When Absence Equals Forfeiture: A Warned Refusal to Return to Court Extinguishes the Right to Self‑Representation for the Remainder of Trial (State v. Petteway, Conn. 2025)

Introduction

State v. Petteway, decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut on April 1, 2025, addresses the limits of a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation under Faretta v. California. The case arises from a murder prosecution in which the defendant, Christopher Petteway, after being permitted to represent himself and warned in clear terms about courtroom obligations, refused to return to the courtroom during jury selection. The trial court, citing a pattern of dilatory and manipulative conduct including prior refusals to attend proceedings, reappointed standby counsel to represent him for the rest of trial.

On appeal, Petteway argued that this reappointment violated his Faretta right; he maintained that his refusal to return after lunch at most waived his right to be present that afternoon, not his right to self-representation. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant’s warned refusal to return to court—against a backdrop of repeated failures to appear and threats to absent himself—constituted a forfeiture of the right to self-representation for the balance of the proceedings. The Court clarified that violent outbursts are not a prerequisite to forfeiture; persistent, non‑violent obstruction can suffice.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the trial court did not violate the defendant’s right to self-representation. The defendant’s conduct, including a conscious refusal to return to the courtroom during voir dire after clear warnings, amounted to a forfeiture of his Faretta right.
The trial court’s response—reappointing standby counsel—was not premature or impulsive; it was a measured attempt to regain control of the proceedings and honor the trial schedule.
The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that his mid‑day refusal merely waived his right to be present that afternoon. The same conduct can both waive the right to be present for a session and forfeit the right to self-representation for the remainder of trial.
The Court distinguished Second Circuit decisions (Clark v. Perez; Torres v. United States) because Petteway’s absence was not a strategic, articulated trial tactic but a manipulative, dilatory refusal that obstructed proceedings.
Standard of review was abuse of discretion, reflecting the trial judge’s superior position to manage proceedings and assess a self‑represented defendant’s ability and willingness to proceed appropriately.

Case Background

In 2018, Petteway fatally stabbed his romantic partner in New London. He was charged with murder and criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order. After multiple attorney appointments, a COVID-related delay, and competency findings, Petteway moved to represent himself. On January 11, 2023, following a full canvass, the court granted his motion, appointed Attorney Duby as standby counsel, and warned Petteway that attendance—especially during jury selection—was mandatory and that failure to appear could be treated as an “implied waiver” of his self-representation right.

