Weaponizing Social Media as a “Course of Conduct” Under New Hampshire’s Stalking Statute: No Direct Threat Requirement in D.V. v. R.G.

Weaponizing Social Media as a “Course of Conduct” Under New Hampshire’s Stalking Statute: No Direct Threat Requirement in D.V. v. R.G.

Introduction

In D.V. v. R.G. (N.H. July 2, 2025), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed a civil stalking final order of protection issued by the Circuit Court following a two-day bench trial. The dispute originated from a fraught disagreement over a dying cat but swiftly escalated to an online campaign featuring public posts, doxxing, endorsements of violent threats by third parties, and an in-person protest at the plaintiff’s business. The central question on appeal was whether the defendant’s conduct—conducted largely through social media and without the defendant personally issuing threats—could satisfy New Hampshire’s civil stalking statute, RSA 633:3-a.

The court’s resolution, issued by order under Supreme Court Rule 20(3), clarifies several points of New Hampshire stalking law: most notably, that a defendant need not personally issue threats or explicitly encourage others to threaten violence to incur stalking liability; that “weaponizing” social media in a way that foreseeably inflames public outrage and induces reasonable fear can constitute a “course of conduct” under the statute; and that the statute’s protective purpose does not hinge on the victim’s “innocence” or any “provocation” defense. The court also rejected a First Amendment challenge due to inadequate briefing and an incomplete appellate record.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the protective order, holding:

  • RSA 633:3-a, I(a) does not require the defendant to personally convey threats of violence or to expressly encourage others to make threats. It is sufficient that the defendant purposely, knowingly, or recklessly engages in a targeted “course of conduct” that causes reasonable fear and actually places the victim in fear.
  • Social media activity—including public posts that identify the target (“doxxing”), statements calculated to inflame public outrage, and visible approval of violent responses—can be “acts of communication” that, when repeated, form a “course of conduct” under RSA 633:3-a, II(a) and II(a)(7), as informed by RSA 644:4, II.
  • The court rejected the defendant’s contention that stalking relief is limited to “innocent citizens” or that “provocation” by the plaintiff is a statutory defense; no authority supports such a defense.
  • The First Amendment challenge failed due to undeveloped briefing and an incomplete record (key protest videos were not included on appeal). The court therefore upheld the trial court’s determination that the defendant’s conduct was not constitutionally protected on the facts presented.

Background

The plaintiff, a business owner in Manchester, took in a gravely ill cat found on her property and incurred substantial veterinary expenses. After learning the defendant had lost a cat, the plaintiff visited the defendant’s apartment to determine ownership. By day’s end, the plaintiff refused to return the cat, expressing concerns about potential neglect and indicating she would consult animal control after the weekend.

Over the following days, the defendant used public social media accounts to accuse the plaintiff and her daughter of theft, asserted racial animus as a motive for refusal to return the cat, shared identifying information about the plaintiff, her daughter, and the business, and expressed approval (via profile imagery and red-heart reactions) of violent responses posted by third parties. The defendant also organized an in-person protest at the business where a protester chanted, “Come out b****, come out.” When the cat died before it could be turned over to animal control, the defendant publicly accused the plaintiff of killing the cat.

The trial court found that the defendant had “weaponized” social media against the plaintiff, recklessly engaging in a targeted course of conduct that foreseeably inflamed public outrage and caused the plaintiff to reasonably fear for her safety and her daughter’s. The court further found no legitimate purpose for the defendant’s conduct apart from inflaming the public against the plaintiff and her business, and concluded the conduct was not constitutionally protected speech. A final order of protection issued, which the Supreme Court affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Statutory Framework

