Waiver of “Person Aggrieved” Requirement: Jurisdiction vs. Capacity in Zoning Appeals

Introduction

In Ex parte Teachers’ Retirement System of Alabama et al. (2025), the Supreme Court of Alabama resolved whether a land-use zoning appeal’s “person aggrieved” requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite (and thus unwaivable) or a capacity issue subject to waiver if not raised before the administrative board.

Key features of the case:

Parties:
- Appellants: Teachers’ Retirement System of Alabama and Employees’ Retirement System of Alabama (“RSA”).
- Appellees: Baldwin County Planning & Zoning Department, Baldwin County Board of Adjustment No. 1, and Point Clear Property Owners Association, Inc. (“PCPOA”).
Procedural posture: RSA obtained from the Baldwin County zoning administrator a land-use certificate to expand The Grand Hotel. PCPOA, purportedly “aggrieved,” appealed that certificate to the County Board of Adjustment; the Board rescinded it. RSA then lost in the circuit court and in the Court of Civil Appeals. RSA sought certiorari, arguing that PCPOA was never “aggrieved” and that that jurisdictional defect could not be waived.
Statutes at issue:
- § 45-2-261.11, Ala. Code 1975 (Local Laws, Baldwin County)—defines who “may appeal” a zoning administrator’s decision to the Board: “any person aggrieved.”
- § 45-2-261.12(a)(1)—grants the Board authority to hear and decide appeals “where it is alleged there is error.”
- § 45-2-261.13(a)—permits “any party aggrieved” by the Board’s decision to appeal to the circuit court.

Summary of the Judgment

Writing for a 7–1 majority, Justice McCool held that the Court of Civil Appeals correctly concluded—pursuant to City of Mobile v. Lee (1963)—that RSA’s failure to challenge PCPOA’s status as a “person aggrieved” before the Board meant that RSA waived that issue. Under Lee, statutory standing to appeal zoning decisions is a matter of capacity (a waivable procedural point), not of the Board’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, but capacity issues can, RSA’s argument came too late. The majority affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals on that basis (and expressly declined to endorse dicta in that decision suggesting PCPOA in fact was aggrieved).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

City of Mobile v. Lee, 274 Ala. 344 (1963): Held that a zoning appellant’s status as a “party aggrieved” under a statute was an issue of capacity, not jurisdiction, and that failure to raise it in the trial court waived the point on appeal.
Ex parte City of Huntsville, 684 So. 2d 123 (Ala. 1996): Reaffirmed the vitality of municipal standing under its local zoning‐appeal statute, without disputing Lee’s waiver doctrine.
Munza v. Ivey, 334 So. 3d 211 (Ala. 2021), and Riley v. Hughes, 17 So. 3d 643 (Ala. 2009): Clarified that constitutional (Article III-style) standing requirements apply only in “public-law” cases, whereas statutory standing is governed by the relevant enabling statute.
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), and related federal decisions: Distinguish “statutory standing” (a merits/capacity issue) from subject-matter jurisdiction.
Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 159 So. 3d 31 (Ala. 2013): Explicitly noted that lack of statutory authorization is not a jurisdictional defect, but a failure to state a claim.

2. Legal Reasoning

The majority’s core holding rests on two pillars:

Lee’s Waiver Rule: In Lee, this Court treated a zoning‐appeal statute’s “party aggrieved” requirement as a waivable capacity objection. Because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, that requirement must instead go to the party’s procedural right to appear.
Statutory vs. Constitutional Standing: While Article III standing in federal courts (and its Alabama “public-law” analogue) is a jurisdictional limit that cannot be forfeited, “statutory standing” created by local zoning laws is controlled by statutory language and construed as a capacity or merits requirement. Neither the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act’s continuation of the “person aggrieved” test nor subsequent cases (including Ex parte City of Huntsville and Mwangi v. Ndegwa) displaced Lee’s teaching.

Applying those principles, RSA’s failure to object before the Board to PCPOA’s lack of status as a “person aggrieved” doomed RSA’s later challenge in the appellate courts. The Court of Civil Appeals properly deemed the point waived and was correct to proceed to decide the appeal on the merits.

3. Impact

This decision reaffirms decades of Alabama jurisprudence establishing that local zoning-appeal statutes’ “aggrieved party” language controls who may participate—not where or when standing issues must be raised for the first time. Attorneys and appellants in county‐level zoning appeals should note:

Challenges to an opponent’s status as a “person aggrieved” by an administrative decision must be raised in the first instance before the administrative board or agency.
Failure to do so will waive the objection on further appeal, even if the argument concerns who has the right to be heard rather than how the board applied its own regulations.
This rule does not alter the nonwaivable nature of subject-matter jurisdiction (i.e., whether a board has statutory power to act at all), but distinguishes that from the separate, waivable question of who has procedural capacity to invoke the board’s power.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Constitutional Standing vs. Statutory Standing: In federal courts, a party must show an “injury in fact” to establish jurisdiction (Article III “cases or controversies”). In state administrative appeals, “statutory standing” (e.g., being a “person aggrieved”) is not about court jurisdiction but about who the statute allows to participate.
Subject‐Matter Jurisdiction vs. Capacity: Jurisdiction is the power to hear any matter of a given type, and it cannot be waived. Capacity is the party’s right under procedural rules or statutes to appear, and it can be waived if not timely asserted.
Waiver: If a party fails to make a timely objection to a procedural deficiency that the rules characterize as “capacity” (rather than jurisdiction), it cannot raise that objection later on appeal.

Conclusion

Ex parte Teachers’ Retirement System of Alabama et al. reaffirms that under Alabama law, a local zoning statute’s requirement that only a “person aggrieved” may appeal to a board of adjustment is a waivable capacity issue—not a jurisdictional one. Parties challenging the constitutional or statutory authority of an administrative agency must distinguish between nonwaivable jurisdictional defects (the agency’s power to act at all) and waivable capacity defects (a party’s procedural right to be heard). In zoning appeals, failure to challenge an opponent’s “person aggrieved” status before the board forfeits that argument on appeal.