Jury selection began on February 28, 2023. On day three, after participating in the morning session, Petteway refused to return following the lunch break, stating he would explain himself later in writing. The court found that his refusal, in light of prior failures to appear and explicit warnings, constituted an implied waiver/forfeiture of self-representation and reappointed Duby. The next day, Petteway again refused to come to court in the morning, and the court additionally found he was not competent to conduct trial proceedings without counsel. Thereafter, Petteway sporadically appeared (sometimes remotely), announced he would not come unless he could represent himself or have different counsel, and ultimately left the courtroom when present; the trial continued to verdict in his absence with counsel representing him. He was convicted on both counts and sentenced to sixty-five years.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975): Establishes the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation. The Court reaffirmed that this right, though fundamental, is not absolute and must be exercised within the demands of orderly trial administration.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993): A defendant must be competent to waive counsel; competence in this context concerns the voluntariness and understanding of the waiver, not necessarily the skill to try a case.
State v. Johnson, 185 Conn. 163 (1981), aff’d, 460 U.S. 73 (1983): Recognizes forfeiture of self-representation through obstructionist conduct during trial. Petteway builds on Johnson by confirming that nonviolent yet persistent obstruction can also effect forfeiture.
State v. Jones, 281 Conn. 613 (2007): Finds forfeiture when a defendant reacted violently and resisted removal. Petteway clarifies that similar forfeiture may be warranted absent violence when conduct is sufficiently disruptive and dilatory.
State v. Braswell, 318 Conn. 815 (2015): Improper denial of self-representation is structural error requiring a new trial. The Court contrasted Braswell’s respectful, non-disruptive defendant with Petteway’s persistent refusals and delays, reinforcing that forfeiture demands concrete disruptive conduct.
United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092 (3d Cir. 1995): Distinguishes waiver, waiver by conduct, and forfeiture. The Court acknowledged that “implied waiver” as used by the trial court in label is best framed as forfeiture under Goldberg’s vocabulary, though it adhered to the trial court’s terminology for record consistency.
United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1973) and other federal cases (Mosley, Long, Brock, Butler): Emphasize the trial court’s role in ensuring orderly proceedings and support denial/termination of self-representation when conduct obstructs or delays trial.
State v. Pires, 310 Conn. 222 (2013) and State v. Flanagan, 293 Conn. 406 (2009): Address timing and factors relevant to self-representation requests; underscore that once trial begins, the right is sharply curtailed. Although Petteway had been granted self-representation, these cases frame trial-court discretion mid‑trial.
State v. Auburn W., 198 Conn. App. 558 (2020); Luke v. State, 214 N.E.3d 1013 (Ind. App. 2023); Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. 2009): Persuasive authority that trial judges—who observe demeanor firsthand—are best positioned to assess whether a defendant can and will proceed appropriately without counsel.
Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2008) and Torres v. United States, 140 F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 1998): Distinguished. Those cases involved a deliberate, articulated political strategy in absentia while self‑represented, with the opportunity to reenter at will. Petteway’s absence was not strategic; it was obstructive and manipulative, so forfeiture was appropriate.
Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 43: Address the right to be present and waiver thereof at trial’s commencement and mid‑trial absences when represented by counsel. The Court found Crosby inapposite to the Faretta issue presented here.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1 (2012): Provide incorporation and structural error background for Sixth Amendment rights.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied abuse of discretion review, recognizing the trial judge’s superior vantage point in assessing conduct, controlling the courtroom, and evaluating the practical feasibility of self-representation amid disruptions. The governing principles are:

Courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of fundamental rights, including the right to self-representation; yet the right operates within the framework of an orderly trial and fairness to all participants, including jurors and victims.
Self-representation can be denied or terminated if the defendant is incompetent to proceed without counsel, fails to validly waive counsel, seeks self-representation for dilatory/manipulative purposes, or engages in disruptive/obstructive behavior (Braswell framework).
Forfeiture can occur through conduct alone; violence is not required. Persistent refusal to attend, especially after clear warnings, is a paradigmatic form of obstruction that undermines the adversarial process.

Applying these principles, the Court emphasized several record‑based findings:

Petteway had a documented pattern: refusal of court‑ordered transport, failure to appear at scheduled hearings, threats to leave, and actual refusal to return during voir dire after lunch.
He was clearly warned, before being allowed to proceed pro se, that failure to attend would be treated as an implied waiver of self-representation; he acknowledged understanding and affirmed he could follow courtroom rules.
The refusal to return was not tied to illness or emergency and followed an explicit denial of his request for “days off,” indicating a manipulative, dilatory purpose.
Reappointment of standby counsel was measured and aimed at regaining control of a trial already long delayed; the court showed “admirable patience,” offering accommodations and repeated admonitions.

The Court also addressed the independence of the rights at issue. While the right to be present and the right to self-representation are distinct, the same obstructive conduct can both waive presence (for a session) and forfeit self‑representation for the balance of proceedings—particularly where the defendant is plainly warned, persists in noncompliance, and the absence undermines the feasibility of a fair, orderly trial (citing Clark for the broader concept that disruptive conduct can trigger both consequences).

Finally, the Court noted the trial court’s additional finding that Petteway was not competent to conduct trial without counsel. Although it was unnecessary for the Supreme Court to rely on this alternative ground, its presence underscored the trial court’s careful, layered approach and further supported reappointment of counsel.

