WARN Act: Functional “Single Employer” Liability Beyond Parent–Subsidiary Formalities; Disjunctive “Employment Loss” Proof and Forfeiture of Inconsistent-Verdict Challenges

1. Introduction

This published Fourth Circuit decision affirms a WARN Act jury verdict against five mining-related companies—Tams Management, Inc.; Pay Car Mining, Inc.; Bluestone Industries, Inc.; Bluestone Resources, Inc.; and Bluestone Coal Corporation—arising from the October 2019 shutdown of the Burke Mountain Mine Complex in West Virginia.

The class, led by miner Jules Gautier, alleged the companies failed to provide the 60-day written notice required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a), before a plant closing or mass layoff. The appeal centered on two issues:

• Single-employer liability: whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the five entities functioned as a single employer for WARN Act purposes.
• Employment loss instruction and verdict: whether the district court’s instruction on “employment loss,” 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6), was legally erroneous and produced an irreconcilable verdict.

The Fourth Circuit also addressed litigation-conduct questions that routinely control WARN Act appeals: the adequacy of a post-trial Rule 50(b) motion to preserve sufficiency arguments and the timing required to preserve an “inconsistent verdict” challenge.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion is anchored by prior Fourth Circuit WARN Act cases and procedural-preservation decisions, plus interpretive guidance from the Supreme Court and a WARN Act decision from the Seventh Circuit.

A. WARN Act purpose and the “single employer” doctrine

• Schmidt v. FCI Enters. LLC: The court invoked this case to frame the WARN Act’s purpose—advance notice of “sudden, significant employment loss”—which informs why courts look past corporate form when workers experience a coordinated shutdown.
• Pennington v. Fluor Corp.: This was the central Fourth Circuit precedent for WARN Act “single employer” liability. The Gautier court reiterated Pennington’s formulation: distinct businesses may be treated as one employer when operational differences are “purely formal” and the entities function as the same employer. The court also used Pennington to identify the governing multi-factor framework (implemented through 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2)) and to rebut defendants’ attempt to limit WARN “single employer” cases to traditional parent–subsidiary or lender–borrower patterns.

B. Preservation and sufficiency review after a jury verdict

• Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. (Wiener I): Cited for the appellate posture on post-verdict review—disputed facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, and sufficiency review is highly deferential to the jury’s factfinding.
• Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. (Wiener II): Provided the preservation rule: a party may mount a sufficiency appeal only if it first raised the challenge in a Rule 50(b) motion. Gautier applies this rule but, on its facts, avoids a forfeiture ruling.
• In re Under Seal (quoting Dallas Gas Partners, L.P. v. Prospect Energy Corp., and citing Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.): Used to emphasize that parties must do more than “intimate” arguments; they must develop them so the district court is on notice of the substance. These cases supplied the doctrinal basis for the panel’s warning against “threadbare references” and footnote incorporation.
• Murthy v. Missouri: Quoted for the admonition that judges are not “like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the record,” reinforcing the expectation of clear, developed argumentation in post-trial motions.

C. Standards governing deference to the jury and legal correctness

• Burgess v. Goldstein and Younger v. Crowder: Cited to restate the appellate sufficiency standard: uphold the verdict unless the only reasonable conclusion favors the movant.
• Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co.: Supplied the framework for reviewing jury instructions—abuse of discretion for framing, de novo for legal correctness, and prejudice as the gateway to a new trial.

D. Statutory interpretation of “employment loss” and inconsistent verdict preservation

• Leeper v. Hamilton Cnty. Coal, LLC: The decisive authority against defendants’ “mutually exclusive” theory. The Fourth Circuit relied on Leeper’s reading that Congress created “three separate and distinct categories” in 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6), and courts must respect that structure.
• Campos-Chaves v. Garland: Cited for the interpretive principle that “or” is “almost always disjunctive,” supporting the conclusion that § 2101(a)(6)(A)–(C) sets alternative routes, not a single exclusive classification.
• Talkington v. Atria Reclamelucifers Fabrieken BV and White v. Celotex Corp.: Provided the procedural trapdoor: while inconsistent verdicts may justify a new trial (Talkington), the challenge is forfeited if not raised before the jury is released (White). Gautier applies White to reject defendants’ post hoc “inconsistency” theory.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The Rule 50(b) “close call”: preservation despite skeletal briefing

The panel openly criticized the defendants’ Rule 50(b) motion for relying on “cursory footnotes” and incorporation by reference rather than developed argument. Still, it declined to find forfeiture because the district court “spotted and addressed the issue,” reducing concerns about lack of notice and loss of analysis.

The practical lesson is twofold: (1) Fourth Circuit doctrine demands specificity in Rule 50(b) practice (per Wiener II and In re Under Seal), and (2) a district court’s decision to reach an underdeveloped issue may, in a close case, save the issue from forfeiture—though the opinion signals that litigants should not expect that grace.

B. Single-employer liability: functional integration supported by cumulative evidence

Applying the multi-factor framework in 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2) (as adopted in Pennington v. Fluor Corp.), the court held the jury had a sufficient evidentiary basis to find lack of independence across the entities. The opinion emphasized the cumulative force of record evidence rather than any single “smoking gun.”