  • RSA 633:3-a, I(a): Defines stalking to include purposely, knowingly, or recklessly engaging in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to fear for personal safety (or the safety of an immediate family member), and that actually places the person in such fear.
  • RSA 633:3-a, II(a): “Course of conduct” means two or more acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Acts include “any act of communication” (II(a)(7)).
  • RSA 644:4, II: “Communicates” includes messages transmitted via electronic means, including computer-generated communications—plainly encompassing social media posts, comments, and reactions.
  • RSA 633:3-a, III-a; RSA 173-B:3, VI: Establish burden and procedure for civil stalking relief and the standard that the trial court’s findings of fact are final, with legal questions reviewable by the Supreme Court.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Despres v. Hampsey, 162 N.H. 398 (2011): Establishes the appellate standard of review—findings are upheld unless lacking evidentiary support or tainted by legal error; evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party; deference to trial court’s credibility determinations.
  • State v. Giles, 140 N.H. 714 (1996): Further grounds deference to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, noting the trial transcript’s limits in conveying demeanor and tone.
  • State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47 (2003), and State v. Newton, 175 N.H. 279 (2022): Provide the principle that undeveloped or conclusory arguments are insufficient for appellate review.
  • S.D. v. N.B., 176 N.H. 44 (2023): Discusses the constitutional framework of protective orders and describes the statute’s protective purpose toward “innocent citizens,” which the court here treats as descriptive, not as imposing an “innocence” element or “provocation” defense.
  • RSA 490-F:18: Clarifies that statutory references to the district court are deemed to refer to the circuit court, situating the jurisdiction for civil stalking petitions.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court affirmed on sufficiency of the evidence and legal grounds, applying the statutory definitions to the defendant’s conduct and reiterating key principles of appellate review.

1) No requirement of direct threats or express encouragement

The court squarely rejected the defendant’s contention that stalking liability under RSA 633:3-a, I(a) requires personal, direct threats or explicit encouragement of threats. The statute’s plain text requires a targeted “course of conduct” that causes reasonable fear and actually places the victim in fear; it does not specify how the fear-inducing conduct must be conveyed. Consistent with RSA 633:3-a, II(a)(7) and RSA 644:4, II, the court confirmed that “any act of communication” includes electronic transmissions—encompassing public social media posts, doxxing-type disclosures, and visible endorsements of threatening responses by others.

Thus, even absent direct threats by the defendant, the trial court could find a qualifying course of conduct where the defendant:

  • Publicly posted accusatory and inflammatory messages regarding the plaintiff and her daughter;
  • Shared their names, photographs, and business information to a public audience, knowing or reasonably foreseeing such disclosure would inflame outrage;
  • Expressed approval of third-party threats (as evidenced by profile imagery and red-heart reactions); and
  • Organized a protest where hostile chants demanded the plaintiff’s appearance.

The foreseeability of third-party violence or harassment is pivotal: the trial court found, and the Supreme Court accepted, that the defendant’s conduct foreseeably inflamed public outrage, satisfying the causation component for reasonable fear.

2) Recklessness and the “course of conduct” finding

The trial court found—and the defendant failed to meaningfully challenge on appeal—that the defendant acted recklessly. Recklessness, as used in RSA 633:3-a, is one of the statute’s expressly permitted mental states. The court noted the defendant did not develop arguments contesting the findings of recklessness, the existence of a targeted course of conduct, or the conclusion that the conduct lacked a legitimate purpose. Under Despres and Giles, those unchallenged or inadequately developed points are not grounds for reversal.

3) Reasonable fear and actual fear

RSA 633:3-a, I(a) requires both objective and subjective components: conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear for safety, and conduct that in fact placed the plaintiff in fear. The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and deferred to credibility determinations. Given the volume and nature of online hostility, defendant’s visible approval of threats, and the protest’s tenor, the findings on reasonable and actual fear were supported by the record.

4) “Innocent citizen” and the absence of a provocation defense

Invoking language from S.D. v. N.B. describing RSA 633:3-a’s purpose to protect “innocent citizens,” the defendant argued the plaintiff’s conduct “provoked” the defendant and thus should bar relief. The Supreme Court rejected that theory: the defendant cited no legal authority creating a provocation defense to civil stalking, and the “innocent citizen” description does not add an element to the statute. Even if such a defense existed, the factual disputes over who provoked whom were resolved by the trial court, and appellate courts defer to those credibility determinations.

5) First Amendment claim and record sufficiency

The defendant asserted a right to protest, but the First Amendment challenge was undeveloped, and the defendant did not argue that the social media posts were themselves protected speech. The trial court had determined the conduct was not constitutionally protected on these facts. The Supreme Court declined to reach a broader constitutional ruling in part because:

  • The argument was not sufficiently developed for review (Blackmer; Newton); and
  • Key evidence (videos of the protest) was not included in the appellate record, preventing the court from second-guessing the trial court’s factual findings.

On this record, the court concluded the defendant did not establish error in the trial court’s determination that the conduct was not protected speech in context.