Impact and Prospective Significance

State v. Petteway meaningfully clarifies the line in Connecticut between permissible self-representation and conduct that forfeits the Faretta right:

No minimum “violence threshold.” The Court expressly rejects any implication from Jones that forfeiture requires violent or physically disruptive behavior. A sustained pattern of warned, non‑violent obstruction—especially refusals to attend—can suffice.
Dual consequences from a single course of conduct. After adequate warning, a refusal to appear may both waive the right to be present and forfeit the right to self‑representation for the remainder of the trial. Trial courts need not treat each absence as a discrete, temporary waiver of presence while preserving Faretta status.
Deference to trial management. The abuse-of-discretion standard, coupled with a requirement of clear warnings and a developed record, equips trial courts with firm authority to reappoint counsel when self-representation becomes incompatible with orderly adjudication.
Record-building guidance. Petteway highlights best practices for trial judges: thorough Faretta canvass; explicit warnings about attendance and consequences; patience and accommodations; and findings that tie observed conduct to obstruction, delay, or manipulation.
Strategic posture for counsel. Defense counsel and standby counsel should advise pro se defendants that attendance and adherence to court directives are integral to preserving Faretta status. Prosecutors can rely on Petteway to support motions (or court action sua sponte) to terminate self-representation upon documented obstruction.
Victim and juror considerations. The opinion’s emphasis on the burden placed on jurors and the victim’s family underscores a holistic fairness lens that includes nonparty participants affected by dilatory tactics.

In future cases, Petteway will likely be cited for the proposition that repeated, warned refusals to appear—without more—are sufficient to justify forfeiture of self-representation. It thus strengthens trial courts’ hands in managing complex, pro se criminal trials while insisting on thorough, on-the-record admonitions and measured, incremental responses.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Right to self-representation (Faretta right): A defendant may choose to represent themselves rather than accept counsel. It is fundamental but not absolute; it yields when a defendant disrupts proceedings or manipulates the process.
Waiver vs. Forfeiture vs. Waiver by Conduct:
- Waiver: An express, knowing, and voluntary relinquishment of a right after proper advisement.
- Waiver by conduct: A right is treated as waived based on behavior after warnings, even if the defendant does not state “I waive.”
- Forfeiture: Loss of a right due to egregious or persistent misconduct, regardless of the defendant’s intent to waive. Petteway treats the mid‑trial “implied waiver” label as forfeiture, consistent with Goldberg.
Structural error: Certain constitutional violations (including wrongful denial of the Faretta right) demand automatic reversal. But where the right is properly forfeited, there is no structural error.
Right to be present vs. right to self-representation: Distinct rights. A defendant can waive presence for a session yet remain pro se. But when the absence reflects warned, obstructive conduct, it can also justify forfeiture of the Faretta right for the remainder of trial.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard recognizing the trial court’s superior ability to observe conduct and manage proceedings.

Key Takeaways

New Rule Clarified: In Connecticut, a defendant who, after clear warnings, refuses to return to court during trial engages in conduct that can forfeit the right to self-representation for the remainder of proceedings—even absent violence.
Warnings Matter: A robust Faretta canvass and explicit, recorded warnings about attendance and consequences are essential predicates to forfeiture.
Pattern Counts: Isolated lapses may be insufficient; a documented pattern of refusals, delays, or threats to absent oneself demonstrates obstruction and manipulation.
Trial Court Discretion: Appellate courts will defer to trial judges who act patiently, incrementally, and with a fully developed record to preserve the fairness and integrity of the trial.
Distinct but Related Rights: While self-representation and presence are separate rights, the same conduct can lawfully waive one and forfeit the other.
Strategic Absence vs. Obstruction: Clark/Torres remain distinguishable; a strategic, articulated protest tactic is categorically different from manipulative refusals to attend.

Conclusion

State v. Petteway fortifies trial court authority to terminate a defendant’s Faretta status when warned, non‑violent obstruction—chiefly refusals to appear—threatens the orderly and fair conduct of a criminal trial. The decision powerfully underscores that self-representation is conditioned on the defendant’s willingness to abide by court rules and schedules. By holding that such conduct can simultaneously waive the right to be present and forfeit the right to self-representation, the Court provides a clear, administrable rule that balances defendants’ autonomy with the judiciary’s obligation to ensure a fair, efficient process for all participants. As a practical matter, Petteway offers a roadmap for trial judges: canvass thoroughly, warn explicitly, document patterns of obstruction, try lesser measures, and reappoint counsel when necessary to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings.