Waiver of Relevant Conduct Challenges and Deference to Sentencing Findings in Plea Agreements

Introduction

United States v. Larry Jones, decided by the Seventh Circuit on April 9, 2025, addresses two core issues in federal sentencing law: first, the enforceability of express waivers in plea agreements with respect to “relevant conduct” under the Sentencing Guidelines, and second, the standard of appellate review for factual findings—particularly drug-quantity determinations—made by district courts at sentencing. The appellant, Larry Jones, had pleaded guilty to narcotics conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 846) and money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A)). He contended on appeal that the district court improperly included uncharged drug transactions predating the conspiracy period in its drug‐weight calculations, and that it erred in considering gang-related violence at sentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reinforcing the binding effect of waiver provisions and the deferential “clear‐error” standard for credibility-based findings.

Summary of the Judgment

Plea Agreement and Waiver: Jones’s plea agreement specifically acknowledged and waived any challenge to uncharged drug‐dealing activity as “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
Sentencing Hearing: The district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing, heard testimony from two cooperating witnesses (Jamar Spencer and Dante Dockett), and attributed drug quantities spanning 2016–2020 to Jones.
Drug-Weight Determination: The district court adopted the government’s drug‐quantity calculations (including pre‐indictment activity), resulting in a base offense level that corresponded to a 151–188-month advisory range.
§ 3553(a) Factors and Violence: The court considered gang‐related violence—murder and assaults—as part of Jones’s history and characteristics under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), imposing a high‐end sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment.
Appeal and Affirmance: On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Jones had waived any challenge to relevant conduct, and found no clear error in the district court’s drug‐quantity findings or in its consideration of violent conduct for sentencing purposes.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993): Defines waiver as the intentional relinquishment of a known right. This case underpins the court’s conclusion that a defendant cannot later contest matters expressly admitted in a plea agreement.
United States v. Zehm, 217 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2000): Interprets U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) to include all acts that are part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as relevant conduct.
United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2008): Clarifies that relevant conduct is treated as if the defendant had been convicted of it, even when uncharged.
United States v. Tankson, 836 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 2016): Establishes that appellate review of drug‐quantity and relevant‐conduct findings is deferential and reversible only for clear error.
United States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2003) and United States v. Noble, 246 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2001): Emphasize that credibility determinations by a district court “can virtually never be clear error.”

Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in two steps:

Waiver of Challenge to Relevant Conduct: Jones’s plea agreement unmistakably acknowledged pre‐conspiracy drug sales of marijuana, cocaine base, and fentanyl to his co‐conspirator Spencer, and expressly agreed that those sales “constitute[d] relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Under Olano, admitting such facts for sentencing purposes constitutes an intentional waiver of the right to challenge their inclusion. Jones’s challenge on appeal was therefore barred.
Deferential Review of Drug‐Quantity Findings: Although Jones reserved the right to dispute the quantum of drugs attributed to him, the district court conducted a thorough evidentiary hearing. It credited the eyewitness testimony of Spencer and Dockett, made specific factual findings, and applied U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). Citing Blalock and Noble, the court held that such credibility‐based findings are subject only to clear‐error review. No clear error appeared in the record, so the findings—and the resulting Guidelines calculation—stood.
Consideration of Violence under § 3553(a): Jones argued that gang‐related murders were improperly used to enhance his Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit clarified that the district court did not rely on violence as relevant conduct to calculate the base offense level; rather, it considered the violence under the statutory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and § 3661, which allows the court to consider any information about the defendant’s background and conduct. Thus, no error occurred in imposing a top‐range sentence.

Impact

This decision will guide future sentencing practices in several ways:

Plea Negotiations and Drafting: Defense counsel must carefully review and negotiate any waiver language in plea agreements to preserve the right to contest relevant conduct. Clear, unqualified admissions in the plea documents will be enforced.
Sentencing Hearings: District courts are reaffirmed in their authority to hold evidentiary hearings on drug‐quantity issues and to credit cooperating‐witness testimony, knowing their credibility determinations enjoy strong appellate deference.
Appellate Strategy: Appellate advocates should recognize the high threshold of “clear error” when challenging district‐court findings on drug weights or similar factual determinations.
Use of Violence in Sentencing: Judges remain free to consider violent conduct—whether or not charged—as part of the § 3553(a) analysis, provided it is not folded into the Guidelines calculation without proper statutory basis.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Relevant Conduct (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3): Conduct that is part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as the offense of conviction. It is treated for sentencing as if the defendant had been directly convicted of that conduct.
Waiver: An intentional and knowing abandonment of a legal right. A defendant who admits certain facts in a plea agreement cannot later challenge those facts on appeal.
Clear‐Error Standard: A highly deferential review. A factual finding by the district court will not be overturned unless the appellate court is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake was made.
§ 3553(a) Sentencing Factors: Statutory factors that a sentencing court must consider, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for deterrence and protection of the public.

Conclusion

United States v. Larry Jones underscores two fundamental principles in federal sentencing practice: first, that unambiguous waiver clauses in plea agreements will be strictly enforced to bar later challenges to relevant conduct; and second, that district‐court findings on drug quantities and witness credibility will be upheld absent clear error. By affirming these tenets, the Seventh Circuit both clarifies the drafting and negotiating strategy for plea agreements and confirms the deference afforded to trial judges in sentencing determinations. Practitioners now have a blueprint for understanding how plea admissions and evidentiary hearings translate into binding sentencing outcomes and how appellate courts will review those outcomes.