What This Decision Adds to New Hampshire Law

  • Explicit clarification: A defendant need not personally issue threats or explicitly incite third parties to violate RSA 633:3-a. Reckless, targeted online conduct that foreseeably unleashes third-party threats and induces reasonable fear can suffice.
  • Social media as “acts of communication”: Public posts, doxxing, and visible approvals (e.g., “likes,” hearts, and profile signals) may be aggregated as part of a “course of conduct.”
  • Provocation is not a defense: The “innocent citizen” language is descriptive of the statute’s purpose; it does not create an “innocence” or “provocation” element that a petitioner must prove or a respondent can invoke.
  • Procedural discipline matters: Undeveloped constitutional arguments and incomplete appellate records will not dislodge a protective order, especially where the trial court made specific findings and credibility determinations.

Impact and Implications

For stalking and harassment law

  • Doxxing and online mobbing: Courts can treat doxxing and orchestrated online campaigns as stalking when targeted and fear-inducing. This is particularly salient where the defendant’s posts reasonably foresee—and in fact generate—threatening responses.
  • Third-party threats count via foreseeability: Liability does not depend on the defendant issuing threats personally. If the defendant’s conduct foreseeably prompts threats that create reasonable fear, the statute applies.
  • Evidence of endorsement: Emojis, reactions, and profile changes can be probative of approval of violence, helping establish a course of conduct and the mental state of recklessness.
  • Mixed online/offline conduct: Organizing an in-person protest with hostile expressions can be considered alongside online conduct to show continuity of purpose and escalation.

For First Amendment litigation

  • Line-drawing remains fact-specific: While the court did not issue a broad First Amendment holding, the decision underscores that where speech-related conduct is part of a stalking course of conduct that induces reasonable fear, courts may treat it as outside constitutional protection in context.
  • Briefing and record completeness are critical: Constitutional challenges must be thoroughly developed, and key exhibits must be included in the record; otherwise, appellate courts will defer to trial courts' factual findings and legal conclusions.

For practitioners and parties

  • Petitioners: Document the sequence of posts, reactions, shares, and offline events to show continuity and foreseeability. Capture the specific third-party threats and the respondent’s visible approvals.
  • Respondents: Recognize that “I didn’t threaten anyone directly” is not a safe harbor. Legal exposure exists where posts foreseeably unleash threats and induce fear, even if others authored the explicit threats.
  • Appellate counsel: Preserve and include all audiovisual evidence; fully brief constitutional issues with supporting authority to avoid waiver.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Course of conduct: A pattern of at least two acts showing a continuity of purpose. Here, multiple social media posts, doxxing, visible approvals of violent responses, and an organized protest formed that pattern.
  • Acts of communication: Messages sent by any method, including electronic transmissions like social media posts and reactions. These communications can satisfy the statutory “acts” needed for a course of conduct.
  • Recklessness: Acting with awareness of and disregard for a substantial risk. In this case, repeatedly publicizing personal information and endorsing violent responses made fear a foreseeable outcome.
  • Reasonable fear vs. actual fear: The law requires both that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would fear for safety (objective) and that the plaintiff actually felt fear (subjective).
  • Preponderance of the evidence: The standard of proof in civil stalking proceedings—more likely than not.
  • Undeveloped arguments: Arguments without legal development or citation to authority are typically not considered on appeal.
  • Constitutionally protected speech: Not all speech is protected in all contexts. While political protest is generally protected, conduct that constitutes stalking by inducing reasonable fear may fall outside protection, depending on the facts and proper legal development.

Conclusion

D.V. v. R.G. meaningfully clarifies New Hampshire stalking law for the social media era. The Supreme Court confirms that the statute does not require direct threats or explicit incitement by the respondent. Instead, a targeted, reckless pattern of online and offline conduct that foreseeably unleashes violent responses, doxxes personal information, and results in reasonable and actual fear can satisfy RSA 633:3-a. The court also dispels the notion of a “provocation” defense and emphasizes disciplined appellate practice: constitutional arguments must be fully briefed with a complete record.

As online disputes increasingly spill into real-world intimidation, this decision equips trial courts to assess doxxing and online mobbing within the established framework of stalking law, while signaling that visible online endorsements of violence are legally consequential. The case stands as a caution that “weaponizing” social media against a targeted individual can have immediate protective-order consequences in New Hampshire, even absent a direct threat from the defendant.

Decision: Affirmed. MACDONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN and COUNTWAY, JJ., concurred. Order issued under Sup. Ct. R. 20(3); Clerk: Timothy A. Gudas.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire

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