Introduction

This order resolves a Rule 61 postconviction appeal by Raymond Warncke, who was convicted after a bench jury trial of assault on a person over 62 years of age, terroristic threatening, criminal mischief (under $5,000), and disorderly conduct, and later sentenced as a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214. The convictions stem from an October 8, 2020 incident in which the then-40-year-old Warncke assaulted a 71-year-old man who had given him a ride, threatened to kill him, resisted police, and damaged a patrol vehicle. The Superior Court denied postconviction relief after a Commissioner’s report recommended denial; the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.

The appeal raised two clusters of claims: (1) a renewed challenge to sentencing based on an allegedly “closed mind” (previously litigated on direct appeal), and (2) a series of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) allegations under Strickland v. Washington, including claims that counsel failed to object to testimony that Warncke used racial slurs, failed to press the victim’s intoxication, failed to present mental health mitigation, dissuaded him from testifying, failed to communicate plea offers promptly, failed to challenge habitual offender status, failed to mount a self-defense theory, and failed to provide trial transcripts.

Key issues included the scope of Rule 61’s procedural bars, the rigor of Strickland’s performance and prejudice standards when trial counsel’s choices are strategic, and the significance of racially charged language at trial. The Court’s order principally reinforces settled law: formerly adjudicated claims are barred by Rule 61(i)(4), and Strickland prejudice demands a reasonable probability of a different result—a high bar not crossed here.

Summary of the Opinion

• The “closed-mind” sentencing claim is procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4) because it was raised and rejected on direct appeal. No exception (jurisdictional defect, new exculpatory evidence, or a new retroactive constitutional rule) was pled.
• All ineffective assistance claims fail under Strickland. Either counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable given the record and strategic context, or, even assuming deficiency, Warncke failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
• On racial-slur testimony, even if counsel should have objected, the Court found no Strickland prejudice because ample other evidence independently supported each conviction.
• Mental health mitigation was presented via the presentence investigation (PSI) and acknowledged by the sentencing court; no deficiency and no prejudice.
• Claims regarding not testifying, delayed plea communications, challenging habitual offender status, self-defense, and failure to provide transcripts were rejected for lack of factual support, legal basis, or prejudice (and, for transcripts, consistent with prior Delaware precedent).
• The Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief is affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Rule 61 procedural framework: Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) (courts address Rule 61’s procedural bars before merits); Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020) (timely IAC claims are generally not barred).
• Standard of review: Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019) (abuse of discretion for denial of Rule 61 relief; de novo for constitutional/IAC claims).
• Ineffective assistance: Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–89, 694 (1984) (two-prong test: performance falling below objective reasonableness; prejudice—reasonable probability of a different outcome; strong presumption of reasonable professional assistance).
• Habitual offender—“some chance of rehabilitation”: Eaddy v. State, 1996 WL 313499, at *2 (Del. May 30, 1996) (“some chance of rehabilitation” is satisfied by temporal separation between predicate convictions and the later offense).
• Transcripts claim: Nickerson v. State, 2003 WL 21106527, at *1 (Del. May 12, 2003) (no general obligation for counsel to provide trial transcripts to pursue postconviction relief).
• Prior direct appeal: Warncke v. State, 2023 WL 5028842, at *1–2 (Del. Aug. 8, 2023) (affirming convictions and sentence, except remanding criminal mischief for resentencing as an unclassified misdemeanor; rejecting “closed-mind” sentencing claim).
• Substantive statutes: 11 Del. C. §§ 612(a)(6) (assault on a person over 62), 621(a)(1) (terroristic threatening), 1301(1)(b) (disorderly conduct), 811(a)(1) (criminal mischief), 4214 (habitual offender sentencing).

Legal Reasoning and Application

1) Rule 61(i)(4) bars formerly adjudicated “closed-mind” sentencing claims

The Court reaffirmed that Rule 61(i)(4) precludes relitigation of issues “formerly adjudicated” in a prior appeal unless the movant pleads a recognized exception (lack of jurisdiction, new evidence creating a strong inference of actual innocence, or a new retroactive constitutional rule) (Rule 61(d)(2), (i)(4), (i)(5)). Because Warncke previously argued “closed-mind” sentencing on direct appeal and lost—and did not plead any exception—the Superior Court properly rejected the recycled claim as procedurally barred.

