(A) violation—namely, when a judge knows or should know that their policies or omissions substantially impair court functioning and create potential harm to litigants’ core interests.
It reaffirms that removal from judicial office is an extraordinary remedy, reserved for flagrant, intentional violations of the oath or serious misuse of power, and not for all serious mismanagement or temperament problems.
It underscores that judges bear ultimate responsibility for court operations and workplace culture; harsh, discourteous conduct and mismanagement that harms staff and litigants will draw meaningful sanctions.
It acknowledges the reality of racial and gender bias in court workplaces as an important contextual factor, without allowing that context to overshadow the judge’s ethical duties.
It elevates mentoring and coaching to a central place in the remedial arsenal, reflecting a commitment to rehabilitation and professional development where feasible.

In the end, the Court balances accountability and proportionality. It holds Judge Flood publicly responsible for serious lapses in demeanor and administration, while recognizing her relative inexperience, the difficult context in which she served, the prior year-long suspension she has already endured, and her potential capacity for growth. For Washington judges, lawyers, and court administrators, the case is a clear message: court management is not a mere administrative detail—it is an ethical obligation whose breach can have constitutional consequences for the liberty and property interests of those who come before the court.

¹ In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Keenan, 199 Wn.2d 87, 502 P.3d 1271 (2022).
² In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anderson, 138 Wn.2d 830, 981 P.2d 426 (1999).