• Common ownership / common directors and officers: State business records showed overlapping officers and directors, including Justice family members, and a shared business address.
• De facto exercise of control: Testimony indicated Jay and Jim Justice visited frequently, Jay Justice led operations calls, managers sought their approval on operational decisions, and supervision crossed nominal employer lines.
• Unity of personnel policies emanating from a common source: Evidence showed centralized HR authority (a Senior Vice President for Safety and Human Resources with hiring/firing authority), common payroll coordination, and shared administrative processes for hiring and paperwork.
• Dependency of operations: Witnesses described exchange of employees and machines and fluid deployment of labor and equipment across the complex.
• Non-exclusive considerations: The court highlighted workers’ confusion over which entity employed them due to frequent name changes—supporting the inference that corporate separateness was formal rather than operational.

The court also rejected defendants’ attempt to characterize the judgment as an unprecedented expansion of WARN Act liability to an “independent contractor.” Without announcing a new categorical rule, the panel clarified that Pennington describes common patterns (“generally involve[]” parent-subsidiary relationships) but does not limit single-employer liability to those patterns. The decisive inquiry remains functional: whether operational differences are “purely formal.”

C. Employment loss instruction: alternative statutory categories, not mutually exclusive “labels”

Defendants argued that the three WARN Act “employment loss” categories—termination, layoff exceeding six months, or reduction in hours—are “mutually exclusive,” so the jury had to select only one category. The Fourth Circuit disagreed.

Relying on Leeper v. Hamilton Cnty. Coal, LLC and the disjunctive reading of “or” in Campos-Chaves v. Garland, the court held the district court correctly instructed the jury to consider categories “independently and alternatively.” On the panel’s logic, the statute sets multiple pathways to liability; it does not require a jury to fit the entire event into one exclusive box.

D. Inconsistent verdict theory: forfeiture when not raised before jury discharge

Defendants’ reply focused on alleged inconsistency: if the same 91 employees are counted, how can 50+ be “terminated” and 50+ also suffer “reduction in hours”? The court treated this as an inconsistent verdict argument, not an instruction-error argument. Under White v. Celotex Corp., defendants forfeited this challenge by failing to object after the verdict was read and before the jury was released. The court also rejected defendants’ attempt to revive forfeited inconsistency arguments by relabeling them as instructional error.

3.3. Impact

A. WARN Act litigation: broader factual routes to “single employer” proof

Gautier strengthens the practical reach of WARN Act “single employer” claims in the Fourth Circuit by confirming that liability is not confined to classic parent–subsidiary structures so long as plaintiffs can prove functional integration using the 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2) factors and other indicia of operational unity. For employers operating through management entities, payroll companies, and frequently rebranded affiliates, the case underscores that formal separateness will not prevent WARN aggregation if operational reality is unified.

B. Trial practice: two preservation warnings with immediate consequences

• Rule 50(b) specificity matters: While defendants avoided forfeiture here, the opinion’s tone signals that future panels may not be forgiving where sufficiency arguments are relegated to footnotes or incorporations by reference (see Wiener II, In re Under Seal, and Murthy v. Missouri).
• Object before the jury is released: Any inconsistency in a verdict must be raised immediately under White v. Celotex Corp.. Waiting to package the issue as “instructional error” post-trial will not work.

C. Employment loss proof: plaintiffs may plead and prove alternatives

By endorsing a disjunctive, alternative approach to § 2101(a)(6), the decision supports plaintiffs’ ability to advance multiple “employment loss” theories simultaneously (termination and hours reductions) where the evidence supports them—while leaving defendants to focus on factual rebuttal and timely verdict-form objections rather than exclusivity arguments.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• WARN Act notice duty (29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)): Covered employers must provide 60 days’ written notice before a plant closing or mass layoff.
• Employment loss (29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6)): A worker suffers “employment loss” if they experience (A) certain terminations, (B) layoffs exceeding six months, or (C) hours reductions of more than 50% over specified time. The categories are alternative routes to meeting the statutory definition.
• Single employer (20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2)): Separate entities can be treated as one WARN employer when they are not truly independent—e.g., they share leadership, control, personnel policies, and operations.
• Rule 50(b) motion: A post-verdict motion asking the judge to overturn the jury’s verdict for insufficient evidence. Without properly raising the issue, an appellate court typically will not consider a sufficiency challenge (see Wiener II).
• Forfeiture vs. preservation (and inconsistent verdicts): If a party does not timely object—especially to an inconsistent verdict before the jury is discharged—the issue is forfeited (see White v. Celotex Corp.), even if it might otherwise warrant a new trial (see Talkington v. Atria Reclamelucifers Fabrieken BV).

5. Conclusion

Jules Gautier v. Tams Management, Inc. affirms a WARN Act verdict by emphasizing operational reality over corporate formalism: where affiliated entities share leadership, control, personnel systems, and dependent operations, a jury may find a functional “single employer” even outside classic parent–subsidiary patterns described in Pennington v. Fluor Corp.. The decision also clarifies that the WARN Act’s “employment loss” definition is disjunctive and may be submitted to a jury as alternative statutory theories, consistent with Leeper v. Hamilton Cnty. Coal, LLC and the ordinary meaning of “or” recognized in Campos-Chaves v. Garland.

Equally significant are the procedural lessons: sufficiency arguments must be clearly developed in Rule 50(b) practice, and any inconsistency in a verdict must be raised before the jury is released. In WARN Act class litigation—where entity structure, payroll practices, and verdict forms frequently determine outcomes—Gautier reinforces that substantive and procedural discipline are both decisive.