2) Strickland governs all ineffective assistance claims; presumption of reasonableness and robust prejudice showing required

Across each IAC allegation, the Court applied Strickland’s two-step inquiry. The analysis repeatedly underscores two features of Delaware’s postconviction review: (a) strategic decisions by counsel are highly deferentially reviewed, and (b) prejudice is outcome-focused and demanding—speculation or disagreement with strategy is not enough.

a) Victim’s intoxication

The record itself defeated this claim: defense counsel cross-examined the responding trooper about the victim’s drinking, noted difficulties obtaining a coherent statement, and highlighted in closing that the victim told 911 he had been drinking. Because counsel in fact pursued the intoxication angle, the performance prong was not met; nor was prejudice shown, as Warncke did not explain how an alternative presentation would have changed the outcome.

b) Mental health mitigation at sentencing

Counsel directed the court to the PSI’s “substantial mental health history,” which the sentencing judge expressly incorporated by ordering evaluation and treatment. The Court held there was no deficiency and no prejudice. This confirms that effective mitigation can be conveyed via the PSI and argument, without needing separate expert testimony in every case.

c) Failure to object to racial-slur testimony

The victim, a friend-witness, and a trooper testified that Warncke used the N-word contemporaneously with the threats and combative conduct. Counsel cross-examined on the absence of a verbatim racial epithet in the police report while eliciting that the report documented “derogatory comments” and community disturbance. Counsel attested she had no good-faith basis to object because the witnesses testified from personal knowledge. The Commissioner (and the Supreme Court) deemed the non-objection strategic and reasonable.

Critically, the Court added an alternative holding: even if the non-objection were deficient, there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome. Independent evidence supported all elements of second-degree assault of a person over 62 (§ 612(a)(6)), terroristic threatening (§ 621(a)(1)), disorderly conduct (§ 1301(1)(b)), and criminal mischief (§ 811(a)(1))—including striking the elderly victim (causing a bleeding lip), threatening to kill him, creating public alarm through shouting and cursing, and damaging a police vehicle. Put differently, excising the racial epithets would not undermine confidence in the verdicts. This is an important clarification for trial practice: inflammatory language, while potentially prejudicial, does not automatically produce Strickland prejudice absent a plausible path to acquittal without it.

d) Right to testify—“talked out of testifying”

The trial court conducted a personal colloquy. Under oath, Warncke acknowledged he understood the right and chose not to testify. Absent concrete proffers of exculpatory testimony and a plausible path to a different result, the claim failed on both prongs. The colloquy record is strong evidence that the choice was knowing and voluntary and that counsel did not override the defendant’s autonomy.

e) Plea-offer communication

Warncke alleged delayed communication until April 27 and May 2, 2022. The docket shows a final case review without a plea (April 27) and a plea-rejection colloquy (May 2). He offered no details of any earlier, more favorable terms or that an earlier conveyance would have produced a different resolution. Without specifics establishing a reasonable probability of acceptance and a materially better outcome, the claim failed on prejudice. (Although not cited, this aligns with Sixth Amendment plea-bargaining prejudice principles requiring a showing that an earlier plea would likely have been accepted and approved by the court.)

f) Habitual offender challenge under § 4214

The claim was undeveloped in the motion; in reply, Warncke asserted he lacked the “opportunity to rehabilitate.” The Court reiterated Eaddy’s definition: “some chance of rehabilitation” means simply that time elapsed between prior convictions and the later offense. The record showed the requisite predicates—aggravated menacing (2016), resisting arrest with force (2011), and a 2002 predicate—and temporal separation. Counsel had no viable legal ground to contest habitual status; no prejudice shown.

g) “Counsel did nothing” / alleged lack of trial preparation; self-defense

The record contradicted the premise: counsel was prepared, cross-examined effectively, and advanced mitigation. As for self-defense, Warncke told police the victim threatened him with a sword, but police observed no evidence of a sword. Without evidentiary support for a justification instruction, counsel was not deficient for declining a self-defense theory, and the absence of a factual basis foreclosed prejudice.

h) Failure to provide transcripts

Consistent with Nickerson, counsel is not obligated as a matter of law to furnish transcripts to a defendant for postconviction purposes. Moreover, trial transcripts were prepared for the direct appeal, and Warncke’s postconviction filings included transcript pages—undercutting any claim of prejudice.

3) Treatment of the reply

On appeal, Warncke argued the Superior Court ignored his reply submissions. The Supreme Court flatly rejected this, concluding the arguments lacked merit. The order reflects consideration of the reply’s contents where relevant (for example, the expanded self-defense theory and the habitual-offender “rehabilitation” contention), but found them insufficient to meet Strickland or overcome procedural bars.

Impact and Implications

• Procedural bars matter: Delaware’s Rule 61(i)(4) “former adjudication” bar remains a potent gatekeeper. Once an issue has been resolved on direct appeal, it will not be re-litigated in postconviction absent a specifically pled and applicable exception.
• Strickland’s prejudice is the fulcrum: Even arguable missteps—like not objecting to inflammatory rhetoric—will not warrant relief without a concrete, outcome-differential showing. Courts will scrutinize the total trial record and the elements of each offense.
• Trial strategy deference: Choices about cross-examination, whether to object, whether to present certain defenses, and how to marshal mitigation remain squarely within strategic discretion. The presumption of reasonableness is difficult to overcome, especially when counsel’s actions are borne out by the record.
• Habitual offender challenges are narrow: Under Eaddy, “some chance of rehabilitation” is satisfied by temporal spacing of predicates; absent defects in the predicates themselves, § 4214 challenges are unlikely to succeed in Rule 61 proceedings.
• Racially charged evidence is not per se reversible: Testimony about racial slurs—when tied to the charged conduct (e.g., threats, disorderly conduct)—may be relevant and admissible; and even if arguably objectionable, its exclusion must plausibly change the verdict to support Strickland prejudice.
• PSI-based mitigation can suffice: When a PSI documents substantial mental health history and the court orders treatment, the absence of additional oral or expert presentation will typically not demonstrate deficient mitigation advocacy.
• Plea-offer claims require specifics: To show prejudice from delayed or failed communication of pleas, defendants must provide details about the terms, likelihood of acceptance, and material benefit over the outcome obtained.
• Transcripts: There is no freestanding right to have counsel furnish transcripts post-trial for collateral review; prejudice remains the touchstone.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 61 postconviction relief: Delaware’s mechanism for challenging a conviction or sentence after direct appeal. It has strict procedural bars, including against claims already decided on appeal.
• Former adjudication (Rule 61(i)(4)): If an issue was raised and decided before, you cannot re-raise it in a Rule 61 motion unless you plead and prove an exception (e.g., jurisdictional defect, new exculpatory evidence, or a new retroactive constitutional rule).
• Strickland ineffective assistance: To win, a defendant must show counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and that the error likely affected the outcome. Courts defer to strategic choices made after reasonable investigation.
• Reasonable probability: Less than “more likely than not,” but enough to undermine confidence in the outcome. It demands more than speculation—there must be a plausible path to a different result.
• Habitual offender (§ 4214): Enhanced sentencing for repeat serious offenders. “Some chance of rehabilitation” refers to the passage of time between convictions, not proof of successful rehabilitation efforts.
• Closed-mind sentencing: A claim that the sentencing judge predetermined the sentence or refused to consider relevant mitigating information. If rejected on direct appeal, it cannot be relitigated in postconviction absent an exception.
• PSI (Presentence Investigation): A report prepared for sentencing detailing a defendant’s background, including mental health and substance use histories, often used to shape mitigation and conditions (e.g., treatment requirements).

Conclusion

The Delaware Supreme Court’s order in Warncke v. State is a careful, methodical application of settled postconviction principles. It underscores that Rule 61’s procedural bars carry real force; once a claim like “closed-mind” sentencing has been litigated on direct appeal, it is foreclosed absent a specific exception. It also reiterates Strickland’s demanding two-part test, especially the centrality of prejudice: even if counsel’s performance is questioned (such as not objecting to racial-slur testimony), relief will not follow unless there is a reasonable probability that the verdict or sentence would have been different.

For practitioners, Warncke is a reminder to: develop concrete prejudice showings tied to the elements of the offenses; document plea communications; ensure a clean record on the client’s right-to-testify decision; leverage the PSI for mitigation; and recognize the limited room to contest habitual offender status under § 4214 in collateral proceedings. For courts, the decision maintains doctrinal clarity: deference to strategic choices, fidelity to procedural bars, and rigorous enforcement of Strickland’s outcome-focused prejudice requirement.

Bottom line: Affirmed. No procedural gateway for the formerly adjudicated sentencing claim, and no Strickland violation shown on any theory of ineffective assistance.